The People of the State of New York, v. Bryan Contreras, Defendant. (2026)

Recitation of the papers considered in reviewing the underlying CPL 30.30 and CPL 245.20 motion includes:

Papers Numbered

Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, October 24, 2025, Patrick A. H. Watts, Esq., affirm. 1

People's Affirmation in Opposition, October 31, 2025, ADA Judith P. Barcavage, Office of the District Attorney, Bronx County, affirm. 2

Defendant's Reply [Withdrawn] to People's Opposition, November 1, 2025, Patrick A. H. Watts, Esq., affirm.¹ 3

Defendant's Amended Reply to People's Opposition, November 1, 2025, Patrick A. H. Watts, Esq., affirm. 4

Defendant's Supplemental Reply to People's Opposition, November 7, 2025, Patrick A. H. Watts, Esq., affirm. 5

People's Supplemental Affirmation in Opposition, January 21, 2026, ADA Judith P. Barcavage 6

Defendant's Surreply to People's Supplemental Opposition, January 26, 2026 Patrick A. H. Watts, Esq., affirm. 7

Defendant Bryan Contreras, charged with Criminal Possession of a Weapon in the Second Degree (Penal Law § 265.03 [3]) and other related charges, under Indictment Number 73518-23, moves for an order deeming the prosecution's Certificates of Compliance (COC) invalid and their Statements of Readiness (SOR) illusory pursuant to Criminal Procedure Law (CPL) §§ 245.20 and 245.50 (1) and further dismissing the accusatory instrument on the ground that he has been denied his right to a speedy trial pursuant to CPL § 30.30 (1) (a) and § 210.20 (1) (g), and granting such other relief as this court may deem proper. The People oppose the motion.

The court decides the motion as follows:

I

Defendant moves to invalidate the People's certificates of compliance. Defendant asserts that the People were not ready and remain unready to proceed to trial, as counsel was never served with certificates of compliance or statements of readiness related to this indictment, 73518-23. Defense contends that the discovery he received on October 24, 2025, at 3:20 p.m., via email, as well as the original and supplemental certificates of compliance and notices of maintained readiness, dated December 15, 2023, December 20, 2023, January 25, 2024, and June 12, 2024, all bear indictment number 75447-24. Although the defense acknowledged that defendant has a second case under that indictment number, defendant is represented by a different attorney on that matter.

Defense counsel maintains that the People never served him with the applicable discovery or compliance certifications related to this case. Counsel claims that he only became aware of the error on October 24, 2025, when he received a OneDrive email link to files that contained the correct discovery material.

In response, the prosecution, citing Rule 1.16 (e) of the New York State Rules of Professional Conduct (22 NYCRR 1200), insists that it was prior counsel's responsibility to provide discovery, along with the case file, to new counsel, not theirs. Rule 1.16 (e) states in pertinent part

"[U]pon termination of representation, a lawyer shall take steps, to the extent reasonably practicable, to avoid foreseeable prejudice to the rights of the client, including giving reasonable notice to the client, allowing time for employment of other counsel, delivering to the client all papers and property to which the client is entitled, . . . and complying with applicable laws and rules."

It is true that this rule, expressed as an imperative, imposes on outgoing counsel the responsibility to transfer the case file to incoming counsel. That said, Rule 1.16 (e) sets forth an obligation, and is more of an ethical consideration related to file management rather than a constitutional or statutory requirement safeguarding defendant's legal rights. As stated in the Rules' scope, "the Rules are partly obligatory and disciplinary and partly constitutive and descriptive in that they define a lawyer's professional role." Thus, the rules provide a framework for the ethical practice of law. Furthermore, "[t]he Rules presuppose a larger legal context shaping the lawyer's role. That context includes court rules and statutes relating to matters of licensure, laws defining specific obligations of lawyers, and substantive and procedural law in general."²

New York's criminal procedure law and case law comprise part of that larger legal context. The Criminal Procedure Law (CPL), enacted in 1970, applies exclusively to "[a]ll criminal actions and proceedings commenced upon or after the effective date thereof and all appeals, and other post-judgment proceedings, relating or attaching thereto; and [a]ll matters of criminal procedure prescribed in this chapter which do not constitute a part of any particular action or case, occurring upon or after such effective date" (CPL 1.10 [a], [b]).

