The People of the State of New York v. Saul Bernade, Defendant. (2025)

Defendant Saul Bernade moves for an order: (1) dismissing this matter pursuant to Criminal Procedure Law ("CPL") § 30.30; (2) suppressing physical evidence; (3) suppressing statement evidence; and (4) granting a Sandoval hearing. For the reasons set forth below, the Defendant's motion to dismiss the accusatory instrument is granted.

I. Factual Allegations

According to the misdemeanor information, on October 2, 2024, at 3:00 A.M., Police Officer Michael Quinones responded to a 311 call at 36 Arden Street in New York County. Officer Quinones observed a female pit bull dog in the courtyard with two other dogs. He further noted that there was no food or water available to the dogs, and that the female pit bull was injured in her left eye, could not put any weight on her front right leg, and had scars on her face and front legs. Officer Quinones was unable to determine who owned the injured dog; however, residents of the building informed him that the dog belonged to "the guy with the beard." The dog was initially removed to an emergency veterinarian, and was subsequently transferred to the ASPCA hospital for continued care.

Approximately six months later, on April 1, 2025, Officer Quinones returned to 36 Arden Street to remove from the courtyard ten roosters that belonged to the Defendant. At that time, according to the People, Officer Quinones asked the Defendant, "What's the deal with those dogs? Do you also have dogs out here?" The Defendant responded, "Those are my dogs."¹

On May 19, 2025, an arrest warrant was issued in connection with the alleged neglect of the female pit bull on October 2, 2024. The warrant was executed on June 16, 2025.

II. Procedural History

On June 16, 2025, the People filed a misdemeanor information charging the Defendant with Overdriving, Torturing and Injuring Animals, pursuant to Agriculture and Markets Law § 353, and Abandonment of Animals, pursuant to Agriculture and Markets Law § 355. The Defendant was arraigned the same day. The case was adjourned to August 6, 2025, for trial.

On August 6, 2025, the People were not ready for trial. The case was adjourned to September 18, 2025, for the People to file a Certificate of Compliance ("COC"), and for trial.

On September 11, 2025, the People filed and served off-calendar an Automatic Discovery Form ("ADF"), a COC, and a Certificate of Readiness ("COR").

On September 18, 2025, the People stated that they were ready for trial. The case was adjourned to October 15, 2025, for trial.

From September 24, 2025, through October 14, 2025, defense counsel and the People conferred via email regarding disclosed discovery materials, as well as items which defense counsel contended were outstanding.

On October 15, 2025, defense counsel requested a motion schedule to file the instant challenge to the People's COC and statements of readiness. The Court set a motion schedule, and the case was adjourned to December 4, 2025, for decision.

III. Challenges to the Certificate of Compliance

The Defendant contends that the People's initial COC and COR, filed on September 11, 2025, and their restatement of readiness on September 18, 2025, are invalid because discovery materials were either belatedly disclosed or not provided at all. The People respond that certain items requested by the defense are not discoverable, and that they have made good faith, diligent efforts to obtain and disclose the remaining items.

A. Criminal Procedure Law 245

Pursuant to Criminal Procedure Law Article 245, the People must produce certain initial discovery as a matter of course, without any demand from the defense  ² (CPL 245.10, 245.20). When a defendant is not in custody and no individualized circumstances apply, this discovery must be served on the defense within thirty-five days of the defendant's arraignment (CPL 245.10[1] [a] [ii]).

Criminal Procedure Law § 245.20 (1) sets forth a non-exhaustive list of materials subject to automatic disclosure. The prosecution must make a diligent, good faith effort to ascertain the existence of these materials, and to make any such materials available for discovery, even where the items are "not within the prosecutor's possession, custody or control" (CPL 245.20 [2]). "[A]ll items and information related to the prosecution of a charge" that are "in the possession of any New York state or local police or law enforcement agency" are deemed to be "in the possession" of the prosecution (id.). The People are not, however, required to obtain by subpoena duces tecum materials which the defense may also obtain via subpoena.

