IN RE: a Proceeding for Custody A.R.G. (2026)

I. Statement Pursuant to CPLR § 2219 [a]

In accordance with CPLR § 2219 [a], the court recites that the following papers were read and considered on these motions. On Motion Sequence No. 001: petitioner's emergency order to show cause signed September 18, 2026 (NY St Cts Filing [NYSCEF] Doc No. 9), together with the affirmation of urgency of Shannon Rogers Simpson, Esq., dated September 17, 2026 (NY St Cts Filing [NYSCEF] Doc No. 3), the affirmation of petitioner A.R.G. dated September 17, 2026 (NY St Cts Filing [NYSCEF] Doc No. 4), and the exhibits annexed thereto (NY St Cts Filing [NYSCEF] Doc Nos. 5-7), upon which that order to show cause was granted; and the affirmation of service of Andrea Phillips, Esq. (NY St Cts Filing [NYSCEF] Doc No. 20).

On Motion Sequence No. 002: petitioner's emergency order to show cause signed September 21, 2026 (NY St Cts Filing [NYSCEF] Doc No. 23); the affirmation of urgency and compliance with 22 NYCRR 202.7 [f] of Shannon Rogers Simpson, Esq., dated September 21, 2026 (NY St Cts Filing [NYSCEF] Doc No. 11); the affirmation of petitioner dated September 21, 2026 (NY St Cts Filing [NYSCEF] Doc No. 12), together with the exhibits annexed thereto (NY St Cts Filing [NYSCEF] Doc Nos. 14-19; 22); the affirmation of A.B. dated September 21, 2026 (NY St Cts Filing [NYSCEF] Doc No. 13), together with the exhibit annexed thereto (NY St Cts Filing [NYSCEF] Doc Nos. 14-19; 22); the supplemental affirmation of Shannon Rogers Simpson, Esq., dated September 21, 2026 (NY St Cts Filing [NYSCEF] Doc No. 21); and the acknowledgment of service of Nicholas Murgolo, Esq., dated September 23, 2026 (NY St Cts Filing [NYSCEF] Doc No. 25).

On Cross-Motion Sequence No. 001: respondent's notice of cross-motion dated September 28, 2026 (NY St Cts Filing [NYSCEF] Doc No. 28); the attorney affirmation of Nicholas J. Murgolo, Esq., in support of the cross-motion, dated September 28, 2026 (NY St Cts Filing [NYSCEF] Doc No.29), together with the exhibits annexed thereto (NY St Cts Filing [NYSCEF] Doc Nos. 32-55); the affirmation of respondent G.E. dated September 28, 2026 (NY St Cts Filing [NYSCEF] Doc No. 30), together with the exhibits annexed thereto (NY St Cts Filing [NYSCEF] Doc Nos. 32-55); and the affirmation of S.G. dated September 27, 2026 (NY St Cts Filing [NYSCEF] Doc No. 31).

In further support of Motion Sequence Nos. 001 and 002 and in opposition to Cross-Motion Sequence No. 001: the affirmation of petitioner dated September 30, 2026, together with the exhibits annexed thereto (NY St Cts Filing [NYSCEF] Doc No. 56); the affirmation in reply and opposition of Shannon Rogers Simpson, Esq., dated September 30, 2026 (NY St Cts Filing [NYSCEF] Doc No. 57); the affirmation of C.L.G. dated September 30, 2026 (NY St Cts Filing [NYSCEF] Doc No. 58); the affirmation of E.G. dated September 30, 2026 (NY St Cts Filing [NYSCEF] Doc No. 59); and the affirmation of K.H. dated September 29, 2026 (NY St Cts Filing [NYSCEF] Doc No. 60).

In further support of Cross-Motion Sequence No. 001: the attorney affirmation in further support of cross-motion and in reply of Nicholas J. Murgolo, Esq., dated October 8, 2026 (NY St Cts Filing [NYSCEF] Doc No. 94), together with the exhibits annexed thereto (NY St Cts Filing [NYSCEF] Doc Nos. 98-100); the reply affirmation of respondent dated October 8, 2026 (NY St Cts Filing [NYSCEF] Doc No. 95), together with the exhibit annexed thereto (NY St Cts Filing [NYSCEF] Doc No. 98-100); the affirmation of A.F.M. dated October 8, 2026 (NY St Cts Filing [NYSCEF] Doc No. 97); and the affirmation of T.G. dated October 8, 2026 (NY St Cts Filing [NYSCEF] Doc No. 103). Finally, the court has read the letter of petitioner's counsel dated October 21, 2026 (NY St Cts Filing [NYSCEF] Doc No. 113) and the supplemental affirmation of petitioner dated October 21, 2026 (NY St Cts Filing [NYSCEF] Doc No. 114), which are addressed separately below.

The undersigned was recently assigned to this Part (see Administrative Order of the Chief Administrative Judge of the Courts, AO/150/2026). Because the two orders to show cause and the cross-motion concern the same child, arise from the same events, and present the same threshold question of jurisdiction, they are consolidated for disposition and determined together as follows.

II. Findings of Fact

The facts recited below are drawn exclusively from the parties' sworn submissions, the affirmations of the nonparty witnesses, and the orders of this court contained in the record. Much of what the parties say about each other is sharply disputed. Where that is so, the court sets out the competing accounts as contentions and does not resolve them. Nothing in this section is a credibility determination or a finding on the merits of custody, and nothing in it binds the court that ultimately determines custody of the child.

A. The Parties and the Child

Petitioner A.R.G. (petitioner or the father) and respondent G.E. (respondent or the mother) are the unmarried parents of one child, G.R.G. (the child), who was born in California in 2022 and is now four years old. The parties have been together since 2018. It is undisputed that there are no prior orders of custody or parental access concerning the child in any court. Respondent states that the parties agreed when the child was born that she would stop working and stay home to raise her, that she has had no independent source of income since the child's birth, and that petitioner has supported the family. Petitioner does not dispute that he has been the family's financial provider.