Article 245, formerly Article 240 of the chapter, regulates the discovery process in criminal cases. Discovery may be defined as "the usually pretrial disclosure of pertinent facts or documents by one or both parties to a legal action or proceeding" (Hon. Dineen Riviezzo and Hon. Betty Calvo-Torres, "Discovery", NYS New Judges Seminar 2026). Article 245 defines terms, sets timeframes, and outlines the rights and obligations of the defendant and those of the prosecution regarding discovery in the case. Initially, "[t]he prosecution shall disclose to the defendant, and permit the defendant to discover, inspect, copy, photograph and test, all items and information that relate to the subject matter of the case and are in the possession, custody or control of the prosecution or persons under the prosecution's direction or control" (CPL 245.20 [1]). The defense must provide reciprocal discovery thirty days after the prosecution complies with the discovery law (CPL 245.20 [4]). No motion or demand is required of the defendant (People ex rel. Ferro v Bran, 197 AD3d 787, 787 [2d Dept 2021]). Additionally, there is a presumption in favor of disclosure (CPL 245.20 [7]), and the duty to disclose is a continuing obligation (CPL 245.60).

While the statute primarily dictates initial disclosure timelines, the spirit of the reform and ethical obligations require the prosecutor to provide the same discovery to new counsel that they were required to provide to previous counsel, or risk having their COC ruled invalid. It is crucial that replacement counsel promptly review the previously filed COC, demand any missing items, and ensure the prosecution is complying with its ongoing disclosure obligations. However, make no mistake, the statutory obligation to provide discovery to defense counsel falls exclusively on the prosecution, and is not an obligation that may be delegated to a third party (People v Damon, 57 Misc 3d 891, 896 [Hudson City Ct 2017] [holding that prosecutor obligated to provide material responsive to discovery demand, not state police).

In People v Steadman, 82 NY2d 1 (1993), which addressed the People's obligation to disclose the terms of a cooperation agreement, the Court of Appeals noted that prosecutors occupy a dual role as advocates and as public officers. In recognizing that prosecutors occupy both roles simultaneously, the Court found that prosecutors are charged with the duty not only to seek convictions, but also to see that justice is done. Prosecutors must deal fairly with the accused and candidly with the courts. The Court held that "this rule of fairness, rooted in the concept of constitutional due process, [and] given substance by the Brady decision [ ] imposes on the People the duty to disclose to the defense evidence in its possession" (Steadman, at 7). Furthermore, in this distinctive role, a prosecutor has special responsibilities, "constitutional, statutory, ethical, and personal, to safeguard the integrity of criminal proceedings and fairness in the criminal process" (People v Santorelli, 95 NY2d 412, 421 [2000] [prosecution only gauged with providing defense with evidence in its possession]). Those special responsibilities include providing discovery to the defense.

To be ready for trial in accordance with CPL 30.30, the People must both state their readiness and certify compliance with their discovery obligations (CPL 30.30 [5] ["Any statement of trial readiness must be accompanied or preceded by a certification of good faith compliance with the disclosure requirements of section 245.20 of this chapter . . . ."]; CPL 245.50 [3] ["[T]he prosecution shall not be deemed ready for trial for purposes of section 30.30 of this chapter until it has filed a proper certificate pursuant to subdivision one of this section"]). As part of their discovery obligations, the People must give to defendant "all items and information that relate to the subject matter of the case and are in the possession, custody or control of the prosecution or persons under the prosecution's direction or control" (CPL 245.20 [1] [describing automatic discovery]). After the People have provided all required discovery, excluding items subject to a protective order or items that have been lost or destroyed, the People may certify compliance with their discovery obligations by filing a certificate of compliance (see CPL 245.50 [1] [describing certificates of compliance]).

Should the People fail to file a proper certificate of compliance, then the People cannot be deemed ready for trial (CPL 245.50 [3]). If the People are not ready for trial within the required period, defendant may move for dismissal (CPL 30.30 [1]). The case would be dismissed for failure to provide a speedy trial (CPL 210.20 [1] [g]). In this way, "[t]he legislature tethered the People's CPL article 245 discovery obligations to CPL 30.30's speedy trial requirements" (People v Bay, 41 NY3d 200, 209 [2023]).