Once the People have fulfilled their disclosure obligations pursuant to CPL 245.20, they must file a COC (CPL 245.50 [1]). In doing so, the People must affirm that, "after exercising due diligence and making reasonable inquiries and efforts to ascertain the existence of, obtain, and disclose material and information subject to discovery," the People have "disclosed and made available" all known, discoverable material that they have obtained (id.). In addition, the People must identify the specific items provided to the defense, and must disclose any materials "of which the prosecution is aware, but has been unable to obtain despite the exercise of due diligence" (id.).

Absent an individualized finding of special circumstances, only after a proper COC has been filed can the People be deemed ready for trial (CPL 245.50 [3]). Indeed, CPL 30.30 provides that "[a]ny statement of trial readiness must be accompanied or preceded by a certification of good faith compliance with the disclosure requirements of section 245.20" (CPL 30.30 [5]).

Once the People have filed a COC, the defendant must provide discovery to the prosecution within thirty days (CPL 245.10 [2]). Both the prosecution and the defense are bound by a continuing duty to disclose discoverable materials. If either party "subsequently learns of additional material or information which it would have been under a duty to disclose," then that party must "expeditiously notify the other party and disclose the additional material and information" (CPL 245.60).

Should the prosecution disclose additional discovery after filing a COC, the People must file and serve a supplemental COC. The supplemental COC must identify the additional materials provided, and must "detail the basis for the delayed disclosure" (id.; CPL 245.50 [1-a]). So long as the original COC was "filed in good faith and after exercising due diligence," the filing of a supplemental COC will not impact the validity of the original certificate  ³ (CPL 245.50 [1-a]; see also People v Bay, 41 NY3d 200, [2023]; People v Coley, 240 AD3d 122 [2d Dept 2025]; People v McMahon, 237 AD3d 746 [2d Dept 2025]). The court will, however, "impose a remedy or sanction that is appropriate and proportionate to the prejudice" for any discoverable materials that are "disclosed belatedly" (CPL 245.80).

If the defense is aware of a "potential defect or deficiency" relating to a COC filed by the People, then the defense must file a motion challenging the COC "within 35 days of service of the certificate"⁴ (CPL 245.50 [4] [b], [c]). Any such challenge must include an affirmation that the defense "timely conferred in good faith" or "timely made good faith efforts to confer with" the prosecution "regarding the specific and particularized matters forming the basis for" the challenge, and that such efforts to resolve the issues raised "were unsuccessful"⁵ (CPL 245.50 [4] [c]).

A court will not invalidate a COC if the prosecution "has exercised due diligence and acted in good faith in making reasonable inquiries and efforts to obtain and provide the material required to be disclosed" (CPL 245.50 [6]). In assessing whether the prosecution exercised due diligence, courts weigh the totality of the People's efforts to comply with their discovery obligations, "rather than assess[ing] the [prosecution's] efforts item by item" (CPL 245.50 [5]). The recently amended statute codifies the criteria set forth by the Court of Appeals in People v Bay, 41 NY3d at 212, along with other factors, for making such an assessment. In particular, relevant factors include:

[T]he efforts made by the prosecutor to comply with [their discovery obligations]; the volume of discovery provided and the volume of discovery outstanding; the complexity of the case; whether the prosecutor knew that the belatedly disclosed or allegedly missing material existed; the explanation for any alleged discovery lapse; the prosecutor's response when apprised of any allegedly missing discovery; whether the belated discovery was substantively duplicative, insignificant, or easily remedied; whether the omission was corrected; whether the prosecution self-reported the error and took prompt remedial action without court intervention; and whether the prosecution's delayed disclosure of discovery was prejudicial to the defense or otherwise impeded the defense's ability to effectively investigate the case or prepare for trial.

(CPL 245.50 [5]).

