The People of the State of New York v. Carlos Garcia, Defendant. (2026)

The defendant moves to dismiss on speedy trial grounds. This case addresses the issue of whether the day where the courts are partially closed due to inclement weather should be excluded from speedy trial calculations. This court holds that it does not and as such the motion is granted.

On November 24, 2025, the criminal action commenced with the filing of a misdemeanor complaint charging the defendant with assault in the third degree (Penal Law § 120.00 [1]) and harassment in second degree (Penal Law § 240.26). On December 30, 2025, the People filed a supporting deposition. On Tuesday, February 24, 2026, 92 days after the commencement of the criminal action, the People filled a certificate of compliance and statement of readiness.

Since the highest count is a class A misdemeanor, the People have 90 days in which to be ready for trial (CPL 30.30 [1] [b]).

The defendant moves to dismiss on speedy trial grounds (CPL 170.30 [1] [e]; 30.30 [1] [b]). Both parties agree that the statement of readiness was filed on the 92nd day. However, the People argue that the 90th day fell on a Sunday and the courts were closed on Monday, February 23, 2026 due to inclement weather.

Defense first argues that General Construction Law § 25-a does not extend the time in which to announce their readiness for trial beyond a weekend or legal holiday. Next, defense argues that the Court of Appeals has made it clear that even when the courts are closed, the People can still file their statement of readiness up until midnight on the 90th day (People v Licius, 45 NY3d 109 [2025]) and regardless of whether the court was closed due to the weather, EDDS was not closed. Third, defense argues that inclement weather does not meet the exceptional circumstances exclusion criteria for CPL 30.30 (4) (g).

The People argue that because Criminal Court was closed with an exception for arraignments due to a snowstorm on Monday February 23, 2026, the next business day when the courts were open again was February 24, 2026. Secondly, the People argue that the inclement weather on February 23, 2026 qualifies as an exceptional circumstance pursuant to CPL 30.30 (4) (g).

When the speedy trial time expires on a weekend or legal holiday, the time the People may announce their readiness is extended to the next business day (General Construction Law § 25-a; People v Mandela, 142 AD3d 81, 86 [3d Dept 2016]; People v Pierre, 83 Misc 3d 134[A], 2024 NY Slip Op 51181[U] [App Term, 2d Dept 9th & 10th Jud Dist 2024]; People v Powell, 179 Misc 2d 1047, 1048, 1999 NY Slip Op 99208 [App Term, 2d Dept 2d & 11th Jud Dist 1999], lv denied 93 NY2d 928 [1999]). Therefore, the issue is whether Monday or Tuesday was the next business day.

The term "business day" is not defined in General Construction Law § 25-a. The closest thing to a definition pertains to "newspaper published each business day," and does not include Saturdays, Sundays or legal holidays (General Construction Law § 60). This is consistent with General Construction Law § 25-a. The purpose of this law "is to alleviate performance of any act on a day that is not generally considered a workday" (People v Norvil, 81 Misc 3d 350, 354 [Crim Ct, Kings County 2023]). Therefore, the court finds that the next business day as contemplated by General Construction Law § 25-a was Monday, February 23, 2026. The defendant is correct that Monday was not a weekend day or a legal holiday. Further, an Executive Order was not issued excluding this day from speedy trial calculations (see e.g. Executive Order [A. Cuomo] No. 202.8 [9 NYCRR 8.202.8] [COVID-19]; Executive Order [A. Cuomo] No. 202.67 [9 NYCRR 8.202.67] [COVID-19]; Executive Order [Cuomo] No. 52 [9 NYCRR 8.52]; Executive Order [Cuomo] No. 81 [9 NYCRR 8.81] [Hurricane Sandy]; Executive Order [Pataki] No. 113 [9 NYCRR 5.133] [September 11, 2001]).

Having found Monday the next business day, the next issue is whether the period of delay caused by inclement weather on Monday is excluded as an exceptional circumstance (CPL 30. 30 [4] [g]). CPL 30.30 (4) (g) states in relevant part:

4. In computing the time within which the people must be ready for trial pursuant to subdivisions one and two of this section, the following periods must be excluded:

(g) other periods of delay occasioned by exceptional circumstances, including but not limited to, the period of delay resulting from a continuance granted at the request of a district attorney if (i) the continuance is granted because of the unavailability of evidence material to the people's case, when the district attorney has exercised due diligence to obtain such evidence and there are reasonable grounds to believe that such evidence will become available in a reasonable period; or (ii) the continuance is granted to allow the district attorney additional time to prepare the people's case and additional time is justified by the exceptional circumstances of the case.

This provision has been described as a catchall exclusion (People v Smietana, 98 NY2d 336, 341 [2002]):

"There is no precise definition of what constitutes an exceptional circumstance under CPL 30.30 (4) (g). The Legislature enacted this catchall provision because it could not anticipate every situation that might warrant tolling of the speedy trial time period. Our cases provide some guidance, however. We have repeatedly emphasized that the People may not rely on factors which do not actually prevent them from being ready to proceed to trial to justify a failure to timely announce readiness. Conversely, where the People are truly unable to take necessary steps to prepare for trial and announce readiness due to circumstances which are beyond their control, the CPL 30.30 clock must stop temporarily while those circumstances persist" (Smietana at 341 [citations omitted]).

Now that the criminal court has Electronic Document Delivery System (EDDS), which is available every hour of every day, a statement of readiness "does not depend on whether the court is closed, about to close, or otherwise unavailable to commence trial" (People v Licius, 45 NY3d 109, 112 [2025]). The People had until midnight of the technically 90th day to deliver the SOR through EDDS, but the court credits that the People were permitted to file on the following business day, Monday, February 23, 2026.

Although the court was closed for a snowstorm on February 23, 2026, and only the arraignment part was open for a portion of the day, the Court is unable to find that this constitutes an exceptionable circumstance as to the People's inability to file their COC via EDDS on February 23, 2026. The Court notes that when the People did eventually file their COC on February 24, 2026, it was filed electronically via EDDS. The People's opposition failed to include any details regarding their inability to electronically file on the 91st day, nor any explanation as to how the inclement weather and the court closure on the 23rd inhibited their ability to electronically file their COC. Thus, the People have failed to explain why they could not announce their readiness for trial within the statutory time limit, that is, that they were "truly unable to take necessary steps to prepare for trial and announce readiness due to circumstances which are beyond their control" (Smietana, 98 NY2d at 341). Accordingly, the period of delay caused by court closure due to inclement weather is not excluded from speedy trial calculations as an exceptional circumstance (CPL 30.30 [4] [g]).

Therefore, the court finds 91 days included in speedy trial calculations and as such, the defendant's motion to dismiss is GRANTED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: June 1, 2026

Kew Gardens, NY

LANA SCHLESINGER

Judge of the Criminal Court

Lana Schlesinger, J.