The People Of The State Of New York v. Kevin Pinos, Defendant. (2026)

The Defendant, Kevin Pinos, is charged with, inter alia, Vehicle and Traffic Law (VTL) § 600[2] Leaving the Scene of an Accident with Injuries. By motion dated June 11, 2026, the Defendant and moves, inter alia, to invalidate the People's May 7, 2026, Certificate of Compliance (COC) and for dismissal pursuant to Criminal Procedure Law [CPL] § 30.30 and § 170.30[1][e]. The People oppose and argue that their initial COC was filed in accordance with their obligations under CPL Article 245, by opposition filed June 29, 2026. After reviewing the Defendant's motion, the People's response, the court file, and the relevant legal authority, this court finds that the People's initial COC was valid, and therefore, the Defendant's motion is DENIED.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

The defendant was arrested on February 21, 2026, and arraigned that same day. The matter was adjourned to February 26, 2026 and Defendant subsequently posted bail that was set at his arraignment. On February 26, 2026, the Defendant failed to appear and a bench warrant was stayed to March 3, 2026. On March 3, 2026, a bench warrant was issued. On March 23, 2026, Defendant voluntarily appeared in Court and the warrant was vacated; the matter was adjourned to April 28, 2026. On April 28, 2026, the People did not serve a COC, and the matter was adjourned to July 20, 2026. The People filed a COC, off calendar on May 7, 2026. Defense counsel emailed the People and provided a list of missing discovery on May 26, 2026. The People responded on June 1, 2026. On June 2, 2026, the government filed an SCOC. The People filed a SCOC on June 2nd 2026 and a second SCOC on June 29th, 2026.

CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE

CPL § 245.20[1] prescribes "[t]he prosecution shall disclose to the defendant, and permit the defendant to discover, inspect, copy, photograph and test the following material and information in the possession, custody or control of the prosecution or persons under the prosecution's direction or control" and lists the intended items for initial discovery in CPL § 245.20[1][a]-[v]. Furthermore, possession of all items and information related to the prosecution of a charge in the possession of any New York state or local police or law enforcement agency shall be imputed to the possession of the prosecution (CPL § 245.20[2]; see also CPL § 245.55[1] [prosecution must "ensure that a flow of information is maintained between the police and other investigative personnel and his or her office"]). It is incumbent upon the prosecution to "make a diligent, good faith effort to ascertain the existence of material or information discoverable under [CPL § 245.20[1]] and to cause such material or information to be made available for discovery where it exists but is not within the prosecutor's possession, custody, or control" with the exception that the People are not required to obtain material or information through a subpoena duces tecum where the defense is able to obtain the same material in that manner (CPL § 245.20[2]).

The time periods for automatic disclosure are dictated by CPL § 245.10 and require the discovery obligations be performed "as soon as practicable but not later than the time periods specified" (CPL § 245.10[1][a]). When a defendant is in custody, the People "shall perform its initial discovery obligations within twenty calendar days after the defendant's arraignment" (CPL § 245.10[1][a][i]) and when the defendant is not in custody the People "shall perform its initial discovery obligations within thirty-five calendar days after the defendant's arraignment" (CPL § 245.10[1][a][ii]). The exception to these timing requirements, without the requirement that the People request an extension from the court, is limited to when "materials, including video footage from body-worn cameras, surveillance cameras, or dashboard cameras, are exceptionally voluminous or, despite diligent, good faith efforts, are otherwise not in the actual possession of the prosecution" (CPL § 245.10[1][a]). Under those circumstances, "the time period in this paragraph may be stayed by up to an additional thirty calendar days without need for a motion pursuant to subdivision two of section 245.70 of this article." (CPL § 245.10). The People also may request an extension of the time period of disclosure through a motion pursuant to CPL § 245.70[2] under these circumstances (CPL § 245.10[1][a][iv][B]).

When the People have "exercised due diligence and acted in good faith in making reasonable inquiries and efforts to obtain and provide the discovery required by subdivision one of section 245.20 of this article" the People must serve upon the Defendant and file with the court, a Certificate of Compliance (COC) (CPL § 245.50[1]). The COC "shall state that, after exercising due diligence and making reasonable inquiries and efforts to ascertain the existence of, obtain, and disclose material and information subject to discovery, the prosecution has disclosed and made available all known material and information it has obtained subject to discovery. It shall also identify the items provided. The prosecution shall also identify the items that the prosecution is required to disclose and of which the prosecution is aware, but has been unable to obtain despite the exercise of due diligence as evaluated under this section." (CPL § 245.50[1]).

