The People of the State of New York v. Max Hartman, Defendant. (2026)

Defendant Max Hartman, charged with one count of Unauthorized Use of a Vehicle in the Third Degree pursuant to Penal Law § 165.05 (1) ("Count One"), and one count of Criminal Possession of Stolen Property in the Fifth Degree pursuant to Penal Law § 165.40 ("Count Two"), moves for an order dismissing the information on the ground that it is facially insufficient. The Defendant also moves to dismiss the information pursuant to Criminal Procedure Law ("CPL") § 30.30. The People oppose the Defendant's motions and argue that the challenge under CPL 30.30 is procedurally barred. For the reasons set forth below, the Defendant's motions to dismiss are granted in part and denied in part.

I. Factual Allegations

The criminal court information alleges that on October 1, 2023, the complainant reported as stolen her black Vespa motorbike with license plate 75TN44. On November 6, 2025, at approximately 9:42 a.m., at 642 West 42nd Street, New York, New York, Police Officer Samanth Lynagh observed the Defendant "standing next to" a 2017 black Vespa motor bike with the license plate 75TN44. While standing next to the motor bike, the Defendant stated to Officer Lynagh, "this is mine." The complainant affirms that she is the owner of the motor bike, and that "the Defendant did not have permission or authority to take, possess, or otherwise use" the motor bike.

II. Facial Sufficiency

A. Legal Standards

An information must contain factual allegations providing reasonable cause to believe that the defendant committed the offense charged in the accusatory part of the information, and non-hearsay factual allegations establishing, if true, that the defendant committed every element of the offense charged. (CPL 100.40 [1] [b]-[c]) This latter requirement, the "prima facie case requirement," is " 'not the same as the burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt required at trial,' nor does it rise to the level of legally sufficient evidence that is necessary to survive a motion to dismiss based on the proof presented at trial" (People v Smalls, 26 NY3d 1064, 1066 [2015], quoting People v Kalin, 12 NY3d 225, 230 [2009]). "So long as the factual allegations of an information give an accused notice sufficient to prepare a defense and are adequately detailed to prevent a defendant from being tried twice for the same offense, they should be given a fair and not overly restrictive or technical reading" (People v Casey, 95 NY2d 354, 360 [2000]).

B. Analysis

i. Unauthorized Use of a Vehicle in the Third Degree

A person commits Unauthorized Use of a Vehicle in the Third Degree when, "knowing that he does not have the consent of the owner, he takes, operates, exercises control over, rides in or otherwise uses a vehicle" (PL § 165.05 [1]). An individual "who engages in any such conduct without the consent of the owner" is "presumed to know that he does not have such consent" (PL § 165.05 [1]). The Defendant argues that the allegations that he was standing next to the vehicle and stated "it's mine" are insufficient to establish the requisite "control over" or "use" of the motor bike. The Court disagrees.

Unauthorized use of a vehicle does not require theft, operation, or movement of the vehicle (People v Franov, 17 NY3d 58 [2011] [operability is not "a sine qua non of the crime of unauthorized use of a vehicle"). Rather, a person "uses" or "exercises control over" over a vehicle when he "takes actions that interfere with or are detrimental to the owner's possession or use of the vehicle" (id. at 64). For example, "use" or "control" of a vehicle includes placing possessions in a vehicle (see People v Nesbitt, 50 Misc 3d 490 [Crim Ct, Bronx County 2015]), sleeping in a vehicle (see People v Guitierrez, 44 Misc 3d 1212[A], 2014 NY Slip Op 51097[U] [Crim Ct, Kings County 2014]), entering and vandalizing the interior of a vehicle (see Franov, 17 NY3d at 64), and being present in a recently stolen and operable vehicle (see People v McCaleb, 25 NY2d 394 [1969]).

A person may also exercise control over a vehicle by "barring the owner or others from entry into" the vehicle (id. at 399). No "minimum duration or physical invasiveness" is required; the "only consideration is whether a defendant's conduct is detrimental to a vehicle owner's use or possession of the vehicle" (Nesbitt, 50 Misc 3d at 496).