B. Application

Here, the Defendant argues that the People failed to properly disclose: 1) body-worn camera ("BWC") footage for Police Officers Quinones and Murphy from October 2, 2024; 2) activity logs for Officers Quinones and Murphy from October 2, 2024; 3) activity logs for Officer Quinones from April 1, 2025; 4) ASPCA animal treatment follow-up records; and 5) law enforcement disclosures ("LED") for Officers Carter, Martinez, Mojica, Quinones, Rodriguez, Sandoval and Sejdiu. Specifically, the Defendant contends that the first four items have not been disclosed, and the fifth item was disclosed belatedly. The People respond that viewing the entirety of their efforts to collect and provide all required discovery, they have satisfied their statutory obligations.

(i)Disputed Discovery Material

a. Body-Worn Camera Footage for Officers Quinones and Murphy from October 2, 2024

The accusatory instrument states that on October 2, 2024, at approximately 3:00 A.M., Officer Quinones observed three dogs in the courtyard of 36 Arden Street. He noted that one of the dogs was injured, and that no food or water was available for the dogs. That same day, according to an NYPD chain-of-custody form, Officer Murphy took custody of the injured dog at 3:15 A.M. Officer Murphy retained custody of the dog until she was transferred to the ASPCA at 1:20 P.M. the following day.

On September 11, 2025, the People disclosed BWC footage for Officer Quinones from two dates: April 2, 2025, when the Defendant allegedly stated that the dogs belonged to him  ⁶ , and June 16, 2025, when the Defendant was arrested. The People did not disclose BWC footage for Officer Quinones for October 2, 2024, the date on which Officer Quinones observed the female pit bull in the courtyard of 36 Arden Street, and noted her injuries. Nor did the People disclose BWC for Officer Murphy from that date.

On September 24, 2025, defense counsel emailed the People requesting BWC footage for Officer Quinones and Officer Murphy from October 2, 2024. On September 29, 2025, the assigned Assistant District Attorney ("ADA") responded that he would reach out to the NYPD "to inquire as to the existence" of the BWC, but did not believe that it existed. Between that date and the filing of the instant motion, the People provided no further information regarding the existence of BWC footage from October 2, 2024, for Officer Quinones or Officer Murphy, or their efforts to obtain any existing footage.

The Defendant filed the instant motion on October 16, 2025. Subsequently, on November 4, 2025, "the People were informed by the 34th Precinct" that "Officer Quinones was wearing BWC on October 2, 2024," but that "the available footage does not depict any interactions with individuals or animals." The People's response next contains the incomplete sentence "In fact, the desk 34th Precinct reported that the BWC for Officer Quinones was from." (affirmation of prosecutor at ¶ 20). The People note that it is "unclear if the available footage is related to the October 2, 2024 response," and affirm that they have "again requested" that the NYPD provide the footage to the assigned ADA. According to the People, once they receive the BWC footage, they "will disclose it whether or not it is related to the instant matter." The People have not addressed the existence, or non-existence, of BWC for Officer Murphy on October 2, 2024.⁷

b. Activity Logs and Related Police Paperwork from October 2, 2024

On September 24, 2025, defense counsel informed the People that no activity logs for Officer Quinones had been produced for October 2, 2024, and requested all activity logs for that date.⁸ On September 29, 2025, the assigned ADA responded that he was unaware of the existence of any such logs, but would contact Officer Quinones. The ADA further stated that any existing activity logs should have been provided in the original disclosures provided on September 11, 2025, but he would inquire further and ensure that any remaining activity logs were made available.

On October 3, 2025, defense counsel responded that no "completed" activity logs had been disclosed, as the paperwork disclosed to the defense indicated that the logs were "still in progress." On October 10, 2025, the assigned ADA replied that he would ensure that the completed activity logs were made available "as soon as practicable." On October 14, 2025, counsel notified the People that completed activity logs still had not been disclosed for October 2, 2024, and raised the concern that other police paperwork, such as notes taken in activity logs or memo books, might also be missing.⁹ The People responded that it was their understanding that all police paperwork had been disclosed, but if the requested documents existed, they would be disclosed expeditiously.

