The People of the State of New York, v. Juan M.G., Defendant. (2026)

The defendant Juan M.G  ¹ . (Defendant) stands charged with aggravated driving while intoxicated per se (Vehicle and Traffic Law [VTL] § 1192 [2-a] [a]) and other related charges. A combined Mapp/Ingle/Huntley/Dunaway hearing was held before the undersigned on April 20, 2026.

At the hearing, the People called one witness: Detective Jorge Perez of SRG4. Defendant did not call any witnesses. The court accepted into evidence: People's exhibit 1 (body-worn camera footage [BWC] of Det. Perez) and 2 (video footage from the New York City Police Department [NYPD] 45th Precinct Intoxicated Driver Testing Unit [IDTU]).

Based on the evidence adduced at the hearing, the arguments set forth in the parties written post-hearing submissions, the court file, and relevant legal authority, the court makes the following findings of fact and conclusions of law.

I. Findings of Fact

The court finds Det. Perez credible and credits his hearing testimony on all material points. The court also finds as fact all events depicted in the video footage and makes the following specific findings of fact.

Det. Perez has worked for the NYPD for about ten years. He has been assigned to SRG4 command for about seven years. During his time with NYPD, he has made over 200 arrests, about 13 of which have involved driving while intoxicated. In his personal and professional life, Det. Perez has observed someone consume alcohol and become intoxicated. Prior to becoming a NYPD officer, he trained at the police academy for six months. The training involved what to look for when someone consumed alcohol, and training on the portable breath test (PBT).

On July 21, 2025, at 1:34AM in the vicinity of the northeast corner of Grand Concourse and East Fordham Road, Det. Perez was working as a NYPD officer in uniform with a partner. The officers were traveling in a marked police vehicle. Det. Perez was brought to that location because he received a phone call from PO Mandaro who stated he believed Defendant to be driving under the influence of alcohol. PO Mandaro told Det. Perez that he stopped Defendant because Defendant "was driving slower than the allotted speed," and when the officer attempted to pull him over, Defendant did not pull over until the officer was able to move his police vehicle in front of Defendant (Hearing tr at 10:1-4).

When Det. Perez arrived at the scene he saw a parked vehicle with Defendant behind the driver's seat. Det. Perez observed Defendant to have red, bloodshot, watery eyes and a strong odor of alcoholic beverage was emanating from the vehicle. Det. Perez asked Defendant to step out of the vehicle. While Det Perez stood in front of Defendant he continued to observe Defendant's red, bloodshot, and watery eyes. Defendant smelled of an alcoholic beverage and seemed uneasy on his feet. Communicating in Spanish, Det. Perez explained the PBT to Defendant, who agreed to take it. The test resulted in a ".15" reading. Det. Perez then placed Defendant under arrest for suspicion of operating a vehicle while intoxicated.

While standing behind Defendant's vehicle, Det. Perez asked Defendant if he had been drinking that night. Defendant, in Spanish, said that he had consumed one beer. Defendant was not in handcuffs when he made this statement. Det. Perez's service weapon remained in his holster and was not taken out during his encounter with Defendant. He did not promise Defendant anything, threaten Defendant, nor coerce Defendant in any way into making a statement. He did not read Defendant his Miranda warnings prior to asking him questions because during the questioning, he and Officer Mandaro were still conducting an investigation and did not yet place Defendant under arrest.

Det. Perez testified that all his interactions with Defendant were captured by his BWC. The BWC footage was admitted into evidence as People's Exhibit 1. Some of the footage was published at the hearing. The footage depicts the officers communicating with Defendant, administering the PBT, placing him in handcuffs and into a police vehicle.

Defendant was transported to the IDTU to conduct another breath test to determine blood alcohol content. PO Mandaro asked Defendant to submit to the test, and Defendant consented. The test returned a result of ".19." It was conducted at around 2:37AM. Det. Perez and PO Mandaro were both present during testing at the IDTU. People's Exhibit 2, the IDTU footage, was admitted over Defendant's objection. The IDTU footage depicts, among other things, an officer asking Defendant to take the breath test and he consents. Based on the totality of his observations of Defendant, and training and experience, Det. Perez opined that Defendant was operating a vehicle while under the influence of alcohol.

II. Conclusions of Law

Mapp/Dunaway/Ingle

At a Mapp/Dunaway/Ingle hearing, the People bear the burden of going forward to establish the legality of police conduct in the first instance (see People v Berrios, 28 NY2d 361, 367 [1971]; People v Hinshaw, 35 NY3d 427 [2020]; People v Ingle, 36 NY2d 413 [1975]; People v Johnson, 134 Misc 2d 474 [Crim Ct Queens County 1987], citing Mapp v Ohio, 367 US 643 [1961]). Once that burden of production is met, the defendant has the ultimate burden of proving, by a preponderance of the credible evidence, that the arrest was not based on probable cause or that the police conduct was otherwise illegal (Berrios, 28 NY2d at 367; People v Harris, 192 AD3d 151, 158 [2d Dept 2020]). Physical evidence obtained illegally is inadmissible at trial (Mapp v Ohio, 367 US 643). Dunaway requires any evidence to be suppressed, be it statements or physical evidence, obtained as a result of an unlawful police seizure (Dunaway, 442 US at 218-219; People v Jennings, 54 NY2d 518, 522 [1981]).