Here, the information sufficiently alleges that the Defendant exercised control over the motor bike. The complainant allegedly reported the motor bike stolen, and the Defendant did not have permission or authority to take, possess, or use it. Nonetheless, the Defendant allegedly stood next to the motor bike and informed Officer Lynagh, "this is mine."¹ Standing next to a motor vehicle and claiming ownership of it, at the pleading stage, constitutes an "action that interferes with" or is "detrimental to" the complainant's possession or use of the motor bike (Franov, 17 NY3d at 64; Nesbitt, 50 Misc 3d at 496). Contrary to the Defendant's contentions, the People were not required to allege that the motor bike was running, or that the Defendant rode or operated the vehicle (Franov, 17 NY3d at 63-64).

Notably, Penal Law § 165.05 (1) contains a presumption that an individual who uses or exercises control over a motor vehicle without the consent of the owner is "presumed to know that he does not have such consent" (PL § 165.05 [1]). Here, "the information satisfactorily makes out defendant's unconsented use of complainant's vehicle," as the complainant allegedly reported the vehicle stolen and did not give the Defendant permission or authority to possess or use it. Accordingly, the Defendant is "presumed to have done so knowingly" (Nesbitt, 50 Misc 3d at 496; PL § 165.05 [1]). The Defendant's motion to dismiss Count One, charging Unauthorized Use of a Vehicle in the Third Degree, is thus denied.

ii. Criminal Possession of Stolen Property in the Fifth Degree

A person is guilty of Criminal Possession of Stolen Property in the Fifth Degree when he "knowingly possesses stolen property, with the intent to benefit himself or a person other than an owner thereof or to impede the recovery by an owner thereof" (PL § 165.40). The Defendant argues that the information fails to allege that he "exercised dominion or control" over the vehicle. As set forth above, however, the Defendant's alleged conduct in standing next to the motor bike and informing Officer Lynagh, "this is mine," sufficiently establishes that he "exercised dominion or control" over the motor bike.

The Defendant further contends that the information fails to allege that he "knowingly possessed" stolen property. While Count One, Unauthorized Use of a Vehicle in the Third Degree (PL § 165.05 [1]), contains a presumption that a defendant who uses a vehicle "without the consent of the owner" is "presumed to know that he does not have such consent," Count Two, Criminal Possession of Stolen Property in the Fifth Degree, contains no such presumption. The People therefore cannot rely upon a presumption of knowledge that property is stolen to establish Criminal Possession of Stolen Property in the Fifth Degree.² "Indeed, appellate courts have analyzed circumstantial cases of knowledge for criminal possession of stolen property separate from the unauthorized-use presumption" (People v N.R., 76 Misc 3d 390 [Crim Ct, Bronx County 2022]). An allegation that "the owner had not given anyone permission to possess" the property is thus insufficient to establish a defendant's knowledge that the property is stolen (People v Brissett, 62 Misc 3d 149[A] [Sup Ct, App Term 2019]). "And courts have found unauthorized-use charges legally sufficient where they also found stolen-property possession charges legally insufficient for lack of evidence establishing that the person knew the vehicle was stolen" (N.R., 76 Misc 3d at 395).

Knowledge that property is stolen may be shown "circumstantially by conduct," "directly by admission," or "indirectly by contradictory statements from which guilt may be inferred" (People v Reisman, 29 NY2d 278, 285 [1971]). Circumstantial conduct includes "recent, exclusive, unexplained possession" (Matter of Jashua A., 50 AD3d 528 [1st Dept 2008]), damaged ignition locks, or the defendant's flight (Matter of John R., 229 AD2d 442 [2d Dept 1998]).

Here, the information sufficiently alleges that the Defendant did not have permission or authority to possess the motor vehicle; however, this allegation, on its own, is insufficient to establish the Defendant's knowledge that the motor bike was stolen (see Brissett, 62 Misc 3d 149[A]). Nor have the People alleged an admission of knowledge that the property was stolen; to the contrary, the Defendant claimed ownership of the motor bike.

And while the information alleges possession of the motor bike, it does not support "recent possession" (N.R., 76 Misc 3d at 390 [information "fail[ed] to establish a 'time frame' under which 'recent' exclusive possession could be established"]; Brissett, 62 Misc 3d 149[A] ["absent an allegation as to when the bicycle was stolen, or of facts circumstantially establishing a time frame, the inference based on recent exclusive possession is inapplicable"]. The complainant allegedly reported the motor bike stolen on October 1, 2023. Over two years later, on November 6, 2025, the Defendant stood next to the motor bike and asserted that it belonged to him. This two-year period does not permit an inference of "recent possession" of stolen property. Without any further factual allegations, Count Two of the information is facially insufficient.

