TROMBLEY v. SORRELLE (2004)

FACTS

The Plaintiff and Defendant agreed to move in together at the Defendant's residence.   The Plaintiff before and after this social arrangement elected to pay various bills of the Defendant's as he felt the “homestead” was a place he intended to remain in for the rest of his life.   He said that he expended over $10,000.00 for which he seeks $5,000.00 in this action.   The Plaintiff agreed that when he spent these sums he did not expect any repayment.

The Defendant in her counterclaim seeks $2,697.03 she claims the Plaintiff owes to her after the live-in arrangement soured and he had been removed from her property on 2/13/04.   She explained that both parties had agreed to pool their incomes in a joint checking account and the Plaintiff was to pay all bills of both parties from it.   The Defendant discovered that not all of her obligations were paid and she seeks $697.03 to cover “expenses” she claims were the Plaintiff's responsibility arising from the period their relationship was in effect.   She also seeks $2,000.00 for the cost of a bankruptcy filing with the attendant lawyer's fees she was forced to pay because of the financial situation that developed while the parties were together as a result of these debts that were not paid.

LAW

Prof. Alan Scheinkman in his Practice Commentary for section 236 of the Domestic Relations Law, Book 14, McKinney's Consolidated law of New York, states that “marriage is an economic partnership ․ [which] cannot exist until marriage has occurred;” and if “[I]f non-marital cohabitants wish to form an economic partnership, they may do so;  but the partnership can be created only by agreement, not by operation of law.   See Morone v. Morone, 50 N.Y.2d 481, 429 N.Y.S.2d 592, 413 N.E.2d 1154 (1980).”  Id. p. 258.   Thus “[A]n oral agreement between non-married cohabitants as to a division of property is enforceable.”  Id. p. 258.

Later in his Commentary Prof. Scheinkman observes vis-a-vis equitable distribution of marital property that “[E]quitable means what is fair, just and right in consideration of the facts and circumstances of each case” (id. p. 409).   He explains “[I]n mandating that the court distribute marital property to the parties ‘equitably’ the Legislature has empowered the courts to divide marital property justly and fairly.   The court ‘shall do equity’ (citation omitted).”  Id. p. 409.

In Morone Court stated:  “[N]ew York courts have long accepted the concept that an express agreement between unmarried persons living together is as enforceable as though they were not living together (Rhodes v. Stone, 63 Hun. 624, opn. in 17 N.Y.S. 561;  Vincent v. Moriarty, 31 App.Div. 484, 52 N.Y.S. 519), provided only that illicit sexual relations were not “part of the consideration of the contract” (Rhodes v. Stone, supra, at 17 N.Y.S., p. 562, quoted in Matter of Gorden, 8 N.Y.2d 71, 75, 202 N.Y.S.2d 1, 168 N.E.2d 239, supra.).   The theory of these cases is that while cohabitation without marriage does not give rise to the property and financial rights which normally attend the marital relation, neither does cohabitation disable the parties from making an agreement within the normal rules of contract law (Matter of Gorden, supra, at p. 75, 202 N.Y.S.2d 1, 168 N.E.2d 239;  see Ann. 94 A.L.R.3d 552, 559).”  Id. p. 486, 429 N.Y.S.2d 592, 413 N.E.2d 1154.

The Court went on to state:  “[C]hanging social custom has increased greatly the number of persons living together without solemnized ceremony and consequently without benefit of the rules of law that govern property and financial matters between married couples.   The difficulties attendant upon establishing property and financial rights between unmarried couples under available theories of law other than contract (see Douthwaite, loc. cit.) warrant application of Gorden's recognition of express contract even though the services rendered be limited to those generally characterized as “housewifely” (Matter of Adams, 1 A.D.2d 259, 149 N.Y.S.2d 849, affd. 2 N.Y.2d 796, 159 N.Y.S.2d 698, 140 N.E.2d 549;  cf. Dombrowski v. Somers, 41 N.Y.2d 858, 393 N.Y.S.2d 706, 362 N.E.2d 257).   There is, moreover, no statutory requirement that such a contract as plaintiff here alleges be in writing (cf. General Obligations Law, section 5-701, subd. a, pars. 1, 3).”  Id. p. 487, 429 N.Y.S.2d 592, 413 N.E.2d 1154.

In DeFina v. Scott, 195 Misc.2d 75, 755 N.Y.S.2d 587, the court dealt with a dispute that arose from the “termination of an engagement” and the subsequent disputes over what reimbursement would be due for funds expended for the wedding “and the establishment of their eventual economic union” (id. p. 76, 755 N.Y.S.2d 587).   Justice Lebedeff opined “[w]hen both married and unmarried couples may call upon courts for enforcement of contract, the arguments of formerly betrothal couples surely should be accorded the same honor” (id. p. 80, 755 N.Y.S.2d 587).

The DeFina court also cited Minieri v. Knittel, 188 Misc.2d 298, 727 N.Y.S.2d 872, where a same sex couple's domestic partnership ended and a dispute arose over the rights of the partners to assets acquired during their union.   The Minieri Court noted that “[T]his dispute typifies the legal difficulties in relation to property which lesbian and gay couples face.   Because New York State does not afford them a legal right to marry, they must use contractual, statutory, common law, and equitable vehicles to protect their interests in property.   Here, the failure of plaintiff and defendant to have executed any documents specifying any changes that would occur in their respective rights to the properties at issue in the event of a dissolution of the relationship of plaintiff and defendant (admittedly anti-romantic, akin to a prenuptial agreement) leaves them in the position of needing to have a court determine their rights at law and in equity.”  Id. p. 300, 727 N.Y.S.2d 872.

