The People of the State of New York, v. J. Billingsley, Defendant. (2026)

Pending is the defense's counseled omnibus motion. Upon review of the filings and the record of proceedings thus far, it is resolved as follows.¹ As the parties are the primary audience, familiarity with the case is assumed.

It is ordered that the branch seeking to invalidate the COC and dismiss the accusatory instrument is denied, as the People have met their burden of demonstrating due diligence and good faith in connection with their statutory discovery obligations. See C.P.L. § 245.50(5)(a); People v. Bay, 41 NY3d 200, 211-12 (2023). As addressed further below, the People are directed to disclose the testifying officers' CPIs to the defense.

As an initial matter, the defense makes a persuasive argument that the delay by the People in disclosing some of the disputed materials is "befuddling." Defense's Reply at 17.² This case commenced November 15, 2025, when the accusatory instrument was originally filed with the court. C.P.L. §§ 1.20(16)-(17), 30.30(1)(b). The People disclosed discovery materials and declared ready on January 27, 2026, which was 73 days later. As of that time, and as conceded in their COC, the People were missing activity logs for nine officers, one of whom was not listed as having provided body-worn camera footage. Defense's Mot., Ex. A at 2-3.

The prosecution was not without the logs for long. They were received on January 28, just one day after the People declared ready.

But the People did not disclose the logs on January 28. Instead, the People waited until February 18, 2026 to provide to the defense the logs and the electronic version of the Medical Treatment of Prisoner Report (the handwritten version of which had already been disclosed). People's Resp. Aff. ¶¶ 9, 14; People's Resp. at 16. (The People's unsworn representations here and elsewhere will be considered for the sake of expediency and because the defense raises no objection to them.) The People then did not file a SCOC until far later.

This unexplained delay amounts to a self-inflicted injury. When they originally obtained the logs, the People were still within the 90-day misdemeanor speedy trial period. Had they disclosed the, promptly, filed a SCOC, and declared ready again, the People might have been immunized against dismissal even if their initial COC were invalidated. Instead, the People waited until February 18—day 95—to disclose the logs. They then declared ready again on February 20 at the earliest, thereby risking dismissal if their initial COC were to be deemed invalid.

On this record, however, the People have nevertheless shown reasonable diligence in connection with their discovery obligations, premature declaration of readiness and belated disclosure of the activity logs notwithstanding. So, befuddling or not, their delay does not require dismissal of the case on these facts.

Many of the § 245.50(5)(a) factors favor the People. The People's discovery proffer was voluminous and comprehensive given this fairly straightforward case. Their pre-readiness outreach, while not extensive, included at least three contacts and yielded much of the material discussed above; the People also knew that the logs were missing and were able to obtain them very quickly after declaring ready, without any need for court intervention (notwithstanding the timing caveat discussed above). And with one exception, the logs were for officers whose body-worn camera footage was otherwise timely received by the defense.

Moreover, February 20 is just five days after the speedy trial period would have expired, and is thus within the 35-day conferral window. Accordingly, with regard to the logs and other material belatedly disclosed that day, disclosure within the conferral window satisfies "a number of the due diligence factors." People v. Whitney, --- Misc 3d ---, 2025 NY Slip Op. 25248, at *6 (N.Y.C. Crim. Ct., Bronx Co. 2025) (David, J.).

The other omissions and belated disclosures are comparatively minor in scope.

Beginning with the allegedly missing body-worn camera footage: first, the People persuasively argue that they did not understand what defense counsel was asking for during the conferral process. See People's Resp. at 21. The defense's February 12 email just requested "BWC for all officers," which did not clarify that counsel's concern was other officers at the precinct whose cameras may have been activated but whose footage was not disclosed. Defense's Mot., Ex. B at 1. When the People responded that all body-worn camera footage had already been disclosed, defense counsel did not elaborate on the basis for the request, and instead moved to another topic. Id. Thus, the People would have had no reason to know that defense counsel was specifically requesting footage from the other officers at the precinct. See Defense's Mot. at 8.

In any event, the People maintain that the other officers in question either were not wearing body-worn cameras or did not have their cameras turned on. People's Resp. at 16. The defense does not allege that the cameras were turned on or could be seen as activated on the underlying footage—which is often the case in "missing body-worn camera" situations—but instead just alleged that other officers were present at the precinct. And while the defense challenges the People's "uncorroborated speculation" that no other footage exists, Defense's Reply at 20, the People's position here is stronger than the defense's on the present record.³

Moving to the next item: the People represent that the DAS entity report for the defendant does not exist, People's Resp. at 17, and that the underlying information would not be discoverable under § 245.20(1)(e) if no report were generated. Compare with People v. DeJesus, 86 Misc 3d 1265(A), 2025 NY Slip Op 51345(U), at *4-5 (N.Y.C. Crim. Ct., Bronx Co. 2025) (Moore, J.) (addressing discoverability of defendant's entity report that was generated). The defense argues that the material is nevertheless still in the People's systems, Defense's Reply at 18, but even if that were so, the defense does not persuasively explain how data on a computer system on the defendant would satisfy any of the § 245.20(1)(k) grounds for the disclosure of relevant material. Even if the defense had done so, however, the missing entity report would not lead to invalidation of the COC under a holistic assessment of the relevant factors.