III. Procedural History

On November 6, 2025, the People filed a misdemeanor complaint charging the Defendant with Unauthorized Use of a Vehicle in the Third Degree pursuant to Penal Law § 165.05 (1), and Criminal Possession of Stolen Property in the Fifth Degree pursuant to Penal Law § 165.40. The Defendant was arraigned the same day. According to defense counsel, in court on November 6, 2025, he made a record that the Defendant had previously been arrested for the same charges in February 2025, and that the District Attorney's Office had declined to prosecute the February 2025 case. The instant case was adjourned to January 28, 2026, for the People to obtain a supporting deposition from the complainant.

Between November 6, 2025, and January 28, 2026, the People sought and obtained discovery materials. Specifically, on November 6, 2025, the prosecutor requested and received photographs from the arresting officer and scheduled a meeting with the complainant. On November 7, 2025, an analyst from the District Attorney's Body-Worn Camera ("BWC") Unit ordered BWC footage and corresponding metadata for five police officers. On November 10, 2025, the People subpoenaed Department of Motor Vehicle ("DMV") records regarding title and ownership of the vehicle.

On November 11, 2025, the prosecutor met with the complainant and her civil attorney.³ The People received email correspondence between the Defendant's and complainant's civil attorneys about the ongoing dispute regarding the vehicle. The People also requested and received all available complaint reports regarding the two parties.

On November 17, 2025, an analyst from the District Attorney's Case Management Unit ("CMU") ordered 911 recordings and radio runs. On the same day, CMU also obtained the Defendant's arrest photograph.

In court on January 28, 2026, the People filed and served a supporting deposition and the court deemed the accusatory instrument an information. The case was adjourned to February 25, 2026, for trial.

In the interim, the People continued gathering discovery materials. On February 2, 2026, the People disclosed approximately 172 items of discovery to the defense. These materials included: New York Police Department ("NYPD") activity logs, the complaint and arrest reports for the instant case, the complaint report for the February 25, 2025 arrest, Criminal Court paperwork, BWC footage, all complaint reports associated with the Defendant and complainant, and photographs. The same day, the prosecutor contacted the District Attorney's Litigation Support Unit ("LSU") regarding finalized activity logs for responding officers, a report of lost or stolen property, and a vehicle seizure form.

On February 3, 2026, the People disclosed approximately 10 additional items to defense counsel. These items included: emails between the civil attorneys, the Prisoner Arraignment Lookup Sheet ("ZOLPA"), and DMV records. The same day, the People filed and served off-calendar an Automatic Discovery Form ("ADF") and addendum, a discovery list, a Certificate of Compliance ("COC"), and a Certificate of Readiness ("COR").

On February 4, 2026, LSU supplied the prosecutor with the finalized activity logs and confirmed that the other requested documents did not exist. That same day, the People disclosed the finalized activity logs to the defense and filed and served a supplemental COC and restatement of readiness.

Additionally, on February 4, 2026, the radio run was provided to the People. According to the People, the assigned prosecutor missed the notification, and mistakenly believed that no radio run associated with this case existed, because it had begun as a traffic stop rather than a 911 call. On February 9, 2026, the prosecutor discovered that the radio run did exist, disclosed it to the defense, and filed and served a supplemental COC and restatement of readiness.

In court on February 25, 2026, the People stated that they were ready for trial. Defense counsel asserted that People had not yet disclosed the complainant's statements from the Defendant's prior arrest on February 25, 2025. At the request of the defense, the Court set a motion schedule, and the case was adjourned to May 13, 2026, for decision.

On March 6, 2026, defense counsel contacted the prosecutor via email and telephone to request any statements made by the complainant and BWC footage in connection with the February 25, 2025 arrest. The prosecutor responded via email that she would investigate whether these items existed.

On April 16, 2026, defense counsel requested an extension of time to file a reply to the People's response. The Court granted the request, and the case was adjourned to June 18, 2026, for decision.

IV. Challenges to the Certificate of Compliance

The Defendant contends that the People's initial COC and COR, filed on February 3, 2026, their SCOCs dated February 4, 2026 and February 9, 2026, and their in-court statement of readiness are invalid because discovery materials were either belatedly disclosed or have yet to be disclosed. The People respond that the Defendant's motion should be procedurally barred, for failure to comport with the requirements of CPL 245.50 (4) (c). In the alternative, the People assert that they have made good faith, diligent efforts to obtain and disclose all required discovery.