It is well-settled that an automobile stop is lawful when "based on probable cause that a driver has committed a traffic violation" (Hinshaw, 35 NY3d at 430, quoting People v Robinson, 97 NY2d 341, 349-50 [2001]). In addition, vehicle stops may be lawfully effectuated "pursuant to routine, nonpretextual traffic checks to enforce traffic regulations or when officers have reasonable suspicion that the driver or occupants have committed, are committing, or are about to commit a crime" (Robinson, 97 NY2d at 351, quoting People v Spencer, 84 NY2d 749, 753 [1995][cleaned up]). Probable cause exists "where the 'facts and circumstances ..., when viewed as a whole, would lead a reasonable person possessing the same expertise as the arresting officer to conclude that an offense has been or is being committed and that the defendant committed or is committing that offense' " (People v Devoll, 75 Misc 3d 142[A], 2022 NY Slip Op 50615[U] [App Term, 2d Dept, 11th and 13th Jud Dists 2022], , quoting People v Brown, 256 AD2d 414, 415 [2d Dept 1998]; and citing People v Bigelow, 66 NY2d 417, 423 [1985]).

In this case, even accepting that the "fellow officer" rule applies (see, e.g., People v Haga, 72 Misc 3d 130[A] *2 [App Term 2d Dept, 9th and 10th Jud Dists 2021], lv denied, 37 NY3d 1061 [2021]), the People failed to establish the legality of the traffic stop. Det. Perez was told that PO Mandaro initiated the stop because the defendant "was driving slower than the allotted speed . . . " VTL § 1181 entitled "Minimum speed regulations" provides:

(a) No person shall drive a motor vehicle at such a slow speed as to impede the normal and reasonable movement of traffic except when reduced speed is necessary for safe operation or in compliance with law.

(b) Whenever a minimum speed limit has been established as authorized in sections sixteen hundred twenty or sixteen hundred forty-two, no person shall drive at a speed less than such minimum speed limit except when entering upon or preparing to exit from the highway upon which such a minimum speed limit has been established, when preparing to stop, or when necessary for safe operation or in compliance with law.

The People adduced no evidence at the hearing demonstrating that Defendant violated either subsection of VTL § 1181 before the officer initiated the traffic stop. There is no evidence of the posted speed limit or whether a "minimum speed limit" had been established at the incident location. The mere assertion that Defendant was driving "slower than the allotted speed limit" provides no insight as to the actual speed of the vehicle or whether its movement impeded the normal flow of traffic. There is no evidence establishing PO Mandaro's experience in observing the rate of moving objects or any other satisfactory basis for his opinion that the vehicle was operating below the speed limit (see People v Olsen, 22 NY2d 230, 231-232 [1968] [opinion evidence as to the speed of moving vehicles is admissible when "the witness who testifies first shows some experience in observing the rate of speed of moving objects or some other satisfactory reason or basis for his [or her] opinion" ]). Absent such evidence, the People failed to carry their burden of establishing that the vehicle stop was based on probable cause of a traffic infraction (see People v Mandato, 195 Misc 2d 636, 637 [App Term, 2d Dept 2003], lv denied, 100 NY2d 563 [2003] [no probable cause to stop defendant's vehicle where there was no evidence as to the actual posted speed limit and unsupported testimony that driver was only traveling 15 miles per hour in a 30 miles per hour zone]; see also People v Martinez, 31 Misc 3d 201, 206, 2011 NY Slip Op 21021 [Nassau Dist Ct 2011]; People v Stead, 18 Misc 3d 1115[A], 2008 NY Slip Op 50032[U] [Broome County Ct 2008] [defendant driving ten miles per hour under the speed limit at night, on the right hand side of the road, with no traffic on the road, would not make out a violation of VTL § 1181[a]).

The People do not argue that Defendant committed any other traffic infraction or that there was an alternative basis for the stop. Det. Perez testified he was told that Defendant did not pull over once PO Mandaro attempted to stop the vehicle. But "[w]here a police encounter is not justified in its inception, it cannot be validated by a subsequently acquired suspicion" (People v William "II," 98 NY2d 93, 98 [2002]).

Because the stop of Defendant's vehicle was unlawful and the People have not proved the legality of the police conduct, any subsequent discoveries by the officers including physical observations of defendant, statements he made to law enforcement, and the results of any chemical breath tests must be suppressed (Ingle, 36 NY3d at 418; see People v Vasquez, 84 Misc 3d 48, 50 [App Term, 1st Dept 2024]).

In light of the foregoing, the Huntley/Dunaway portion of the hearing is rendered moot.

Accordingly, it is hereby

ORDERED, that the motion to suppress pursuant to Mapp/Dunaway/Ingle is granted, and all evidence including statements, PBT/IDTU breath test results, and physical observations made by police following the stop of Defendant's vehicle are suppressed, and it is further,

ORDERED, that the motion to suppress pursuant to Huntley/Dunaway is moot.

Dated: July 6, 2026

HON. SCOTT M. KROMPINGER, J.C.C.

FOOTNOTES

1.   This version of the opinion has been redacted to remove certain identifying information.

Scott M. Krompinger, J.