The People of the State of New York v. Robert Brown, Defendant. (2026)

Defendant Robert Brown moves for an order dismissing this case, pursuant to Criminal Procedure Law ("CPL") § 30.30. For the reasons set forth below, the Defendant's motion is denied.

I. Factual Allegations

The People allege that on July 21, 2025, at 10:30 P.M., inside 88 East 127th Street, New York, New York, the Defendant repeatedly shoved the complainant's body with his hands, causing bruising to her arms, legs, and chest, and causing her to fall and hit her head on a doorframe. The complainant sustained lacerations and bleeding to her head. She fled the Defendant's apartment and called her friend, who drove the complainant to Mount Sinai Hospital Morningside. The complainant was assessed by Dr. Ramon Millan from the Emergency Department, who determined that the complainant had a seven-centimeter-long laceration on her scalp. The complainant received seven staples on her head to close the wound.

On July 23, 2025, the complainant went to NYU Langone Hospital because her head wound was bleeding and oozing. An Emergency Department doctor placed one additional staple on her head to treat the wound.

On July 29, 2025, the complainant returned to the Emergency Department at NYU Langone Hospital for a follow-up appointment. She complained of a headache at the laceration site, shooting pain from her head to her shoulder, and chills. Emergency Department doctors removed the staples from the complainant's head.

On August 1, 2025, the complainant again returned to NYU Langone Hospital because the laceration site was swelling and tender.

On August 31, 2025, the complainant went to the 25th Precinct of the New York City Police Department ("NYPD"), and reported that the Defendant had assaulted her on July 21, 2025. The complainant also completed a Domestic Incident Report ("DIR") on that date.

The following day, September 1, 2025, NYPD officers conducted a phone interview with the complainant; the complainant also sent officers photographs of the injuries she had sustained during the alleged July 21, 2025 incident.

On September 2, 2025, NYPD officers conducted a home visit to the complainant's residence, and the complainant provided photos of the Defendant to the officers. On September 3, 2025 and September 4, 2025, Officer Norman Brissett went to the Defendant's residence, but did not apprehend him on either date.

On September 9, 2025, the Defendant turned himself in at the 25th Precinct, and Officer Brissett placed him under arrest.

II. Procedural History

On September 9, 2025, the People filed a misdemeanor complaint charging the Defendant with Assault in the Third Degree (PL § 120.00 [1], [2]), Aggravated Harassment in the Second Degree (PL § 240.30 [4]), Attempted Assault in the Third Degree (PL §§ 110/120.00 [1]), and Harassment in the Second Degree (PL § 240.26 [1]). The Defendant was arraigned the same day. The case was adjourned to October 27, 2025, for the People to obtain a supporting deposition from the complainant.

On October 27, 2025, the People filed and served a supporting deposition and the Court deemed the accusatory instrument an information. The case was adjourned to December 11, 2025, for trial.

In the interim, on December 4, 2025, the People served discovery upon original defense counsel,¹ and filed and served off-calendar an Automatic Discovery Form ("ADF"), a Certificate of Compliance ("COC"), and a Certificate of Readiness ("COR"). The People noted in the COC that certain discovery items were still outstanding, to wit, medical records from Mount Sinai Hospital and NYU Langone Hospital, approximately nine NYPD activity logs, and an Internal Affairs Bureau ("IAB") log for Officer Brissett. The People affirmed that they had exercised due diligence in seeking to obtain the materials, and would continue to do so.

On December 11, 2025, the People served additional discovery  ² on the defense, then filed and served off-calendar a Supplemental COC ("SCOC") and restatement of readiness. The People again noted in the SCOC that outstanding items, specifically, the medical records from Mount Sinai Hospital and NYU Langone Hospital, the approximately nine NYPD activity logs, and the IAB log for Officer Brissett, were not yet in the People's custody or control. In court on December 11, 2025, present defense counsel was assigned to represent the Defendant, and the People stated that they were ready for trial. The case was adjourned to January 7, 2026, for trial. Following the court appearance, the People served the previously-disclosed discovery materials on present counsel.

