The People of the State of New York, Plaintiff, v. Roderic McCord, Defendant. (2026)

By omnibus motion, the defendant moves for an order dismissing the case in the interest of justice (CPL 170.40); suppressing the fruits of his seizure and arrest (People v Ingle, 36 NY2d 413 [1975], Dunaway v New York, 442 US 200 [1978], Mapp v Ohio, 367 US 643 [1961]); precluding evidence of his alleged refusal to submit to a chemical test (VTL 1194 [2] [f]); suppressing a noticed statement (People v Huntley, 15 NY2d 72 [1965]); and ordering the People to produce certain discovery (CPL 245.20; see also CPL 245.30 [3]).

First, the motion to dismiss is DENIED. Under CPL § 170.40, a case "may be dismissed in the interest of justice" when "such dismissal is required as a matter of judicial discretion by the existence of some compelling factor, consideration or circumstance clearly demonstrating that conviction or prosecution of the defendant upon such accusatory instrument or count would constitute or result in injustice." In making that determination, the court must consider, in relevant part: "(a) the seriousness and circumstances of the offense; (b) the extent of harm caused by the offense; (c) the evidence of guilt, whether admissible or inadmissible at trial; (d) the history, character and condition of the defendant; (e) any exceptionally serious misconduct of law enforcement personnel in the investigation, arrest and prosecution of the defendant; (f) the purpose and effect of imposing upon the defendant a sentence authorized for the offense; (g) the impact of a dismissal on the safety or welfare of the community; (h) the impact of a dismissal upon the confidence of the public in the criminal justice system" (CPL 170.40 [1]).

The defendant argues that four factors compel dismissal in this case. First, he asserts that the evidence against him consists entirely of false claims that will be disproved by video evidence. Second, he states that he is veteran of the U.S. Army who served during Operation Iraqi Freedom and was honorably discharged, and that his "character is defined by service." Third, he claims that the NYPD engaged in serious misconduct by fabricating a reason to stop his vehicle; arresting him without probable cause; denigrating his right under the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (VCCR) as a dual U.S.-Canadian citizen to have the Canadian consulate informed of his arrest; and falsely characterizing his request to use the bathroom as a refusal to submit to a chemical breath test. Finally, he asserts that public confidence in the criminal justice system "is destroyed when veterans are prosecuted based on demonstrably falsified police reports" (defendant's amended reply, May 18, 2026, at 2). The People contest many of the defendant's factual and legal premises and argue that he has not met his burden of proving that dismissal is justified.

Many of the defendant's arguments for dismissal are standard suppression claims or claims of innocence and thus do not support dismissal at this early stage. The defendant will have the opportunity to challenge the NYPD's bases for stopping his vehicle and placing him under arrest at a pretrial suppression hearing (see infra), and if his factual claims are proven to be true, the evidence against him will be suppressed (see Ingle, 36 NY2d 413; Dunaway, 442 US 200; Mapp, 367 US 643). Similarly, he will have the opportunity to contest the NYPD's claim that he refused to submit to a chemical test at a pretrial hearing and, potentially, at trial. By contrast, it is not clear that NYPD ignoring his request for consular notification under the VCCR constitutes "serious misconduct", as this right appears to be largely unenforceable (see, e.g., Sanchez-Llamas v Oregon, 548 US 331 [2006]), and the defendant's claimed prejudice is extremely speculative. Nevertheless, the defendant will also have the opportunity to present this claim and argue for an appropriate remedy at a pretrial hearing (see infra).

From the information available to the court, the defendant's character is not a factor in favor of dismissal. His military service is a factor in his favor but is not alone enough to warrant dismissal. The defendant has not provided any supporting documentation or provided any detail about when or for how long he served in the military. Based on his criminal history, though, it seems that his service must have been at least 20 years ago, and he has not provided any information about his more recent activities or employment. Weighing against dismissal is the defendant's criminal record, which, according to the rap sheet provided to the court, includes felony convictions in Oklahoma for "pointing firearms" in 2006 and for "assault and battery on [a] police officer" in 2010.

Other factors weigh heavily against dismissal. The defendant is charged with driving while intoxicated under VTL § 1192 (3), a serious offense with substantial penalties. In a densely populated area such as Manhattan, where roads are heavily trafficked by motorists, pedestrians, and cyclists and public transportation is widely accessible, intoxicated driving presents a significant threat to public safety and risks serious bodily injury or death. Dismissing the case at this stage, rather than allowing the case to proceed to pretrial hearings and trial, would not increase public safety or the public's confidence in the criminal legal system.

Weighing all the statutory factors, the defendant has not established that dismissal would be in the interest of justice, and the motion to dismiss is therefore DENIED.

Next, the motion to suppress is GRANTED to the extent that a combined Ingle, Huntley, Dunaway, and VTL § 1194 refusal hearing is ordered. The parties' allegations create issues of fact that must be resolved at a hearing (CPL 710.60 [4]). While the defendant's allegations are technically deficient as to the Dunaway hearing — he does not specifically deny that he was intoxicated or that he was exhibiting signs of intoxication — the court grants the hearing in an exercise of discretion.

The court also GRANTS a pretrial evidentiary hearing regarding the alleged violation of the defendant's rights under the VCCR. The United States Supreme Court has held that violations of a defendant's rights under the VCCR do not mandate suppression under either the Convention itself or the U.S. Constitution (Sanchez-Llamas, 548 US 331). However, the International Court of Justice has interpreted the VCCR as creating individual rights for criminal defendants (LaGrand Case (Germany v United States of America), 2001 ICJ 466, 494 [Judgement of June 27]), and no New York appellate court has held that those individual rights are categorically without remedy as a matter of New York criminal procedure law. At the hearing, the defendant will have the burden to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that (1) his rights under the VCCR were violated and (2) he suffered actual prejudice as a result (see People v Jemmott, 125 AD3d 1005, 1006 [2nd Dept 2015] [for VCCR violation, "no remedy is required in the absence of a showing of prejudice"]; cf. Osagiede v United States, 543 F3d 399 [7th Cir 2008] [discussing in the context of an ineffective assistance of counsel claim what is required to demonstrate prejudice resulting from a VCCR violation]). If the defendant can make such a showing, the hearing court should consider what remedy would be appropriate as a matter of New York law.

Last, the defendant's motion for discovery is granted in part. The People have filed a certificate of compliance, which the defense has not challenged, and their filings suggest that the demanded discovery was produced to the defendant's first assigned attorney. However, the defendant is now proceeding pro se and states that he is not in possession of certain discoverable material. The defendant's motion for discovery is GRANTED to the extent that the People, the defendant, and his current advisory counsel are directed to diligently confer to ensure that all discovery has been produced to the defendant.

This constitutes the decision and order of the court.

Dated: May 28, 2026

New York, NY

Ilona B. Coleman, J.C.C.

Ilona B. Coleman, J.