The People of the State of New York v. Jorge Cintron, Defendant. (2026)

Defendant is charged with two counts of Criminal Contempt in the Second Degree (PL § 215.50 [3]); Criminal Trespass in the Third Degree (PL § 140.10[a]), Trespass (PL § 140.05), and two counts of Harassment in the Second Degree (PL § 240.26[1]). By motion filed on March 26, 2026, the defendant challenges the validity of the People's certificate of compliance (COC) and moves to dismiss the information pursuant to CPL § 30.30. He also challenges the validity of the People's statement of readiness (SOR) and the facial sufficiency of the counts charging the defendant with Criminal Contempt in the Second Degree. The People filed an opposition to the defendant's motion on April 17, 2026, and the defendant filed a reply on May 1, 2026.

For the reasons set forth below, the defendant's application to dismiss two counts of Criminal Contempt in the Second Degree is granted; and the defendant's application to dismiss Criminal Trespass in the Third Degree, Trespass, and two counts of Harassment in the Second Degree is denied.

Procedural History

The criminal action commenced with the filing of a felony complaint on September 11, 2025, charging the defendant with Burglary in the Second Degree (PL § 140.25[2]) and Burglary in the Third Degree (PL § 140.20) in addition to the above-mentioned charges. The People filed and served a supporting deposition on February 11, 2026. A COC and SOR were filed and served on February 19, 2026. That same day, the People contacted the court to request an advancement to reduce the matter to a misdemeanor by dismissing the felony counts. On February 26, 2026, the matter was heard in court, and the case was reduced to a misdemeanor upon the People's motion to dismiss the felony counts pursuant to CPL § 180.50.

Facial Sufficiency

The defendant moves to dismiss the information because the Peopled failed to timely serve the underlying order of protection that was allegedly violated, which would have been necessary to cure the hearsay defect and convert the two counts of Criminal Contempt in the Second Degree. The People concede that the two counts of Criminal Contempt in the Second Degree should be dismissed but oppose dismissal of the remaining counts on the information.

To be facially sufficient, an information together with any supporting depositions, must contain non-hearsay allegations providing reasonable cause to believe that the People can prove every element of the crime charged. (See CPL § 100.40 [1][a]-[c]. See also People v Dumas, 68 NY2d 729 [1986]; People v Alejandro, 70 NY2d 133 [1987]; People v McDermott, 69 NY2d 889 [1987]; People v Case, 42 NY2d 98 [1977].) This does not require that the accusatory instrument state facts that would prove the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, but rather that it contains allegations of fact that "give an accused sufficient notice to prepare a defense and are adequately detailed to prevent a defendant from being tried twice for the same offense." (People v Casey, 95 NY2d 354, 360 [2000].) The court must assume that the factual allegations are true and must consider all reasonable inferences that may be drawn from the allegations. (CPL § 100.15; Alejandro, supra; People v. Henderson, 92 NY2d 677 [1999].)

The defendant argues that the accusatory instrument does not meet the requirements for a valid misdemeanor information as set forth in CPL § 100.15(3) because the counts charging Criminal Contempt in the Second Degree have not been properly corroborated. In the absence of a certified copy of the order of protection that was allegedly violated, it is the defendant's position that the allegation that he violated a lawful court order is based on hearsay. Noting that he has not waived prosecution by information, the defendant asserts that this omission requires dismissal of the entire accusatory instrument pursuant to CPL § 30.30(5-a).

In response, the People acknowledge that the charges of Criminal Contempt in the Second Degree were not properly converted and concede the facial insufficiency of those counts. Citing People v Williams, they argue that dismissal of the entire accusatory instrument is not appropriate and that the proper remedy is dismissal of the defective counts only. (See People v Williams, 2025 NY Slip Op 06535 [2025].)

Pursuant to CPL § 30.30(5-a), "a statement of readiness shall not be valid unless the prosecuting attorney certifies that all counts charged in the accusatory instrument meet the requirements of sections 100.15 and 100.40 of this chapter and those counts not meeting the requirements of sections 100.15 and 100.40 of this chapter have been dismissed."

