The People of the State of New York v. Stuart Danziger, Defendant. (2026)

In his motion defendant challenges the conversion of the accusatory instrument pursuant to CPL §§ 170.30 (1) (a), 170.35 (1) (a), and 170.35 (2). Defendant additionally challenges the validity of the People's certificate of compliance (hereinafter "COC") and seeks dismissal pursuant to Criminal Procedure Law (hereinafter "CPL") § 30.30. The People oppose the application.

For the reasons detailed below, the defendant's motion challenging the conversion of the accusatory instrument and the validity of the People's COC is denied.

I. Background

The criminal action commenced with the filing of a misdemeanor complaint on February 18, 2026, charging defendant with Forcible Touching (Penal Law, hereinafter "PL", § 130.52 [1]), Sexual Abuse in the Third Degree (PL § 130.55), and Harassment in the Second Degree (PL § 240.26 [1]).

On May 4, 2026, the People served on defendant and filed with the court a superseding information (hereinafter "SSI") charging defendant with Forcible Touching (PL § 130.52 [1]) and Sexual Abuse in the Third Degree (PL § 130.55), and a supporting deposition which was electronically signed by complainant. The SSI did not include an affidavit verifying complainant's signature nor did it include a copy of the email correspondence between the People and complainant verifying complainant's signature. On May 11, 2026, the People served on defendant and filed with the court an off-calendar COC and statement of readiness (hereinafter "SOR").

During a scheduled court appearance, defendant raised issue with the conversion of the accusatory instrument, given the signature on the supporting deposition was an electronic signature and there was no accompanying affidavit or email exchange between the People and complainant to verify complainant's signature. After the People made a record that there had been an email exchange between the People and complainant, the court ordered the People to disclose the email exchange.

After receiving an extension to file his motion challenging the People's COC pursuant to CPL § 245.50 (4) (c) (i), defendant filed the instant motion on June 26, 2026. The People filed their opposition on July 13, 2026.

II. Conversion of the Accusatory Instrument

Defendant argues that the People's SSI, filed on May 4, 2026, is insufficient in that the accompanying supporting deposition electronically signed by complainant does not show verification of complainant's signature and argues that without the corresponding email communication between the assigned Assistant District Attorney (hereinafter "ADA") and complainant, it did not act to convert the SSI. The People, in response, state the SSI is converted and valid because the supporting deposition contained the complainant's electronic signature, which the People argue is sufficient.

CPL § 100.20 provides that:

"a supporting deposition is a written instrument accompanying or filed in connection with an information, a simplified information, a misdemeanor complaint or a felony complaint, subscribed and verified by a person other than the complainant of such accusatory instrument, and containing factual allegations of an evidentiary character, based either upon personal knowledge or upon information and belief, which supplement those of the accusatory instrument and support or tend to support the charge or charges contained therein."

Subscription as referenced in the statute means to sign one's name at the end of a document (see People v Brothers, 58 Misc 3d 664, 666 [Crim Ct, Kings County 2017]; James v Patten, 6 NY 9, 12 [Ct App 1851]). Additionally, General Construction Law § 46 defines a signature as "any memorandum, mark or sign, written, printed, stamped, photographed, engraved or otherwise placed upon any instrument or writing with intent to execute or authenticate such instrument or writing." The signature must reflect the intent of the person endorsing it (see Brothers, 58 Misc 3d at 668). "A person may validly subscribe a supporting deposition by placing one's signature upon it by electronic means, so long as the signature was placed with the intent to sign the supporting deposition," (People v Williams, 63 Misc 3d 765, 769 [Crim Ct, NY County 2019]). Therefore, complainant's electronic signature can be used to convert hearsay within an accusatory instrument.

In addition to the requirement for subscription, a support deposition must be verified. There exist several mechanisms for verifying a supporting deposition, including "a form notice that false statements made therein are punishable as a class A misdemeanor pursuant to [PL § 210.45]," (CPL § 100.30 [1] [d]). The court must determine whether a supporting deposition signed via electronic signature, without corroborating documentation is sufficient. Regarding the necessity of the email exchange to convert the accusatory instrument, such email exchange is necessary where the People themselves type a witness's name on the signature line. This ordinarily happens where the People email the accusatory instrument and supporting deposition to a witness and instruct the witness to read the documents and if the documents are accurate and the witness wishes to sign the supporting deposition, the People instruct the witness to type "I agree" along with their name in a reply email to the People. In the situation as described, the email exchange verifies the witness's intent to sign the supporting deposition and verify its contents under penalty of perjury, because the electronic signature is being placed on the document by someone other than the witness (see Brothers, 58 Misc 3d 664).

