The People of the State of New York, v. A.J., Defendant. (2026)

On November 16, 2025, A.J. (hereinafter referred to as "Defendant"), was arrested and charged with Penal Law ("P.L.") § 215.50(3), criminal contempt in the second degree, a class A misdemeanor. The Defendant was arraigned the same day and released.

Defendant moves for dismissal of the accusatory instrument pursuant to Criminal Procedure Law ("C.P.L.") §§ 30.30(1)(b) and 170.35(1)(a). The Defendant contends that the speedy trial period has expired, as the accusatory instrument is facially insufficient pursuant to the requirements of C.P.L. §§ 100.40 and 100.15.

Upon review and consideration of the submissions, court file and relevant legal authority, the Court finds that the accusatory instrument contains no counts that meet the requirements of C.P.L. §§ 100.40 100.15. The Defendant's motion to dismiss is GRANTED.

RELEVANT PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On November 16, 2025, Defendant was arraigned on a charge of violating P.L. § 215.50(3), criminal contempt in the second degree. The criminal complaint was converted to a misdemeanor information, on which the Defendant was arraigned. The case was adjourned to December 2, 2025, for discovery compliance.

On December 2, 2025, the People were not discovery compliant and requested a violation of conditional discharge ("VOCD") hearing. The defense agreed to waive time, and the case was adjourned to January 5, 2026, for discovery compliance and to conduct the VOCD hearing.

On January 5, 2026, the People were not yet discovery compliant and withdrew their request for a VOCD hearing. The case was adjourned to March 24, 2026, for discovery compliance.

On January 22, 2026, the People filed and served, off calendar, a certificate of compliance ("COC") and statement of readiness ("SOR"). At the next court appearance, the COC was deemed valid, and the matter was adjourned for trial to April 28, 2026.

By motion filed and served April 23, 2026, the Defendant moves for dismissal of the accusatory instrument pursuant to C.P.L. §§ 30.30(1)(b), 170.35(1)(a), 100.40(1)(b) and (c), and 100.15(3). By motion dated April 29, 2026, the People oppose. The defense reply followed on May 18, 2026.

APPLICABLE LEGAL STANDARD

A facially sufficient accusatory instrument must "allege[ ] nonhearsay factual allegations of an evidentiary nature which, if true, provide reasonable cause for every element of the offense(s) charged and the defendant's commission thereof" (People v Lawrence, 70 NYS3d 798, 800 [Crim Ct, Kings County 2018]; C.P.L. §§ 100.15[3] and 100.40[1][b], [c]). "Reasonable cause to believe that a person has committed an offense exists when evidence or information which appears reliable discloses facts or circumstances which are collectively of such weight and persuasiveness as to convince a person of ordinary intelligence, judgment and experience that it is reasonable that such offense was committed and that such person committed it" (C.P.L. § 70.10[2]).

Conclusory statements contained within an accusatory instrument must be "supported by evidentiary facts showing the basis for the conclusion" (People v Dumas, 68 NY2d 729, 739 [1981]). Evidentiary facts are "nonconclusory descriptions of what the deponent personally observed, heard or experienced" (People v Phillipe, 142 Misc 2d 574, 578 [Crim Ct, Kings County 1989]).

"A valid and sufficient accusatory instrument is a nonwaivable jurisdictional prerequisite to a criminal prosecution" (People v Case, 42 NY2d 98, 99 [1977]). While the accusatory instrument should not be given an overly restrictive or technical reading (People v Casey, 95 NY2d 354 [2000]), the factual allegations must give rise to a prima facie case when viewed in the light most favorable to the People (People v Henderson, 92 NY2d 677 [1999]; C.P.L. § 100.40).

DISCUSSION

I. The Factual Allegations and the Parties' Arguments

The accusatory instrument charges the Defendant with one count of P.L. § 215.50(3), criminal contempt in the second degree. A person is guilty of P.L. § 215.50(3) when that person "engages in [ ] intentional disobedience or resistance to the lawful process or other mandate of a court."¹ Here, the Defendant is alleged to have violated an order of protection issued by Hon. Judge Craig Ortner in Bronx County Criminal Court.