The validity of a certificate of compliance is critical to determining whether the People are ready for trial. As a threshold matter, the potential deficiencies in the certificate of compliance must consist of materials subject to automatic discovery (see CPL 245.50 [1]). The defense argues that the People did not serve him with discoverable materials related to this case before October 24, 2025. As the defense alleges that he did not receive any discovery, that includes automatic discovery which consists of "all items and information that relate to the subject matter of the case and are in the possession, custody or control of the prosecution or persons under the prosecution's direction or control" (CPL 245.20 [1]). This includes all evidence in police custody, collected as part of the detective's investigation of this case, thus relating to its subject matter.

Counsel, who entered this case on March 3, 2025, sought several adjournments to familiarize himself with the file.  ³ At the calendar call on June 18, 2025, defense requested time to review recently received discovery. On July 18, 2025, defense counsel expressed a desire to resolve a newer matter, Ind. No. 75447-24, before proceeding to hearings and trial in this case. The case could not proceed to pretrial hearings on September 16, 2025, because defense counsel was engaged in another matter that day. The case was adjourned to October 15, 2025.

On October 24, 2025, seven months after attorney Watts entered the case, the People served him with discovery for this indictment, 73518-23, consisting of their December 15, 2023, December 20, 2023, January 25, 2024, and June 12, 2024, disclosures provided to prior counsel Alice Swenson (defense withdrawn 30.30 reply ¶ 3 a — d.). Counsel claims that the discovery he received from the prosecution before October 24, 2025, related to defendant's other case, indictment 75447-24. The People sent additional discovery to the defense on November 3, 2025.⁴

With these belated disclosures in mind, this court must determine if defense counsel can contest the validity of the certificates of compliance and statements of readiness filed between December 5, 2023, and June 12, 2024.

In assessing the validity of the certificates of compliance filed in this case, this court must evaluate "whether the prosecution [ ] 'exercis[ed] due diligence and ma[de] reasonable inquiries to ascertain the existence of material and information subject to discovery' " (Bay at 211, quoting CPL 245.50 [1]). In evaluating the People's efforts, "[r]easonableness . . . is the touchstone" (id. at 211-212). Although the analysis inevitably turns upon the details of the case, courts should assess reasonableness by looking at (1) the People's efforts to comply with the discovery requirements; (2) the volume of discovery, both provided and outstanding; (3) the complexity of the case; (4) the obviousness of the omission; (5) the People's response to learning of the omission; and (6) the People's explanation for the omission in the first place (id. at 212).⁵ These Bay factors have been incorporated into CPL 245.50 (5) and CPL 30.30. Additionally, where previously the defense did not need to demonstrate prejudice, the delay must now be prejudicial to the defense or otherwise impede defendant's ability to investigate the case or prepare for trial effectively.⁶

CPL 245.50 governs the procedural prerequisites for defendant's motion. Challenges to certificates of compliance must be filed within 35 days of service of the certificate of compliance (CPL 245.50 [4]) [c]). The deadline may be extended for good cause, but the movant must request the extension before the 35-day period expires (CPL 245.50 [4] [c] [i]). Good cause is established if the delay is due to either a material change in circumstances or some issue that could not have been known beforehand, even with due diligence (CPL 245.50 [4] [c] [ii]).

These statutory provisions which took effect on August 7, 2025, "apply to all criminal actions pending on such date and all actions commenced on or after such date" (L 2025, ch 56, part LL, § 8). For any pending action, the 35-day period to challenge a certificate of compliance "shall run from the effective date of this act" (id.). Since the People's certificates of compliance were served on the defendant, before the effective date of the 2025 amendments, the 35-day challenge period ran from August 7, 2025, to September 11, 2025. Counsel entered this case in March 2025 but did not serve his motion challenging the certificates until October 24, 2025, over a month after the September 11, 2025 deadline. Therefore, the motion is untimely.

Even under the predecessor statute, defendant needed to challenge the certificates of compliance "as soon as practicable" (former CPL 245.50 [4] [c]). Were the motion made under this more lenient standard after affording counsel an opportunity to become familiar with the case file, the October 24, 2025 filing was seven months after counsel's entry into the case, arguably not as soon as practicable (see People v Seymour, 84 Misc 3d 23, 25 [App Term, 2d Dept, 9th & 10th Jud Dists 2024] [finding defendant's motion untimely when filed 72 days after the prosecution filed their certificate of compliance]; People v Morales, 86 Misc 3d 523, 525 [Sup Ct, Kings County 2025] [48 days]; People v Chavers, 80 Misc 3d 1218[A], 2023 NY Slip Op 51030[U], *1 [Sup Ct, Kings County 2023] [59 days]).