In the instant motion, the Defendant states that he has still not received completed activity logs for October 2, 2024, the date law enforcement observed the injured dog and removed her from the courtyard. The People do not specifically address this material in their opposition to the instant motion. Rather, the People state that, with regard to non-specified "allegedly missing discovery items," their "investigation is going." In particular, they do not confirm whether or not the activity logs exist, and if they do exist, whether the People have obtained them. The People claim only that the requested activity logs are "substantively duplicative or insignificant" and "will provide virtually no additional information related to the case."

c. Activity Logs for Officer Quinones from April 1, 2025

The accusatory instrument alleges that Officer Quinones spoke with the Defendant on April 1, 2025 at 1:00 A.M.; on that date and time, the Defendant allegedly told Officer Quinones, "Those are my dogs." The People subsequently disclosed BWC footage from Officer Quinones for April 2, 2025.

On October 14, 2025, the Defendant requested activity logs for Officer Quinones for April 1, 2025, the date on which, according to the accusatory instrument, the Defendant made the alleged statement to Officer Quinones.¹⁰ The assigned ADA responded that same day that he believed that "all police paperwork" had been disclosed, but if the requested documents existed, they would be disclosed "expeditiously." In their opposition to the instant motion, the People do not specifically address whether any such activity logs exist for April 1, 2025. They do, however, claim that the requested activity logs are "substantively duplicative or insignificant" and "will provide virtually no additional information related to the case."

d. Law Enforcement Disciplinary Materials

On October 15, 2025, defense counsel notified the prosecution that the LED materials had not been disclosed. The same day, the People responded that they believed these materials had previously been disclosed. The assigned ADA sent the LED materials for Officers Carter, Martinez, Mojica, Quinones, Rodriguez, Sandoval, and Sejdiu to the defense later that day. The People acknowledge that this discovery was belatedly disclosed, but assert that the omission was inadvertent and quickly corrected, once the People became aware of the error.

e. ASPCA Animal Treatment Follow-up Records

The People disclosed a veterinary statement from the ASPCA dated October 2, 2024, detailing the dog's condition, physical examination, and treatment. The statement indicated that the dog's left eye would be evaluated by a surgeon to determine an ongoing treatment plan. The People also disclosed an email chain from the ASPCA, from October 19, 2024, to October 25, 2024, chronicling the dog's condition and continued treatment at an emergency veterinary location.

On September 24, 2025, defense counsel requested continued veterinary statements for the dog's treatment, and specifically, any evaluation by an eye surgeon. The People responded that there were no additional statements in their possession or control.

(ii) Due Diligence

As an initial matter, the Court finds that the People were not required to disclose follow-up treatment records from the ASPCA. The ASPCA is not a law enforcement agency, and its materials are not deemed to be in the possession of the prosecution (CPL 245.20 [2]); see People v Solomon, 2025 WL 3276850, *1, 2025 NY Slip Op 25249 [App Term, 1st Dept 2025]). Here, the People disclosed all materials from the ASPCA that were in their possession; they were not required to obtain by subpoena duces tecum materials which the defense could also obtain via subpoena from the ASPCA (CPL 245.20 [2]); see id. at *1).

The remaining items raised by the defense: the BWC footage, activity logs, and LED materials, are clearly discoverable. Accordingly, the Court assesses whether the prosecution has demonstrated diligent, good faith efforts to ascertain the existence of these materials, and to make the materials available for discovery.

Here, the Court acknowledges that the People have disclosed numerous discovery materials, and in addition, that the People's disclosure obligations were complicated by the six-month time period between the officers' initial observation of the injured dog and the Defendant's arrest. The Court further determines that the People have acted in good faith throughout the pendency of the case. The People have not, however, provided a sufficient record for the Court to find that the People have exercised due diligence in fulfilling their disclosure obligations.