The factual portion of the complaint alleges that:

Deponent [PO N.C.] is informed by [complainant] that, [on or about October 9, 2025, at approximately 4:00 a.m. inside of [ ], Bronx County, New York], defendant began banging on her apartment door and stating in a loud voice in sum and substance, YOU KNOW WHO IT IS, YOU NEED TO GET THE FUCK OUT OF MY HOUSE, YOU CAN CALL THE POLICE I DON'T GIVE A SHIT.

Deponent further states that [complainant] is in possession of a valid order of protection issued by the Honorable Judge Craig Ortner of the Bronx Criminal Court on August 7th, 2025 and valid until August 6th, 2027 under docket CR-004050-25BX, and said order directs defendant in pertinent part to stay away from [complainant] and her home. Deponent further states that defendant had knowledge of aforementioned order of protection, in that said order indicates that defendant was present in court when said order was issued.

Defendant argues that the misdemeanor information fails to provide reasonable cause supporting his identity as the perpetrator of the charged crime, as the information lacks evidentiary facts to support the complainant's conclusion that the Defendant was the person banging at her door.

The People maintain that the factual portion of the accusatory instrument supports a prima facie case of P.L. § 215.50(3), particularly since "the People are entitled to rely on [ ] fair inferences" drawn from the facts contained in the information (People's Opposition at 7). Here, the People argue, the Court can infer that the complainant "observed and heard the defendant at her apartment" (id. at 9).

II. The Court's Analysis

The Court agrees with the defense that the factual portion of the accusatory instrument is conclusory as to the Defendant's identity as the person who came to the complainant's door. The facts allege that, at 4:00 in the morning, the Defendant banged on the complainant's door while yelling at the complainant to "get [ ] out of my house." The People are correct that reasonable inferences may be drawn from the accusatory instrument's articulated facts (People's Opposition at 7, citing People v Casey, 95 NY2d 354 [2000]). Here, however, the Court is left to speculate as to how the complainant determined the Defendant was the person at her door. The complaint does not allege that the complainant looked through her door's peephole or was otherwise able to see the Defendant; that the complainant recognized the Defendant's voice; or that the person at the door identified himself as the Defendant. Nor can the Court infer the Defendant's identity as the perpetrator from that person's command to "get [ ] out of my house," as there is no articulated nexus between the Defendant and the apartment where the incident occurred, and the complaint designates no existing relationship between the parties.

Because the Court cannot infer that the complainant visually observed the Defendant, this case is analogous to matters where a facially sufficient accusatory instrument must adequately plead the defendant's identity as the maker of a phone call or sender of a message. In such cases, multiple courts have found that a facially sufficient accusatory instrument requires evidentiary facts indicating the deponent's basis of knowledge that the caller or sender was the accused (see People v Gunther, 83 Misc 3d 1 [App. Term, 1st Dept, 2024] [accusatory instrument charging P.L. § 215.50(3) lacked evidentiary facts to support the complainant's belief that the person who contacted her on Facebook was the defendant]; People v Garcia, 18 NYS3d 581 [Crim Ct, New York County 2015] [accusatory instrument was facially insufficient as it lacked facts supporting complainant's conclusion that threatening phone call came from the defendant]; People v Shaw, 2002 NY Slip Op 40486[U] [App Term 9th & 10th Jud Dists 2002] [accusatory instrument charging P.L. § 240.30(1) lacked evidentiary facts establishing basis for complainant's belief that threatening phone calls were made by defendant]; People v McBride, 242 NYS3d 915 [Crim Ct, New York County 2025] [accusatory instrument did not adequately plead the defendant's identity as the perpetrator of the charged offense, as the instrument lacked evidentiary facts establishing the basis for detective's belief that the person he spoke with on the phone was defendant]; People v Velez, 95 NYS3d 126 [Crim Ct, New York County 2018] [accusatory instrument contained no facts to support the conclusion that the defendant left threatening voicemails, as "there [were] no allegations that the voicemails derived from a telephone number that the complainant recognized as defendant's or that she had prior familiarity with defendant's voice such that she would be able to recognize it on the voicemails"]; People v Lemons, 30 NYS3d 527 [Crim Ct, New York County 2016] [misdemeanor information charging P.L. § 215.50(3) facially sufficient where the facts alleged that complainant received a request to follow her Instagram page, from an Instagram handle which she recognized as the defendant's]). Here, the factual portion of the information fails to establish the complainant's basis of knowledge that the Defendant was the person outside her door.

