People of the State of New York, v. Iris Addai, Defendant. (2026)

Periods when the court considers pre-trial motions are excluded from a speedy trial calculation absent exceptions inapplicable here. When opposing defendant Iris Addai's statutory speedy trial motion, the People identified two motion periods on the defendant's other docket as excludable. When should pre-trial motion practice on a defendant's unrelated case toll the speedy trial clock in a different case?

On a now closed docket ("closed docket" or "closed case"), the People charged Addai with third-degree assault and other charges for an incident that happened on September 19, 2025, to complainant B.G. By December 17, 2025, the prosecution moved for a protective order for impeachment material relating to a testifying police officer. The court resolved the protective order two days later. On December 21, the People filed and served a certificate of compliance (COC), statement of readiness (SOR), and automatic disclosure form (ADF). On January 20, 2026, the court set a motion schedule at the defendant's request and resolved the motion on March 12, 2026.

Meanwhile, on December 8, 2025, the People separately charged Addai with (and the court arraigned the defendant on) second-degree criminal contempt, third-degree assault, and other charges for an incident that happened on December 7, 2025 against the same complainant, B.G. ("open docket" or "open case"). On December 19, when the court resolved the discovery protective order on the closed docket, the court adjourned the open docket for conversion of the accusatory instrument and for discovery compliance. On January 20, 2026, when the court set the motion schedule on the closed case, the court adjourned the open case for conversion of the accusatory instrument and for discovery compliance. On March 9, the People filed and served a COC, SOR, and ADF for the open docket.¹ On March 26, the court rendered a decision on the closed docket and, at the defendant's request, set a motion schedule for Addai's open docket. On the closed docket, defense counsel filed regargument and dismissal motions on April 10, which the court granted on May 14, 2026, resulting in a dismissal on the closed case on statutory speedy trial grounds. On April 13, defense counsel filed and served an omnibus motion on the open docket, which is on June 15, 2026, for the court's decision and order.

On this open docket, Addai moved to dismiss the accusatory instrument due to a statutory speedy trial violation, invalidate the People's certificate of compliance, preclude the admission at trial by the People of any statement or identification evidence, prevent the People from introducing into evidence or cross-examining the defendant (should she testify) about the defendant's prior bad acts, and other relief. The court first turns to the statutory speedy trial motion.

When making a statutory speedy trial motion, the defense must come forward with allegations that the prosecution failed to declare trial readiness within the statutorily prescribed time.² The People then must identify excludable periods upon which they rely.³ The burden finally shifts to the defendant to identify factual or legal impediments to the People's claimed exclusions.⁴ In the open docket, the top charge was a class A misdemeanor, so the People had to declare their trial readiness within 90 days.⁵ The defendant alleged that the People should be charged for 109 days. The People countered that the exclusionary periods on the closed docket applied to the open docket, so the People should be charged only 41 days. Although the court scheduled a reply, the defendant did not file one. Thus, the defendant failed to point to some factual or legal impediment to the claimed exclusionary periods. And for that reason alone, the court denies Addai's speedy trial motion. Alternatively, the defendant's motion lacks merit.

CPL 30.30 (4) (a) plainly pauses the speedy trial clock, when the court considers pre-trial motions. Interpreting that statute, the Court of Appeals has concluded that the defendant's motion practice in one case pauses the speedy trial clock in a defendant's unrelated case.⁶ In People v. Brown, 99 NY2d 488 (2003), the defendant on a gun sale case asked for a motion schedule in the defendant's unrelated narcotics case. The Court, citing CPL 30.30 (4) (a), excluded the period for motion practice on the defendant's narcotics case from the firearms case. The Brown holding appears to allow for excludable time based on serendipitous events in an unrelated case. But a crucial detail appears in the oral argument transcript  ⁷ that did not make it into the Brown decision: the People explained to the Court that, in the trial court's decision, the justice indicated that the narcotics case was going to be tried first. When defense counsel said she would file motions on the unrelated narcotics and the understanding is that the narcotics case would be tried before the gun case, the delay resulting from the court considering the narcotics motion had some impact on the People's ability to be ready to try the firearms case. The more precise rule, then, should be that pre-trial motion practice in an unrelated case may result in an excludable statutory speedy trial period in the current case provided that the motion practice impairs the People's readiness in the current case.

