The People of the State of New York v. A.M., Defendant. (2026)

Defendant is charged with Criminal Possession of Stolen Property in the Fifth Degree (PL § 165.40). By motion filed on March 16, 2026, the defendant moves to dismiss the information pursuant to CPL § 30.30. The People filed their opposition on April 15, 2026. For the reasons detailed below, the defendant's motion to dismiss is granted.

The criminal action commenced on November 11, 2025, with the filing of a misdemeanor complaint. On November 12, 2025, the defendant was arraigned on the accusatory instrument. The People filed a certificate of compliance (COC) and statement of readiness (SOR) on February 10, 2026. Both parties do not dispute these facts.

Issue Presented

The sole issue raised by the parties is whether the one-day delay between November 11, 2025, and November 12, 2025, is chargeable to the People under CPL § 30.30. The Court holds that, under the specific circumstances presented here, the period of delay between the filing of the accusatory instrument and the defendant's arraignment is chargeable to the People.

Defendant's Arguments

The defendant argues that the People have exceeded the statutory speedy trial time. Noting that the criminal action commenced with the filing of the accusatory instrument on November 11, 2025, he argues that the People filed their COC 91 days after the commencement of the action, requiring dismissal of the action under CPL § 30.30(1)(b).¹

People's Response

In response, the People argue that the one-day delay between filing of the complaint and the defendant's arraignment is excludable from speedy trial calculations pursuant to CPL § 30.30(4)(c)(i). They assert that they became aware of the arrest at 8:29 a.m. on November 11, 2025, and then filed the misdemeanor complaint at 1:24 p.m. on the same day. They argue that the delay in the defendant's production for arraignment is attributed to the Court without providing any facts supporting this argument.

Discussion and Legal Analysis

Pursuant to CPL § 30.30(1)(b), the People must be ready for trial within "ninety days of the commencement of a criminal action wherein a defendant is accused of one or more offenses, at least one of which is a misdemeanor punishable by a sentence of imprisonment of more than three months and none of which is a felony." A criminal action is commenced "by the filing of an accusatory instrument with a criminal court." (CPL § 100.05). In any challenge based on CPL § 30.30(1), the initial burden lies with the defendant to assert that the People have failed to state ready within the statutorily prescribed time limit. (People v Beasley, 16 NY3d 289, 292 [2011].) Once the defendant has properly raised the issue, the People then have the burden to prove certain periods of delay are excludable. (People v Berkowitz, 50 NY2d 333, 349 [1980].)

The time is computed by calculating "the time elapsed between the filing of the accusatory instrument and the People's declaration of readiness, subtracting any periods of delay that are excludable under the terms of the statute and then adding to the result any post readiness delay that are actually attributable to the People and are ineligible for an exclusion." (People v Beasley, 69 AD3d 741, 743 [2nd Dept. 2010] citing People v Cortes, 80 NY2d 201,208 [1992].) The People must identify the exclusions on which they rely. (People v Luperon, 85 NY2d 71, 78 [1995].)

CPL § 30.30(4)(c)(i) excludes, "the period of delay resulting from the absence or unavailability of the defendant. A defendant must be considered absent whenever his location is unknown and he is attempting to avoid apprehension or prosecution, or his location cannot be determined by due diligence. A defendant must be considered unavailable whenever his location is known but his presence for trial cannot be obtained by due diligence . . . "

The People assert that the lag between the commencement of the action and the defendant's appearance for arraignment was attributed to "court delay" but provide no explanation supporting their claim. They provide an account of when they were made aware of the defendant's arrest and the time they filed the accusatory instrument but offer no additional information as to what occurred while the defendant was in NYPD custody thereafter.

The Court holds that a defendant remains in custody of the arresting agency from the time of arrest, through their arraignment, until the court decides on issuing a securing order or releasing them. In this case, the defendant was in NYPD custody after his arrest, and it was the NYPD's responsibility to bring the defendant to court for arraignment. (See CPL § 140.20; see also NYPD Patrol Guide Procedure No. 208-03, Arrests — General Processing.² ) Without an account of what occurred between the defendant's arrest and his appearance in court, there is no basis to credit the People's argument that the delay between the filing of the accusatory instrument and arraignment was due to court delay.

Here, the defendant's location was known, and the People failed to meet their burden in showing that his presence for trial could not be obtained by due diligence. CPL § 30.30(4)(c)(i). The record is devoid of any showing of due diligence exercised by the People or NYPD in attempting to produce the defendant for arraignment on the day the accusatory instrument was filed. Therefore, the delay between November 11, 2025, through November 12, 2025, is chargeable to the People.

Accordingly, the court finds that 91 chargeable days have accrued since the defendant's arraignment and the defendant's motion to dismiss pursuant to CPL § 30.30 is granted.

This constitutes the decision and order of the Court.

Dated: June 25, 2026

Kings County, New York

Hon. Masateru Marubashi

Judge of the Criminal Court

FOOTNOTES

1.   Criminal Possession of Stolen Property in the Fifth Degree (PL § 165.40) is an A misdemeanor, requiring the People to be ready for trial within 90 days of the commencement of the criminal action.

2.   https://www.nyc.gov/site/nypd/about/about-nypd/manual.page

Masateru Marubashi, J.