A. Criminal Procedure Law 245

Pursuant to Criminal Procedure Law Article 245, the People must produce certain initial discovery as a matter of course, without any demand from the defense  ⁴ (CPL 245.10, 245.20). When a defendant is not in custody and no individualized circumstances apply, this discovery must be served on the defense within thirty-five days of the defendant's arraignment (CPL 245.10[1] [a] [ii]).

Criminal Procedure Law § 245.20 (1) sets forth a non-exhaustive list of materials subject to automatic disclosure. The prosecution must make a diligent, good faith effort to ascertain the existence of these materials, and to make any such materials available for discovery, even where the items are "not within the prosecutor's possession, custody or control" (CPL 245.20 [2]). "[A]ll items and information related to the prosecution of a charge" that are "in the possession of any New York state or local police or law enforcement agency" are deemed to be "in the possession" of the prosecution (id.). The People are not, however, required to obtain by subpoena duces tecum materials which the defense may also obtain via subpoena.

Once the People have fulfilled their disclosure obligations pursuant to CPL 245.20, they must file a COC (CPL 245.50 [1]). In doing so, the People must affirm that, "after exercising due diligence and making reasonable inquiries and efforts to ascertain the existence of, obtain, and disclose material and information subject to discovery," the People have "disclosed and made available" all known, discoverable material that they have obtained (id.). In addition, the People must identify the specific items provided to the defense, and must disclose any materials "of which the prosecution is aware, but has been unable to obtain despite the exercise of due diligence" (id.).

Absent an individualized finding of special circumstances, only after a proper COC has been filed can the People be deemed ready for trial (CPL 245.50 [3]). Indeed, CPL 30.30 provides that "[a]ny statement of trial readiness must be accompanied or preceded by a certification of good faith compliance with the disclosure requirements of section 245.20" (CPL 30.30 [5]).

Once the People have filed a COC, the defendant must provide discovery to the prosecution within thirty days (CPL 245.10 [2]). Both the prosecution and the defense are bound by a continuing duty to disclose discoverable materials. If either party "subsequently learns of additional material or information which it would have been under a duty to disclose," then that party must "expeditiously notify the other party and disclose the additional material and information" (CPL 245.60).

Should the prosecution disclose additional discovery after filing a COC, the People must file and serve a supplemental COC. The supplemental COC must identify the additional materials provided, and must "detail the basis for the delayed disclosure" (id.; CPL 245.50 [1-a]). So long as the original COC was "filed in good faith and after exercising due diligence," the filing of a supplemental COC will not impact the validity of the original certificate  ⁵ (CPL 245.50 [1-a]; see also People v Bay, 41 NY3d 200, [2023]; People v Coley, 240 AD3d 122 [2d Dept 2025]; People v McMahon, 237 AD3d 746 [2d Dept 2025]). The court will, however, "impose a remedy or sanction that is appropriate and proportionate to the prejudice" for any discoverable materials that are "disclosed belatedly" (CPL 245.80).

If the defense is aware of a "potential defect or deficiency" relating to a COC filed by the People, then the defense must file a motion challenging the COC "within 35 days of service of the certificate"⁶ (CPL 245.50 [4] [b], [c]). Any such challenge must include an affirmation that the defense "timely conferred in good faith" or "timely made good faith efforts to confer with" the prosecution "regarding the specific and particularized matters forming the basis for" the challenge, and that such efforts to resolve the issues raised "were unsuccessful" (CPL 245.50 [4] [c]).

A court will not invalidate a COC if the prosecution "has exercised due diligence and acted in good faith in making reasonable inquiries and efforts to obtain and provide the material required to be disclosed" (CPL 245.50 [6]). In assessing whether the prosecution exercised due diligence, courts weigh the totality of the People's efforts to comply with their discovery obligations, "rather than assess[ing] the [prosecution's] efforts item by item" (CPL 245.50 [5]). In particular, relevant factors include:

[T]he efforts made by the prosecutor to comply with [their discovery obligations]; the volume of discovery provided and the volume of discovery outstanding; the complexity of the case; whether the prosecutor knew that the belatedly disclosed or allegedly missing material existed; the explanation for any alleged discovery lapse; the prosecutor's response when apprised of any allegedly missing discovery; whether the belated discovery was substantively duplicative, insignificant, or easily remedied; whether the omission was corrected; whether the prosecution self-reported the error and took prompt remedial action without court intervention; and whether the prosecution's delayed disclosure of discovery was prejudicial to the defense or otherwise impeded the defense's ability to effectively investigate the case or prepare for trial.