The child has been cared for throughout her life by a longstanding nanny, C.L.G., whom the family calls "Yaya." Petitioner's parents, P.G. and E.G., whom the child calls "Oma" and "Opa," figure prominently in the events of September 2026, as do their executive assistant, K.H., and A.B., a former New York City police detective who describes himself as the former Vice President of Corporate Security for the [a family office and an affiliated investment firm] and who now operates a security consulting firm.

B. The Family's Residence in California and the Summer of 2026

The parties agree on the broad outline of where the family lived before September 2026, but disagree about what it meant. Respondent states that the family has always resided in California and has lived in its family home in [Town A], California since before the child was born. In January 2025 the family was forced to evacuate from [Town A] because of wildfires, and the family then lived for a time in a rented home in [Town B], California. Respondent states that when the [Town B] lease ended, she moved the family's belongings, including clothing and furniture, back into the [Town A] home in or around the middle of July 2026, and unpacked the child's belongings first so that the child would have a familiar home to return to. She states that the family dog remains in California with a dog sitter, that the family's cars and nearly all of its belongings remain there, that food was left in the refrigerator because the family expected to return, and that the child's pediatrician since birth is in California. The record also reflects that the child attended a preschool in [Town B], which the child calls "fairy school."

Petitioner states that no one has lived in the [Town A] house since January 2025, that the family moved its belongings back to [Town A] only because it was easy to keep them there, and that the parties were in the process of preparing to sell that house. He states that the parties had discussed moving to New York since at least 2023, that he had started a new business and rented office space in New York, and that respondent had for years researched homes in New York and corresponded with the family's real estate agent there. Respondent acknowledges that the parties discussed a possible future move to New York and that she researched apartments, but states that petitioner was also considering homes in Scotland, Vermont, New York and California, and that nothing had been settled.

In the summer of 2026, the family traveled. Respondent states that petitioner flew to Vermont on or about July 10, 2026, that the child and Ms. C.L.G. accompanied him, and that respondent joined them in Vermont before returning to California on July 24, 2026. She states that the child was later flown back to Los Angeles with Ms. C.L.G. and remained with respondent in California until mid-August. The child then traveled with Ms. C.L.G. to Maine on August 18, 2026 for what respondent describes as the family's annual vacation with petitioner's parents, and respondent arrived on August 19, 2026. Respondent states that the family customarily purchased one-way tickets for its trips.

Respondent states that she first learned of a definite plan to move to New York on August 22, 2026, when a family friend congratulated her during a boat outing on the family's move. Petitioner calls that account false, and states that by then the parties had already spoken with the director of [a private school] in Manhattan and had agreed to visit New York as the next step. The family traveled to New York on or about August 24, 2026, where respondent, the child and Ms. C.L.G. stayed in the Upper West Side apartment of petitioner's aunt at [address redacted], while petitioner stayed at a hotel. The family returned to Maine on August 29, 2026.

Respondent states that on September 3, 2026, in the presence of petitioner's father, she told petitioner that although she did not agree with the move to New York, she would support him for the child's sake, and that she refused his request that she sign something stating that she agreed to the move. Respondent states that petitioner enrolled the child at [the school] on September 5, 2026. Petitioner states that both parties signed the school contract. Respondent acknowledges that she signed it, and explains that she did so because petitioner insisted that the child remain in New York and she was trying to make a situation that had been forced upon her more manageable for the child.

C. The Arrival in New York and the Events Preceding This Proceeding

The family arrived in New York on or about September 6 to 8, 2026. Respondent states that the family first stayed one night in a rented apartment that petitioner rejected, and then moved into petitioner's aunt's apartment, which respondent describes as unsuitable because of ongoing construction and steep open staircases. Petitioner describes the aunt's apartment as large and unoccupied, and states that the parties moved there while they looked for a permanent residence. It is not disputed that the family had no permanent residence in New York when this proceeding began. The child's school started on September 8, 2026, with shortened days at first, and her first full day was September 14, 2026.

The parties describe the child's first weeks in New York very differently. Respondent states that the child cried often, asked when she would be going home to California, struggled to eat and sleep, and was so distressed on her first full day of school that her teacher sent her home. Respondent states that on that day petitioner's mother forcibly pried the child's fingers from a handrail. E.G. denies that account and states that she merely lifted the child's hand from the railing so that they could continue up the stairs. Petitioner states that the child took some time to adjust but has since done so, and relies on an email from her teacher stating that she is adjusting well and making social connections. Respondent points out that the same correspondence describes separation as "becoming easier and shorter" and notes that the child still sometimes cries at school.

Respondent states that on September 12, 2026, petitioner's parents and Ms. K.H. arrived and began staying at the apartment, and that from that point she was never permitted to be alone with the child. Petitioner does not deny this. To the contrary, his September 17, 2026 affirmation stated, as respondent's counsel quotes it, that he had "ensured that [the child] is at no times present with [respondent] unsupervised," and that the child was always in the presence of a relative, a caretaker or a family friend. Petitioner explains that he had become worried about respondent's mental health and her ability to manage the child's care, and was afraid of the child being alone with her.

In the days that followed, respondent told petitioner that if he would not discuss where the family would live and when its belongings and dog would arrive, she would take the child back to California. She purchased refundable one-way airline tickets for herself and the child from New York to Los Angeles on her own credit card. Respondent states that the trip was meant to coincide with a three-day school weekend and to retrieve the child's belongings, and that her mother had suggested it. Petitioner states that respondent repeatedly told him she would take the child to California, that when he asked her to promise not to do so she responded with a text consisting of laughter and stopped sharing her location with him, and that the tickets were purchased without telling him and outside the family's practice of arranging travel through his assistant. Respondent canceled the tickets on September 18, 2026, and annexes a cancellation confirmation timestamped 2:50 p.m. that day. She states that she did not know that petitioner had gone to court that day.