From December 17, 2025 through January 30, 2026, defense counsel and the People conferred via email multiple times regarding disclosed discovery materials, as well as items which defense counsel contended were outstanding.

On December 18, 2025, the People served the nine NYPD activity logs and an updated disclosure index for one police officer  ³ on the defense, and then filed and served off-calendar an SCOC and restatement of readiness. The People noted that, while they had produced certain previously-outstanding items, the medical records from Mount Sinai Hospital and NYU Langone Hospital, as well as the IAB log for Officer Brissett, were still outstanding.

On January 6, 2026, the People served the NYU Langone medical records on the defense, then filed and served off-calendar an SCOC and restatement of readiness. The People noted in the SCOC that the medical records from Mount Sinai Hospital and the IAB log for Officer Brissett were not yet in the People's custody or control.

In court on January 7, 2026, the People stated that they were ready for trial. The case was adjourned to February 26, 2026, for trial.

On January 20, 2026, the People served the Mount Sinai Hospital records and the IAB log for Officer Brissett on the defense, and then filed and served off-calendar an SCOC and restatement of readiness. The People noted that they had disclosed all previously-outstanding materials, but that they were now awaiting receipt of the complainant's follow-up medical treatment records. In addition, the People filed and served a supplemental ADF that included notice of their intent to call expert witnesses at trial, specifically, the complainant's treating physician and one of three proposed experts on domestic violence. The People disclosed the curriculum vitae ("CV") for the treating physician, Dr. Millan, and the CV and list of academic sources and publications for each potential domestic violence expert witness.

On January 30, 2026, the Defendant filed and served off-calendar the instant motion to dismiss.

On February 25, 2026, the People served on the defense discovery materials that did not exist at the time the initial COC and COR were filed (see CPL 245.50 [1-a]), then filed and served off-calendar an SCOC and restatement of readiness. The People noted in the SCOC that they were not yet in possession of NYU Langone Hospital neurology records from the complainant's follow-up appointments, despite diligent efforts to acquire those records.

On February 26, 2026, the Court set a motion schedule for the instant motion, and the case was adjourned to April 16, 2026, for decision.⁴

III. Challenges to the Certificate of Compliance

The Defendant contends that the People's initial COC and COR, filed on December 4, 2025, and their SCOCS and restatements of readiness on December 11, 2025, December 18, 2025, January 6, 2026, and January 20, 2026, are invalid because discovery materials were either belatedly disclosed or not adequately disclosed. The People respond that the Defendant's motion should be procedurally barred for failure to comport with the requirements of CPL 245.50 (4) (c). In the alternative, the People assert that they have made good faith, diligent efforts to obtain and disclose all required discovery.

A. Criminal Procedure Law 245

Pursuant to Criminal Procedure Law Article 245, the People must produce certain initial discovery as a matter of course, without any demand from the defense  ⁵ (CPL 245.10, 245.20). When a defendant is not in custody and no individualized circumstances apply, this discovery must be served on the defense within thirty-five days of the defendant's arraignment (CPL 245.10[1] [a] [ii]).

Criminal Procedure Law § 245.20 (1) sets forth a non-exhaustive list of materials subject to automatic disclosure. The prosecution must make a diligent, good faith effort to ascertain the existence of these materials, and to make any such materials available for discovery, even where the items are "not within the prosecutor's possession, custody or control" (CPL 245.20 [2]). "[A]ll items and information related to the prosecution of a charge" that are "in the possession of any New York state or local police or law enforcement agency" are deemed to be "in the possession" of the prosecution (id.). The People are not, however, required to obtain by subpoena duces tecum materials which the defense may also obtain via subpoena.

