The People of the State of New York, v. Stephaun Goldstein, Defendant. (2026)

Stephaun Goldstein, hereinafter "defendant," is charged with one count of criminal contempt in the second degree (PL § 215.50[3]), a class A misdemeanor. By Notice of Motion to Dismiss, dated May 7, 2026, the defense challenges the validity of the People's Certificate of Compliance (COC) and moves to dismiss pursuant to CPL § 30.30. The People oppose by motion filed June 11, 2026, and the defense replied on June 16, 2026. Upon review of the submissions, the Court file and relevant legal authority, this court finds that the People's COC is VALID, along with the People's Certificate of Readiness (COR). As only 84 days are chargeable to the People, the defendant's motion to dismiss is hereby DENIED.

I. VALIDITY OF THE PEOPLE'S CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE

Under CPL § 245.20(1), "the prosecution shall disclose to the defendant, and permit the defendant to discover, inspect, copy, photograph and test," all items enumerated in CPL § 245.20(1) that are "in the possession, custody and control of the prosecution or persons under the prosecution's direction or control". "[A]ll items and information related to the prosecution of a charge in the possession of any New York state or local police or law enforcement agency shall be deemed to be in the possession of the prosecution" (CPL § 245.20[2]; see also CPL § 245.55[1] [prosecution must "ensure that a flow of information is maintained between the police and other investigative personnel and his or her office"]).

CPL § 245.10(1)(a) requires the People to perform their initial discovery obligations on a case "as soon as practicable" but within twenty days after arraignment for incarcerated defendants, and, within thirty-five calendar days after arraignment for all others. Pursuant to CPL § 245.50(1), when the prosecution has exercised due diligence and acted in good faith in making reasonable inquiries and efforts to obtain and provide all required discovery, it shall serve upon the defendant and file with the court a certificate of compliance (COC). Any COC shall state that, "after exercising due diligence and making reasonable inquiries and efforts to ascertain the existence of, obtain, and disclose material and information subject to discovery, the prosecution has disclosed and made available all known material and information it has obtained subject to discovery." The COC must also identify the items provided, along with items "that the prosecution is required to disclose and of which the prosecution is aware but has been unable to obtain despite the exercise of due diligence as evaluated under this section" (id.). If additional discovery is disclosed after a COC is filed, the prosecution must serve and file a supplemental certificate of compliance (SCOC) detailing "the basis for the delayed disclosure so that the court may determine whether the delayed disclosure impacts the propriety of the certificate of compliance" (CPL § 245.50[1-a]). However, the filing of an SCOC shall not impact the validity of the original COC if filed "in good faith and after exercising due diligence", or if the additional discovery did not exist at the time of the original COC's filing (id.).

To assess the People's diligence with respect to automatically discoverable items either belated disclosed or not disclosed at all, this court must look at the totality of the People's efforts to comply with Article 245, rather than assess their efforts item by item (see CPL § 245.50[5][a], see also CPL § 30.30[5][b]). "Relevant factors for assessing the prosecutor's due diligence include, but are not limited to: the efforts made by the prosecutor to comply with the requirements of this article; the volume of discovery provided and the volume of discovery outstanding; the complexity of the case; whether the prosecutor knew that the belatedly disclosed or allegedly missing material existed; the explanation for any alleged discovery lapse; the prosecutor's response when apprised of any allegedly missing discovery; whether the belated discovery was substantively duplicative, insignificant, or easily remedied; whether the omission was corrected; whether the prosecution self-reported the error and took prompt remedial action without court intervention; and whether the prosecution's delayed disclosure of discovery was prejudicial to the defense or otherwise impeded the defense's ability to effectively investigate the case or prepare for trial" (CPL § 245.50[5][a]; see also CPL § 30.30[5][b]). "The court's determination shall be based on consideration of all factors listed in [CPL § 245.50(5)(a)] and no one factor shall be determinative" (CPL § 245.50[5][b]). "A court shall not invalidate a certificate of compliance where the party has exercised due diligence and acted in good faith in making reasonable inquiries and efforts to obtain and provide the material required to be disclosed" (CPL § 245.50[6]).