A. The Defense Motion Comports with CPL § 245.50[4].

Under CPL § 245.50[4], the defense must "notify or alert" the prosecution of any defects or deficiencies relating to a COC, and any challenges relating to the sufficiency of a COC shall be addressed by motion within thirty-five days of the COC's service (CPL § 245.50[4][a]-[c]). After the expiration of 35 days, the defense is permitted to file a COC challenge "where the grounds for such challenge are based upon a material change in circumstances, including but not limited to the belated disclosure of discoverable material pursuant to [CPL § 245.20], or, where the party entitled to disclosure could not, with due diligence, have known of the specific and particularized matters forming the basis of the challenge prior to the expiration of such period" (CPL § 245.50[4][c][ii]). Any motions to challenge a COC must also be accompanied by an affirmation that the movant timely made good faith efforts to confer about the missing items at issue, and that these efforts were unsuccessful (CPL § 245.50[4][c]). Defense may request and the court may extend the 35-day window for filing a COC challenge for good cause shown (CPL § 245.50[3][c][i]).

The defense affirmed and provided emails detailing that a good faith conferral took place (Def. Mot. Exh. A). The defense filed the instant motion within the 35-day motion filing timeframe, as required by Article 245 and affirmed that the basis for the motion is that the People's delayed disclosures and lack of disclosures could not be resolved without court intervention after conferral. Therefore, the Defense has met the threshold requirements of CPL § 245.50[4].

B. The Validity of the People's May 7, 2026 COC

In determining the validity of the People's COC, by assessing if the standard of due diligence was met, "the court shall look at the totality of the party's efforts to comply with the provisions of this article, rather than assess the party's efforts item by item." CPL § 245.50[5]. Relevant factors to the Court's determination are explicated in CPL § 245.50[5][a]: (1) the efforts made to comply with CPL 245 requirements (including the timing requirements of CPL § 245.10, the disclosure requirements of CPL § 245.20, the supplementary certificate of compliance requirements of CPL § 245.50[1-a], and the protective order requirements of CPL § 245.70); (2) the volume of discovery provided and the volume of discovery outstanding; (3) the complexity of the case; (4) whether the prosecutor knew that the belatedly disclosed or missing material existed; (5) the explanation for any alleged discovery lapse; (6) the prosecutor's response when apprised of any allegedly missing discovery; (7) whether the belated discovery was substantively duplicative, insignificant, or easily remedied; (8) whether the omission was corrected; (9) whether the prosecution self-reported the error and took prompt remedial action without court intervention; (10) whether the prosecution's delayed disclosure of discovery was prejudicial to the defense or otherwise impeded the defense's ability to effectively investigate the case or prepare for trial (CPL § 245.50[5][a]). The Court is not limited to the factors in CPL § 245.50[5][a], however, "[t]he court's determination shall be based on consideration of all factors listed in paragraph (a) of this subdivision and no one factor shall be determinative." (CPL § 245.50[5][b]). The overall standard for a valid COC is that the Court find that "the party has exercised due diligence and acted in good faith in making reasonable inquiries and efforts to obtain and provide the material required to be disclosed pursuant to section 245.20 of this article." (CPL § 245.50[6]).

Here, Defendant argues that the COC was invalid because at the time it was filed the following materials were not disclosed: body worn cameras, metadata, and audit trail logs, for Officer Fader, Officer Wynn, and Officer Campbell, activity logs for Officers Fader, Wynn, and Campbell, DD5s and ECMS for Detective Mozdziak and Detective O'Leary, the 911 call from the date of incident, the two supporting depositions, the accident report, aided cards, medical records, and ambulance records. Further, Defendant argues that after the SCOC was filed on June 2, 2026, the following materials remained outstanding at the time of Defense's motion filing: body worn camera for Officer Wynn; DD5s and ECMS for Detective Mozdziak and Detective O'Leary, aided cards, medical records, ambulance records. The People argue that any belated or potentially outstanding discovery does not render their initial COC invalid, and that their discovery efforts as a whole in this case were duly diligent. The People further argue that the materials that the defense alleges are outstanding either do not exist or are not automatically discoverable.

As to the belated disclosure of the 911 call, the People requested the 911 call immediately when the case began, then properly identified the 911 call in their COC notice of non-disclosure, and turned over the 911 call as soon as they received it and filed a SCOC. As to the allegedly missing two supporting depositions, the Defense stated they "returned an error message" without further information. This Court cannot necessarily conclude that was due to error, technical or otherwise, on the People's behalf. Furthermore, the People responded to this issue in their June 1, 2026 email, in response to the Defense's May 26, 2026 email, and stated that they had already reshared this material. In that same email the People stated that they were not in possession for aided cards related to this case. Regarding the ambulance records, these were not in the People's constructive or actual possession and therefore are not automatically discoverable under the circumstances of this case.¹