Once the People have fulfilled their disclosure obligations pursuant to CPL 245.20, they must file a COC (CPL 245.50 [1]). In doing so, the People must affirm that, "after exercising due diligence and making reasonable inquiries and efforts to ascertain the existence of, obtain, and disclose material and information subject to discovery," the People have "disclosed and made available" all known, discoverable material that they have obtained (id.). In addition, the People must identify the specific items provided to the defense, and must disclose any materials "of which the prosecution is aware, but has been unable to obtain despite the exercise of due diligence" (id.).

Absent an individualized finding of special circumstances, only after a proper COC has been filed can the People be deemed ready for trial (CPL 245.50 [3]). Indeed, CPL 30.30 provides that "[a]ny statement of trial readiness must be accompanied or preceded by a certification of good faith compliance with the disclosure requirements of section 245.20" (CPL 30.30 [5]).

Once the People have filed a COC, the defendant must provide discovery to the prosecution within thirty days (CPL 245.10 [2]). Both the prosecution and the defense are bound by a continuing duty to disclose discoverable materials. If either party "subsequently learns of additional material or information which it would have been under a duty to disclose," then that party must "expeditiously notify the other party and disclose the additional material and information" (CPL 245.60).

Should the prosecution disclose additional discovery after filing a COC, the People must file and serve a supplemental COC. The supplemental COC must identify the additional materials provided, and must "detail the basis for the delayed disclosure" (id.; CPL 245.50 [1-a]). So long as the original COC was "filed in good faith and after exercising due diligence," the filing of a supplemental COC will not impact the validity of the original certificate  ⁶ (CPL 245.50 [1-a]; see also People v Bay, 41 NY3d 200, [2023]; People v Coley, 240 AD3d 122 [2d Dept 2025]; People v McMahon, 237 AD3d 746 [2d Dept 2025]). The court will, however, "impose a remedy or sanction that is appropriate and proportionate to the prejudice" for any discoverable materials that are "disclosed belatedly" (CPL 245.80).

If the defense is aware of a "potential defect or deficiency" relating to a COC filed by the People, then the defense must file a motion challenging the COC "within 35 days of service of the certificate"⁷ (CPL 245.50 [4] [b], [c]). Any such challenge must include an affirmation that the defense "timely conferred in good faith" or "timely made good faith efforts to confer with" the prosecution "regarding the specific and particularized matters forming the basis for" the challenge, and that such efforts to resolve the issues raised "were unsuccessful" (CPL 245.50 [4] [c]).

A court will not invalidate a COC if the prosecution "has exercised due diligence and acted in good faith in making reasonable inquiries and efforts to obtain and provide the material required to be disclosed" (CPL 245.50 [6]). In assessing whether the prosecution exercised due diligence, courts weigh the totality of the People's efforts to comply with their discovery obligations, "rather than assess[ing] the [prosecution's] efforts item by item" (CPL 245.50 [5]). The recently amended statute codifies the criteria set forth by the Court of Appeals in People v Bay, 41 NY3d at 212, along with other factors, for making such an assessment. In particular, relevant factors include:

[T]he efforts made by the prosecutor to comply with [their discovery obligations]; the volume of discovery provided and the volume of discovery outstanding; the complexity of the case; whether the prosecutor knew that the belatedly disclosed or allegedly missing material existed; the explanation for any alleged discovery lapse; the prosecutor's response when apprised of any allegedly missing discovery; whether the belated discovery was substantively duplicative, insignificant, or easily remedied; whether the omission was corrected; whether the prosecution self-reported the error and took prompt remedial action without court intervention; and whether the prosecution's delayed disclosure of discovery was prejudicial to the defense or otherwise impeded the defense's ability to effectively investigate the case or prepare for trial.

(CPL 245.50 [5]).

B. Application

The Defendant argues that the People failed to timely disclose: 1) information pertaining to expert witnesses they intend to call at trial; 2) nine activity logs for NYPD officers involved in the case; and 3) an IAB log related to misconduct allegations against Police Officer Brissett. He further asserts that the belated disclosure of these materials invalidates the People's COC, SCOCs and statements of readiness. The People respond that the Defendant's motion is procedurally barred under CPL 245.50 (4) (c) because defense counsel failed to confer with the People regarding the NYPD activity logs and IAB log in advance of filing the instant motion. The People further assert that, viewing the entirety of their efforts to collect and provide all required discovery, they have satisfied their statutory obligations.