Although defendant neither complied with the deadline nor sought a timely extension, defendant may still challenge the certificates of compliance under one of two statutory exceptions to the 35-day requirement. Under the first exception, defendant must show that the challenge is grounded on a "material change in circumstances" (CPL 245.50 [4] [c] [ii]). The second exception requires defendant to show that, even with the exercise of due diligence, defendant could not have anticipated the specific and particularized matters that would form the basis of the challenge before the deadline expired (id.).

Neither statutory exception is applicable here. There was no material change in circumstances. The only change was of counsel, who entered the case in March 2025, and should have been aware that the People had not provided him with the proper discovery before October 2025. Nor has the defense shown that this claim could not have been discovered earlier through the exercise of due diligence in reviewing the case file. Thus, neither statutory exception applies to salvage defendant's motion.

Regarding the late disclosure, both parties are to blame. Initially, the People, pursuant to their statutory obligation, should have sent the discovery to counsel rather than relying on prior counsel to provide it. Compounding the issue, the defense had a professional obligation to examine the discovery upon receipt to determine whether it was the correct materials, let alone complete.

Defense counsel did not inform the People of any defects in the discovery, and by extension, the validity of the People's certificates of compliance, until October 24, 2025. Counsel was either unaware or failed to notify the People of these deficiencies for nearly seven months. The defense had a statutory obligation to notify the People of any issues related to discovery "[t]o the extent that the party is aware of a potential defect or deficiency . . . as soon as practicable" (former CPL 245.50 [4] [b]), as the statute imposes a "quasi 'due diligence' requirement" on the party challenging the certificate of compliance to discourage gamesmanship of competing discovery obligations (People v Lanfair, 78 Misc 3d 371, 375 [Cohoes City Ct 2023] [describing factors to determine defendant's diligence in alerting the People of a discovery deficiency]). Under the current statute, that notification should have taken place within 35 days of receiving the COC (CPL 245.50 [4]) [c]).

In their defense, the People responded diligently and provided the correct discovery packet upon being informed of their mistake.

Finally, defense's argument that the discovery sent to his attention before October 2025 was misaddressed is inaccurate. The discovery forwarded to counsel's attention had the name and address of the prior attorney on the accompanying correspondence, which was from December 2023, January and June 2024. The People neglected to redraft the cover letters. The better practice would have been for the assigned assistant to revise the accompanying cover letter to reflect the date, contents of the disclosure, and the name of the current counsel. However, forwarding prior discovery distributions and accompanying correspondence to present counsel without revising the cover letter is not fatal to this case.

On this record, the defense has not proven that the People's certificates of compliance were invalid or illusory.

II

New York law addresses statutory speedy trial in its criminal procedure law. Where a defendant is accused of one or more offenses, at least one of which is a felony, CPL 30.30 (1) (a) requires the People to be ready for trial within six months of the start of a criminal action. This six-month period is calculated based on calendar months, not necessarily 180 days (People v Smith, 97 AD2d 485 [2d Dept 1983]). The statutory period begins when the criminal action commences, which happens when the first accusatory instrument is filed (CPL 1.20 [17]). If the People are not ready for trial in this period, the defendant may seek dismissal of the accusatory instrument under CPL 30.30 (1). Additionally, the People must certify that they have complied with their statutory obligation of providing all appropriate discovery, CPL 30.30 [5], and filing a proper certificate of compliance attesting as much, CPL 245.50 [3].

In this case, the criminal action started with the filing of the initial accusatory instrument, the criminal court complaint, on July 27, 2023 (CPL 1.20 [17]; People v Porch, 212 AD2d 360 [1st Dept 1995]). The People must be ready for trial within 184 days (CPL 30.30 [1] [a]).

In evaluating whether the People are ready for trial, this court must "comput[e] the time elapsed between the filing of the first accusatory instrument and the People's declaration of readiness," subtract any periods of excludable time, and then add any periods of postreadiness delay that are chargeable to the People (People v Cortes, 80 NY2d 201, 208 [1992]).