(CPL 245.50 [5]).

B. Application

The Defendant claims that the People failed to: 1) timely disclose the NYPD radio run; and 2) disclose the complainant's statements and any BWC from the February 25, 2025 arrest. He argues that the belated and non-disclosure of these materials invalidates the People's COC, SCOCs, and statements of readiness. The People respond that the Defendant's motion is procedurally barred under CPL 245.50 (4) (c), because defense counsel's communications did not constitute a good faith conferral as contemplated by the statute. The People further assert that, viewing the entirety of their efforts to collect and provide all required discovery, they have satisfied their statutory obligations.

(i) CPL 245.50 (4) (c)

A defense challenge to a COC must include an affirmation that the defense "timely conferred" or "made good faith efforts to confer" with the prosecution regarding the issues forming the basis for the challenge (CPL 245.50 [4] [c]). The People assert that defense counsel contacted the People only once via email and once via telephone, and did not do so until nine days after requesting a motion schedule, and thus did not engage in a "good faith conferral." Under the circumstances of this case, the defense sufficiently conferred with the prosecution pursuant to CPL 245.50 (4) (c). Defense counsel raised an objection on the record on February 25, 2026, regarding outstanding materials, and called and emailed the People to address discovery issues. Accordingly, the Defendant's motion pursuant to CPL 30.30 is not procedurally barred.

(ii) Good Faith and Due Diligence

In determining whether the People exercised due diligence, the Court considers the totality of the People's efforts to comply with their discovery obligations (CPL 245.50 [5]). Here, the People's belated disclosure of the radio run is not a basis to invalidate their initial or supplemental COCs or statements of readiness. The People requested the radio run on November 17, 2025, eleven days after the Defendant's arraignment. The People received the radio run on February 4, 2026.⁷ Although the assigned prosecutor initially overlooked the notification, the People discovered the oversight five days later, on February 9, 2026, and disclosed the radio run to the defense that same day. The People offer an explanation for the discovery lapse: namely, their belief that no radio run existed in the case, based on its inception as a traffic stop. The People also remedied the oversight without any request from the defense. As the defense is now in possession of these materials and does not assert any claim of prejudice, the belated disclosure does not carry significant weight in the Court's due diligence analysis.

With regard to the complainant's statements and any BWC from the February 25, 2025 arrest, the People did not violate their discovery obligations in failing to disclose these materials. On February 2, 2026, the People disclosed the original Omniform System Complaint report, which contains statements that the complainant made to the NYPD in February 2025. With regard to BWC for the February 25, 2025 arrest, the People affirm that, generally, no BWC is created when a complainant walks into a police precinct to make a report, as the complainant did in February 2025. The prosecutor nonetheless contacted the District Attorney's LSW and BWC units to obtain any existing BWC from February 2025, but learned that any related materials had been sealed and an unsealing order would be required. If the BWC or other materials from the February 2025 arrest do exist, CPL 160.50 does not provide a basis for the People to unseal the records under these circumstances. Rather, the statute permits the Defendant to obtain the records, should he seek to do so (see CPL 160.50 [1] [b], [d]; Matter of Katherine B. v Cataldo, 5 NY3d 196 [2005]; Matter of Akieba Mc., 72 AD3d 689 [2d Dept 2010]).

The People began obtaining and reviewing materials on the day of the Defendant's arrest and arraignment. The prosecution lists by date all communications to obtain discovery, any follow-up requests, and when particular items were received and disclosed. Additionally, the prosecutor conferred multiple times with the office's LSU and BWC Unit to acquire missing items. The People disclosed numerous materials, including: activity logs, complaint reports for both arrests, photographs, NYPD arrest paperwork, radio run, DMV records, and BWC footage. Considering the totality of the People's efforts to comply with their discovery obligations, the Court holds that they have acted with good faith and due diligence.

V. 30.30 Motion

The Defendant is accused of a misdemeanor offense punishable by a sentence of imprisonment of more than three months. Accordingly, the People must be ready for trial within 90 days of the commencement of the criminal action, absent excludable time (CPL 30.30 [1] [b]).⁸ Once a defendant has alleged an unexcused delay greater than the statutory allowance, the burden shifts to the People to demonstrate that specific periods of delay should be excluded (see People v Santos, 68 NY2d 859, 861 [1986]; People v Berkowitz, 50 NY2d 333, 349 [1980]).