Statutory interpretation rules support the impairment requirement. When interpreting statutes, a court must effectuate the Legislature's intent,⁸ the best evidence of which is the statute's plain language.⁹ But a court's interpretation must avoid unreasonable or absurd applications.¹⁰ Here, a hyper-technical reading of CPL 30.30 (4) (a) would allow for serendipitous exclusionary periods on an instant case from unrelated cases. Suppose a defendant has two open cases, a misdemeanor assault in county A and a petit larceny in county B. The respective District Attorney offices know nothing about the other case. For unknown reasons, the assistant district attorney in the county A makes no effort to be ready for trial. When opposing a speedy trial dismissal, the assigned assistant district attorney then checks statewide to see if the defendant had any cases pending, finds the case in the county B, and discovers pre-trial motion practice in that unrelated case. Although the case in county B had no impact on the District Attorney's ability in county A to go to trial on the assault charge, CPL 30.30 (4) (a)'s plain language would still make the motion period in the county B case to be excludable in the county A case. The Legislature could not have intended such a result when the statute's purpose is to avoid prosecutorial delay of trials.¹¹ Also, in 1972, "when the legislature enacted CPL 30.30, it was accompanied by a memorandum of the State Executive Department, Crime Control Council which declared "the purpose of the bill [is to] ' . . . promote prompt trials for defendants in criminal cases,' " noting "that '[t]he public, defendants and the victims of crimes all have a strong interest in the prompt trial of criminal cases.' "¹²

To avoid a result at odds with the statute's purpose, this court reads into the statute that the pre-trial motion practice in an unrelated case must, at least theoretically, affect the People's ability to be ready for trial in another case. Here, Addai's motion practice in the closed case theoretically impacted the prosecution's trial readiness in the open case—the People could have moved to consolidate the dockets because the dockets, although different criminal transactions, had the same charges of third-degree assault, obstruction of breathing or blood circulation, and second-degree harassment.¹³ The People could not have tried the open case, when they did not know the court's dismissal decision on the closed case. Thus, the court's alternative ruling is that the periods to resolve the motion for a protective order and the omnibus motion in the closed case were excludable speedy trial periods in this open case. As such, the court calculated the speedy trial periods:

December 8, 2025 — December 19, 2025

The adjournment from arraignment for the People to convert the complaint and to be discovery compliant is chargeable to the People, but the court excludes two days for the resolution of the People's motion for a protective order on the closed case.¹⁴ Thus the court charges the People with 9 days.

December 19, 2025 — January 20, 2026

On December 19, the court adjourned the open docket for conversion and compliance. The People filed and served their COC and SOR on December 21. Thus, the court charges the People with 2 days, or 11 in total.

January 20, 2026 — March 26, 2026

The court adjourned this case for conversion and compliance to March 26—time normally charged to the People. But, on the closed case, the court set a motion schedule at the defendant's request and adjourned that matter to March 26 for the court's decision and order. Also, the People filed and served their COC and SOR on this docket on March 9, which also tolled the speedy trial clock. Thus, the court charges the People with 0 days, or 11 in total.

March 26, 2026 — June 15, 2026

On March 26, 2026, the court set a motion schedule at the defendant's request on the open case. Pre-trial motion practice is excludable.¹⁵ Thus, the court charges the People with 0 days, or 11 in total.

As noted earlier, the court denied the defendant's speedy trial motion because the defendant failed to point to any factual or legal impediments to the People's claimed exclusionary periods. As an alternative holding, because the court charges the People with only 11 chargeable days, the court denies the motion to dismiss for an alleged speedy trial violation.

PEOPLE'S DISCOVERY OBLIGATIONS UNDER ARTICLE 245

Under CPL 245.20 (1), the People must automatically disclose to the defense 21 types of items and information that "are in the possession, custody or control of the prosecution or persons under the prosecution's direction or control." Some discovery categories must "relate to the subject matter of the charges" while others require the narrower standard of: "are relevant to any offense charged." In fulfilling their discovery obligations, the People must exercise due diligence and make reasonable inquiries to ascertain the existence of discoverable material and information.¹⁶ When material is not in the People's possession, custody, or control, the People must "make a diligent, good faith effort to ascertain the existence of material or information . . . and cause such material or information to be made available for discovery."¹⁷

Once the People satisfy their automatic discovery obligations, the People must file and serve a certificate of compliance (COC) certifying their fulfillment of CPL 245.20 (1).¹⁸ Any statement of readiness (SOR) must be accompanied by or preceded by a valid COC.¹⁹ "No adverse consequence to the prosecution or the prosecutor shall result from the filing of a certificate of compliance in good faith and reasonable under the circumstances."²⁰