The New York Police Department arrested Bryan Contreras on July 26, 2023, nineteen days after a police officer observed him in possession of a firearm near 500 East 171st Street, Bronx, New York. The court arraigned Contreras on July 27,2023, for two counts of Criminal Possession of a Weapon in the Second Degree (CPL 265.03 [3], 265.03 [01][b]), Criminal Possession of a Firearm (CPL 265.01-b [1]), Criminal Possession of a Weapon in the Fourth Degree (CPL 265.01 [1]), and Possession of Ammunition (AC 10-131 [i] [3]). Defendant entered a plea of not guilty. The court set bail at $5,000 cash, $15,000 insurance company bond, and $15,000 partially secured surety bond at 10%. The matter was adjourned to the Gun Waiver Part (GWP1) on July 31, 2024, for grand jury action. The four-day period from July 27, 2023, to July 31, 2023, is chargeable to the People(People v Correa, 77 NY2d 930 [1991]).

On July 31, 2023, the People presented the case to the A Panel of the grand jury and secured an indictment. Defendant posted cash bail on August 25, 2023, and was released on supervised release with electronic monitoring. The court transferred the case to Part SCA for Supreme Court arraignment scheduled for August 18, 2023. This adjournment is chargeable to the People (People v Correa, 77 NY2d 930 [1991]). Eighteen days are chargeable to the People.

Since defendant was not arraigned on August 18, 2023, the court adjourned the case to September 8, 2023, for arraignment in Part 71. The twenty-one-day adjournment between these dates is charged to the People(People v Correa, 77 NY2d 930 [1991]).

On September 8, 2023, following arraignment on Indictment Number 73518-23 in Part 71, the defendant pleaded not guilty. The court set a motion schedule: defense motions were due by September 25, 2023, and the People's response and grand jury minutes were due by October 10, 2023. The matter would then be adjourned to October 27, 2023, in Part 71 for a decision. This period is excludable (CPL 30.30 [4] [a]) because it involves pre-trial motions.

Because the omnibus motion was filed late, the court, on October 27, 2023, amended the motion schedule, requiring the People's reply by November 2, 2023. The court adjourned the matter to November 20, 2023, for decision and order. The period constitutes excludable time (CPL 30.30 [4] [a]).

As the court had not received the grand jury minutes for review, it adjourned the case to January 5, 2024, for decision. This adjournment is excludable (CPL 30.30 [4] [a]); People v Wellington 254 AD2d 21, 22 [1st Dept 1998] [excluding delay for motion practice where the case could not proceed until the motion was decided]). During the adjournment, the People filed an automatic disclosure form (ADF), a statement of readiness (SOR), and a certificate of compliance (COC) on December 15, 2023, with the court and the attorney of record, Alice Swenson, Esq. The People filed a supplemental certificate of compliance and a Statement of Readiness on December 20, 2023.

The court issued its decision and order on January 5, 2024, denying the motion to dismiss the indictment after an evaluation of the grand jury presentation and upon consideration of defendant's arguments pursuant to New York State Rifle Ass'n, Inc. v Bruen, 597 US 1 (2022). The court granted defendant's motions to challenge the existence of probable cause for his arrest and suppression of physical evidence and identification testimony, to the extent of granting a Mapp/Wade/Dunaway hearing to resolve the issues. The court adjourned the case to February 9, 2024, in Part 71. Time is excludable (CPL 30.30 [4] [a]; see People v Green, 90 AD2d 705, 706 [1st Dept 1982] [excluding period after the court decides the motion and grants pretrial hearing]).

Additionally, the defense was to file their certificate of compliance by January 26, 2024. This court notes that the defense filed their COC on January 8, 2024. During the adjournment, the People filed a motion to compel a buccal swab, along with a second supplemental COC, on January 25, 2024. This adjournment is not chargeable to the People (CPL 30.30 [4] [a]).

On February 9, 2024, the court gave the defense until February 15, 2024, to oppose the People's motion to compel. The case was adjourned to March 8, 2024, for decision. This adjournment is excludable (CPL 30.30 [4] [a]). Defense filed an opposition to the People's motion to compel, also seeking to litigate how the People obtained the cigarette butt that served as the source of the biological material used to create a DNA profile of the defendant. The adjournment constitutes excludable time (CPL 30.30 [4] [a]).