The accusatory instrument fails to provide facts of an evidentiary character which support reasonable cause to believe that the Defendant committed P.L. § 215.50(3). The instrument's sole charged count thus does not meet the requirements of C.P.L. §§ 100.40 and 100.15.

III. The Accusatory Instrument Contains No Facially Sufficient Counts

In order to validly declare their trial readiness upon a local criminal court accusatory instrument, the People must certify "that all counts charged in the accusatory instrument meet the requirements of sections 100.15 and 100.40 of this chapter and those counts not meeting the requirements of sections 100.15 and 100.40 of this chapter have been dismissed" (C.P.L. § 30.30[5-a]).

Although the sole count contained in the misdemeanor information is defective under C.P.L. §§ 100.15 and 100.40, the People argue that dismissal of the accusatory instrument is not required under the Court of Appeals decision in People v Williams, ___ NY3d ___, 2025 NY Slip Op 06535 [Nov 25, 2025]). In Wiliams, the Court of Appeals considered the effect of an inaccurate C.P.L. § 30.30(5-a) certification—where one of multiple charged counts was later determined to be facially insufficient—on the validity of the People's prior statement of trial readiness. The Court of Appeals found that, where an accusatory instrument contains one or more counts which are later determined to be jurisdictionally defective, "dismissal of the defective count is the appropriate remedy."

Here, the jurisdictionally defective count is the sole count contained in the accusatory instrument, and dismissal of this count necessarily implicates dismissal of the entire accusatory instrument. The instant matter does not involve the "facial insufficiency of individual counts within an otherwise-triable accusatory instrument" (People v Brito, 88 Misc 3d 1223[A] [Crim Ct, Bronx County 2026]). The misdemeanor information contains no counts meeting the requirements of C.P.L. §§ 100.15 and 100.40. Accordingly, the entire accusatory instrument must be dismissed.

THE CPL § 30.30 CALCULATION

The instant matter commenced with the filing of the accusatory instrument on November 16, 2025 (C.P.L. § 100.15); the first day counted for speedy trial purposes is the next day (People v Morrison, 85 Misc 3d 1272(A) [Crim Ct, Bronx County 2025]). The speedy trial clock was first tolled when the Defendant waived time on December 2, 2025 (November 17, 2025—December 2, 2025 = 16 days).

The speedy trial clock commenced again on January 5, 2026, when the defense ceased waiving time. Although the People filed and served their certificate of compliance and statement of readiness on January 22, 2026, the statement of readiness failed to toll the speedy trial clock, as the sole count contained in the accusatory instrument was jurisdictionally defective. The speedy trial clock was next tolled when the Defendant filed the instant motion (January 6, 2026—April 23, 2026=108 days).

One hundred twenty-four (124) days are charged to the People, and their statutorily allotted 90-day speedy trial period has elapsed.

CONCLUSION

Upon review and consideration of the submissions, court file and relevant legal authority, Defendant's motion to dismiss the accusatory instrument as facially insufficient pursuant to C.P.L. §§ 30.30(1)(b), 100.40, 100.15, and 170.35(1)(a) is GRANTED.

This constitutes the opinion, decision, and order of the Court.

Dated: July 23, 2026

Bronx, New York

Hon. Deidra R. Moore, J.C.C.

FOOTNOTES

1.   P.L. § 215.50(3) does not include acts of intentional disobedience or resistance "growing out of labor disputes as defined by subdivision two of section seven hundred fifty-three-a of the judiciary law."

Deidra R. Moore, J.