If the prosecution provides additional discovery after filing the initial COC, it must file a supplemental COC,²¹ detailing the basis for the delayed disclosure so that the court can assess the initial COC's validity.²² The original COC will not be impacted so long as the COC was filed in good faith and after exercising due diligence or the delayed discovery did not exist when the COC was filed.²³

When assessing the People's due diligence, the court "shall look at the totality of the party's efforts to comply with [Article 245], rather than assess the party's efforts item by item."²⁴ The court must consider the listed statutory factors  ²⁵ and may consider others. Finally, the People bear the burden of proving that they exercised due diligence prior to filing their certificate of compliance.²⁶ Vague assertions regarding their efforts are insufficient to meet their burden.²⁷ Thus, in their affirmation, the People must provide details regarding initial and follow-up efforts made.

The pertinent procedural history is that the People filed the accusatory instrument, and the court arraigned the defendant on December 8, 2025. The People charged the defendant of committing second-degree criminal contempt, third-degree assault, criminal obstruction of breathing or blood circulation, and second-degree harassment. On March 9, 2026, the People filed and served their COC, SOR, and ADF. By March 18, defense counsel emailed discovery objections to the prosecution, and the prosecution replied by email the next day. On March 23, defense counsel emailed further discovery objections to the prosecution to which the People responded on March 26. That same day, the People disclosed additional discovery and filed a supplemental COC (SCOC). Later that day, the court set the current motion schedule. Defense counsel filed an omnibus motion on April 13.

Addai moved to invalidate the People's COC because discovery was belatedly disclosed or not at all. After the filing of the COC, the People turned over to the defense a previously redacted image of the complainant. The People had yet, as of April 13, to disclose all domestic violence home visit materials, an unredacted complainant entity report, an ICAD attached to the domestic incident report (DIR) of June 5, 2025, unredacted IAB logs for Police Officer Carbucia and various IAB attachments, an unredacted CCRB report for Officer Carbucia, the NYPD Advocate's Office reports for all substantiated IAB and CCRB cases, a central personnel index (CPI) for two police officers, roll call logs for three police officers, audit trails for all body worn camera (BWC) footage, a pre-arraignment notification report, and the ZOLPA.²⁸

The People failed to prove what pre-COC efforts they made to fulfill their discovery obligation. Instead, they provided the unsworn vague assurances:" the People made diligent efforts . . . to gather and disclose all discoverable materials"²⁹ ; "The efforts made by the People to obtain materials from the NYPD via phone calls, emails, text messages, and notifications were numerous and continuous throughout this matter from its inception until all relevant discovery was disclosed."³⁰ The People thus failed to sustain their burden of proving their specific efforts both pre- and post-COC. Also, the prosecution must perform its discovery obligations within 35 days after the defendant's arraignment on a misdemeanor complaint, if the defendant is not in custody.³¹ If the discovery is especially voluminous, the statute gives the People an additional 30 days to comply.³² And the People can move the court to "alter the time . . . for discovery . . . upon a showing of good cause."³³ The prosecution never moved to expand the discovery timeline for good cause. Instead of filing by, at least, the 65th day after arraignment, the People filed their COC approximately 91 days after the defendant's arraignment. The failure to timely comply with discovery or to ask for more time is a red flag indicating a lack of diligence.

Other factors favor the People. The volume of discovery provided pre-COC greatly outweighed the discovery provided belatedly. The pre-COC discovery consisted over 233 pages of NYPD documents, as well as five IAB logs, and a NYPD Disciplinary Administrative Database System investigation relating to the testifying officers. After the COC, the People turned over a single photograph of the complainant's injuries, so the belated discovery was easily remedied. In response to the defendant's objections regarding the redactions of discovery information, the court found the redactions to be appropriate. Most of the defendant's discovery requests were not automatically discoverable, such as the ICAD for the June 5, 2025 domestic incident report, a central personnel index report, body-worn camera audit trails, roll call logs, the ZOLPA, and the pre-arraignment notification report. And the defendant failed to specify how the belated photograph impeded the defendant's trial preparation.

In light of all the required factors (with no one factor being determinative), the court finds that, although the People inexplicably failed to detail their discovery efforts prior to certifying compliance, they nonetheless demonstrated due diligence. And the court concludes that the People substantially complied with their discovery obligations. Thus, the court denies the invalidation motion.