In contrast, here, complainant typed her signature underneath the provision that false statements made in the document are punishable as a class A misdemeanor pursuant to PL § 210.45, thereby verifying her intent to sign the document under penalty of perjury, and demonstrating her intent to adopt the factual portion of the accusatory instrument as her own (see People v Adams, 65 Misc 3d [Crim Ct NY County, 2019]. Accordingly, no supporting documentation, like the frequently exchanged emails between the People and witnesses, was required to convert the accusatory instrument. Therefore, the supporting deposition was properly subscribed and verified.¹

III. People's Certificate of Compliance

CPL § 245.10 (1) (a) (2) mandates the People to perform initial discovery obligations within thirty-five days of defendant's arraignment on a misdemeanor complaint. CPL § 245.20 then provides a non-exhaustive list of items required to be automatically disclosed to a defendant and mandates disclosure of "all items and information that relate to the subject matter of the case and are in the possession, custody or control of the prosecution or persons under the prosecution's direction or control" (CPL § 245.20 [1]). Further, CPL § 245.50 (1) provides that the prosecution must certify their compliance with their discovery obligations under CPL § 245.50 (4). Pursuant to CPL § 30.30 (5) this certification must accompany or precede any statement of trial readiness. Absent such certification, an SOR must be deemed invalid.

Defendant first argues that because the People did not provide him with initial discovery within thirty-five days of his arraignment, the People's COC is invalid and the matter must be dismissed. Defendant conflates the bifurcated remedies within CPL § 245. While dismissal is required where the People have failed to file a proper COC within the statutorily allotted speedy trial time, where the issue centers on a belated disclosure with a proper COC, rather than being mandated to dismiss, the court is empowered to impose a "remedy or sanction that is appropriate and proportionate to the prejudice suffered by the party entitled to disclosure" (CPL § 245.80 [1]; Bay, 41 NY3d at 214-215). Thus, without a showing that dismissal is appropriate and proportionate to the prejudice suffered by defendant, belated disclosure in isolation does not necessitate dismissal. In People v Fuentes, the Court of Appeals addressed this issue directly, writing "[f]or belated disclosures--i.e., those outside CPL 245.10 (1) (a)'s 20- or 35-day window--the Court may impose appropriate sanctions [citations omitted]," (2025 NY Slip Op 05872 n 1 [Ct App 2025]). Here, as discussed below, the People's COC was proper, and the speedy trial time has not expired. Accordingly, dismissal is not mandated and any sanctions under CPL § 245.80 are deferred to the trial court.

In any challenge to the People's COC, the court must determine whether the People exercised the requisite level of diligence in obtaining the materials (see People v Erby, 68 Misc 3d 625 [Sup Ct Bronx County 2020]; People v Knight, 69 Misc 3d 546, 552 [Sup Ct Kings County 2020]; People v McKinney, 71 Misc 3d 1221A [Crim Ct Kings County 2021]; People v Adrovic, 69 Misc 3d 563 [Crim Ct Kings County 2020]). Additionally, effective May 9, 2022, CPL § 245.50 (4) was amended to include and require that a party aware of a potential defect or deficiency in a COC, or supplemental COC, shall notify or alert the opposing party as soon as practicable (See CPL § 245.50 [4] [a] & [b]).

The New York State legislature amended and modified portions of CPL § 245 on August 7, 2025, clarifying the obligations of the prosecution and providing guidance for courts determining the validity of COCs. Pursuant to these changes, CPL § 245.50 (5) provides that the court must "look at the totality of the party's efforts to comply with the provisions" of the statute when assessing whether a party acted with the proper level of due diligence prior to filing a COC "rather than assess the party's efforts item by item." The facts a court must consider include, but are not limited to:

"the efforts made by the prosecutor to comply with the requirements [of the statute]; the volume of discovery provided and the volume of discovery outstanding; the complexity of the case; whether the prosecutor knew that the belatedly disclosed or allegedly missing material existed; the explanation for any alleged discovery lapse; the prosecutor's response when apprised of any allegedly missing discovery; whether the belated discovery was substantively duplicative, insignificant or easily remedied; whether the omission was corrected; whether the prosecution self-reported the error and took prompt remedial action without court intervention; and whether the prosecutions delayed disclosure of discovery was prejudicial to the defense or otherwise impeded the defense's ability to effectively investigate the case or prepare for trial,"

(CPL § 245.50 [5] [a]).