Respondent states that on September 17, 2026 the child received two vaccinations from a New York pediatrician that respondent had located. On September 18, 2026, during a session with the parties' couples counselor, respondent was asked whether she felt scared for petitioner to be alone with the child. Petitioner quotes her answer as including the following statements: "I don't think he would ever hurt her. I've never thought that or said that," and "I have never, for a moment, thought you would ever hurt her in any capacity, emotional or physical. I really want to be clear about that." Respondent does not deny making these statements. She explains that she was distinguishing petitioner's treatment of her from her expectation of direct harm to the child, and that her concerns include the environment to which the child could be exposed, petitioner's prolonged absences, his alleged substance use, and the effect on the child of his conduct toward respondent.

D. The Commencement of This Proceeding and Motion Sequence No. 001

Petitioner commenced this proceeding by verified petition for custody filed on September 18, 2026. The petition identifies the child as having lived at the New York address from on or about September 6, 2026. The same day, petitioner moved by emergency order to show cause (Motion Sequence No. 001) for an order awarding him sole legal and physical custody of the child and directing respondent to refrain from removing the child from the State of New York. As described in the later papers of both sides, petitioner's supporting affirmation relied on respondent's stated intention to take the child to California and her purchase of one-way tickets; a mark that petitioner observed on the child's forehead on September 9, 2026, after the child had been alone with respondent for a short time, which petitioner believed resembled a ring that respondent owns; and statements that petitioner attributes to respondent concerning self-harm and arson.

The court signed the order to show cause on September 18, 2026 and directed, pending the hearing of the motion, that respondent refrain from removing the child from the State of New York. The court directed service by email and overnight mail, fixed a briefing schedule, and made the motion returnable on October 1, 2026. Respondent, then without counsel of record, was served by email that evening and by overnight delivery.

E. The Events of September 20 Through 22, 2026 and Motion Sequence No. 002

The events of September 20, 2026 are recounted in detail by petitioner, respondent, Mr. A.B., E.G. and Ms. K.H.. The accounts agree on a core of facts and diverge sharply on almost everything else.

Petitioner states that at 5:00 a.m. on September 19, 2026, respondent woke him because she believed she was having a heart attack, then woke the child and told petitioner to leave the child's room or she would call the police. He states that on September 20, 2026, after respondent acknowledged receiving the court's order, she screamed at him in front of the child that he would "regret this" and that "things are going to get ugly." He states that respondent took the child to her bedroom, said within the child's hearing that she was entitled to time alone with her daughter, filmed him on her iPad while accusing him of holding her hostage, closed the door, and packed her belongings and a large quantity of the child's belongings into suitcases. He states that she told the child, "Remember, you always stay with me," and, as police arrived, "NO MATTER WHAT HAPPENS YOU STAY WITH ME." He states that when the child ran to him and he picked her up, respondent forcibly pulled the child from his arms. He states that respondent then carried the child down the building's stairwell shouting for help, and falsely told the police that he was holding her hostage and had put her in a chokehold. Ms. K.H. states that she heard respondent tell petitioner "you will regret this," heard respondent offer the child candy while remarking that petitioner's family did not like her to eat it, and heard petitioner say that respondent was free to leave but that he did not want her to take the child.

Respondent tells a different story. She states that on the morning of September 20, 2026 she learned from her email that petitioner had ended their relationship and commenced this proceeding. She states that petitioner, his parents and Ms. K.H. then took out their phones and recorded her and the child wherever they went in the apartment, stood in her bedroom doorway so that she could not close the door to change her clothes, and followed her even while she sat doing a craft with the child, so that the child asked why they were following them with cameras. She states that she sent a video to a third party who called the police on her behalf, that petitioner and his father tried to block her from leaving the apartment, and that she heard petitioner tell his father to block the front door. She states that when she reached the lobby, petitioner's mother told the police that respondent was kidnapping the child, and the police explained that respondent was the child's mother and was free to leave with her. Respondent's counsel adds that respondent has filed domestic incident reports pertaining to petitioner's conduct.

What happened next is also disputed. Petitioner, Mr. A.B., E.G. and Ms. K.H. each state that, with the assistance of the police, the parties agreed that respondent and the child would spend the night at [a hotel], that the child would remain in the presence of Mr. A.B. until Ms. C.L.G. arrived and then in Ms. C.L.G.'s presence, and that petitioner would pick the child up at the hotel at 10:00 a.m. the next morning. Petitioner states that he memorialized the agreement in a message, and Mr. A.B. states that the message accurately reflects the terms the parties accepted in the officers' presence. Respondent denies that she agreed to return the child at 10:00 a.m. She states that she told petitioner he could send her anything he wanted but that she would not agree to or sign anything without first reviewing it with her attorney, and that she agreed to go to a hotel of petitioner's family's choosing, and allowed petitioner's father to ride with her, so that they would know where the child was. Petitioner states that shortly after respondent left, she texted him that she rejected the agreement.

At the hotel, respondent states, petitioner's mother screamed in the lobby that respondent was an unfit mother and was removed by hotel security, and claimed a right of access to the room because the reservation was in her name. E.G. denies all of this. Respondent states that Mr. A.B. twice entered the hotel room within a short span, and that she changed rooms because she feared a listening device had been placed there. Mr. A.B. states that he went to the room with respondent's express permission and later at her invitation for a wellness check, that respondent's attorney told him by phone that his presence was inappropriate and that respondent had not agreed to any arrangement, and that he left so as not to distress the child. Ms. C.L.G. arrived that evening and stayed with respondent and the child.

Petitioner states that the same evening Ms. C.L.G. forwarded him a voicemail in which the child said, in substance, that she hoped Ms. C.L.G. was not with petitioner's parents because "they've been spying at us so we had to get the police to get us out," after which respondent can be heard saying that she did not tell the child to say that and then, "Okay, that was hilarious." Petitioner states that on the morning of September 21, 2026, respondent texted him that he had "never been and will never be a real father" and that the child "wants to go home to CA," and that respondent had canceled a physician's appointment that the child had scheduled for that day.

On September 21, 2026, petitioner moved by a second emergency order to show cause (Motion Sequence No. 002), without notice to respondent. His counsel affirmed that notice was withheld because the child was in respondent's care at a hotel and notice might prompt respondent to remove the child to California or cause further harm. Shortly after the application was filed, respondent told petitioner that she would not abide by the September 20 arrangement and would not return the child, and identified her counsel. Respondent did not appear on September 21, 2026. Petitioner states that she ignored notice of the appearance. Respondent states that she did not see the emailed notice in time, received no call or text about it, and was occupied caring for the child.

