The People of the State of New York, v. Shadasia Whitley (2026)

The People commenced this misdemeanor action on February 17, 2026, and were required to announce their trial readiness within 90 days—i.e., by May 18, 2026. See CPL 30.30(1)(b). The People filed a statement of readiness on March 12, 2026. Defendant now moves to dismiss the action on speedy-trial grounds, arguing that the statement of readiness was invalid because the People's CPL 30.30(5-a) certification was incorrect. Defendant also requests pretrial suppression hearings. The court assumes the parties' familiarity with the facts and arguments raised in the motion. For the reasons that follow, the dismissal motion is DENIED and hearings are ordered as indicated.

To declare ready, the People must file a valid, triable accusatory instrument. See, e.g., William C. Donnino, Practice Commentaries, McKinney's Consol. Laws of NY, Book 11, CPL 30.30, at 332. Absent a waiver, a misdemeanor complaint is not a triable instrument; to declare ready, the People must replace the complaint with an information. See, e.g., CPL 100.10(1), (4); CPL 170.65(1). Pursuant to CPL 30.30(5-a), the People must also certify that all counts charged in the information are facially sufficient. Among other things, a facially sufficient information must contain non-hearsay allegations which, if true, establish each element of the offenses charged. See CPL 100.40(1); see People v. Kalin, 12 NY3d 225, 228-29 (2009). If a complaint contains hearsay, the People can cure that defect—and convert the complaint to an information—by filing a supporting deposition from the hearsay declarant attesting on personal knowledge to the truth of the hearsay statements in the accusatory instrument. See CPL 100.50(3), 170.65(1); see also People v. Slade, 37 NY3d 127, 136, 140 (2021).

In this case, Police Officer Jose Angelesrestituy swore out a criminal complaint based on statements from complaining witness Christina Nicholson. To convert the complaint, the People filed a supporting deposition from Nicholson, which was dated March 11, 2026. The supporting deposition recited that Nicholson had read the complaint and that the facts in it were true based on their personal knowledge. The name "Christina Nicholson" appeared typed in a digital font on the signature line of the supporting deposition, below a ledger stating that "false statements made herein are punishable as a class A misdemeanor pursuant to P.L. 210.45." In their sworn motion opposition, the People assert that the assigned prosecutor spoke with Nicholson on March 11 and explained the significance of the supporting deposition, and then Nicholson authorized the prosecutor to type Nicholson's name on the document. Defendant has not disputed that account. Instead, defendant argues that the electronic signature on the supporting deposition was invalid because it was not accompanied by separate evidence that Nicholson intended to sign the document. In defendant's view, because the supporting deposition was invalid, it did not properly convert the complaint to an information, which rendered the People's CPL 30.30(5-a) certificate of facial sufficiency incorrect, their statement of readiness illusory, and the action untimely and subject to dismissal under CPL 30.30(1)(b).

At the outset, although defendant frames her challenge in speedy-trial terms, it is really a facial sufficiency challenge, i.e., the information is not facially sufficient because the People's supporting deposition failed to remove hearsay from the complaint. Because the parties dispute whether the information was facially sufficient, they also dispute whether, in retrospect, the People's CPL 30.30(5-a) certificate was correct. This is not a proper speedy-trial challenge, as the CPL "does not provide for any readiness-related consequence for a mistaken or incorrect [ CPL 30.30(5-a) ] certification." People v. Williams, 2025 NY Slip Op. 06535, at *2 (Ct. Apps. 2025); see People v. Rosario, 88 Misc 3d 129(A), at *1 (App. Term, 2d Dep't 2026). Absent any challenge to the validity of the CPL 30.30(5-a) certification itself, defendant's present challenge is properly a challenge to the facial sufficiency of the information under CPL 170.30 and CPL 170.35.

Contrary to defendant's claim, the supporting deposition was valid and converted the complaint in this case to an information. To be valid, a supporting deposition must be "subscribed and verified." CPL 100.20.¹ To "subscribe" a document means "to sign one's name at the end of [ it ]." People v. Sanchez, 47 Misc 3d 612, 614 (N.Y.C. Crim. Ct. 2015); see Black's Law Dictionary (12th ed. 2024), subscribe ("to put one's signature on a document"); see also People v. Robertson, 50 Misc 3d 1224(A), at *4 (N.Y.C. Crim. Ct. 2016). The CPL does not require that a document be signed manually, and the Electronic Signatures and Records Act ("ESRA") provides that "unless specifically provided otherwise by law, an electronic signature may be used by a person in lieu of a signature affixed by hand." State Technology Law § 304(2). Thus, in criminal proceedings, an electronic signature has "the same validity and effect as the use of a signature affixed by hand." State Technology Law § 304(2); see People v. Johnson, 31 Misc 3d 145(A), at *1 (App. Term, 2d Dep't 2011).