PRECLUSION

The court denies the preclusion motion without prejudice with leave to renew before the trial court because the issue is unripe.

MOTIONS IN LIMINE (SANDOVAL/VENTIMIGLIA/MOLINEUX)

The court denies the in limine motions without prejudice and with leave to renew before the trial court because the issues are unripe.

RESERVATION OF RIGHTS

The court denies the motion for more time to file additional motions, subject to Criminal Procedure Law § 255.20 (3) for good cause shown.³⁴

DISCOVERY

The court orders the People to comply with their continuing discovery obligations under Criminal Procedure Law, Article 245. The court further orders the defendant to certify compliance with Criminal Procedure Law §§ 245.20 (4) and 245.50 (2) within 14 calendar days of this decision.

OTHER RELIEF

Any relief the parties sought that is not specifically granted in this decision is denied.

DATED: June 15, 2026

BRONX, NEW YORK

Hon. Harold E. Bahr, III, J.C.C.

FOOTNOTES

1.   The People also had filed a supporting deposition to convert the misdemeanor complaint to a misdemeanor information.

2.    People v Goode, 87 NY2d 1045, 1047 (1996).

3.    People v Luperon, 85 NY2d 71, 77-78 (1995).

4.    People v Allard, 28 NY3d 41, 45 (2016).

5.   CPL 30.30 (1) (b).

6.    People v Brown, 99 NY2d 488 (2003).

7.   Oral Argument in People v Brown, 2003 WL 25773991.

8.   McKinney's Cons Laws of NY, Statutes § 92 (a); Riley v County of Broome, 95 NY2d 455, 463 (2000).

9.    People v Galindo, 38 NY3d 199, 203 (2022).

10.   McKinney's Cons Laws of NY, Statutes § 145 ("A sensible construction of a statute is preferred to one which is absurd"); People v Santi, 3 NY3d 234, 243-244 (2004).

11.    People v McKenna, 76 NY2d 59, 63 (1990).

12.    People v Clarke, 28 NY3d 48, 52 (2016), citing People v Anderson, 66 NY2d 529, 535 n.1 (1985), quoting 1972 McKinney's Session Laws of NY at 3259.

13.   CPL 200.20 (3).

14.   Recall that the People, on the closed docket, filed their motion on December 17, and the court resolved the motion on December 19.

15.   CPL 30.30 (4) (a).

16.   CPL 245.50 (1); see People v Bay, 41 NY3d 200 (2023).

17.   CPL 240.20 (2).

18.   CPL 245.50 (1).

19.   CPL 30.30 (5).

20.   CPL 245.50 (1).

21.    Id.

22.   CPL 245.50 (1-a).

23.    Id.

24.   CPL 245.50 (5).

25.   The factors are: "the efforts made by the prosecutor to comply with the requirements of this article; the volume of discovery provided and the volume of discovery outstanding; the complexity of the case; whether the prosecutor knew that the belatedly disclosed or allegedly missing material existed; the explanation for any alleged discovery lapse; the prosecutor's response when apprised of any allegedly missing discovery; whether the belated discovery was substantively duplicative, insignificant, or easily remedied; whether the omission was corrected; whether the prosecution self-reported the error and took prompt remedial action without court intervention; and whether the prosecution's delayed disclosure of discovery was prejudicial to the defense or otherwise impeded the defense's ability to effectively investigate the case or prepare for trial" (CPL 245.50 [5] [a]).

26.    People v Hespinobarros, 245 AD3d 826 (2d Dept 2026).

27.    People v Zeigler, 2026 NY Slip Op 50232(U) (App Term, 1st Dept February 26, 2026).

28.   Omnibus, at 7-8.

29.   Opposition, at 11. The court notes that the People did not number the paragraphs in their legal memorandum, which made citation to their papers more difficult than it needed to be.

30.   Opposition, at 15.

31.   CPL 245.10 (1) (a) (ii).

32.   CPL 245.10 (1) (a).

33.   CPL 245.70 (2).

34.    Brill v City of New York, 2 NY3d 648, 652 (2004) (concluding that good cause "requires a showing . . . for the delay in making the motion--a satisfactory explanation for the untimeliness--rather than simply permitting meritorious, nonprejudicial filings, however tardy").

Harold E. Bahr, III, J.