The People of the State of New York v. Dogan Karakas, Defendant. (2026)

Defendant Dogan Karakas, charged with Aggravated Harassment in the Second Degree (PL § 240.30 [1] [a]) ("Count One"), Stalking in the Fourth Degree (PL § 120.45 [1]) ("Count Two"), and Harassment in the Second Degree (PL § 240.26 [3]) ("Count Three"), moves to dismiss the superseding information ("SSI"), on the ground that it is facially insufficient. The Defendant also moves to dismiss this matter pursuant to Criminal Procedure Law ("CPL") § 30.30, and for discovery-related relief. The People oppose the Defendant's motions, and argue that the challenge under CPL 30.30 is procedurally barred. For the reasons set forth below, the Defendant's motions to dismiss are granted in part and denied in part. The remaining motions are denied in part and reserved in part.

I. Factual Allegations

The SSI  ¹ alleges that on June 5, 2025, and June 6, 2025, inside 410 St. Nicholas Avenue, New York, New York, the complainant received emails from the Defendant stating, "Come outside." On both dates, the complainant observed the Defendant outside her apartment building "near the time" she received the emails.

On June 10, 2025, the complainant received an email from the Defendant that stated in substance, "Didn't you come home tonight? I waited exactly 12 hours."

On June 11, 2025, the complainant received three emails from the Defendant. The first stated:

I'm telling you, I swear I'm not saying this to scare you. I don't want a single hair of your head to he harmed I say to myself every day that I'm going to stand head-to-head with the devil, you see. Let's just talk and say goodbye. I begged you, come and let this torture end, [complainant's name]. I swear, both of us will get hurt, we'll be disgraced. I know what's going to happen. Please.

The second email stated:

[Complainant's name], I won't give up even if this ends in death, please know that. I know we will both be very, very upset and no one can change me. Time won't help either, please. I'm getting worse every day. Let's talk and let it end. Don't talk, I'll talk and relax and then leave. Look, you're here and you'll be here for many years. Let's be good and not be enemies. Please, I'm begging you. I'm not okay.

The third email stated:

I know what's going to happen, [complainant's name]. Finding you and confronting you isn't hard, but making a scene is something else entirely. Today I'll try again, even if I don't want to. If that doesn't work, I'll make strangers wait for you, I'll find out where you're going and show up there. But these are shameful, disgraceful, ugly things---I know. Yet the devil is whispering to me, [complainant's name]. Either I'll do these things or I'll do something to myself.

The SSI further alleges that between June 2025 and July 2025, the complainant received approximately 170 emails from the Defendant. The complainant knew that these emails were from the Defendant, because she recognized the email address from which they were sent as belonging to the Defendant.

On September 18, 2025, the complainant received several telephone calls from an unknown number. The complainant answered two of these calls, and recognized the Defendant's voice as that of the caller. In the first call, the Defendant told the complainant to "come downstairs to talk for the last time" and that "he was waiting" for her. In the second call, the Defendant asked, "Why do you do this to me?"

The Defendant's alleged conduct caused the complainant "to feel annoyed, harassed, alarmed, threatened, and in fear for her physical safety."

II. Legal Standards

An information must contain factual allegations providing reasonable cause to believe that the defendant committed the offense charged in the accusatory part of the information, and non-hearsay factual allegations establishing, if true, that the defendant committed every element of the offense charged. (CPL 100.40 [1] [b]-[c]) This latter requirement, the "prima facie case requirement," is " 'not the same as the burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt required at trial,' nor does it rise to the level of legally sufficient evidence that is necessary to survive a motion to dismiss based on the proof presented at trial" (People v Smalls, 26 NY3d 1064, 1066 [2015], quoting People v Kalin, 12 NY3d 225, 230 [2009]). "So long as the factual allegations of an information give an accused notice sufficient to prepare a defense and are adequately detailed to prevent a defendant from being tried twice for the same offense, they should be given a fair and not overly restrictive or technical reading" (People v Casey, 95 NY2d 354, 360 [2000]).

III. Analysis

(A) Facial Sufficiency

i. Aggravated Harassment in the Second Degree

An individual is guilty of Aggravated Harassment in the Second Degree pursuant to Penal Law § 240.30 (1) (a) where, with the intent to harass another person, he communicates by telephone, computer, mail, or other form of communication, "a threat to cause physical harm to, or unlawful harm to the property of" another person, and he "knows or reasonably should know that such communication will cause such person to reasonably fear harm to such person's physical safety or property." Because PL § 240.30 (1) (a) "criminalize[s] speech alone, a defendant's communication may invoke free speech protection unless the speech presents a clear threat of danger" (People v Goldstein, 74 Misc 3d 1226[A] [Crim Ct, Kings County 2022]; People v Golb, 23 NY3d 455, 466-67 [2014]; see People v Morales, 63 Misc 3d 135[A] [Sup Ct, App Term, 2d Dept 2019] ["[P]rohibitions of pure speech must be limited to communications that qualify as fighting words, true threats, incitement, obscenity, child pornography, fraud, defamation or statements integral to criminal conduct"]).