CPL § 100.15, which governs the form and content of informations and misdemeanor complaints, requires that the accusatory instrument "contain a statement of the complainant alleging facts of an evidentiary character supporting or tending to support the charges." (CPL § 100.15 [3].)

CPL § 100.40 sets forth three requirements for a facially sufficient information. The statute states that an information must: (1) substantially conform "to the requirements prescribed in section 100.15," (2) provide "reasonable cause to believe that the defendant committed the offense charged," and (3) provide non-hearsay factual allegations establishing "every element of the offense charged and the defendant's commission thereof." (CPL §§ 100.40[1][a], [b] and [c].)

In effect, CPL § 30.30 (5-a) prohibits the previously accepted practice of partial conversion which allowed prosecution on an accusatory instrument that included both converted and unconverted counts. (See Williams, at 8-9; People v Councel, 77 Misc 3d 1132, 1135 [Crim Ct Kings County 2022].)

Here, the People have certified their compliance with CPL § 30.30(5-a) in an off-calendar SOR but later conceded and moved to dismiss the two counts of Criminal Contempt in the Second Degree for facial insufficiency. The Court holds that this sufficiently complies with the requirements of the statute. Any hearsay defects with respect to the counts charging the defendant with Criminal Contempt in the Second Degree do not invalidate the People's readiness to proceed on the remaining counts of the misdemeanor information which is otherwise valid. (Id.; People v Arroyo, 78 Misc 3d 1239 [A], [Crim Ct Kings County 2023].)

Accordingly, the defendant's motion to dismiss for facial insufficiency is granted as to the two counts of Criminal Contempt in the Second Degree and denied as to the remaining counts of the information.

Statement of Readiness

The defendant challenges the validity of the People's SOR. Acknowledging that the People announced their intention to dismiss the felony counts on February 19, 2026, he argues that their SOR does not accurately reflect their trial readiness because it was filed while the felony charges were still pending. He further states that the People did not submit a new statement of readiness after the felony counts were dismissed and have therefore not stopped the speedy trial clock with a valid statement of readiness.

In response, the People assert that their statement of readiness is valid. They state that they properly declared their readiness for trial off-calendar at a time when they were, in fact, ready for trial. They argue that they should not be penalized because court scheduling prevented the matter from being calendared to reduce the case at the time they declared their readiness.

A statement of readiness, to be effective, must be made in open court on the record, or by filing it off-calendar and serving a copy of the statement upon defense counsel. (People v Kendzia, 64 NY2d 331, 337 [1985].) The People are ready for trial when they have "done everything [they] could up to that point to move the case to trial." (People v Cortes, 80 NY2d 201 [1992].) The People must "in fact be ready to proceed at the time they declare readiness." [People v Chavis, 91 NY2d 500, 505 [1998] citing Kendzia, at 337.] As an initial matter, the People must file a valid accusatory instrument sufficient to confer the court's jurisdiction over the defendant, and arraignment on the accusatory instrument is an elemental prerequisite for trial readiness. (People v England, 84 NY2d 1, 5-6 [1994].¹ )

The Court of Appeals has held that where it is possible for a defendant to be arraigned on a superseding instrument within the applicable statutory time, the People's pre-arraignment statement of readiness may be valid. (People v Goss, 87 NY2d 792 [1996].) The court in People v Goss clarified their earlier holding in People v England by noting that England did not alter the principle that the People can be ready to proceed to trial prior to the defendant's arraignment. Rather the court carved out a single exception — "a declaration of readiness prior to arraignment is illusory in the 'unusual circumstances' where arraignment within the statutory time period is impossible and that impossibility is attributed solely to the People." (England at 3.)