Defendant's motion challenging the People's COC argues that the People have failed to turn over or have belatedly disclosed certain discoverable materials as required by CPL § 245.20 (1), namely: domain awareness system (hereinafter "DAS") reports for complainant and defendant; Giglio  ² materials for non-testifying NYPD officers; body worn camera (hereinafter "BWC") footage for Officer Nadeem; a radio run; video surveillance footage; photographs of defendant taken by complainant; emergency services (hereinafter "EMS") records and names and contact information for EMS personnel; and written communications between complainant and the assigned assistant district attorney (hereinafter "ADA").

With respect to the DAS reports defendant alleges the People have failed to disclose, the People state that no DAS reports were generated in connection with the instant matter. DAS reports query the history of either an individual's or an address's NYPD involvement and are generally produced by the NYPD in connection with an ongoing investigation. When they are generated, they are automatically discoverable under CPL § 245.20 (1) (e). Given that no DAS reports were generated in this matter and the People have no obligation to create such reports, the People not disclosing any DAS reports does not impact the validity of the People's COC.

Defendant states the People belatedly disclosed impeachment materials for non-testifying NYPD officers. In response, the People argue these materials are not discoverable. Impeachment materials for testifying witnesses are automatically discoverable under CPL § 245.20 (l) (k). When the People disclose materials for testifying trial witnesses, they satisfy their obligations to disclose impeachment material. Because non-testifying witnesses cannot be impeached, the disclosures the defendant seeks are not discoverable (see People v Jawad, 84 Misc 3d 31, 34 [App Term 2nd Dept 2024]). Accordingly, the People's belated disclosure of these materials does not invalidate their COC.

The remaining above-listed materials, including BWC footage for Officer Nadeem; a radio run; video surveillance footage; photographs of defendant taken by complainant; emergency services EMS records and names and contact information for EMS personnel; and written communications between complainant and the assigned ADA are automatically discoverable under CPL § 245.20 (1).

The People timely disclosed to defendant nearly all automatically discoverable material in this case, as evidenced by the list of disclosed material in their COC. Included in those materials were arrest paperwork, a 911 call and related materials, activity logs for all officers, BWC and related documentation for all officers involved in the investigation and arrest, two video surveillance videos, and impeachment materials for testifying officers. While defendant states the People did not disclose BWC footage for Officer Nadeem, the People's COC includes reference to disclosure of this officer's BWC footage and the People state they disclosed it with their COC, sharing it again with defendant after defendant's conferral. Therefore, the People's disclosure of Officer Nadeem's BWC footage does not impact the validity of the People's COC.

This matter is not especially complex. Defendant is alleged to have grabbed complainant's buttocks without consent. Complainant then called 911 and the NYPD and EMS responded. Defendant was arrested shortly after the alleged incident.

Defendant states the People belatedly disclosed a radio run generated in this matter. The People, in response, state that prior to the filing of their COC, they timely requested and received materials from the Tapes and Records Department, which were then disclosed to defendant with the People's COC. When defendant conferred regarding a possibly missing radio run, the People responded promptly and corrected the omission without court intervention.

Defendant further alleges the People failed to disclose a surveillance video, stating that on disclosed BWC footage, officers can be seen reviewing three surveillance videos with an employee of the building, but only two were disclosed to him by the People. Defendant states the two which were disclosed depict two individuals walking into the building. The People state that none of the three videos captured the alleged incident and that after reviewing the three videos, the NYPD officers obtained only the two videos which were disclosed to defendant. Defendant additionally alleges the People belatedly disclosed photographs complainant took of defendant. The People state that after defendant requested these photographs, the People obtained them from complainant and disclosed the photographs.

The People state that neither the third surveillance video nor the photographs were in their possession at the time of the filing of their COC. Pursuant to CPL § 245. 20 (2), the People have an obligation to cause material not in their possession but subject to automatic discovery under CPL § 245. 20 (1) available for discovery, but the People are not required to obtain material where it could be obtained by defendant via a subpoena duces tecum. Upon request by defendant of the third video and photographs, the People made efforts to obtain these materials by having an investigator sent to obtain the third video (even though they would not have been required to obtain the video as defendant could have just as easily have obtained it via a subpoena duces tecum) and requesting complainant provide the People with the photographs. Complainant provided, and the People disclosed promptly, the photographs complainant took of defendant. As it pertains to the third video surveillance video, it has been destroyed since the alleged incident.