A "true threat" is a statement "where the speaker means to communicate a serious expression of an intent to commit an act of unlawful violence to a particular individual" (Morales, 63 Misc 3d at 135[A]; see People v Williams, 75 Misc 3d 129[A] [App Term, 1st Dept 2022]). Thus a "true threat" exists where "an ordinary, reasonable recipient familiar with the context of the communication would interpret it as a true threat of violence" (People v Winsbarrow, 48 Misc 3d 1231[A] [Crim Ct, NY County 2015]; see People v Spruill, 49 Misc 3d 1202[A] [Crim Ct, NY County 2015] [communication constitutes a "true threat" where it "convey[s] a clear and unambiguous message that the recipient [can] not help but understand as a threat of future violence"]).

"Where the language at issue is incapable of constituting a true threat, as a matter of law, the complaint should be dismissed" (id.). Even communications that are "vulgar and insulting," (Paruchuri v. Akil, 156 AD3d 712, 714 [2d Dept 2017]), or "unwanted . . . and alarming," are insufficient to support a charge of Aggravated Harassment pursuant to § 240.30 (1) (a), if those communications do not constitute "true threats of physical harm" or "unlawful harm" to property (People v Orr, 47 Misc 3d 1213[A] [Crim Ct, NY County 2015]). So too, expressions of anger or "crude outbursts" without an actual threat will not suffice (People v Dietze, 75 NY2d 47, 54 [1989]). Accordingly, "New York courts have consistently found that there is no 'true threat' in those cases where the communication either did not contain a threat of future violence at all or the seeming threat was not sufficiently specific" (People v DePasquale, 55 Misc 3d 1215[A] [Crim Ct, Kings County 2017]).

Statements of unrequited love, even those that are offensive, are insufficient to support aggravated harassment charges without an actual threat of injury (see People v Franco, 15 Misc 3d 1136[A], 2007 NY Slip Op. 51011[U] [Crim Ct, NY County 2007] ["Defendant's ineptitude, and even offensiveness, as a suitor, is insufficient to establish the charged offense"]; People v Bonitto, 4 Misc 3d 386, 389 [Crim Ct, NY County 2004] [finding no true threat where defendant sent letters to stranger asking to call her; warning that if he could not get her attention, he would "go to Plan B"; and stating that if she did not write back, he would have to call her]).

Here, Count One of the SSI is facially insufficient, because it fails to allege statements containing a threat to cause physical harm to, or unlawful harm to the property of, the complainant. While the alleged communications alarmed the complainant, none of these statements constitutes a "serious expression of an intent to commit an act of unlawful violence" against her (Morales, 63 Misc 3d at 135[A]). Rather, the alleged communications evince a desire to "talk" to the complainant ("Let's just talk and say goodbye"; "Let's talk and let it end"; "I'll talk and relax and then leave"). Even the statement "I won't give up even if this ends in death" is insufficiently specific: the email goes on to state, "you're here and you'll be here for many years." So too, the alleged statement "I'll make strangers wait for you, I'll find out where you're going and show up there," viewed in context, appears to refer to "making a scene" involving the complainant, rather than a threat of physical harm. Accordingly, Count One, charging Aggravated Harassment in the Second Degree under PL § 240.30 (1) (a), is dismissed.

ii. Stalking in the Fourth Degree

Penal Law § 120.45 (1) provides, in relevant part, that "a person is guilty of stalking in the fourth degree when he or she intentionally, and for no legitimate purpose, engages in a course of conduct directed at a specific person, and knows or reasonably should know that such conduct is likely to cause reasonable fear of material harm to the physical health, safety or property of such person." The Defendant argues that Count Two is facially insufficient because the SSI does not adequately allege an objectively reasonable fear of material harm,² or that the course of conduct served no legitimate purpose.³

Stalking does not require proof that a defendant "intended a specific result, such as fear or harm" (People v Stuart, 100 NY2d 412, 426 [2003]). Rather, Penal Law § 120.45 (1) applies regardless of the Defendant's underlying purpose or motive (id. at 427 ["The statute thus focuses on what the offenders do, not what they mean by it or what they intend as their ultimate goal"]). Nor is a "true threat" required to establish Stalking in the Fourth Degree. Penal Law § 120.45 (1) requires that a defendant "knows or reasonably should know" that his conduct "is likely to cause reasonable fear of material harm" to the complainant.