In his motion to dismiss, the Defendant argues that more than 90 days are chargeable to the People. The People, on the other hand, contend that only 89 days should be charged. This Court finds that 89 days are chargeable to the People, as follows:

A. November 6, 2025 to January 28, 2026: 83 days

Following the filing of the accusatory instrument and the Defendant's arraignment on November 6, 2025, the case was adjourned to January 28, 2026, for the People to obtain a supporting deposition. This 83-day period is chargeable to the People.

B. January 28, 2026 to February 25, 2026: 6 days

On January 28, 2026, the People filed and served a supporting deposition and the court deemed the accusatory instrument an information. The case was adjourned to February 25, 2026, for trial. As set forth in Section II, supra, Count One of the information is facially sufficient. The dismissal of Count Two for facial insufficiency does not invalidate the COC or any statements of readiness (see People v Williams, --NY3d--, 2025 NY Slip Op 06535 [2025]; CPL 30.30 [5-a]).

On February 3, 2026, the People filed and served off-calendar a COC and COR. As set forth in Section IV, supra, the initial COC and COR and subsequent SCOCs and statements of readiness are valid. Therefore, the filing of the initial COC and COR tolled the speedy trial clock. The 6-day period from January 28, 2026 to February 3, 2026 is chargeable to the People. The remainder of this period is not chargeable to the People.

C. February 25, 2026 to May 13, 2026: 0 days

On February 25, 2026, the People stated that they were ready for trial. The Defendant requested a motion schedule to file the instant motions. The Court set a motion schedule, and the case was adjourned to May 13, 2026, for decision. This period is not chargeable to the People (CPL 30.30 [4] [a]).

D. May 13, 2026 to June 18, 2026: 0 days

On April 16, 2026, defense counsel requested an extension to file his reply to the People's opposition to the instant motion. The Court granted the extension, and the case was adjourned to June 18, 2026, for decision. This period is not chargeable to the People (CPL 30.30 [4] [a]).

Accordingly, 89 days are chargeable to the People; the motion to dismiss is denied.

This opinion constitutes the decision and order of the Court.

Dated: June 17, 2026

New York, New York

Kacie A. Lally, J.C.C.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Both parties' motion papers contain additional factual representations: namely, that (according to both parties) the complainant and Defendant are former spouses or intimate partners; that the parties have engaged in civil litigation regarding, inter alia, the motor bike at issue; that (according to the defense) the Defendant paid money toward the purchase of the motor bike; that (according to the People) title and insurance for the motor bike are in the complainant's name, and the defendant has garnered unpaid tickets and fines for the motor bike that have accrued in the complainant's name. In considering the facial sufficiency of the information, however, the Court cannot consider allegations outside the "four corners" of the accusatory instrument (see People v Thomas, 4 NY3d 143 [2005]).

2.   Penal Law § 165.55 (1) provides a permissible inference that "a person who knowingly possess stolen property is presumed to possess it with intent to benefit himself or a person other than an owner thereof or to impede the recovery by an owner thereof."

3.   As set forth in Section II, supra, both parties have referenced civil litigation between the complainant and Defendant regarding, inter alia, the motor bike at issue.

4.   Criminal Procedure Law Article 245 went into effect on January 1, 2020, and has since been amended, most recently on August 7, 2025.

5.   Similarly, a COC will not be deemed invalid if the People subsequently produce additional discovery that "did not exist at the time of the filing of the original certificate of compliance" (CPL 245.50 [1-a]).

6.   This 35-day period may be extended upon a showing of good cause, or where the grounds for the challenge are "based upon a material change in circumstances" (CPL 245.50 [4] [c] [i], [ii]).

7.   The People affirm that there was a delay in receiving any 911 calls and radio runs from the NYPD due to an approximately two-month backlog of requests.

8.   CPL 1.20 (17) provides that "[a] criminal action is commenced by the filing of an accusatory instrument against a defendant in a criminal court." Here, the accusatory instrument was filed on November 6, 2025. The speedy trial clock started running the next day (People v Stiles, 70 NY2d 765, 767 [1987]).

Kacie A. Lally, J.