Here, in terms of the complainant's medical records, there is no record that any medical records resulting from treatment to persons injured during the alleged vehicle collision connected to this case were "made by or at the request or direction of a public servant engaged in law enforcement activity" and therefore these records are not automatically discoverable (CPL 245.20 [1][j]; People v Pilgrim, 87 Misc 3d 1262(A) [Crim Ct, Bronx County 2025] [FDNY/EMS records subject to discovery in limited circumstance when emergency services or FDNY work under police direction]). In contrast, the Appellate Term has held that "the People were required to "make a diligent, good faith effort to ascertain the existence of [the FDNY/EMS records] and to cause [the records] to be made available for discovery" even if the records were not in the People's "possession, custody, or control" in the "circumstances" where police personnel called EMS assistance for a complainant located in the precinct (People v Rahman, 79 Misc 3d 129(A) [App Term, 2d, 11th and 13th Jud Dists 2023]).

Despite the EMS records and complainant medical records not being automatically discoverable in this case, the People did respond to these inquiries and noted that they were obtaining a HIPPA for the complainants' medical records and had subpoenaed the ambulance records.

As to the accident report, the People noted that a version of the accident report had been disclosed and that a the final version had not yet been provided by the officer when the COC was filed. The People disclosed the completed accident report and filed a COC on June 2, 2026. The People also stated in their email on June 1, 2026 that they spoke with their arresting officer and confirmed that DD5s and ECMS for Detective Mozdziak and Detective O'Leary did not exist. Despite that, the Defense raises this issue as material that remains outstanding, however, does not provide any explanation for this claim given this response from the People.

Regarding, the body worn cameras, metadata, and audit trail logs, and activity logs for Officer Michael Fader, Officer Wynn, and Officer Campbell, the People informed the Defense on June 1, 2026 that they had obtained this material for Officers Fader and Cambell, and were waiting for it to be uploaded to share. It was disclosed and an SCOC was filed for this material on June 2, 2026. The People also noted there was no activity log for Officer Wynn. The People explained the delay in disclosing this material stating: "the body-worn camera footage had not been linked to the People's discovery monitoring system, requiring additional inquiry to determine whether responsive footage existed from the scene of the incident. Further, once the People became aware that Officers Campbell and Fader responded to the scene, the People promptly requested and obtained their activity logs for disclosure." (P.'s Opp. at p. 11). A diligent prosecutor should have more carefully reviewed the discovery to be aware that these were officers who responded to the scene. Further, the People's explanation that this lapse occurred because the additional officer's body worn camera was not linked to the case, does reflect a lack of diligence. However, as to the material related to Officers Fader and Cambell, the People did respond quickly to the Defense inquiry, obtained the material, and disclosed it without court intervention.

The only automatically discoverable material possibly still outstanding is Officer Wynn's body worn camera. The People did not specifically address this material in their response, and this weighs heavily against a finding of diligence. However, the People did indicate that no activity log exists for this Officer, suggesting there may not be body worn camera footage from him connected to this case. The information that Officer Wynn was a contributor to the complaint report (information only found in the body of the emails in Def. Mot. Exh. C and not further explained) is not sufficient for this court to conclude what Officer Wynn's role was in this case or what might be captured on his body worn camera to find that the absence of this material is prejudicial to the Defense.

The People are ordered to inquire as to the existence of Officer Wynn's body worn camera and turn over anything that exists within 14 days of this order.

When considering the factors of CPL § 245.50[5][a] this court finds that the People met their burden to establish that they exercised due diligence to comply with their discovery obligations for this case at the time that they filed their initial COC. The People performed their initial discovery obligations 55 days from this case's commencement (subtracting the period of time Defendant was in warrant status) on May 7, 2026. Although outside of Article 245's 35-day timeline, the People provided discovery and filed their COC before the expiration of the speedy trial period, allowing for ample time to work out any discovery issues with defense counsel. When the People filed their initial COC, on May 7, 2026, they had disclosed approximately sixty (60) files with defense counsel that included complaint drafts, complaint report, arrest report, discovery relating to the photo array, DD5s, ICAD, Activity logs, Giglio material, and other arrest paperwork (P's Opp. at p. 4). The People also detailed their efforts to obtain discovery starting February 21, 2026, when they requested various documents and 911 calls, sprint report, and radio runs associated with the case (P.'s Opp. at p. 6-7). The People further documented that they reached out to the complainants on February 22, 2026, requested LEOW materials on March 26, 2026, requested material from the arresting officer on April 24, 2026, and then followed up for some of that material on May 6, 2026.

As the People obtained new discovery, they disclosed it to the defense expeditiously and subsequently served and filed two supplemental COCs, as required by CPL § 245.50[1-a]. The volume of discovery belatedly disclosed was significantly less than that which was disclosed prior to the People's initial COC. Most importantly, discovery was disclosed before a trial date was scheduled for this case. To the extent that the defense needs more time to review the belatedly disclosed material, they are free to request a longer adjournment for trial. Lastly, given the volume of discovery already disclosed, and the fact that the People's delay in disclosing the items did not prejudice the defense to the extent that they could not adequately prepare for trial, this court finds that the Peoples' belated disclosures do not invalidate their initial COC.