An electronic signature is any "electronic sound, symbol, or process, attached to or logically associated with an electronic record and executed or adopted by a person with the intent to sign the record." State Technology Law § 302(3); see General Construction Law § 46. The key "is that the endorser intended to leave his mark upon a document, thereby taking some level of responsibility for its contents." People v. Williams, 63 Misc 3d 765, 769 (N.Y.C. Crim. Ct. 2019) (quoting People v. Jackson, 17 Misc 3d 788, 791 (N.Y.C. Crim. Ct. 2007). Here, Nicholson authorized the assigned prosecutor to affix Nicholson's type-written name to the supporting deposition, after the prosecutor explained the significance of doing so. The type-written name was an acceptable mark, and the communication between the prosecutor and Nicholson sufficiently demonstrated the latter's intent to sign.

Courts have stated that an "electronically signed supporting deposition, without further proof of complainant's intent to sign, is insufficient to convert a complaint to an information." E.g., People v. Rivera, 87 Misc 3d 1224(A), at *2 (N.Y.C. Crim. Ct. 2025). Statements such as these hinge on a basic distinction between manual and electronic signatures. For a manual signature, the ceremonial act of applying a penned signature to a piece of paper unmistakably manifests the signer's intent to sign the document. Thus, in that context, the signature itself establishes the signer's intent. But the same is not necessarily true for an electronic signature: the application of an electronic signature to a document, standing alone, does not rule out the possibility of an unintentional signature in the same way that the act of applying of a manual signature to a paper document rules out the possibility of inadvertence. Courts have thus held that when a supporting deposition (or some other document) is signed electronically, "additional proof demonstrating the intent of the person signing the document" is required to establish a valid signature. People v. Bailey, 81 Misc 3d 1250(A), at *3 (N.Y.C. Crim. Ct. 2024).

Contrary to defendant's claim, however, nothing in these decisions requires that additional proof of signatory intent must be submitted when the signed document is filed for the document to be valid. The court in Rivera imposed no such rule: it held that the People's proof of intent supplied during motion practice was insufficient, but not untimely. See 87 Misc 3d 1224(A) at *1-*2; see also People v. Hutchinson, 80 Misc 3d 678, 686 (N.Y.C. Crim. Ct. 2023) (same). And the supporting deposition was invalid in Bailey because it bore no signature at all, electronic or otherwise. See 81 Misc 3d 1250(A), at *3. None of these cases held that proof of signatory intent must accompany an electronic signature for the signature to be valid. And while there are decisions where the People submitted proof of signatory intent with the signed document, see, e.g., People v. Rodriguez, 50 Misc 3d 1223(A), at *3 (N.Y.C. Crim. Ct. 2016), nothing in those decisions indicates that the People were required to follow that course to make a valid signature. Other cases requiring additional proof of signatory intent have uniformly permitted that proof to be submitted later during litigation. See People v. Adams, 65 Misc 3d 289, 295 (N.Y.C. Crim. Ct. 2019); Williams, 63 Misc 3d at 769; People v. Brothers, 58 Misc 3d 664, 668 (N.Y.C. Crim. Ct. 2017); People v. Robertson, 50 Misc 3d 1224(A) (N.Y.C. Crim. Ct. 2016); Sanchez, 47 Misc 3d at 613. That approach makes sense, and defendant presents no compelling reason to depart from it here: the People submitted proof in response to defendant's motion establishing that Nicholson authorized prosecutors to affix an electronic signature to the supporting deposition on her behalf, thereby demonstrating Nicholson's "intent to sign the record." State Technology Law § 302(3). Nicholson's electronic signature was valid, and defendant's challenge is therefore denied.

As defendant asserts no other challenge to the facial sufficiency of the information nor any other ground for dismissal, the portion of the defense motion seeking dismissal of the action is denied.

Defendant's request for a Wade / Dunaway hearing is GRANTED.

The foregoing constitutes the order of the court.

Dated: July 10, 2026

Bronx, New York

Hon. Philip V. Tisne

FOOTNOTES

1.   There is no dispute that the supporting deposition in this case was properly verified under CPL 100.30(1)(a)(d) because it bore an appropriate perjury-warning ledger.

Philip V. Tisne, J.