On March 8, 2024, the court granted the People's motion to compel a DNA sample. The court also granted defendant's motion for a protective order, limiting the comparison of his DNA profile to evidence tested for this case and prohibiting the profile from being uploaded into law enforcement DNA databases. The People did not make an offer or recommendation. The case was adjourned to April 5, 2024, for the defense's COC. This time is excludable (CPL 30.30 [4] [a]).

On April 5, 2024, Ms. Swenson remained counsel but was now assigned to represent defendant pursuant to the Assigned Counsel Law (County Law Article 18-B). The People offered a plea to Penal Law 110/265.03(3), a D felony, with a sentence of two years' incarceration, two years' post-release supervision, and a waiver of the right to appeal. The defense filed a prepleading memorandum (PPI).The matter was adjourned to May 9, 2024. Time is excludable (CPL 30.30 [4] [a]; see People v Green, 90 AD2d 705, 706 [1st Dept 1982] [excluding period after the court decides the motion and grants pretrial hearing]).

On May 9, 2024, the prosecution was not ready to proceed and requested a one-day adjournment. Additionally, defendant was not present as the case was originally calendared for May 10, 2024. Also, the defense had not filed a supplemental COC. The People's offer to defendant remained open. The court excused defendant's absence due to the scheduling change and charged the People with one day of post-readiness delay (see People v Stirrup, 91 NY2d 434, 440 [1998] [in the post-readiness context, the prosecution is charged with the time for the period requested]; see also People v Labate, 42 NY3d 184, 190 [2024]). The court adjourned the case until June 14, 2024. The People filed a second set of supplemental certificates on June 12, 2024. As the People were not presently ready to proceed, they are charged with one day (People v Kendzia, 64 NY2d 331, 337 [1985]). One day is chargeable to the People.

On June 14, 2024, the matter was administratively adjourned to August 2, 2024. The period of June 14 to August 2, 2024, is not chargeable to the People (see People v Labate, 42 NY3d 184, 190 [the People generally are not charged with delays attributable to the court]; see also People v Goss, 87 NY2d 792, 797 [1996]).

On August 2, 2024, the People were not ready to proceed with the hearings and trial because the witnesses required for the pretrial hearings were not notified. The prosecution requested that August 6, 2024, be set solely for the hearings. The court adjourned the case until August 8, 2024. The period from August 2 to August 6, 2024, is chargeable to the People as post-readiness delay (see People v Stirrup, 91 NY2d 434). The People are charged with 4 days from August 2 to August 6, 2024.

On August 8, 2024, the People were not ready to proceed because a necessary witness was in mandatory training, and the assigned assistant was leaving the district attorney's office. The People modified their offer from two years' incarceration with two years of post-release supervision to a six-month split, to wit: 6 months' incarceration, concurrent with 5 years' probation. The parties agreed to adjourn the matter to August 15, 2024, for defendant to consider the offer. This period is excludable (see People v Kirk, 27 AD3d 383, 383 [1st Dept 2006] [excluding delay resulting from adjournment "which [was] for plea negotiations"]).

On August 15, 2024, the People again modified their offer, reducing the period of incarceration to three months, concurrent with a five-year term of probation. The agreed-upon adjourn date was October 11, 2024. Defense sought to discuss the offer with defendant, and the parties agreed that the case could be advanced for disposition, with the understanding that the offer would expire upon commencement of hearings. This period is excludable (CPL 30.30 [4] [b] [excluding "period of delay resulting from a continuance granted by the court at the request of, or with the consent of, the defendant or his or her counsel"]; see also People v Kirk, 27 AD3d 383).

On October 11, 2024, the People were not ready to proceed because the assigned assistant was on trial on another matter. The court adjourned the matter to November 22, 2024, with the understanding that the People would be charged with the adjournment until they filed a notice of readiness. The People are charged with 42 days.

On November 22, 2024, the court learned that defendant had been rearrested on a new case being presented to the grand jury that day. Defense counsel waived her client's production and appearance. The People withdrew their prior offer due to the new arrest. The court adjourned the case until December 17, 2024. The People filed a SOR on December 3, 2024. This adjournment constitutes delay attributable to defendant (CPL 30.30 [4] [b] [excluding delay "resulting from other proceedings concerning the defendant, and the period during which such matters are under consideration by the court"]).

