The People of the State of New York, Plaintiff, v. Julio Garcia Casco, Defendant. (2026)

The defense first moves this court to find the People's certificate of compliance (COC) and certificate of readiness (COR) invalid and to dismiss this case pursuant to CPL §§ 30.30 (1) (b) and 170.30 (1) (e). The defense also moves this court to dismiss the accusatory instrument as facially insufficient pursuant to CPL §§ 170.30 and 170.35 (1) (a). Lastly, the defense moves the court to grant suppression of the defendant's blood alcohol test result pursuant to CPL § 710.20 (5). The People oppose, arguing that the COC motion is procedurally barred under CPL § 245.50 (4) (c), that they exercised due diligence, regardless of any lapses, that the accusatory instrument is facially sufficient, and that the defendant is not entitled to a suppression hearing as they failed to allege particularized facts.

I. Relevant Facts

On January 20, 2025, the defendant was arrested and charged with a top count of violating VTL § 1192 (2) for driving while intoxicated. He was arraigned the same day on an information, and the case was adjourned for the People to comply with discovery.

On April 20, 2020, the People filed and served their COC, a supplemental COC (SCOC), a COR, and a superseding information.

On May 1, 2026, the defense filed the instant motion challenging the People's COC, seeking dismissal on speedy trial and facial insufficiency grounds and, in the alternative, moving for suppression of blood alcohol test results. The defense supplemented its motion with two affirmations in support, one on May 14, 2026, and the other on June 9, 2026.

On June 24, 2026, the People filed their opposition to defense's motion, arguing that the COC challenge was procedurally barred, that they nevertheless exercised due diligence in discovery compliance, that the accusatory instrument was facially sufficient, and that the defendant was not entitled to a suppression hearing.

On July 6, 2026, the defense filed a reply arguing that the COC challenge was not procedurally barred.

The case was calendared for July 23, 2026, for decision.

II. The COC Challenge

On a motion challenging a COC, this court will typically first determine whether the movant has complied with the procedural requirements of CPL § 245.50 (4) (see People v Minor, 2026 NY Slip Op. 50255[U] [Crim Ct, NY County 2026]). Next, if the motion satisfies those requirements, the court will examine the alleged discovery violations individually (People v Lodgson-McCray, 88 Misc 3d 1212[A] [Crim Ct, NY County 2026]). Finally, if the court finds that any discovery violations occurred, the court will then examine the violations in the context of "the totality of the [People's] efforts to comply with the provisions of [Article 245]" and determine whether the People nevertheless "exercised due diligence and acted in good faith" in discharging their duties (CPL 245.50 [5], [6]; see also People v Bay, 41 NY3d 200, 211 [2023]).

Here, the defense has not satisfied a necessary procedural requirement. Under CPL § 245.50 (4) (c), a COC challenge must be filed "within thirty-five days of the service of the certificate" and must include an affirmation that the defense "timely conferred in good faith or timely made good faith efforts to confer with the opposing party regarding the specific and particularized matters forming the basis for such challenge." Although the defense's motion was filed within 35 days of the People's COC, it does not contain any affirmation of timely, good faith conferral.

The defense argues that no conferral was required because the People filed their COC on the 90th day following the defendant's arraignment. There is no such exception found in CPL § 245.50 (4) (c). In contrast, the statute requires all challenges, whether to a COC or SCOC, to contain an affirmation of timely, good faith conferral. It is simply a procedural requirement, which was not met here.

For that reason, the COC challenge is DENIED with leave to renew, and the People's April 20, 2026 COC remains valid.

III. Facial Sufficiency

The defense argues that the accusatory instrument is facially insufficient because it fails to allege facts establishing the operation element of a VTL § 1192 offense. The People oppose the motion, arguing that the facts alleged in the superseding information establish every element of the charged offenses.

To be facially sufficient, an information must "set forth facts that establish reasonable cause to believe that the defendant committed the charged offense," and it must "set forth nonhearsay allegations which, if true, establish every element of the offense charged and the defendant's commission thereof" (People v Smalls, 26 NY3d 1064, 1066 [2015] [internal quotations and citations omitted]; CPL 100.40 [1]). An information that "fail[s] to allege a complete element of the charged offense is jurisdictionally defective," and any such defective charge is subject to dismissal (People v Kalin, 12 NY3d 225, 229 [2009]).

The defendant is accused of several counts of operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated. A person is guilty of these crimes when they "operate a motor vehicle" "while in an intoxicated condition", or "while the person's ability . . . is impaired by the consumption of alcohol", or "while [having] .08 of one per centum or more by weight of alcohol in the person's blood as shown by chemical analysis of such person's blood, breath, urine or saliva " (VTL 1192 [3], [1], [2]).

The accusatory instrument was signed by Ronald Barone and reads, in relevant part:

I responded to a motor vehicle accident and observed a gray Porsche Cayenne pressed up against the back of a construction truck located on the side of the highway. I observed the defendant standing outside of the Porsche Cayenne. Although the car's engine was not running, the hood was still warm and the push start was still activated. The defendant was the only person I saw standing near the car.

The defense argues that the accusatory instrument is facially insufficient because it does not allege facts supporting that the defendant operated the motor vehicle, specifically they argue that there is no sworn observation of the defendant driving or any admission of operation. The People respond that the element of operation is made out by the surrounding facts, including where the vehicle was observed, that the hood was warm, and that the car was involved in a crash.

In cases where officers do not observe operation firsthand, a prima facie case can be alleged through facts supporting a reasonable inference of recent operation (see People v Esposito, 33 NY3d 1016 [2019]). Here, the reasonable inference of operation is established by the reported motor vehicle accident, the location of the vehicle (the side of the highway), the state of the vehicle (pressed up against another vehicle), the warm hood, and the observation of the defendant as the only person near the vehicle. All these factors permit a reasonable inference that the defendant operated the motor vehicle (see People v Polanco, 82 Misc 3d 130 [A], 207 NYS3d 330 [NY App Term], leave to appeal denied, 42 NY3d 929 [2024]; People v Brown, 65 Misc 3d 126 [A], 118 NYS3d 361 [NY App Term 2019]).

For these reasons, the defense's motion to dismiss the accusatory instrument for facial insufficiency is DENIED.

IV. CPL § 30.30

In this case, the defendant is charged with an unclassified misdemeanor punishable by a sentence of imprisonment of up to 364 days and no felonies and the People must be ready for trial within ninety days of the commencement of the criminal action (CPL 30.30 [1] [b]).

From the defendant's arraignment on January 20, 2026, to the People's filing of the COC and COR on April 20, 2026, 90 days are chargeable to the People. The People's April 20, 2026 COR was valid, and no delay has been attributable to them since that date. The defendant's motion to dismiss for speedy trial violation is therefore DENIED.

V. Suppression Hearing

Lastly, the defense requests suppression of the blood alcohol test results taken by police. The People argue that the defendant has not argued particularized facts to grant suppression or a hearing. In this case, both parties agree that police obtained a blood alcohol test results from the defendant while investigating suspected driving while intoxicated, and that the People intend to introduce those results at trial. These allegations create an issue of fact that must be resolved at a pretrial hearing (CPL 710.60 [4]; see People v Mendoza, 82 NY2d 415 [1993]).

The motion to suppress is GRANTED to the extent that a Mapp/Dunaway hearing is ordered.

This constitutes the decision and order of this court.

Dated: July 15, 2026

New York, NY

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Ilona B. Coleman, J.C.C.

Ilona B. Coleman, J.