By order to show cause signed September 21, 2026, the court directed, pending the hearing of the motion, that petitioner have sole interim legal and physical custody of the child; that respondent return the child to the apartment at [address redacted], New York, New York (the New York apartment); that the child sleep and spend her overnights there; that respondent stay away from the child, the New York apartment and the child's school; that respondent's access with the child be professionally supervised; and that respondent not disparage petitioner or his family to or in the presence of the child, and not permit third parties to do so. The court directed personal service and made the motion returnable on October 1, 2026.

Ms. C.L.G.'s account of the time in the hotel, from the night of September 20 through September 22, 2026, is as follows. She states that on the morning of September 21 she heard respondent tell petitioner by phone that there was no agreement; that respondent questioned her whenever she picked up her phone and told her not to answer petitioner's calls; that respondent, at Ms. C.L.G.'s urging, briefly showed the child to petitioner on FaceTime, saying, "We are doing fine, that's all you need to know"; that the child spent nearly all of September 21 in the hotel room except for a park visit of about thirty minutes, during which respondent told Ms. C.L.G. "this is war" and that she had to "choose a side"; and that respondent said her lawyer had advised her not to call petitioner. Ms. C.L.G. states that on the morning of September 22, respondent took the phone from her during a FaceTime call with petitioner; that when the lobby called to report that petitioner and his family were downstairs, respondent asked for security and said, "Don't let them up. They can't know anything"; and that a man who appeared to be a security guard came to the room and discussed the events of the preceding days in front of the child until Ms. C.L.G. suggested that they speak in the bathroom.

Respondent states that she continued to give petitioner updates, initiated a FaceTime call between petitioner and the child, and never prevented Ms. C.L.G. from contacting petitioner. She disputes petitioner's account of the September 22 FaceTime call and states that she has video of it. She explains that the child did not attend school because she was tired, had recently been vaccinated, and had slept poorly, and that she spoke with the child's teacher about it. She states that on September 21 she learned through a Google notification that her location was being shared with petitioner, which she had not authorized, and that the repeated appearance of people at the hotel inquiring about her room caused her to fear that petitioner would continue to follow and surveil her and the child. Petitioner states that the parties routinely shared locations by consent, that respondent turned off her sharing when she told him she would take the child to California, and that he does not know what the Google notification is. Petitioner also points to the police report annexed to respondent's papers, which he says reflects that respondent told the police on September 21 that she did not intend to leave the hotel until October 1, 2026. Respondent states that she meant only that she would not change hotels or flee.

On September 22, 2026, S.G., a retired captain of the New York City Police Department who commanded the Manhattan Special Victims Unit, came to the hotel room for what respondent describes as security purposes and remained for nearly two hours. He states that the child was natural and comfortable with respondent and showed no fear of her, and that respondent was calm and composed, though understandably upset. When police officers arrived to enforce the September 21 order, Mr. S.G. arranged for respondent to have about fifteen minutes to pack the child's belongings and say goodbye, and he states that respondent complied fully and cooperated with the officers. Ms. C.L.G. states that before the child left, respondent told her, "You have to go to your dad but don't worry, I will fight to get you back," "only me and my family love you remember that," and "if they tell you to do something you don't have to do it. You don't have to listen to them." Respondent's own account of the parting is that she told the child that she loved her, that the child was brave, and that she would see her soon, and that the child asked whether "they" were demons, a word respondent says came from a television show. Petitioner states that after the transfer respondent texted him that the child did not want to go with him and that he was like the demons in that show, and wrote, "I told her she is the princess and I will come save her." Ms. C.L.G. states that when the child saw her father in the lobby she was extremely happy and jumped into his arms.

Respondent accepted service of the papers on both orders to show cause through counsel, Murgolo & Rutigliano, by acknowledgment dated September 23, 2026.

F. The Family Court and California Proceedings

On September 22, 2026, respondent filed a family offense petition in the Family Court, New York County, under Docket No. [redacted]. Respondent's counsel affirms from personal knowledge that he appeared virtually before Referee Jacob K. Maeroff that day, that counsel learned of this court's order within the hour before that appearance, that he advised the Referee of this proceeding and that respondent would proceed in this court, and that the Family Court petition was withdrawn before any protective order issued. Counsel annexes an order of dismissal. Respondent states that the Family Court matter was withdrawn so that all matters could be heard in this court, and that petitioner's counsel was not notified because no orders issued. Petitioner states that respondent concealed the Family Court filing from this court and that he learned of it only from respondent's California papers.

On September 24, 2026, respondent commenced a proceeding in the Superior Court of California, County of Los Angeles, Case No. [redacted], by a petition to establish a parental relationship. Petitioner states that in her California declaration under the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act, respondent asserted that the child had lived in [Town A] since birth, that the parties had been visiting family in New York when petitioner commenced this proceeding, and that petitioner was a flight risk. On September 28, 2026, respondent made an ex parte request in the California proceeding for a domestic violence restraining order. Petitioner states that the request sought to limit him to FaceTime contact with the child and to bar him from the child's school and medical records. On September 29, 2026, the California court denied the ex parte request, stating: "Each party has a pending DVRO against the other in the State of New York with moving party's set for Hearing on October 1, 2026. As such, there is no basis for 'No Notice' and the alleged rationale lacks factual basis because the visitation is Court Ordered in New York." The papers do not reflect that the California court has determined its own jurisdiction or has declined to exercise jurisdiction in favor of New York, and they do not reflect any communication between this court and the California court.

G. Respondent's Cross-Motion (Motion Sequence No. 001)

Respondent, through counsel, cross-moves for an order (1) dismissing the verified petition on the ground that New York lacks jurisdiction under Domestic Relations Law § 76 to make an initial custody determination concerning the child; (2) vacating the September 18, 2026 restraint on the child's travel and the September 21, 2026 interim award of sole custody to petitioner, the stay-away directives against respondent, and the requirement that all of respondent's contact with the child be professionally supervised; (3) directing a judicial conference between this court and the Superior Court of California, County of Los Angeles; (4) issuing a temporary full stay-away order of protection against petitioner in favor of respondent and the child; and (5) awarding respondent $35,000 in counsel fees, including interim counsel fees.