Defendant states the People belatedly disclosed EMS records and the names and contact information for EMS personnel. The People argue that these materials are not automatically discoverable. The names and contact information for EMS personnel who have information related to charged offenses or potential defenses are automatically discoverable pursuant to CPL § 245.20 (1) (c). Additionally, where EMS are present at the direction of the police, the FDNY/EMS records that are generated are discoverable under CPL § 245.20 (1) (j) (People v Rahman, 2023 NY Slip Op 50692[U] [App Term, 2d Dept 2023]). However, after the filing of their COC, the People made efforts to obtain these materials and then disclosed them to defendant, thereby correcting their initial omission.

Finally, defendant states the People belatedly disclosed written communications between the assigned ADA and complainant. In response, the People state these communications are considered attorney work product and are therefore not automatically discoverable. The People additionally note that when ordered to do so by the court, the People disclosed these communications. These emails pertain to complainant's signing of the supporting deposition and complainant's discomfort with the inclusion of the phrase "alarmed and annoyed" in the criminal complaint, as she did not feel that the language "alarmed and annoyed" captured how she felt regarding defendant's alleged conduct.³ New York narrowly defines attorney work product. Attorney work product under Civil Practice Law and Rules (hereinafter "CPLR") § 3101 (c) is "generally limited to materials prepared by an attorney, while acting as an attorney, which contain his or her legal analysis, conclusions, theory, or strategy," (Geffner v Mercy Med. Ctr., 125 AD3d 802 [2d Dept 2015] citing Matter of New York City Asbestos Litig., 109 AD3d 7, 12 [1st Dept]; Salzer v Farm Family Life Ins. Co., 280 AD2d 844, 846 [3d Dept 2001]). As the communications between complainant and the assigned ADA do not contain the People's legal analysis, conclusions, theory, or strategy, they are not attorney work product. Moreover, these emails are automatically discoverable under CPL § 245.20 (1) (e) and are considered Rosario material (People v Rosario, 9 NY2d 286 (Ct App 1961).

Upon a holistic view of the People's efforts to comply with their discovery obligations, the court finds that the People demonstrated due diligence as described under CPL § 245.50 (5). The People turned over nearly all automatically discoverable materials with their COC and when defendant conferred regarding outstanding discovery, the People made attempts to obtain and disclose all of the materials defendant requested, including impeachment materials for non-testifying officers, the radio run, surveillance video, photographs taken by complainant, EMS records, and communications between the assigned ADA and complainant. The only materials defendant has requested that have not been disclosed are the DAS reports, which the People state do not exist, and the surveillance footage, which has been destroyed since the commencement of the instant action and which the People state does not capture any part of the alleged incident. The People have demonstrated efforts to comply with their discovery obligations and corrected omissions of materials promptly and without court intervention. Accordingly, defendant's motion to invalidate the People's COC is denied.

IV. Speedy Trial

Criminal Procedure Law § 30.30 (1) (b) requires the People to be ready within 90 days of arraignment.

On February 18, 2026, the accusatory instrument was filed. On May 11, 2026, the People served on defendant and filed with the court an off-calendar COC and SOR, thereby stopping their speedy trial clock.

The People have accrued 82 chargeable days since the filing of the accusatory instrument. Therefore, defendant's motion to dismiss is therefore denied.

This constitutes the decision and order of the Court.

Dated: August 10, 2026

Kings County, New York

Hon. Nancy Fayed Carrington

Judge of the Criminal Court

FOOTNOTES

1.   Defendant additionally argues the discrepancy between the date on the supporting deposition, March 18, 2026, and the date complainant emailed the document to the assigned assistant district attorney, April 15, 2026, suggests complainant did not review the People's emails and did not sign the supporting deposition until April 15, 2026, and therefore the signature is not properly verified and subscribed. However, as the document was emailed by the People to complainant on March 6, 2026, there is nothing in the record to suggest that complainant did not sign the document on March 18, 2026, and then email the signed document on April 15, 2026. Accordingly, defendant's argument is without merit.

2.    Giglio v United States, 405 US 150 [1972]).

3.   This exchange led the People to remove the charge of Harassment in the Second Degree (PL § 240.26 [1]) from the criminal complaint.

Nancy Fayed Carrington, J.