First, the BWC footage for Officer Quinones on October 2, 2024, was not disclosed prior to the filing of the COC and COR. BWC footage for NYPD officers is deemed to be in the possession of the People (CPL 245.20 [1] [e]; People v Acevedo, 87 Misc 3d 1201[A], 2025 NY Slip Op 51423[U] [Crim Ct, Bronx County 2025]; see also People v Lawrence, 231 AD3d 1497 [4th Dept 2024]). And in any event, the defense specifically requested this footage on September 24, 2025, thus putting the People on notice regarding the potential discovery lapse. Yet, to date, the only information that the People have provided is that the footage apparently exists, but does not depict any "interactions" with individuals or animals. The People do not appear to be in possession of the footage. They do not appear to have reviewed the footage, or to know its contents. The representation that the footage does not depict "interactions" with people or animals is, itself, non-dispositive. It is unclear, for example, whether the BWC footage depicts Officer Quinones' "observations" of the injured dog (as opposed to an "interaction" with that dog). In short, the People have not provided sufficient information regarding the contents of the BWC, nor a record of the People's attempts to obtain and disclose it, for the Court to conclude that the People have acted with the requisite due diligence.

Second, it appears that completed activity logs for October 2, 2024, and April 1, 2025, have yet to be disclosed. Again, these materials are deemed to be in the possession of the People (CPL 245.20 [1] [e]; People v Kennedy, 79 Misc 3d 973, 979 [Crim Ct, Kings County 2023]). The People have made no record regarding their attempts to obtain these activity logs, nor any responses that they received from the NYPD. It does not appear that the People are in possession of these documents, or have reviewed their contents. As such, the basis for the People's contention that the activity logs are "substantively duplicative or insignificant" and "will provide virtually no additional information related to the case" is unclear. Were the People to have disclosed the activity logs, even belatedly, the Court could analyze whether the information therein was, in fact, duplicative of other information previously disclosed. Without any information regarding the contents of the logs, the Court is unable to make that determination.

Third, it appears that none of the LED were disclosed prior to the filing of the COC and COR. It is unclear whether the failure to timely disclose these materials was due to technological error, oversight, or some other reason. Indeed, the LED materials, which were ultimately disclosed on October 15, 2025, were not accompanied by a supplemental COC identifying the material and detailing the basis for the delayed disclosure, as required by CPL 245.50 (1-a).

In considering the factors set forth in CPL 245.50(5), the Court is unable to conclude that the People have met their burden to demonstrate that they acted with due diligence in meeting their discovery obligations. This case is reasonably complex, in that it involved multiple responses by NYPD officers to the same location, approximately six months apart. In addition, the People disclosed numerous items of discovery.

On the other hand, the defense timely notified the People of the existence of missing materials. While the People did take "prompt remedial action without court intervention" regarding the LED materials, outstanding items still remain: specifically, the BWC footage and activity logs. Nor has the prosecution provided an explanation for the alleged lapses, their efforts to obtain the items, or the reasons that the items have yet to be disclosed. And without any information regarding the contents of the materials, the Court is unable to conclude that the outstanding items are "substantively duplicative, insignificant, or easily remedied" (CPL 245.50[5]). The Court likewise cannot conclude that the Defendant is not prejudiced by the People's failure to obtain and disclose this information.

The Court does not doubt that the People acted in good faith in attempting to satisfy their statutory obligations. In weighing the totality of the People's efforts to comply with the statute, however, the Court is unable to determine that the People exercised the requisite due diligence. Therefore, the Court finds that the People's COC and COR filed on September 11, 2025, were invalid.

IV. 30.30 Motion

The Defendant is accused of a misdemeanor offense punishable by a sentence of imprisonment of more than three months. Accordingly, the People must be ready for trial within 90 days of the commencement of the criminal action, absent excludable time (CPL 30.30 [1] [b])¹¹ . Once a defendant has alleged an unexcused delay greater than the statutory allowance, the burden shifts to the People to demonstrate that specific periods of delay should be excluded (see People v Santos, 68 NY2d 859, 861 [1986]; People v Berkowitz, 50 NY2d 333, 349 [1980]).