The People can always stop the 30.30 clock by "declaring readiness in writing, through an off-calendar statement," even where a defendant cannot proceed directly to trial at that time. (People v Boateng, 73 Misc 3d 1238[A][NY Crim Ct 2022] ([citing People v Barden, 27 NY3d 550, 556 [2016].) The Goss court explained that arraigning a defendant is "exclusively a court function" and where the People properly toll the speedy trial clock by filing their COC and SOR before the expiration of the statutory period, it is the responsibility of the court, rather than the People, to arraign the defendant. (Goss at 797; see also People v Rini, 34 Misc 3d 152[A][App. Term 2012]; see also People v Brown, 8 Misc 3d 1006[A][Crim Ct, New York County 2005]; People v Krecko, 168 Misc 2d 1030 [Crim Ct, Queens County 1996]; People v Condarco, 168 Misc 2d 863 [Crim Ct, Queens County 1996].)

Here, the People validly served and filed their SOR off-calendar on February 19, 2026. The People announced their readiness when they were actually ready for trial, and it was possible to formally reduce the matter to a misdemeanor information at the time they filed their SOR but for court scheduling. Therefore, their declaration of readiness was effective and the defendant's motion to dismiss on this ground is denied.

Certificate of Compliance

Pursuant to CPL § 245.20(1), "the prosecution shall disclose to the defendant, and permit the defendant to discover, inspect, copy, photograph and test, all items and information that relate to the subject matter of the case." After fulfilling their initial discovery obligations, the People must "serve upon the defendant and file with the court a certificate of compliance." (CPL § 245.50 [1].) A valid certificate of compliance is a necessary pre-requisite to an effective statement of readiness. (CPL § 30.30 [5].) For a COC to be valid, the People must disclose and make available "all known material and information it has obtained subject to discovery." (CPL § 245.50 [1].) The statute further requires that the People "make a diligent, good faith effort to ascertain the existence of material or information discoverable." (CPL § 245.20 [2].)

Thus, in any challenge to the People's certification of compliance, the court must determine whether the People exercised the requisite level of diligence in obtaining the materials, whether their COC was filed in good faith and was reasonable under the circumstances. (see People v Erby, 68 Misc 3d 625 [Sup Ct Bronx County 2020], People v Knight, 69 Misc 3d 546, 552 [Sup Ct Kings County 2020], People v McKinney, 71 Misc 3d 1221A [Crim Ct Kings County 2021], People v Adrovic, 69 Misc 3d 563] Crim Ct Kings County 2020]).

In assessing due diligence, the court must conduct a case specific analysis that generally considers, "the efforts made by the prosecutor to comply with the requirements of [the statute]; the volume of discovery provided and the volume of discovery outstanding; the complexity of the case; whether the prosecutor knew that the belatedly disclosed or allegedly missing material existed; the explanation for any alleged discovery lapses; the prosecutor's response when apprised of any allegedly missing discovery; whether the belated discovery was substantively duplicative, insignificant, or easily remedied; whether the omission was corrected; whether the prosecution self-reported the error and took prompt remedial action without court intervention; and whether the prosecution's delayed disclosure of discovery was prejudicial to the defendant or otherwise impeded defense counsel's ability to effectively investigate the case or prepare for trial." (CPL § 245.50 [5][a]; also see People v Bay, 41 NY3d 200, 212 [2023].)

To overcome a challenge to the validity of their certification the People must establish that they exercised the requisite level of diligence in gathering all discoverable materials prior to filing their COC. (Bay at 212.) The court must consider the totality of the circumstances in determining due diligence, "rather than a strict item-by-item test that would require us to conclude that a COC is improper if the People miss even one item of discovery." (People v Cooperman, 225 AD3d 1216, 1220 [4th Dept 2024].)

The defendant filed a motion to challenge the People's COC, arguing that the People failed to turn over certain discoverable materials as required by CPL § 245.20(1). The defendant asserts that the People's COC is invalid for failure to disclose the underlying order of protection, the identification and witness designation of the officer who took the complaint, a photograph taken by the officer at the scene of the defendant's arrest, and complete ICAD paperwork. He argues that these materials are automatically discoverable under CPL § 245.20(1) and the People's failure to timely disclose them renders their COC invalid.