The Minieri court then observed that “[A] court of equity may impose a constructive trust based on a confidential relationship, which can grow out of a marital or other family relationship, such as the one here” (id. p. 300, 727 N.Y.S.2d 872).

This was observed by the Morone court when it noted that “[c]hanging social custom has increased greatly the number of persons living together without solemnized ceremony and consequently without benefit of the rules of law that govern property and financial rights between unmarried couples” (id. p. 487, 429 N.Y.S.2d 592, 413 N.E.2d 1154).

In DeFina the issue was not about a couple who had married, but who were engaged to be when the relationship failed.   The task for the Court was to address “the financial rights between unmarried couples” which was the status of the Defina-Scott cohabitation at the time of the break-up.   Justice Lebedeff after noting commentary “․ that women, who traditionally bear wedding expenses, are necessarily the economic losers in broken engagements” (id. p. 79, 755 N.Y.S.2d 587) concluded, after citing the case of Bloomfield v. Bloomfield, 97 N.Y.2d 188, 738 N.Y.S.2d 650, 764 N.E.2d 950, for the proposition that “the law has advanced to the extent that prenuptial and antenuptial agreements are freely recognized” (id. p. 80, 755 N.Y.S.2d 587) as well as Minieri for the point the “[e]ven domestic partners may call upon a court to resolve and regulate property rights acquired during their relationship” (id. p. 80, 755 N.Y.S.2d 587), that “․ where a contract exists ․” that as “[w]hen both married and unmarried couples may call upon the courts for enforcement of contract, the agreements of formally betrothed couples surely should be accorded the same honor” (id. p. 80, 755 N.Y.S.2d 587).

In Minieri the court expresses the same sentiment as regards same sex cohabitation in resolving disputes arising upon the dissolution of a union “․ they must use contractual, statutory, common law, and equitable vehicles to protect their interests in property”-especially when the couple has failed to provide for (in Minieri) “their respective rights to the properties at issue in the event of a dissolution of the relationship ․ [leaving] them in the position of needing to have a Court determine their rights at law and in equity” (id. p. 300, 727 N.Y.S.2d 872).

 It is clear, then, that an “express agreement between unmarried persons living together is as enforceable as though they were not living together ․” (Morone, supra, p. 486, 429 N.Y.S.2d 592, 413 N.E.2d 1154);  and, as the Morone court ruled “[t]here is, however, no statutory requirement that such a contract ․ be in writing ․” (id. p. 487, 429 N.Y.S.2d 592, 413 N.E.2d 1154).

As a result of this conclusion by the Morone Court any two people who enter in to a joint social venture with or without an intent to obtain a license to marry as provided under the laws of New York, now or in the future, and/or as recognized in New York by comity or full faith and credit due acts of other counties or states, are able to seek at least as to “property and financial rights ․ the benefit of the rules of law that govern property and financial matters ․ within the normal rules of contract law” (Morone, supra, pps. 486-487, 429 N.Y.S.2d 592, 413 N.E.2d 1154).

Thus, from the commencement of a relationship until it terminates contact relief is available through out such a time period whether or not a licensed marriage or one recognized by the State of New York has occurred (in which event Domestic Relations Law section 236 in whole or in part would apply).

It is clear, then, that whether the parties enter into an engagement (DeFina), a domestic relationship (Minieri) or are married they have formed an “economic relationship” (Scheinkman) and they can seek from the appropriate court using its equitable powers as well as other legal remedies i.e. “contractual, statutory, common law” (Minieri, supra, p. 300, 727 N.Y.S.2d 872) to resolve disputes concerning all aspects of the “economic relationship” except a City Court.

 Watertown City Court's civil part “․ is a court of limited jurisdiction (Siegel, New York Practice, 3rd Ed., Sec. 581).   It possesses strictly limited equitable powers [citations omitted].   Those equitable powers do not encompass the sort of equitable relief” (Scott v. Dale Carpet Cleaning, Inc., 120 Misc.2d 118, 119, 465 N.Y.S.2d 680) naturally attendant in fairly settling the type of dispute at issue in this case-that is, an equitable distribution of the “estate,” if you will, created by the “death” of a social relationship.   So, because in the end, as stated by Justice Brown in Minieri in settling disputes upon the dissolutions of unmarried couples “․ they must use contractual, statutory, common law, and equitable vehicles to protect their interests in property” (id. p. 300, 727 N.Y.S.2d 872), and City Courts not having equitable powers “that encompass the sort of equitable relief” needed to craft a fair and equitable solution “to determine their rights at law and equity” (id. p. 300, 727 N.Y.S.2d 872), this Court does not have jurisdiction over such disputes.

The Petition is dismissed without prejudice so the parties can file an action in a Court that has such equitable powers.   The Decision shall serve as the Judgment and Order of the Court.

JAMES C. HARBERSON, J.