A. The Defense Motion Comports with CPL § 245.50(4).

As a threshold issue, this court will not deny the defense's instant motion for failing to comport with CPL § 245.50(4)(c). Contrary to the People's claim, the fact that "[d]uring conferral in this case, the defense raised issues regarding missing discovery, and the People immediately took corrective action and turned over such missing items" does not preclude defense's challenge to the People's initial COC (P.'s Opp. at p. 11). CPL § 245.50(4)(c) states:

"any challenges to a certificate of compliance or supplemental certificate of compliance shall be accompanied by an affirmation by the moving party that, after the filing of the opposing party's certificate of compliance, such moving party timely conferred in good faith or timely made good faith efforts to confer with the opposing party regarding the specific and particularized matters forming the basis for such challenge, that efforts to obtain the missing discovery from the opposing party or otherwise resolve the issues raised were unsuccessful, and that no accommodation could be reached" (emphasis added).

The defense's original moving papers included the exact language required by CPL § 245.50(4)(c) (Def. Mot. at p. 1-2). There was clear back and forth among the parties about missing discovery, and the defense filed their motion within the applicable timeframe for COC challenge motions. Notably, as the defense points out, defense counsel's good faith conferral is evinced by the fact that their motion was limited to the items for which an accommodation could not be reached (Def. Mot. at p. 2).

The fact that the defense's efforts to obtain the missing discovery were successful does not mean that the defense's efforts to "otherwise resolve the issues raised" were also successful (CPL 245.50[4][c]). This court is aware that other lower courts have used CPL § 245.50(4)(c) to bar defense claims concerning the validity of COCs for lack of good faith conferral when conferral periods are short, made close to the deadline for such motions, or resulted in the production of all evidence requested by the defense. However, this court will not eschew its duty to determine the validity of a COC when there are belated disclosures absent clear evidence that the defense failed to act at all within the 35-day timeframe and with no good cause. Considering the fact that there is little to no guidance on what constitutes a "good faith conferral" pursuant to CPL § 245.50(4)(c), this court sees little value in failing to address the validity of a COC when challenged by the defense, especially given the fact an appellate court may one day determine otherwise and send the case back years later for that very determination. Here, as in many of the cases where courts have failed to address the validity of the People's COC for the defense's failure to comply with CPL § 245.50(4)(c), the defense maintains that the People's belated discovery disclosures render the People's initial COC invalid. Here, the defense also has the added argument that the People's belated disclosures only came after the applicable speedy trial period had elapsed, and that as such, this case should be dismissed. These are disputes that cannot be solved without court intervention, and it is the very reason that judges exist in this adversarial system which promotes judicial economy — to step in where the parties' efforts to resolve the "issues raised" were unsuccessful and to make prompt decisions where "no accommodation could be reached" (CPL § 245.50[4][c]).

In sum, this court finds that the defense's motion complies with CPL § 245.50(4)(c) and will not deny the defense's motion due to the fact that the People eventually disclosed all of the requested materials during the conferral period.

B. The People Met Their Burden to Establish That They Exercised Due Diligence.

Here, the defense argues that the People's COC was invalid for their delayed disclosure of the following items: DD5s and ECMS files related to this case; completed activity logs for detectives Caniglia and Singh; notes from the complainant; and the criminal history for one witness, Patrick Dyer. The People argue that these belated disclosures do not invalidate their COC as they exercised due diligence to fulfill their discovery obligations when they filed their initial COC for this case.

When considering CPL § 245.50(5)(a)'s factors, this court finds that the People met their burden to establish that they exercised due diligence to comply with their discovery obligations for this case at the time that they filed their initial COC. The defendant was arraigned on this case on January 8, 2026. At the time the People filed their initial COC, they had already disclosed a voluminous amount of discovery for this case, and a majority of that discovery was disclosed on January 29, 2026 - 21 days from the defendant's arraignment as required by Article 245. Further, when the People filed their initial COC, they properly disclosed that they were still waiting for the items that form the basis of the defense's instant challenge, as permitted and also required by CPL § 245.50(1). As the People obtained new discovery, they disclosed it to the defense expeditiously and subsequently served and filed supplemental COCs (SCOCs) explaining the discovery delay, as required by CPL § 245.50(1-a).¹ As such, it is clear to this court that the People were diligent in their efforts to comply with the requirements of Article 245.