On December 17, 2024, the court adjourned this matter to January 16, 2025, in Part 24, to join defendant's new case, Indictment number 75447-24. This adjournment constitutes delay attributable to defendant (CPL 30.30 [4] [b] [excluding delay "resulting from other proceedings concerning the defendant, and the period during which such matters are under consideration by the court"]).

On January 16, 2025, the People extend an offer of a plea to PL 110/265.03 (3), a D felony, with two years' incarceration, two years of post-release supervision, and a waiver of the right to appeal, in each case. Defense counsel wanted to discuss the offer with defendant. The court adjourned the matter to February 13, 2025, 2:15 p.m., Part 70 for hearings. Time is excludable (CPL 30.30 [4] [a]).

On February 13, 2025, this case was on the Part 24 calendar in the morning and was transferred to Part 70 to be joined with the new indictment. In Part 70, both matters were adjourned to March 3, 2025. This adjournment is not chargeable to the People (see People v Labate, 42 NY3d 184, 190).

On March 3, 2025, defendant retained Patrick A. H. Watts, Esq., to represent him on this indictment. Accordingly, Ms. Swenson requested relief from the court, which granted her application. Mr. Watts sought an adjournment to familiarize himself with the file. Mr. Watts was advised that the recommendation is PL 110/265.03(3), two years' incarceration, two years' post-release supervision, and a waiver of the right to appeal. The court granted Mr. Watts' request and adjourned the case until April 9, 2025. The adjournment is excludable (CPL 30.30 [4] [b] [excluding "period of delay resulting from a continuance granted by the court at the request of, or with the consent of, the defendant or his or her counsel"]).

On April 9, 2025, the People were ready to proceed, but the defense was not ready.⁷ The court adjourned the case to May 28, 2025. This adjournment is excludable (CPL 30.30 [4] [b] [excluding "period of delay resulting from a continuance granted by the court at the request of, or with the consent of, the defendant or his or her counsel"]).

On May 28, 2025, the People maintained their readiness, but the defense was not ready to proceed. The court adjourned the case to June 18, 2025. This period is excludable (CPL 30.30 [4] [b] [excluding "period of delay resulting from a continuance granted by the court at the request of, or with the consent of, the defendant or his or her counsel"]).

On June 18, 2025, the defense requested an adjournment to review recently received discovery. The court adjourned the matter until July 8, 2025. This period is excludable (CPL 30.30 [4] [b]).

On July 8, 2025, the court adjourned the matter to July 18, 2025. This period is not chargeable to the People (see People v Labate, 42 NY3d 184, 190).

On July 18, 2025, the defense wanted to resolve Indictment number 75447-24 before proceeding to hearings and trial on this indictment. Accordingly, this case was adjourned to September 16, 2025. The adjournment is excludable (CPL 30.30 [4] [b] [excluding "period of delay resulting from a continuance granted by the court at the request of, or with the consent of, the defendant or his or her counsel"; see also CPL 30.30 [4] [a]]).

On September 16, 2025, the court adjourned the matter to October 15, 2025, due to defense counsel's engagement in another matter. This period is excludable (CPL 30.30 [4] [b]).

On October 15, 2025, the People stated their readiness but request a one-day delay. Defense stated that he will be unable to proceed on October 16, 2025. The matter was adjourned to October 23, 2025. The assigned assistant later contacted the court and opposing counsel, saying that October 23, 2025, was not a good date and requested either October 21 or October 22, 2025. The matter remained on the calendar for October 23, 2025. People's future statement of readiness, i.e., tomorrow, is invalid, thus one day is chargeable. (People v Kendzia, 64 NY2d 331, 337 [1985]). The People are charged with one day.

On October 23, 2025, the case was administratively adjourned to October 24, 2025, and on October 24, 2025, the matter was then administratively adjourned to October 27, 2025, Part 21, for hearings and trial. This period is not chargeable to the People (see People v Labate, 42 NY3d 184, 190).

On October 27, 2025, the defense filed the present CPL 30.30 motion, although defendant was not present. The court excused defendant who was in the lobby undergoing a security screening, and adjourned the matter to October 28, 2025, 10:30 a.m., for hearings. The adjournment constitutes excludable time (CPL 30.30 [4] [a]).

On October 28, 2025, the court conducted a Mapp/Wade/Dunaway hearing and adjourned the matter to October 30, 2025, for decision. The adjournment is excludable (CPL 30.30 [4] [a]); People v Wellington 254 AD2d 21, 22 [1st Dept 1998] [excluding delay for motion practice "where the case could not proceed until the motion was decided"]).

