The People of the State of New York v. Victor Gualillas, Defendant. (2026)

Defendant, Victor Gualillas, was arraigned on June 1, 2025, and charged with Operating a Motor Vehicle While Under the Influence of Alcohol, .08 (Vehicle and Traffic Law [VTL] § 1192-2), Operating a Motor Vehicle While Under the Influence of Alcohol — Intoxicated Condition (VTL § 1192-3), Operating a Motor Vehicle While Under the Influence of Alcohol or Drugs (VTL § 1192-1). At the Defendant's arraignment on June 1, 2025, the People served Criminal Procedure Law [CPL] § 710.30[1][a] notice of one statement made on June 1, 2025, at 0343 at the Northeast corner of 35th Avenue and 94th Street to Officer Fink in sum and substance "I drank a little".

At the request of Defendant, Dunaway/Huntley/Johnson/VTL 1194 hearings were granted, and the hearings were held on February 17, 2026. At the hearing, the People presented testimony of three witnesses: Police officer Daniel Fink, Police officer Matthew Aluzzo, and Spanish language interpreter Maria Pinto.

The People introduced into evidence one exhibit, the Intoxicated Drivers Testing Unit [IDTU] Video (People's Exhibit 1). The Defense introduced into evidence two exhibits: the body worn camera of Officer Fink (Defense Exhibit A), and the body-worn camera of Officer Aluzzo (Defense Exhibit B).

The defense moves to suppress all tangible and non-tangible fruits of the unlawful detention and arrest of Mr. Gualillas. After the hearing the parties made oral arguments. The Defense submitted a Memorandum of Law in support on February 26, 2026. The People oppose suppression in a memorandum on law submitted on February 19, 2026.

Crucial to any court's assessment in determining whether police conduct was lawful is an assessment of the credibility of witness testimony (People v Morales, 42 NY2d 129, 134 [1977]; People v Harris, 192 AD3d 151 [App Div, 2d Dept, 2020]). "Credibility is a many faceted concept ... requiring a careful assessment of a number of subtle factors before testimony can be labeled as believable or unbelievable" (People v Wise, 46 NY2d 321, 325 [1978]; see Guide to NY Evid rule 6.11, Impeachment in General). The Court finds the testimony of Police officer Daniel Fink, Police officer Matthew Aluzzo, and Spanish language interpreter Maria Pinto credible.

FACTUAL FINDINGS

The court makes the following findings of fact and finds as fact all events depicted on the videos entered into evidence.

Officer Fink testified that he was working in an unmarked vehicle with his partner, Officer Aluzzo on June 1, 2025. At approximately 3:40am, Officer Aluzzo was driving on Northern Boulevard in Queens County. Officer Fink "saw a vehicle, a 2018 Toyota with dark tints and pulled the vehicle over" and stated that the reason they pulled over the vehicle was "[t]inted windows." (Direct, Officer Frink, p9 lines 8-11). Officer Fink described the lighting conditions at that time as "Dark. It was dark." (Hearing Tr. February 17, 2026, Direct, Officer Frink, p9 lines 1-2) and "[t]here's overhead lighting over there. It's dark, it's dark out. There is overhead lighting on Northern Boulevard" (Direct, Officer Fink, p9 lines 3-5). Officer Fink explained that his vehicle drove past the Defendant's vehicle, and that they then made a U-turn to pull over the Defendant. "We drove past the motorist. He was driving and we drove [past] each other and then I conducted -- we made a U-turn and then pulled him over" (id.). Officer Fink and Officer Aluzzo then approached the vehicle, smelled an odor of alcoholic beverage, saw bloodshot, watery eyes, and asked the Defendant to exit the vehicle. Defendant was asked to take a portable breath test, which yielded a result of which was .157 blood alcohol content (BAC). Defendant was then placed under arrest at approximately 3:49am and transported to the 112th precinct for further testing. At approximately 4:26am, Defendant was offered a chemical test of his breath via a video with Spanish translation. The Defendant agreed to take the test.

Police officer Matthew Aluzzo testified that he had been a police officer with the NYPD for over eight years and received six months of training at the police academy and then "IDTU training when he started working for highway patrol, and training regarding the identification of intoxicated people. (Direct, Officer Aluzzo, p32 lines 1-7). On June 1, 2025, he and his partner, Officer Fink, became involved in an investigation because "we pulled over motorists for dark tinted windows" (Direct, Officer Aluzzo, p34 lines 15-19). After the vehicle was pulled over, the officers exited the vehicle. Officer Aluzzo noted the vehicle had dark tinted windows and asked the motorist to roll down the windows. "First thing we noticed, a strong odor of alcohol beverage coming from the vehicle. Noticed the motorist had his bloodshot, watery eyes and slurred speech." (Direct, Officer Aluzzo, p34 lines 5-10). After the Defendant was outside the vehicle, Officer Aluzzo asked (in Spanish) if he had anything to drink tonight, and Defendant responded that he "had a little bit" (Direct, Officer Aluzzo, p34 lines 13-17).