(i) CPL 245.50 (4) (c)

A defense challenge to a COC must include an affirmation that the defense "timely conferred" or "made good faith efforts to confer" with the prosecution regarding the issues forming the basis for the challenge (CPL 245.50 [4] [c]). The People assert that the Defendant's failure to specifically reference the NYPD activity logs and IAB log during the conferral process is fatal to the instant motion. The Court disagrees.

As an initial matter, the Court notes that the parties timely conferred regarding discovery, as required by CPL 245.50 (4) (c). As evidenced by the multiple email chains attached as exhibits to the instant motion, the parties were able to resolve a number of discovery-related issues through their respectful exchanges, prompt review of discovery materials, and follow-up communications. Indeed, both parties are to be commended for their good faith efforts to confer and address outstanding issues.

With regard to the NYPD activity logs and IAB log, defense counsel did not specifically enumerate these items during the conferral process. Yet the People were already on notice as to the delayed disclosure. Indeed, it was the People who originally raised the existence of these outstanding materials in their initial COC and SCOCs. It should have come as no surprise to the People that the Defendant might challenge the COC and SCOC on the basis of these belated disclosures. And even had the defense conferred regarding these materials, it is unclear what additional action the People would, or could, have taken: the People had affirmed in their COC and SCOC that they were already making efforts to obtain and disclose these items. The Court thus declines to deny the motion as procedurally barred.

(ii)Disputed Discovery Material

Turning to the merits of the Defendant's motion, the defense asserts that the People failed to timely disclose: 1) information regarding expert witnesses; 2) nine activity logs for NYPD officers; and 3) an IAB log regarding Police Officer Brissett.

a. Expert Opinion Evidence

On January 20, 2026, the People filed and served a supplemental ADF that included notice of their intent to call expert witnesses at trial pursuant to CPL 245.20 (1) (f). The notice stated:

The People expect to call at trial or a pre-trial hearing an expert witness in the area(s) noted below, and herby make the following disclosures regarding expert opinion evidence. Where we have not determined who the specific expert will be, we have summarized, where possible, the anticipated topics of such witness's expertise, based upon the nature of the expected testimony. We will provide further information required pursuant to this paragraph once specific witness determinations are made and additional discoverable material is available.

A statement of the facts and opinions to which an expert witness is expected to testify, as well as the grounds for the expert's opinions, are or will be included in any report the expert may prepare, as indicated below. However, where it is indicated that the expert will not prepare a report, a statement of the facts and opinions to which the expert is expected to testify is included below. Furthermore, the grounds for the opinions of the expert, if not expressed separately in a written report, include the expert's education in the relevant field, training and experience (as summarized in the disclosed curriculum vitae).

(Defendant's exhibit G).

The ADF indicated the People's intent to call Dr. Ramon Millan, who treated the complainant at Mount Sinai's Emergency Department following the alleged assault, to explain his treatment and diagnosis. It also included the names of three domestic violence experts, one of whom the People would call "to explain the dynamics of Intimate Partner Violence, including short-term and long-term effects of trauma and the barriers that keep victims from reporting and participating in the criminal justice process" (id.). Also on January 20, 2026, the People disclosed the CV for Dr. Millan, and the CV and list of academic sources and publications for each potential domestic violence expert witness.

The Defendant argues that the People's disclosure of this material was both untimely and insufficient. He asserts that the broad description of the subject areas to which the experts will testify does not satisfy the statutory requirements. The Defendant also challenges the People's failure to specify which domestic violence expert they will call.

The People respond that they did not decide to call expert witnesses until they had reviewed the complainant's medical records, that they made the expert disclosures shortly after receiving the records, and that their disclosures are sufficient to satisfy CPL 245.20 (1) (f).