Respondent's counsel argues that New York was not the child's home state on September 18, 2026, because the child had been in New York for less than two weeks; that the child's physical presence here does not confer jurisdiction; that no California court has declined jurisdiction; that petitioner cannot satisfy the significant connection and substantial evidence requirements of Domestic Relations Law § 76 [1] [b] as of the commencement of this proceeding; and that subject matter jurisdiction cannot be created by consent. Respondent does not contend that this court is without power to protect a child from a genuine and immediate danger. She contends instead that the moving papers do not justify the relief granted, particularly the stay-away directive and professional supervision, and that the allegations on which petitioner relies are conclusory, undated, hearsay, or long past. She asks, if the interim orders are not vacated outright, for an immediate hearing on emergency jurisdiction and on the necessity of each restriction, and for compliance with the communication and duration provisions of Domestic Relations Law § 76-c.

In her affirmation, respondent denies ever physically abusing the child or causing a mark on her forehead, and annexes date-stamped photographs of the child from September 9, 10 and 11, 2026, which she says show no mark. She denies that she has threatened arson, explaining that she is terrified of fire after the family's evacuation in January 2025. In her original affirmation she stated that she is not and has never been suicidal, and that her only difficulty has been postpartum anxiety. She states that she has never been psychiatrically hospitalized, that she is not prescribed psychiatric medication, and that a psychiatric nurse practitioner, J.R., whom she saw on September 18, 2026, told her that she did not require medication and that what she was experiencing was normal grief following a series of losses, including the sudden death of her brother in November 2025.

Respondent also seeks protection for herself. She alleges that on or about July 1, 2026, in California, petitioner held her in a chokehold during an argument, impeding her breathing and causing pain, and then grabbed her wrist hard enough to leave marks. She states that she began recording as soon as she broke free, that on the recording petitioner acknowledged putting his hands on her but said he was trying to hug her, and that she immediately reported the incident by text to the parties' couples counselors and to her mother. She alleges that on or about August 6, 2025, at a family pool gathering in California, petitioner flipped over a heavy table holding the guests' belongings and threw objects while the child and other children were nearby, and that the child later became so upset that she was hyperventilating. She further alleges a pattern of physical intimidation, nonconsensual sexual conduct during the relationship, financial control, and threats by petitioner to "destroy" her and to ensure that any custody dispute would be heard in New York because of his family's influence. She alleges that petitioner uses illicit substances and misuses prescribed medication. Respondent's counsel characterizes these allegations as a course of conduct constituting family offenses, and relies on Domestic Relations Law § 240 [3] and Gerner v Stalvey (174 AD3d 601 [2d Dept 2019]) as authority for a temporary order of protection.

Respondent submits the affirmation of Mr. S.G., described above. With her reply she submits the affirmations of A.F.M., who served as the child's nanny in Los Angeles after the child's birth and who describes respondent as a devoted primary caretaker and petitioner as largely absent, critical and at times angry, and of T.G., a bodywork practitioner and neighbor in [Town A] who describes respondent as a loving and attentive mother.

H. Petitioner's Opposition and Reply

Petitioner categorically denies respondent's allegations of abuse. He denies placing her in a chokehold in July 2026 or at any time, denies ever grabbing her in an aggressive or harmful way, and denies any nonconsensual sexual activity. As to the August 2025 gathering, he states that respondent had been provoking him, that he picked up one edge of a coffee table and dumped the items on it, that he regrets doing so, that no child was near the table, and that respondent then threw a pair of his shoes into the pool where children were swimming. He denies that the child almost needed to go to the hospital. He denies the alleged threats concerning his family's influence over the courts. He states that he takes only medications prescribed by a doctor, including Adderall for a diagnosed attention disorder, that any peptides he takes are taken at a doctor's direction, and that he has never been impaired while caring for the child or left needles within her reach. He states that he understands that respondent takes Xanax and Percocet without a prescription and combines them with alcohol, which respondent emphatically denies.

Petitioner disputes respondent's statement that she has never been suicidal, relying on a 2024 email in which respondent wrote to the buyers of a Vermont home that, at the time the family moved to Vermont, she "was suicidal" and had "suffered for a long time with serious mental health issues." As to the forehead mark, petitioner states that respondent's photographs do not prove the mark never existed, because the angle, lighting, distance and side of the face shown all matter, and that respondent does not explain how ointment came to be on the mark. He states that he has not accused respondent of anything beyond what he observed.

Petitioner states that since the September 21, 2026 order, the child has returned to school, has had playdates, continues ballet and gymnastics, has established care with a New York pediatrician who has administered her vaccinations, and has had an emergency root canal because of unusual tooth decay. Ms. C.L.G. states that respondent regularly fed the child sweets, including before breakfast. Petitioner states that he offered respondent six hours of supervised time with the child on a Sunday and that respondent asked for three. He states that he has no objection to the child seeing a therapist, but would prefer one recommended by the school or the child's pediatrician.

Ms. C.L.G.'s affirmation also states that she has heard respondent tell the child, or say in her presence, that "your dad is mean" and "your dad is not a good man"; that respondent told stories about spiders at bedtime that made the child anxious; and that, when Ms. C.L.G. was present, she performed nearly all of the child's care while respondent directed and watched. She states that she has never seen or heard petitioner harm or threaten to harm respondent or the child.