With respect to remaining factors of CPL § 245.50(5)(a), the volume of discovery belatedly disclosed paled in comparison to that which was disclosed prior to the People's initial COC. After exercising due diligence, the People knew that the DD5s, ECMS files and the completed activity logs were still outstanding and identified them as such in their initial COC. Specifically, the People requested discovery from Detective Caniglia very early on in this case, including the DD5s and ECMS files. On January 29, 2026, the People followed up with this detective to attempt to obtain missing materials. On February 2, 2026, the detective responded that he had shared all ECMS files for this case, which apparently was false. Despite this false claim, the People then sent follow up requests to obtain missing discovery from Detective Caniglia on February 27th and March 5th. When this did not work, on March 12, 2026, they reached out to their Litigation Support Unit (LSU) with a list of all outstanding discovery from Detective Caniglia and asked for assistance. The People followed up with LSU on March 20th and April 13th. Once the materials were eventually received, the People disclosed them promptly, and without any need for court intervention. As defense concedes in their motion, much of the material that was in the ECMS files and the completed activity logs had already been disclosed and was substantially duplicative of the police paperwork that was already provided. The only new information to come out of the ECMS files was the identity of Officer Frank Jilling, whose only involvement with this case was his presence at the scene of the defendant's arrest months after the alleged charged conduct. This officer did not have any BWC, did not take any notes, did not talk to the witness, nor did he take any other investigative steps (P.'s Opp. at p. 18).

As for the remaining items, as the People indicate that they were aware of the witness notes but indicate that these notes were inadvertently not disclosed prior to their COC (id.). As soon as the People learned that the notes were not disclosed, they were immediately turned over to defense counsel. The People were also unaware of Mr. Dyer's criminal history, however, upon conferral the People promptly informed defense counsel of this information. The court agrees that both of these omissions were easily and immediately remedied without court intervention and did not impede defense counsel's investigation. Notably, all missing materials, including these items, were disclosed well before any scheduled hearing and trial date for this case, making the prejudice to the defense nearly nonexistent.

In sum, here, considering all factors of CPL § 245.50(5)(a), the People established that they exercised due diligence and acted in good faith in making reasonable inquiries and efforts to comply with their discovery obligations despite the belated discovery disclosures. Therefore, defense's motion to invalidate the People's initial COC is DENIED.²

II. SPEEDY TRIAL

Pursuant to CPL § 30.30(1)(b), when a defendant is charged with a misdemeanor punishable by a sentence of more than three months, the prosecution must be ready within 90 days from the commencement of that criminal action. To satisfy the initial burden under CPL § 30.30, the defendant need allege "only that the prosecution failed to declare readiness within the statutorily prescribed time period" (People v Luperon, 85 NY2d 71, 77 (1995); see also People v Goode, 87 NY2d 1045, 1047 [1996]). Once the defendant has alleged that more than the statutorily prescribed time period has elapsed since the commencement of the action, the prosecution bears the burden of establishing sufficient excludable delay (see People v Berkowitz, 50 NY2d 333, 349 [1980]). Absent a valid COC, the People cannot be deemed ready for trial (CPL § 245.50[3]).

The defendant is charged with an A misdemeanor, and the applicable speedy trial period is 90 days. This case was filed, and the defendant was arraigned on January 8, 2026. The defendant was released on his own recognizance, and the case was adjourned to February 23, 2026, for a supporting deposition. On February 23, 2026, the case was administratively adjourned to March 13, 2026. The People concede that this time is chargeable, as during this time, they were not ready for trial and did not file a supporting deposition. (64 days charged)

On March 13, 2026, the People were not ready, and the case was adjourned to April 10, 2026, for trial. On April 2, 2026, off-calendar, the People served and filed a COC and COR. As stated above, the People's COC and COR were valid and effective in stopping the speedy trial clock. Therefore, the People are only charged from March 13, 2026, to April 2, 2026. (20 days charged; 84 days total)

On April 10, 2026, the People stated ready for trial, but the defense requested an adjournment, and the case was adjourned to May 28, 2026, for trial. This adjournment is excluded, because the People were ready for trial, and the defense requested and consented to this adjournment (see CPL § 30.30[4][b]). (0 days charged)

On May 28, 2026, the defense requested the instant motion schedule, and the case was adjourned to July 17, 2026, for a decision. This adjournment is excluded for motion practice. (0 days charged)

As only 84 chargeable days have accrued, the defense's motion to dismiss is DENIED. This constitutes the Decision and Order of this Court.

Dated: July 15, 2026

__________________________________

HON. MARVA C. BROWN, JCC

FOOTNOTES

1.   The People continued to disclose discovery material to the defense as it came into their possession, specifically, on March 20, 2026, April 2, 2026, April 7, 2026, April 27, 2026, and April 30, 2026, all without court intervention.

2.   Nothing in this decision precludes the defense from arguing in limine for sanctions pursuant to CPL § 245.80 for any missing or belated disclosures discussed in this decision. However, any decisions concerning sanctions for missing or belated disclosures are left to the trial court.

Marva C. Brown, J.