CPL 245.20 (1) (f) requires the People to disclose

the name, business address, current curriculum vitae, a list of publications, and a list of proficiency tests and results administered or taken within the past ten years of each expert witness whom the prosecutor intends to call as a witness at trial or a pre-trial hearing, and all reports prepared by the expert that pertain to the case, or if no report is prepared, a written statement of the facts and opinions to which the expert is expected to testify and a summary of the grounds for each opinion.

(CPL 245.20 [1] [f]). Pursuant to CPL 245.10 (1) (ii), these disclosures must be made within thirty-five days after the Defendant's arraignment. The People are permitted, however, to continue to gather evidence to strengthen their case, including by deciding to call additional witnesses (see People v Wright, 50 AD3d 429, 430 [1st Dept 2008]).

Here, the People did not obtain the complainant's medical records from NYU Langone Hospital until January 6, 2026, and from Mount Sinai Hospital until January 9, 2026.⁸ Once the People reviewed the records, they determined that calling the treating physician and a domestic violence expert would "strengthen their case" (see id.), and promptly disclosed their intent to call these witnesses to the defense on January 20, 2026.

With regard to the sufficiency of the disclosures, the People adequately complied with CPL 245.20 (1) (f) as to Dr. Millan. The People have disclosed both Dr. Millan's CV and his "reports . . . that pertain to the case," specifically, the complainant's medical records for July 21, 2025, the date on which Dr. Millan treated the complainant. These medical records contain a summary of Dr. Millan's evaluation of the complainant, the relevant factors he considered, his findings, and the basis for those findings. These disclosures thus fulfill the requirements of CPL 245.20 (1) (f).

As to the domestic violence expert, the Court declines to invalidate the People's COCs in connection with the required expert witness disclosure (see Section III [B] [iii], infra). Though sparse, the disclosure provides the defense with notice as to the subject matter of the proposed expert testimony, and the People disclosed CVs and a list of academic sources and publications for the domestic violence experts. However, the Defendant is clearly entitled to notice of the specific facts and opinions to which the experts are expected to testify, as well as a summary of the grounds for those opinions (CPL § 245.20 [1] [f]). As such, the People are directed to disclose that information promptly, or risk having such evidence precluded at trial.⁹

b. NYPD Activity Logs

The Defendant contends that the People belatedly disclosed nine NYPD activity logs, and that their failure to timely disclose these items undermines any claim of due diligence. Here, however, the People have detailed repeated efforts to obtain the missing activity logs. The assigned prosecutor contacted her office's Litigation Services Unit ("LSU"), which assists with the gathering of discovery, approximately eleven times, requesting that LSU follow up with the NYPD regarding the outstanding activity logs. From November 16, 2025 to December 18, 2025, LSU contacted the NYPD by email and phone approximately nine times to obtain the missing materials. The prosecutor also directly called, texted, and emailed the officers and their precincts for assistance in obtaining the activity logs. In the initial COC, filed on December 4, 2025, the People notified the Defendant that they were aware that this discovery was missing despite their efforts to obtain it. On December 12, 2025 and December 18, 2025, the NYPD provided the logs to the People, and the People disclosed the logs to the defense promptly on December 18, 2025.

c. IAB Log for Officer Brissett

The Defendant also argues that the COC and SCOCs are invalid because the People belatedly disclosed the IAB log for Officer Brissett. In response, the People detail their efforts to obtain all required disciplinary-related materials for testifying police officers. The People served nineteen documents pertaining to law enforcement disclosures prior to the filing of the initial COC, and also notified the defense that one IAB log was missing from those disclosures. Although the People do not concede that this IAB log is automatically discoverable,¹⁰ they nonetheless continued their efforts to obtain it, contacting the NYPD three times regarding its whereabouts. Once the People received the IAB log, they promptly disclosed it on January 20, 2026.