Maria Pinto testified that she is employed by the Queens District Attorney's office as a Spanish Language interpreter. During her testimony she reviewed People's Exhibit 1 and offered a translation of the Spanish language in the video.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

At a suppression hearing, the prosecution bears the burden of going forward to show, by credible evidence, the lawfulness of the police conduct (People v Hernandez, 40 AD3d 777 [2007]; see also People v Berrios, 28 NY2d 361 [1971]; People v Wise, 46 NY2d 321 [1978]). To evaluate the police conduct, the Court must determine whether it was justified at its inception and whether it was reasonably related in scope to the circumstances at the time (People v DeBour, 40 NY2d 210 [1976]). Once the People have met this burden, the Defendant bears the burden, by a preponderance of the credible evidence, of proving any illegality of the police conduct (see Berrios at 367; Mapp v Ohio, 367 US 643 [1961]; Dunaway v New York, 442 US 200 [1979]; see People v DeBour, 40 NY2d 210, 323 [1976]). An officer has probable cause to arrest a person for committing an offense when "[it] appear[s] to be at least more probable than not that a crime has taken place and that the one arrested is its perpetrator, for conduct equally compatible with guilt or innocence will not suffice" (People v Carrasquillo, 54 NY2d 248, 254 [1981]).

Probable cause does not require "proof sufficient to warrant a conviction beyond a reasonable doubt but merely information sufficient to support a reasonable belief that an offense has been or is being committed ... [t]he legal conclusion is to be made after considering all of the facts and circumstances together" (People v Bigelow, People v Bigelow, 66 NY2d 417, 423 [1985][internal citations omitted]). "The assessment of whether there was probable cause . . . is to be made by the court upon consideration of all the relevant objective facts known to the officer; the subjective beliefs of the officer do not control the determination" (People v Cooper, 38 AD3d 678, 679 [2d Dept 2007]; see also People v Bandera, 204 AD2d 340, 341 [2d Dept 1994] [noting that the officer's subjective belief is irrelevant because "whether probable cause exists" is "for the court" to decide "upon a review of all relevant objective information known to the officer"]).

When a defendant challenges "the sufficiency of the factual predicate for the stop," it is the People's burden "to come forward with evidence sufficient to establish that the stop was lawful" (People v Balkman, 35 NY3d 556, 559 [2020]). "Summary statements that the police had arrived at a conclusion that sufficient cause existed will not do" (People v Bouton, 50 NY2d 130, 135 [1980]). Rather, the prosecution must establish "the basis for [the] belief" that law enforcement possessed the requisite suspicion in the form of "facts, not assurances" (id. at 135-136).

For a stop of a moving vehicle, there must be probable cause that a driver has committed a traffic violation, or reasonable suspicion of criminal activity related to persons in the vehicle (see People v Hinshaw, 35 NY3d 427, 430 [2020]["Automobile stops are lawful only when based on probable cause that a driver has committed a traffic violation; when based on a reasonable suspicion that the driver or occupants of the vehicle have committed, are committing, or are about to commit a crime; or, when conducted pursuant to 'nonarbitrary, nondiscriminatory, uniform' highway traffic procedures"]; People v Robinson, 97 NY2d 341, 349 [2001]).

Vehicle and Traffic Law [VTL] § 375[12-a][b] proscribes that "[n]o person shall operate any motor vehicle upon any public highway, road[,] or street with windows which have a light transmittance of less than 70%." The relevant question for a suppression court in determining whether law enforcement had probable cause for a stop of a vehicle under VTL§ 375(12-a)(b) is "whether the police officer reasonably believes the windows to be over-tinted in violation" of the law (People v Biggs, 208 AD3d 1340, 1344 [2d Dept 2022]).

In People v Nektalov, 42 NY3d 363, 367-68 [2024], the Court of Appeals elucidated that an officer's conclusory testimony that windows were "excessively tinted" without any further details, was a legal conclusion that did not support a finding of probable cause. The Court reasoned that the People had failed to elicit any factual basis for the officer's conclusion, citing the lack of testimony regarding the extent to which the officer could see into the vehicle, the lack of testimony regarding specific training and experience in relation to tinted windows, and the lack of objective corroborative evidence of the reasonableness of the conclusion (see id).