The entity report on all testifying officers may be a different story for discoverability, as impeachment material for the prosecution's witnesses within the People's systems would nonetheless be discoverable even if not recorded in tangible form. See C.P.L. § 245.20(1)(k). The specific context of the defense request, however, arises because the two testifying officers are "new to the NYPD" and, as a result, have no relevant impeachment material within the ordinary categories; thus, the defense needs the entity reports "to effectively impeach the testifying officers." Defense's Reply at 26. This line of reasoning assumes, of course, that relevant impeachment material exists. As this area appears fairly novel—there is little case law cited for uncompiled, pre-NYPD entity reports on testifying officers—an ostensible failure to search computer systems for this material is not indicative of a lack of diligence.

Relatedly, because there is no traditional impeachment material on the testifying officers, it is somewhat unclear what the CPI would show for them. Regardless, the People are directed to disclose the CPI documents to the defense.

The People say the on-line booking system arrest worksheet does not exist, and provide an exhibit to that effect. People's Resp., Ex. 5. The defense thinks the worksheet should exist because the Patrol Guide says one must be prepared and an officer indicated that one had been prepared in an arrest checklist. Defense's Mot. at 22-23. The second position is stronger than the first, but the People still say that they investigated and learned that one does not exist. The defense's argument to the contrary, see Defense's Reply at 28, does not, on this record, persuade that the People's efforts to find and disclose the document fell short. In any event, and as with the defendant's entity report above, the nondisclosure of this document would not require invalidation of the COC under a holistic assessment of the relevant factors.

Finally, while the ZOLPA may be automatically discoverable, its belated disclosure here would also not require invalidation of the COC. Page 16 of the defense's reply observes that the ZOLPA "documents the names of the officers that participated in the defendant's arrest processing, contains notes entered by these officers about the defendant, and documents information such as how long the defendant was in custody and where he was lodged before arraignment." Defense's Reply at 16. Since the defense is in actual possession of this ZOLPA, however, it is reasonable to assume that the actual document tracks the description above and, while technically discoverable, provided little of practical importance to the case. See C.P.L. § 245.50(5)(a).

In sum, a holistic and cumulative assessment of all relevant factors and omissions—those not explicitly mentioned above have been considered as well—favors the People. Their unforced timing error notwithstanding, the People provided a reasonable discovery proffer, responded promptly and thoroughly to the defense's conferral, obtained most of the salient missing discovery in short order, and undertook reasonable efforts to determine whether certain of the documents sought by the defense did or did not exist. The defense's additional arguments to the contrary have all been considered and are either unavailing or do not tip the scales. Accordingly, the branch of the motion that seeks to invalidate the COC and dismiss the accusatory instrument is denied.

It is further ordered that a Huntley/Dunaway hearing is granted. All Sandoval/Molineux/Ventimiglia/preclusion issues are referred to the trial court. Any other request for relief not specifically mentioned is denied.

The trial court may also wish to clarify the particular theory upon which the People intend to proceed. As the Court of Appeals recently observed, A.M.L. § 353 is a "truly behemoth criminal statute, containing 322 separate charging theories in its principal passages alone." People v. Farrell, 44 NY3d 1, 5 (2025) (quoting Jed L. Painter, Practice Commentaries, McKinney's Cons Laws of NY, 2024 Electronic Update, AML § 353).

Dated: May 5, 2026

Bronx, NY

David L. Goodwin

Judge of the Criminal Court

FOOTNOTES

1.   The version of this decision submitted for publication has been lightly redacted to remove certain identifying information.

2.   The People do not argue that the impoundment petition, which appears to remain pending, has any effect on the speedy-trial timeline under C.P.L. § 30.30(4), so this decision assumes it does not.

3.   The defense points out that the relevant § 245.50(5)(a) factor for "substantively duplicative" discovery applies only to "belated" discovery. Defense's Reply at 19. While that is technically correct, the list of factors in § 245.50(5)(a) is explicitly nonexhaustive, so the Legislature's decision to "restrict[ ]" that factor to belated discovery items, id., runs aground on the Legislature's simultaneous decision to permit consideration of all other relevant information in assessing the People's diligence.At the same time, the defense's broader concern—that it is dangerous to assume that material not provided is duplicative or would not have mattered, because there is no way to know that for sure—is well-taken. But there is no need to determine whether the "missing" body-worn camera footage would have been duplicative in this particular case because, at present, there is no reason to assume on this record that any exists.

David L. Goodwin, J.