In his motion to dismiss, the Defendant argues that more than 121 days are chargeable to the People. The People, on the other hand, contend that only 87 days should be charged. This Court finds that at least 94 days are chargeable to the People, as follows:

A. June 16, 2025 to August 6, 2025: 51 days

Following the filing of the accusatory instrument and the Defendant's arraignment on June 16, 2025, the case was adjourned to August 6, 2025, for trial. This 51-day period is chargeable to the People.

B. August 6, 2025 to September 18, 2025: 43 days

On August 6, 2025, the People were not ready for trial. The case was adjourned to September 18, 2025, for the People to file and serve a COC and for trial. On September 11, 2025, the People filed and served off-calendar a COC and COR. As set forth in Section III(B), supra, the COC and COR were invalid and, therefore, did not toll the speedy trial clock. This 43-day period is chargeable to the People.

Inasmuch as the speedy trial clock already exceeds the permissible 90 days, the Court need not address the remaining adjournments or other motions raised by the Defendant.

Accordingly, at least 94 days are chargeable to the People; the motion to dismiss the accusatory instrument is granted.

This opinion constitutes the decision and order of the Court.

Dated: December 1, 2025

New York, New York

Kacie A. Lally, J.C.C.

FOOTNOTES

1.   The accusatory instrument alleges that the Defendant stated, "Those dogs belong to me." In their opposition to the instant motion, the People assert that the Defendant's statement was, "Those are my dogs."

2.   Criminal Procedure Law Article 245 went into effect on January 1, 2020, and has since been amended, most recently on August 7, 2025.

3.   Similarly, a COC will not be deemed invalid if the People subsequently produce additional discovery that "did not exist at the time of the filing of the original certificate of compliance" (id.).

4.   This 35-day period may be extended upon a showing of good cause, or where the grounds for the challenge are "based upon a material change in circumstances" (CPL 245.50 [4] [c] [i], [ii]).

5.   Amendments to CPL Article 245, including the 35-day time period to challenge COCs, and the requirement of an affirmation regarding good faith efforts to confer, became effective on August 7, 2025 (CPL 245.50 [4] [c], as amended by L 2025, ch 56, part LL, § 8). The amendments apply "to all criminal actions pending" on that date, including the instant matter. The requirement that a challenge to a COC be filed within 35 days of service, however, " run[s] from the effective date" of the statute (id.)

6.   As set forth in Section B(i)(c), infra, it is unclear whether this statement was made on April 1, 2025, or on April 2, 2025.

7.   The defense also asserts that the People failed to list Officer Murphy as an individual who may have information relevant to the case on the People's ADF.

8.   The defense also requested all activity logs for June 16, 2025.

9.   The defense also indicated that it had not received completed activity logs for April 1 or June 6, 2025, and expressed concern that other paperwork for those dates might be missing. It appears that June 6, 2025, is a typographical error, and the defense was referring to June 16, 2025, the date of the Defendant's arrest. The activity logs for April 1, 2025, are discussed infra, Section (B)(i)(c).

10.   The Defendant acknowledges the possibility that April 1, 2025, the date alleged in the accusatory instrument, is a typographical error, and that the alleged statement occurred at 1:00 A.M. on April 2, 2025, the date for which the People provided the BWC footage of Officer Quinones. The Defendant asserts, however, that investigating this discrepancy is precisely why the Defendant requested Officer Quinones' activity logs from April 1, 2025: to determine whether Officer Quinones actually spoke with the Defendant early in the morning on April 1 or on April 2.

11.   CPL 1.20 (17) provides that "[a] criminal action is commenced by the filing of an accusatory instrument against a defendant in a criminal court." Here, the accusatory instrument was filed on June 16, 2025. The speedy trial clock started running the next day (People v Stiles, 70 NY2d 765, 767 [1987]).

Kacie A. Lally, J.