Petitioner's counsel argues that the court properly exercised temporary emergency jurisdiction, citing respondent's threats to remove the child and her refusal to return the child until compelled by court order; the unexplained forehead mark; respondent's mental health, alleged suicidal ideation and alleged use of nonprescribed drugs; her disparagement of petitioner in the child's presence; and the child's dental emergency. Counsel argues that respondent submitted to New York's jurisdiction by filing her family offense petition in the Family Court; that this court, as the first court to act, should exercise exclusive, continuing jurisdiction because petitioner resides here and the child has significant connections here; and that the California court should decline jurisdiction under California Family Code § 3427 because California is an inconvenient forum and under California Family Code § 3428 because of respondent's unjustifiable conduct. Counsel opposes the order of protection on the grounds that respondent alleges no harm or threat of harm by petitioner to the child, that the allegations concerning respondent herself are denied, are old, and were never reported before this proceeding, that the parties are physically separated, and that respondent continues to contact petitioner directly. Counsel opposes the fee request on the grounds that respondent has retained two sets of counsel, has paid substantial retainers, and is prosecuting proceedings in three courts, and that she charged more than $27,000 on petitioner's credit card in the twelve days after he first came to court. Counsel asks the court to continue the interim orders, to exercise exclusive, continuing jurisdiction, to communicate with the California court as necessary, and to deny the cross-motion in its entirety.

I. Respondent's Reply

In reply, respondent's counsel argues that petitioner does not dispute that the child arrived in New York on or about September 8, 2026; that exclusive, continuing jurisdiction under Domestic Relations Law § 76-a [1] attaches only to a custody determination made "consistent with section seventy-six or seventy-six-b," which an emergency order is not; that the first-in-time argument assumes jurisdiction that was never acquired; that the family offense petition was a request for protection that did not concede custody jurisdiction, and that family offense jurisdiction rests on a separate statutory footing (see Family Ct Act § 812 [1]; Matter of Vashon H. v Bret I., 191 AD3d 1120 [3d Dept 2021]); and that the California ruling of September 29, 2026 was a denial of ex parte relief, not a declination of jurisdiction. Counsel argues that a hearing is required on the disputed emergency allegations, that any emergency relief retained must be expressly limited as such and coordinated with California, and that the court must make a record of any communication with the California court and allow the parties to be heard. Counsel states that respondent's billed fees had grown to 62.6 hours, or $34,430, as of the reply, and annexes an invoice.

In her reply affirmation, respondent acknowledges that her prior statement that she had "never" been suicidal "was too broad." She explains that after a traumatic pregnancy loss in 2018 that required emergency surgery, she experienced depressive and suicidal thoughts for about a week, that she consulted her doctor, did not act on those thoughts, and that they resolved without medication. She states that the 2024 email described that earlier experience in connection with the sale of a property associated with the loss, not a condition in 2024 or 2026. She states that she has not been suicidal since the child's birth and is not suicidal now. She emphatically denies misusing Xanax or Percocet, and states that she occasionally drinks a glass of wine but never to the point of intoxication or inability to care for the child. She reaffirms her account of the July 2026 chokehold, denies petitioner's assertion that she had sexual relationships with others, and states that she sought a therapist for the child, Dr. G.B., whom petitioner declined to meet as a family. She states that she withdrew the Family Court petition on counsel's advice after learning of this court's order, so that all matters would be heard here. She states that she is in New York with no income, no housing and no support, and cannot pay her counsel fees, and that whatever she charged on petitioner's credit card was for housing, food and necessities.

J. The Supplemental Submission of October 21, 2026

By letter dated October 21, 2026, petitioner's counsel asked permission to submit a supplemental affirmation of petitioner in advance of the October 22, 2026 appearance. In that affirmation, petitioner states that after a supervised visit on October 15, 2026, the supervisor, D.D., texted him that respondent had reported that the child said, while on the playground swings, that someone "tickles her privates," and that the child later named "Yaya." Ms. D.D. is quoted as having written that she could not hear what the child said and thought it was "all innocent." Petitioner states that the next day respondent gave Ms. D.D. a more detailed version of the child's statement and said she now believed it concerned Ms. K.H. rather than Ms. C.L.G., that Ms. D.D. told petitioner she felt obliged to report the matter to the Administration for Children's Services, and that respondent then told Ms. D.D. that, because of stress and hypersensitivity, she thought she had heard the child make the statements but on reflection realized the child had not. Petitioner further states that respondent misstated Ms. D.D.'s reasons for asking to change the time of visits, that Ms. D.D. denied those statements in writing, that respondent gave the child cough medicine during a visit without first confirming whether petitioner had already given a dose, and that respondent sent hostile messages to Ms. C.L.G. after Ms. C.L.G.'s affirmation was filed. He states that during recorded nightly video calls respondent repeatedly tells the child how tired and sick she looks and asks whether she misses California, and that respondent continues to message him outside of the Our Family Wizard application, including an Instagram message stating, "What you are doing is harming [the child]. It is child abuse." Petitioner also refers to an affirmation of a former nanny who, he says, reports that respondent and her father offered her a car in exchange for a favorable affirmation.

The papers before the court contain no response from respondent to the October 21, 2026 submission, and the exhibits referred to in petitioner's supplemental affirmation, including the former nanny's affirmation, are not among the papers before the court. For the reasons stated below, the court does not rely on the contested allegations in that submission for any finding in this decision.

K. The Parties' Finances and the Fee Request

Neither party has submitted a sworn statement of net worth. Respondent states that she has not worked since the child was born, that petitioner has been the family's sole financial provider, that she has no independent access to funds, and that she used a credit card that petitioner pays but on which she was not an authorized user. Petitioner does not dispute that respondent has not worked since the child's birth or that he has supported the family. He states that respondent's ability to purchase airline tickets on her own credit card, her retention of counsel in New York and California, and her charges of more than $27,000 on his credit card in twelve days are inconsistent with a claim of financial dependence. Respondent states that she does not know whether that figure is accurate and that her spending was for housing, food and necessities while she has been without a home in New York.

Respondent's counsel was retained on or about September 21, 2026 at an hourly rate of $550. Respondent paid an initial retainer of $10,000 and a further $10,000 on September 22, 2026. Counsel's itemization reflects 36.8 hours, or $20,240, billed through the filing of the cross-motion, and the reply reports 62.6 hours, or $34,430, billed through the reply. Respondent's counsel states that the fee request does not include fees for the California proceeding.