(iii) Due Diligence

In determining whether the People exercised due diligence, the Court considers the totality of the People's efforts to comply with their discovery obligations (CPL 245.50 [5]). Here, the People's response details their efforts to comply with their statutory requirements from the inception of the case. They list by date all communications to obtain discovery, any follow-up requests, and when particular items were received and disclosed. Additionally, the prosecutor conferred numerous times with her office's LSU, Early Engagement Case Unit, Survivor Services Bureau ("SSB"), Central Services, Body Worn Camera Unit ("BWC"), and Law Enforcement Disclosure Group to acquire missing items. The prosecutor also communicated directly with the complainant, a civilian witness, and law enforcement officers, and repeatedly directed a paralegal to follow up with the relevant hospitals to obtain the complainant's medical records.

The People have also documented the significant "volume of discovery provided" (affirmation of prosecutor at 37-39). In total, the People disclosed approximately 3,155 pages of discovery, including: the Defendant's arrest report and photo, Criminal Justice Agency report, District Attorney's datasheet, court jacket, NYPD domestic incident and complaint reports, NYPD activity logs, complainant interview notes, SSB materials, medical records, radiology imaging records, expert documents, law enforcement disciplinary disclosures, BWC footage and related metadata, and radio messages. In contrast, the belatedly disclosed material was comprised of approximately ten documents, which were ultimately disclosed to the defense.

Although this case is not particularly complex, certain factors complicated the People's discovery obligations. Here, officers from a different precinct than the arresting officer completed a home visit and follow-up phone call with the complainant. The BWC footage from those officers and any materials they created based on those visits, such as activity logs, notes, and communications, are clearly discoverable, but because the officers were not associated with the arresting officer's precinct, these items were not automatically provided to the People. The People thus called and emailed the officers and both precincts multiple times to obtain these materials. The complainant was also treated at two different hospitals on multiple dates, and attended follow-up neurology appointments.

The People offer a thorough explanation for the belated disclosure of the three categories of items that form the basis of the Defendant's challenge (see CPL 245.50 [5]; Sections II and III (B) (ii), supra). The People self-reported in the initial COC and SCOCs that the activity logs  ¹¹ and IAB log were outstanding, and made diligent efforts to obtain them, without notice from the defense or court intervention. The People further promptly disclosed these materials once obtained, on December 18, 2025 and January 20, 2026, respectively. The People also offer a reasonable explanation for the belated notice of their intent to call expert witnesses: that they became aware of the need to do so once they received and reviewed the complainant's medical records.

The People have met their burden of showing that they exercised both good faith and due diligence. They made and documented numerous inquiries to ascertain discoverable material and once identified, to obtain it. The People timely disclosed voluminous discovery, and the Defendant has not alleged any prejudice resulting from the delayed disclosures. Weighing the totality of the People's efforts to comply with their discovery obligations (see CPL 245.50 [5]), the belated disclosure of the materials at issue does not invalidate the initial COC, SCOCs, or statements of readiness.

IV. 30.30 Motion

The Defendant is accused of a misdemeanor offense punishable by a sentence of imprisonment of more than three months. Accordingly, the People must be ready for trial within 90 days of the commencement of the criminal action, absent excludable time (CPL 30.30 [1] [b]).¹² Once a defendant has alleged an unexcused delay greater than the statutory allowance, the burden shifts to the People to demonstrate that specific periods of delay should be excluded (see People v Santos, 68 NY2d 859, 861 [1986]; People v Berkowitz, 50 NY2d 333, 349 [1980]).

In his motion to dismiss, the Defendant argues that 143 days are chargeable to the People. The People, on the other hand, contend that only 86 days should be charged. This Court finds that at 86 days are chargeable to the People, as follows:

A. September 9, 2025 to October 27, 2025: 48 days

Following the filing of the accusatory instrument and the Defendant's arraignment on September 9, 2025, the case was adjourned to October 27, 2025, for the People to obtain a supporting deposition. This 48-day period is chargeable to the People.