In sum, here, the People established that they exercised due diligence and acted in good faith in making reasonable inquiries and efforts to comply with their discovery obligations. Therefore, defense's motion to invalidate the People's initial COC is DENIED.

Nothing in this decision precludes the defense from arguing in limine for sanctions pursuant to CPL § 245.80 for any missing or belated disclosures discussed in this decision. However, any decisions concerning sanctions for missing or belated disclosures are left to the trial court as this court does not currently have sufficient information to render a decision on these issues.

SPEEDY TRIAL

When a defendant is charged with a misdemeanor punishable by a sentence of more than three months, such as the instant case, the prosecution must be ready to proceed to trial within 90 days from the commencement of that criminal action (CPL § 30.30[1][b]). To satisfy the initial burden under CPL § 30.30, the defendant need allege "only that the prosecution failed to declare readiness within the statutorily prescribed time period" (People v Luperon, 85 NY2d 71, 77-78 (1995); see also People v Goode, 87 NY2d 1045, 1047 [1996]). Once the defendant has alleged that more than the statutorily prescribed time period has elapsed since the commencement of the action, the prosecution bears the burden of establishing sufficient excludable delay (see People v Berkowitz, 50 NY2d 333, 349 [1980]). Absent a valid COC, the People cannot be deemed ready for trial (CPL 245.50[3]).

The People cannot be ready for trial on a misdemeanor complaint containing hearsay (CPL § 170.35) or without a valid COC (CPL § 245.50[3]). After a valid statement of readiness, the court must thereafter add "any post readiness periods of delay that are actually attributable to the People and are ineligible for an exclusion" (People v Cortes, 80 NY2d 201, 208 [1992]). In assessing attributable delay, the court must look at the exclusions in CPL § 30.30[4] and attendant caselaw.

This criminal action commenced on February 21, 2026, with the filing of the accusatory instrument (CPL §§ 1.20[17], 100.05; People v Cooper 98 NY2d 541, 543 [2002]). Defendant was arraigned on the same day, bail was set, and the case was adjourned to February 26, 2026, for the People to file a Certificate of Compliance (COC), and SOR. From February 21, 2026 to February 26, 2026 the People did not file a COC/ SOR, and therefore, the time is chargeable. (5 days charged)

On February 26, 2026, the Defendant had posted bail and did not appear, a bench warrant was stayed to March 3, 2026. From February 26, 2026to March 3, 2026 the People did not file a COC/ SOR, and therefore, the time is chargeable. (5 days charged, 10 days total)

On March 3, 2026, a bench warrant was issued. On March 23, 2026, Mr. Pinos voluntarily vacated the warrant in part AP1. Therefore the period from March 3, 2026 to March 23, 2026 is not chargeable to the People (CPL 30.30 [4] [ii]). (0 days charged, 10 days total).

On March 23, 2026, the matter was adjourned to April 28, 2026 for the People to file a COC. From March 23, 2026 to April 28, 2026 the People did not file a COC/ SOR, and therefore, the time is chargeable. (36 days charged, 46 days total)

On April 28, 2026, the matter was adjourned to July 20, 2026. The People filed a COC and SOR, off calendar on May 7, 2026. As discussed above, the People's COC was valid and effective in stopping the speedy trial clock. As such, the People are charged from April 28, 2026 to May 7, 2026 this adjournment. (9 days charged, 55 days total)

Here, as the defendant is charged with a misdemeanor punishable by a sentence of more than three months, the applicable speedy trial time is 90 days. As only 55 days of chargeable time has accrued, defense counsel's motion to dismiss pursuant to CPL § 30.30 is DENIED.

The foregoing constitutes the opinion, decision, and order of the Court.

Dated: July 20, 2026

Queens, New York

ENTER:

Vidya Pappachan, J.C.C.

FOOTNOTES

1.   The People lack possession or control over items and information maintained by the New York Fire Department and their Emergency Medical Service (FDNY EMS) because is not a police or law enforcement agency for discovery purposes (see People v Branton, 238 AD3d 1429, 1431 [3d Dept 2025] [parole officer's DOCCS disciplinary records]; People v Walker, 232 AD3d 1214, 1217 [4th Dept 2024], lv to appeal denied, 42 NY3d 1082 [2025] [to same effect]). Additionally, the People do not have "possession, custody or control" over the complainants' medical records (People v Persaud, 235 AD3d 1006, 1009 [2d Dept 2025] [mistrial denied where People failed to disclose wife's medical records], citing CPL 245.20 [1]).

Vidya Pappachan, J.