III. Conclusions of Law

A. The Governing Framework

Jurisdiction comes first. Before this court may decide who should have custody of this child, it must determine whether it has the authority to make that decision at all. The question is governed by the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act, which New York has enacted as Article 5-A of the Domestic Relations Law. The statute serves to eliminate jurisdictional competition between the courts of different states and to prevent forum shopping (see Matter of Felty v Felty, 66 AD3d 64 [2d Dept 2009]). Because the question is one of subject matter jurisdiction, it cannot be resolved by the parties' agreement or conduct. As the First Department has explained, "a defect in subject matter jurisdiction may be raised at any time by any party or by the court itself, and subject matter jurisdiction cannot be created through waiver, estoppel, laches, or consent" (Matter of Hook v Snyder, 193 AD3d 588 [1st Dept 2021]).

The statute draws a sharp line between two different kinds of authority. The first is the authority to make an initial child custody determination, which is conferred by Domestic Relations Law § 76 [1]. That provision opens with the words "[e]xcept as otherwise provided in section seventy-six-c of this title," and provides that "a court of this state has jurisdiction to make an initial child custody determination only if" one of four conditions is met. The first and most important is that "this state is the home state of the child on the date of the commencement of the proceeding, or was the home state of the child within six months before the commencement of the proceeding and the child is absent from this state but a parent or person acting as a parent continues to live in this state" (see Domestic Relations Law § 76 [1] [a]). The remaining provisions, Domestic Relations Law § 76 [1] [b] through [d], operate only in the circumstances the statute describes, and the statute is explicit that the "[p]hysical presence of . . . a child is not . . . sufficient to make a child custody determination" (Domestic Relations Law § 76 [3]).

The second kind of authority is temporary emergency jurisdiction under Domestic Relations Law § 76-c. A court of this state has that jurisdiction if the child is present in New York and the child has been abandoned or it is necessary in an emergency to protect the child, a sibling, or a parent of the child (Domestic Relations Law § 76-c [1]). Emergency jurisdiction is, by its nature, limited. It exists to protect, not to adjudicate custody in the ordinary course, and it carries with it specific duties to communicate with the court of the state that has ordinary jurisdiction and to define how long any emergency order will last (Domestic Relations Law § 76-c [3], [4]).

B. New York Is Not the Child's Home State, and Petitioner Has Not Established Jurisdiction Under Domestic Relations Law § 76 [1]

The statute defines "home state" as "the state in which a child lived with a parent or a person acting as a parent for at least six consecutive months immediately before the commencement of a child custody proceeding," and provides that "[a] period of temporary absence of any of the mentioned persons is part of the period" (Domestic Relations Law § 75-a [7]).

On this record, New York was not the child's home state when this proceeding was commenced on September 18, 2026, and it had not been her home state at any time in the six months before that date. The child was born in California and lived there with one or both of her parents for her entire life before the summer of 2026. Petitioner's own verified petition places the child at the New York address only from on or about September 6, 2026, and respondent's papers place the child's arrival on or about September 8, 2026. On either date, the child had lived in New York for less than two weeks when the petition was filed. Petitioner does not argue otherwise, and his opposition does not rest on home state jurisdiction at all. The first and principal basis for initial jurisdiction under Domestic Relations Law § 76 [1] [a] is therefore absent.

Nor has petitioner established jurisdiction under the remaining provisions of Domestic Relations Law § 76 [1]. Respondent, relying on Matter of Maurice C.C. v Michelle A. (235 AD3d 576 [1st Dept 2025]), argues that New York cannot exercise initial jurisdiction under Domestic Relations Law § 76 [1] [b] while California remains the child's home state unless a California court has declined jurisdiction in favor of New York. In Maurice C.C., the First Department held that California was the home state of a child who had been born and had lived in California before coming to New York, affirmed the determination that New York lacked jurisdiction, and upheld the vacatur of a temporary restraint on the mother's travel, rejecting the father's reliance on the child's New York connections. Petitioner distinguishes Maurice C.C. on the ground that the stay there was a temporary visit, while the parties here intended a permanent relocation. Respondent answers that the stay at issue in that case was an agreed one-year stay, not a short vacation. The court need not resolve whether the parties' summer travel and the September arrival in New York were temporary absences from California, because petitioner's showing fails in any event.

First, no California court has declined jurisdiction in favor of New York. The only California ruling in the record is the September 29, 2026 denial of respondent's ex parte application. That ruling found no basis for relief without notice because parental access was the subject of an order of this court. It did not address, much less decide, whether California has or will exercise jurisdiction over the child's custody, and it is not a declination. Petitioner's argument that California should decline jurisdiction under California Family Code §§ 3427 and 3428 is addressed to the California court. It is not a determination that the California court has made.

Second, even if the court were to assume that California ceased to be the child's home state when the family arrived in New York, petitioner has not shown the significant connection and substantial evidence that Domestic Relations Law § 76 [1] [b] requires, measured at the commencement of the proceeding. On September 18, 2026, the child had been in New York for about ten days. She had been enrolled in school on September 5, 2026, had attended school on shortened days beginning September 8 and on a full day for the first time on September 14, and had first seen a New York pediatrician, and received two vaccinations, the day before the petition was filed. The family was living in a relative's apartment while it looked for a residence. Her pediatrician since birth, her maternal family, her prior school, and nearly all of her belongings were in California. Much of what petitioner now cites, including the child's adjustment to school, her ballet and gymnastics classes, her playdates, her dental care in New York, and the evidence of the events of September 20 through 22, 2026, came into being after the petition was filed. Those circumstances may bear on the present safety of the child, but they cannot supply jurisdiction that did not exist on the date of commencement. To hold otherwise would allow the physical presence of the child, which the statute declares insufficient, to accomplish indirectly what it cannot accomplish directly (see Domestic Relations Law § 76 [3]).

Third, petitioner has not shown that every court having jurisdiction under the preceding provisions has declined it, as Domestic Relations Law § 76 [1] [c] would require, or that no court of any other state would have jurisdiction, as Domestic Relations Law § 76 [1] [d] would require. A California proceeding concerning this child is pending, and the papers point to California as a state with substantial ties to the child.