B. October 27, 2025 to December 11, 2025: 38 days

On October 27, 2025, the People filed and served a supporting deposition and the accusatory instrument was deemed an information. The case was adjourned to December 4, 2025, for trial. On December 4, 2025, the People filed and served off-calendar a COC and COR. As set forth in Section III, supra, the COC and COR were valid and, therefore, tolled the speedy trial clock. The 38-day period from October 27 to December 4, 2025 is chargeable to the People. The remainder of this period is not chargeable to the People.

C. December 11, 2025 to January 7, 2026: 0 days

On December 11, 2025, the People were ready for trial. The case was adjourned, at the defense request, to January 7, 2026, for trial. This period is not chargeable to the People (CPL 30.30 [4] [b]).

D. January 7, 2026 to February 26, 2026: 0 days

On January 7, 2026, the People were ready for trial and the defense requested an adjournment. The case was adjourned to February 26, 2026, for trial. On January 30, 2026, the Defendant filed and served off-calendar the instant motion to dismiss. This period is not chargeable to the People (CPL 30.30 [4] [a], [b]).

E. February 26, 2026 to April 16, 2026: 0 days

On February 26, 2026, the Court set a motion schedule. The case was adjourned to April 16, 2026, for decision. This period is not chargeable to the People (CPL 30.30 [4] [a]).

Accordingly, 86 days are chargeable to the People; the motion to dismiss is denied.

This opinion constitutes the decision and order of the Court.

Dated: April 15, 2026

New York, New York

Kacie A. Lally, J.C.C.

FOOTNOTES

1.   At arraignment, the Defendant was represented by counsel from the Legal Aid Society. Present defense counsel was assigned to represent the Defendant on December 11, 2025.

2.   The discovery served on this date did not exist when the initial COC and COR were served. The defense, therefore, does not contend that these disclosures are grounds for invalidating the SCOC (see CPL 245.50 [1-a]).

3.   The updated disclosure index did not exist when the initial COC and COR were served, and the Defendant does not challenge the SCOC on the basis of this document (see CPL 245.50 [1-a]).

4.   On March 24, 2026, the People served the NYU Langone Hospital neurology records from the complainant's follow-up appointments on the defense, then filed and served off-calendar an SCOC and restatement of readiness. The Defendant does not challenge the validity of the SCOCs and restatements of readiness filed on February 25, 2026 and March 24, 2026.

5.   Criminal Procedure Law Article 245 went into effect on January 1, 2020, and has since been amended, most recently on August 7, 2025.

6.   Similarly, a COC will not be deemed invalid if the People subsequently produce additional discovery that "did not exist at the time of the filing of the original certificate of compliance" (CPL 245.50 [1-a]).

7.   This 35-day period may be extended upon a showing of good cause, or where the grounds for the challenge are "based upon a material change in circumstances" (CPL 245.50 [4] [c] [i], [ii]).

8.   As set forth in Section III (B) (iii) infra, the People exercised due diligence in obtaining those records, and disclosed them promptly to the defense upon receipt.

9.   This is not to say that the testimony, or the scope of any such testimony, will necessarily be admissible at trial; this is a determination left to the trial court.

10.   The People assert that the IAB log is not automatically discoverable because it relates to an accusation of discourtesy that was deemed unsubstantiated in an unrelated case. They argue that it neither relates to the subject matter of this case nor tends to impeach the officer's credibility and therefore does not fall within the strictures of CPL 245.20 (1) (k). The Court need not reach this issue, as it finds that the People exercised good faith and due diligence to obtain and disclose the material (see Section III (B) (iii), infra).

11.   The People also assert, and the defense does not dispute, that the activity logs are duplicative of information contained in the discovery disclosed prior to the filing of the initial COC.

12.   CPL 1.20 (17) provides that "[a] criminal action is commenced by the filing of an accusatory instrument against a defendant in a criminal court." Here, the accusatory instrument was filed on September 9, 2025. The speedy trial clock started running the next day (People v Stiles, 70 NY2d 765, 767 [1987]).

Kacie A. Lally, J.