On October 30, 2025, the court rendered its decision, declining to suppress either the gun or the identification. The court also set a schedule for the speedy trial motion. The People stated they would file their opposition by October 31, 2025. The defense reply was due by November 7, 2025, and the matter adjourned for decision until November 19, 2025. The adjournment is excludable (CPL 30.30 [4] [a]).

The People filed their opposition on October 31, 2025. Defense filed and withdrew his initial Reply on November 1, 2025, then filed an Amended Reply later that day. Defense filed a Supplemental Reply on November 7, 2025. The adjournment is excludable (CPL 30.30 [4] [a]); People v Wellington, 254 AD2d 21, 22).

On November 19, 2025, neither the People nor the defense was available to appear on the matter. Thus, the court administratively adjourned the case to December 17, 2025. This period is not chargeable to the People (see People v Labate, 42 NY3d 184, 190).

On December 17, 2025, the court initially denied defendant's speedy trial motion. However, it adjourned the matter to January 21, 2026, to reevaluate the motion and for the prosecution to address defendant's arguments challenging the certificate of compliance and the discovery production referenced in defendant's speedy trial motion. This period is excludable (CPL 30.30 [4] [a]).

On January 21, 2026, the People filed their supplemental opposition. Defense filed their surreply on January 26, 2026. The court adjourned the matter to February 11, 2026, for decision. This period is excludable (CPL 30.30 [4] [a]).

On February 11, 2026, the court rendered a decision on the record in accordance with this written decision. The case was adjourned until May 6, 2026, for trial. This period is excludable (CPL 30.30 [4] [a]).

The prosecution has spent 91 days of chargeable time to prosecute this case. Because the People have not exceeded their allotted speedy trial time of six months, defendant's motion to dismiss the indictment on statutory speedy trial grounds is DENIED.

Conclusion

Based on the foregoing, the People's original Certificate of Compliance filed on December 15, 2023, and all subsequent certificates are valid, and their Statements of Readiness were not illusory. Accordingly, defendant's motion to dismiss pursuant to CPL 245.50 is DENIED.

Furthermore, as there are only ninety-one days chargeable to the People, defendant's motion to dismiss pursuant to CPL 30.30 and 210.20 (1) (g) is also DENIED.

This decision constitutes the opinion and order of the Court.

Dated: April 21, 2026

Bronx, New York

HON. VERENA C. POWELL, A.S.C.J.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Defense's Reply in Opposition is referred to within this decision as the exhibits attached to it are needed for both speedy trial and discovery compliance conversations.

2.   The Rules of Professional Conduct specifically address other aspects of prosecutorial obligations, such as due process, in Rule 3.8, Special Responsibilities of Prosecutors and Other Government Lawyers. That rule seeks to prohibit malicious prosecution, 3.8 [a]; requires timely disclosure of material negating the accused's guilt, 3.8 [b]; necessitates efforts to set aside an unjust conviction, 3.8 [c]; and compels case review on claims of actual innocence. See also Rule 3.4, "Fairness to Opposing Party and Counsel," and the District Attorneys Association of the State of New York (DAASNY) "The Right Thing," An Ethics Guide for Prosecutors, 2025.

3.   A full discussion of counsel's tenure on the case is provided in Section II, addressing CPL 30.30.

4.   Based on the date stamp on the EDDS exhibits attached to defense's withdrawn reply to the People's motion in opposition.

5.   A court should consider these factors through a "holistic assessment of the People's efforts . . . rather than a strict item-by-item test that would require us to conclude that a [certificate of compliance] is improper if the People miss even one item of discovery" (People v Cooperman, 225 AD3d 1216, 1220 (4th Dept 2024).

6.   In addition, new statutory factors not enumerated in Bay include whether the prosecution self-reported the error and took prompt remedial action without court intervention; whether the belated discovery was substantially duplicative, insignificant or easily remedied, and whether the omission was corrected (CPL 245.50 [5]).

7.   This assertion of readiness in the People's Opposition conflicts with a notation made by the court attorney in NY Bench which states that neither party was ready to proceed on April 9, 2025. Neither party has ordered the minutes of the calendar call.

Verena C. Powell, J.