'''[N]o legitimate purpose' means the absence of a reason or justification to engage someone, other than to hound, frighten, intimidate or threaten" and should be considered in the context of the statute's other elements (id. at 428), including the alleged "course of conduct." A "course of conduct" is "a pattern of conduct composed of a series of acts over a period of time, however short, evidencing a continuity of purpose" (People v Payton, 161 Misc 2d 170, 174 [Crim Ct, Kings County 1994], quoted with approval in People v Ubbink, 120 AD3d 1574, 1575-1576 [4th Dept 2014]). "The conduct must be viewed as a whole and not evaluated as a separate act in each occurrence" (People v Westwood, 53 Misc 3d 74, 79 [App Term, 2d Dept 2016]). "In the stalking context, 'continuity of purpose' is not the intent to cause a particular fear of harm but to commit acts which create a reasonable likelihood of fear of harm" (People v Todd, 57 Misc 3d 157[A]*7, 2017 NY Slip Op 51656[U] [App Term, 2d Dept 2017]).

The alleged facts support the inference that the Defendant knew his conduct was likely to cause a reasonable fear of material harm to the complainant. On two successive days, the Defendant emailed the complainant, directing her to come outside; the Defendant was outside the complainant's apartment on both occasions. In a third email, the Defendant asked where the complainant had been, and stated that he had waited for her for twelve hours. The following day, the Defendant sent the complainant three separate emails, "begging" to "talk" to her, and stating that if she refused to speak with him, he would "confront" her and "mak[e] a scene."

The sheer number of communications—170 emails sent over two months—the presence of the Defendant outside the complainant's apartment on multiple occasions; and the indication that the Defendant had been "waiting" for the complainant for "twelve hours," when "viewed as a whole and not evaluated as a separate act in each occurrence" (see Westwood, 53 Misc 3d at 79) establish both a lack of legitimate purpose and a course of conduct likely to cause reasonable fear of material harm to the complainant (see People v Wong, 3 Misc 3d 274, 276 [Crim Ct, NY County 2004]). Additionally, although the standard is objective, the Defendant's conduct allegedly did cause the complainant to fear for her personal safety (see People v Demisse, 24 AD3d 118, 119 [1st Dept 2005]). Accordingly, the Defendant's motion to dismiss Count Two, Stalking in the Fourth Degree, is denied.

iii. Harassment in the Second Degree

"A person is guilty of harassment in the second degree when, with intent to harass, annoy or alarm another person he or she engages in a course of conduct or repeatedly commits acts which alarm or seriously annoy such other person and which serve no legitimate purpose" (Penal Law § 240.26 [3]). The Defendant argues that Count Three of the accusatory instrument fails to allege this charge, because it relies only upon conclusory allegations that the conduct served no "legitimate purpose" and "seriously annoyed" the complainant. The Court disagrees.

As set forth in Section ii, supra, the allegations establish both a lack of legitimate purpose and that the alleged conduct alarmed the complainant. Furthermore, the Defendant's "intent to 'harass, annoy or alarm' (Penal Law § 240.26) could be inferred from his conduct" (People v Bland, 85 Misc 3d 143[A] [App Term, 1st Dept 2025]). The Defendant's persistent emails and phone calls to the complainant, coupled with his appearances outside her home, sufficiently alleges all required elements of this offense (see Diana A. v Kareem E., 177 AD3d 528 [1st Dept 2019]; People v Rodriguez, 74 Misc 3d 133[A] [App Term, 1st Dept 2022]). Accordingly, the Defendant's motion to dismiss Count Three, Harassment in the Second Degree, is denied.

IV. 30.30 Motion

The Defendant contends that, under CPL Article 245, the People's initial certificate of compliance ("COC") and certificate of readiness ("COR"), filed on December 19, 2025, are invalid because items of discovery were withheld or restricted pursuant to a protective order issued by Judge Michelle Weber on December 19, 2025. The Defendant thus argues that the People's COC and COR did not toll the speedy trial clock, and they have exceeded the permissible time within which they must be ready for trial pursuant to CPL 30.30. The People respond that, pursuant to CPL 245.50 (4) (c), the Defendant's motion is untimely and is procedurally barred because defense counsel failed to affirm good faith efforts to confer regarding outstanding discovery issues. The People further argue that, viewing the entirety of their efforts, they satisfied their statutory discovery obligations. For the reasons set forth below, the Defendant's challenge to the validity of the COC and COR, and motion to dismiss pursuant to CPL 30.30, are denied.

If the defense is aware of a "potential defect or deficiency" relating to a COC filed by the People, then the defense must file a motion challenging the COC "within 35 days of service of the certificate"⁴ (CPL 245.50 [4] [b], [c]). A defense challenge to a COC must include an affirmation that the defense "timely conferred in good faith" or "timely made good faith efforts to confer with" the prosecution "regarding the specific and particularized matters forming the basis for" the challenge, and that such efforts to resolve the issues raised "were unsuccessful" (CPL 245.50 [4] [c]). "The affirmation requirement, including the moving party's attestation that 'no accommodation could be reached' cannot be read out of the statute or simply inferred" (People v Dugal, 88 Misc 3d 1044, 1048 [Crim Ct, Bronx County 2025]).