In the instant matter, the testimony was conclusory, unsupported by "objective corroborative evidence of the reasonableness" (see Nektalov at 368). Officer Fink testified that the sole reason for the stop of Defendant was that he saw a vehicle with "dark tints" and stated the reason the car was pulled over was "tinted windows" (Direct, Officer Frink, p9 lines 8-11). Officer Aluzzo testified that Defendant's car was pulled over for "dark tinted windows" (Direct, Officer Aluzzo, p34 lines 15-19). The only additional testimony regarding the tinted windows was that when the officers "exited the vehicle. The vehicle had dark tinted windows, had the motorist rolled down the windows" (Direct, Officer Aluzzo, p34 lines 5-8). The testimony fails to elicit any facts about the tints of the windows to assess whether the officer reasonably believed the degree to which the windows were tinted violated VTL § 375[12-a][b]. Indeed, the record is void of any detail that the windows were tinted "excessively" or "illegally" as both Officer Fink and Officer Aluzzo simply assert that the windows were "tinted" and "dark tinted" (see Nektalov supra. [cf. People v Hall, 236 AD3d 1334, 1335 [4th Dept 2025] [concluding that the officer's testimony contained "sufficient facts to establish that he reasonably believed that the windows were excessively tinted in violation of Vehicle and Traffic Law § 375 [12-a][b] where the officer testified that he observed the vehicle from a distance of no more than 10 to 15 feet and "he was unable to see the driver of the vehicle through the window."] [internal citations omitted]).

Further, the record is void of any information about the training or experience of either Officer Fink or Officer Aluzzo regarding illegally tinted windows that might support their conclusory statements (see cf. People v Bacquie, 154 AD3d 648, 649 [2d Dept 2017] ["although he [the officer] did not recall receiving training regarding tinted windows, he had experience in this area, having made thousands of stops and written hundreds of summonses for illegally tinted windows"] [internal citations omitted]). There was no testimony that either officer had experience making these types of stops previously.

While the Court in Nektalov noted that testimony that the officer had "measured the tint after stopping the vehicle and the results confirmed that the tint level violated the Vehicle and Traffic Law could have supported their finding of probable cause", here, evidence regarding the measurement of the window tints fails to cure the lack of testimony to support a finding of probable cause.

The People contend that body worn camera footage of Officer Aluzzo depicts him testing the window tint, and thus, substantiates a sufficient basis to establish probable cause for the stop of Defendant's vehicle. The People rely on the Court's ruling in People v Swift, 185 AD3d 1442, 1443 (4th Dept. 2020) where the Court found that body-worn camera footage can serve to corroborative of the officers' conclusion. However, Swift pre-dates the Court of Appeals decision in Nektalov. Further, the court in Swift relied on the fact that "the first officer's testimony established that he observed an excessively tinted window in violation of Vehicle and Traffic Law § 375 (12-a) (b) (3) and that he measured the tint after the stop, thereby confirming that it was excessive, in addition to the court's own review of photographs of the Defendant's vehicle (People v Swift, 185 AD3d 1442, 1443 [4th Dept 2020]). Thus, the factual circumstances of Swift are notably different, as here, no such testimony was elicited from which this Court could base an analysis of the evidence.

Officer Aluzzo's body worn camera captures him bringing out a small black box from a patrol vehicle, walking to Defendant's vehicle, holding it on the inside of the driver's side window and stating, "4 percent, 4 percent" (Defense Exhibit B at 14:30 to 15:00). The video also depicts, though blurry, that the box has a digital area and that while this box is placed against the window, 0.4 appears on the box (Defense Exhibit B at 14:55). This portion of video, without any testimony explaining what this machine is, how it works, that the officer used it correctly, and what the reading represents, puts the Court in a position to speculate as to the meaning of the information. As in Nektalov, here, "the record is bereft of evidence of its basis to support the [officer's] conclusory belief that the tinted windows violated the law" and therefore, the People have not met their burden to show that the stop of the Defendant was lawful (see Nektalov, 42 NY3d 363, 367-68 [2024]).

It is axiomatic that where evidence is obtained as "fruit of the poisonous tree" meaning the evidence has "been come at by exploitation" of an illegality, it must be suppressed (Wong Sun v US, 371 US 471, 488 [1963]). This exclusionary rule extends to any "fruits" of a constitutional violation "whether such evidence be tangible, physical material actually seized in an illegal search, items observed or words overheard in the course of the unlawful activity, or confessions or statements of the accused obtained during an illegal arrest and detention" (US v Crews, 445 US 463, 470 [1980]). The Court of Appeals has held that statements following an illegal arrest should be suppressed (People v Johnson, 66 NY2d 398, 407 [1985]).

Here, the record reflects a continuous chain of events following the unlawful stop of the Defendant through his statement at the scene and the chemical breath test. This statement and evidence of the chemical breath test was obtained after the unlawful stop of the Defendant and are not sufficiently distinguishable to be purged of the primary taint (Wong Sun v US, 371 U.S. 471, 488 [1963]).

Therefore, the noticed statement of Defendant after the vehicle stop must be suppressed along with the results of the chemical breath test.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons described above, the People have not met their burden to establish that the stop of Defendant's vehicle was supported by probable cause that Defendant had committed a traffic violation, or reasonable suspicion of criminal activity related to persons in the vehicle (see Hinshaw supra).

The Defendant's motion to suppress his noticed statement and motion to suppress the results of the chemical breath test is also accordingly granted.

The Defendant's motion to suppress is GRANTED in its entirety.

The foregoing constitutes the opinion, decision, and order of the Court.

Dated: April 1, 2026

Queens, New York

ENTER

Vidya Pappachan, J.C.C

Vidya Pappachan, J.