In response, the People acknowledge that these materials were inadvertently overlooked but assert that, upon being made aware of the omission, they immediately made inquiries and requests to the relevant officers and NYPD units to obtain them. They disclosed all these items to the defendant upon receipt. The People state that, as of March 29, 2026, all discovery identified by defendant as missing have been disclosed. They argue that they acted with the level of overall diligence required by the statute and that the defendant did not incur any prejudice due to the belated disclosures.

In any challenge to the People's COC, the key question is whether the People exercised the requisite level of diligence and made reasonable inquiries to ascertain the existence of the materials. (Bay at 209.) The court is required to make a case specific analysis and examine various factors to determine if the People's efforts meet the statutory requirement of diligence.

Here, the People have sufficiently shown that their overall efforts in gathering and providing discovery meet the required level of diligence. Their efforts to obtain discovery materials began on September 11, 2025, the day of the defendant's arraignment, and continued up to the filing of their COC. Prior to, and with, the filing of their COC, the People timely disclosed a voluminous amount of discovery. Their efforts to obtain discovery continued after receiving defense counsel's first conferral email on March 16, 2026. They immediately began to make specific requests to address the issues of missing discovery and promptly reached out to defense counsel to make them aware of the status of their various inquiries. Prior to filing their response to defense motions, they disclosed all the materials identified by the defendant. Additionally, the belated disclosure did not prejudice the defendant in that the materials were turned over well in advance of setting a trial date. For these reasons, the delayed disclosure of the materials does not require invalidation of the People's COC.

Accordingly, defendant's motion to invalidate the People's COC is denied.

Speedy Trial

Pursuant to CPL § 30.30(7)(c), when a felony complaint has been replaced with a misdemeanor information, the People must be ready within 90 days of arraignment on the new instrument or six months from the filing of the original instrument, whichever period is shorter. Here, the shorter period is six months, which in this case is 181 days, from the filing of the original instrument. After a careful review of the defendant's motion papers and the People's response, the motion to dismiss is denied. The Court finds that 161 chargeable days have accrued since the commencement of the criminal action.

September 11, 2025, to January 12, 2026

On September 11, 2025, the defendant was arraigned on a felony complaint. The matter was adjourned to January 12, 2026, for grand jury action.

123 chargeable days.

January 12, 2026, to March 27, 2026

On January 12, 2026, the People had not yet secured an indictment. The matter was adjourned to March 27, 2026, for that purpose. On February 19, 2026, the People contacted the court and requested that the matter be advanced to the court calendar to dismiss the felony counts. Also on February 19, 2026, the People filed a valid off-calendar COC and SOR. The matter was advanced to the court calendar on February 26, 2026. The felony counts were dismissed, and the matter was reduced to a misdemeanor. The court adjourned the case to March 27, 2026.

38 chargeable days.

March 27, 2026, to June 1, 2026

On March 27, 2026, the court set a motion schedule and adjourned the matter to June 1, 2026, for the Court's decision. The instant motion was filed on March 23, 2026. The People's response was filed on April 17, 2026. The defendant filed a reply on May 1, 2026.

0 chargeable days.

June 1, 2026, to July 16, 2026

On June 1, 2026, the decision was not yet ready and the matter was adjourned to July 16, 2026, for decision.

0 chargeable days.

The People have accrued a total of 161 chargeable days since the commencement of the criminal action and the defendant's motion to dismiss is therefore denied.

This constitutes the decision and order of the Court.

Dated: July 9, 2026

Kings County, New York

Hon. Masateru Marubashi

Judge of the Criminal Court

FOOTNOTES

1.   In People v England, the People's announcement of readiness upon the passage of a full six months after filing of a felony complaint was insufficient to satisfy CPL § 30.30 since a defendant charged by felony complaint must be given at least two days' notice to appear for arraignment on a specified date (CPL § 210.10 [2]). In other words, arraignment was impossible on the last day of the six months when the People declared ready because the defendant had not yet been furnished the requisite notice.

Masateru Marubashi, J.