Here, the Defendant has not included an affirmation attesting to timely efforts to confer with the prosecution regarding any discovery issues. Nor has the Defendant responded to the People's arguments that the instant motion should be procedurally barred based on his failure to do so.

Similarly, the Defendant neither filed the instant motion within 35 days of service of the December 19, 2025 COC, nor has he provided any basis for his failure to do so, even after the lack of timeliness was raised by the People in their opposition papers.⁵ Without an explanation as to the failure to affirm conferral, or to file the instant motion within the statutory time period, the Court denies the Defendant's motion to invalidate the People's COC as procedurally barred. The Defendant's motion to dismiss pursuant to CPL 30.30 is likewise denied since it is based on a challenge to the validity of the COC (see People v McGriff, 88 Misc 3d 1216[A], *4 [Sup Ct, Bronx County 2026]; People v Miguel, 87 Misc 3d 1247[A], *3 [Crim Ct, NY County 2025]). This decision is without prejudice, should the Defendant provide the Court with proof of conferral or further information regarding the failure to otherwise comply with Penal Law § 245.50 (4).

The Defendant also argues that he was not timely arraigned on the SSI, and the People have thus exceeded their speedy trial time. The Court disagrees. The SSI was filed and served off-calendar on December 11, 2025, the 74th day of speedy trial time; the Defendant was arraigned on the SSI on January 21, 2026, the 82nd day. A pre-arraignment statement of readiness is valid as long as it is possible for a defendant to be arraigned and the trial to proceed within the statutory speedy trial period (see People v Goss, 87 NY2d 792 [1996]; People v Carter, 91 NY2d 795 [1998]). "Arraigning a defendant" upon an accusatory instrument is "exclusively a court function" and, therefore, "any delay in arraignment is attributable solely to the court and not charged to the prosecution" (id. at 797-78). In misdemeanor cases, "the scheduling of defendant's arraignment is the responsibility of the court rather than the People" and, therefore, it is not the prosecution's responsibility to advance a case for arraignment (People v Rini, 34 Misc 3d 152[A], 2012 NY Slip Op 50302[U] [App Term, 2d Dept 2012]; see People v Torres, 78 Misc 3d 1206[A], 2023 NY Slip Op 50169[U] [Crim Ct, Queens County 2023]). Here, the People filed the SSI on the 74th day, allowing adequate time for the Defendant to be arraigned within the applicable speedy trial period. Therefore, the initial COC and COR, filed on day 82, were valid.

V. Remaining Motions

The Defendant seeks materials subject to the protective order issued in this case. The parties are directed to confer regarding any discovery issues related to the protective order by June 24, 2026, including whether the People intend to disclose any materials on the condition that the materials be available only to defense counsel. Any requests regarding modification of the protective order must be directed to the issuing Court.

The Defendant's motion to preclude or limit testimony by the People's proposed domestic violence expert, because the topic is not beyond the understanding of a typical juror, is reserved for decision by the trial court.

The Defendant's motion for a ruling on permissible grounds for cross-examination of the complainant is reserved for decision by the trial court.

The Defendant seeks an order compelling production of "the complete chain, context, and metadata" for certain disclosed communications from the complainant to the Defendant. The parties are directed to confer regarding this discovery by June 24, 2026, with leave to make any appropriate motions if a resolution cannot be reached.

This opinion constitutes the decision and order of the Court.

Dated: June 8, 2026

New York, New York

Kacie A. Lally, J.C.C.

FOOTNOTES

1.   The Defendant was initially charged via a misdemeanor complaint; an SSI was filed on December 11, 2025.

2.   The Defendant raises certain alleged statements that the complainant made to the Defendant and his wife as evidence that the complainant did not experience reasonable fear of material harm; however, the Court cannot consider the complainant's alleged statements as part of its facial sufficiency analysis (see People v Thomas, 4 NY3d 143 [2005]).

3.   The People oppose dismissal of Count Two but refer to Count Two as charging Harassment in the Second Degree, pursuant to PL § 240.26 (2). All arguments regarding Count Two in the People's opposition papers are addressed to the elements of PL § 240.26 (2), an offense with which the Defendant is not charged.

4.   This 35-day period may be extended upon a showing of good cause, or where the grounds for the challenge are "based upon a material change in circumstances" (CPL 245.50 [4] [c] [i], [ii]).

5.   The Defendant was afforded an opportunity to file a reply to the People's opposition to the instant motion, but did not do so.

Kacie A. Lally, J.