Accordingly, the court concludes that New York did not have jurisdiction under Domestic Relations Law § 76 [1] to make an initial child custody determination when this proceeding was commenced, and that the court's authority in this proceeding rests solely on Domestic Relations Law § 76-c. Whether California is the child's home state, and whether California will exercise its jurisdiction, are questions for the California court, informed by the communication between the courts directed below.

C. Petitioner's Alternative Theories of Jurisdiction

Petitioner advances several further grounds on which he asks the court to retain the matter. None of them supplies the jurisdiction that Domestic Relations Law § 76 [1] withholds.

Exclusive, continuing jurisdiction. Petitioner argues that because he resides in New York, this court has exclusive, continuing jurisdiction, relying on Matter of Helmeyer v Setzer (173 AD3d 740 [2d Dept 2019]). That doctrine presupposes a prior custody determination properly made in New York. As respondent correctly observes, exclusive, continuing jurisdiction under Domestic Relations Law § 76-a [1] follows a custody determination made "consistent with section seventy-six or seventy-six-b." In Helmeyer, New York had made the initial custody determination, and the question was whether it retained jurisdiction after the child moved away with the mother. Here, no custody determination has been made under Domestic Relations Law § 76. The interim orders of September 18 and 21, 2026 were made on ex parte emergency applications, and an order resting on temporary emergency authority does not become a qualifying initial determination merely because it awards temporary custody or because the father continues to live here. A parent's continued residence in New York bears on whether jurisdiction properly acquired has been retained. It does not answer whether jurisdiction was acquired in the first place.

First in time. Petitioner argues that New York should proceed because his petition was filed before respondent's California petition. The statute regulates proceedings in courts that have a lawful basis for jurisdiction. It does not confer plenary custody authority on whichever parent first files and obtains emergency relief. Filing first in a state that is not the child's home state, ten days after the child's arrival, does not create jurisdiction that the statute denies, and a contrary rule would reward the very race to the courthouse that the statute was enacted to prevent (see Matter of Felty v. Felty, 66 AD3d 64 [2d Dept 2009]).

Respondent's Family Court petition. Petitioner argues that respondent submitted to New York's jurisdiction, and should be estopped from contesting it, because she filed a family offense petition in the Family Court on September 22, 2026. Petitioner relies on Matter of Michael McC. v Manuela A. (48 AD3d 91 [1st Dept 2007]), Crespo v Crespo (309 AD2d 727 [2d Dept 2003]), and the Family Court's decision in Matter of R.L.B. v C.D.G. (63 Misc 3d 806 [Fam Ct, Kings County 2019]). The argument fails for two independent reasons. First, subject matter jurisdiction "cannot be created through waiver, estoppel, laches, or consent" (see Matter of Hook v. Snyder, 193 AD3d 588 [1st Dept 2021]). Whatever respondent's filing may say about her litigation choices, it cannot confer on this court a jurisdiction to make an initial custody determination that the statute does not give it. Second, a family offense petition invokes a different jurisdiction. The Family Court's authority over family offenses derives from Family Ct Act § 812, which includes persons who have a child in common, and that authority is distinct from the jurisdiction to determine custody under article 5-A (see Matter of Vashon H. v Bret I., 191 AD3d 1120 [3d Dept 2021]). A request for protection from alleged domestic violence while the parties were physically present in New York is not a concession that New York is the child's home state. The record also shows that the petition was withdrawn the same day it was presented, before any order issued, after counsel advised the Referee that respondent would proceed in this court. Petitioner himself acknowledges that a purely defensive filing may not bind a party (see Matter of Tick v Tick, 96 AD2d 657 [3d Dept 1983]). Whether respondent should have disclosed that filing to this court is a matter that may bear on credibility at a hearing. It does not bear on jurisdiction.

Inconvenient forum and unjustifiable conduct. Petitioner argues at length that California is an inconvenient forum under California Family Code § 3427 and that California should decline jurisdiction because of respondent's conduct under California Family Code § 3428, relying in part on Matter of Michael McC. (48 AD3d 91 [1st Dept 2007]). Those arguments are properly made to the California court, which alone can decide whether California will exercise or decline its jurisdiction. They may also be presented in the communication between the courts directed below. They do not, however, permit this court to assume a jurisdiction that it does not have while that question remains open.

The court therefore denies petitioner's request that it exercise exclusive, continuing jurisdiction over this matter.

D. Temporary Emergency Jurisdiction

That New York lacks jurisdiction to make an initial custody determination does not mean that this court was powerless to act, or that it must now step away. Respondent herself does not contend that California's status prevents this court from protecting a child against a genuine and immediate danger. The question is whether the circumstances presented warrant emergency protection, and if so, what protection and for how long.

Temporary emergency jurisdiction exists only where the child is present in New York and protection is necessary in an emergency (Domestic Relations Law § 76-c [1]). The First Department has held that it should be invoked only where there is an "immediate threat" to the safety and well-being of the child (see Matter of Francois B. v Fatoumata L., 170 AD3d 617 [1st Dept 2019], citing Matter of Michael P. v Diana G., 156 AD2d 59 [1st Dept 1990], lv denied 75 NY2d 1003 [1990]). The emergency must be real and immediate, and of such a nature as to require state intervention to protect the child from imminent physical or emotional danger (see Matter of Bridget Y., 92 AD3d 77 [4th Dept 2011]). An emergency may be established by the combined effect of concrete facts bearing on a child's health, care and safety, and not only by a single act of physical abuse (see Paul v Paul, 161 AD3d 888 [2d Dept 2018]). Where substantial allegations of imminent danger are made, the court must hold a hearing even though another state has ordinary jurisdiction (see Matter of Chester HH. v Angela GG., 208 AD3d 945 [3d Dept 2022]). Equally, a New York court should not relinquish emergency authority without first making findings about whether effective protection will be available elsewhere (see Matter of Nathaniel H., 213 AD3d 525 [1st Dept 2023]).

Several features of this record must be kept separate, and so must the two interim orders. The September 18, 2026 restraint on removing the child from New York was granted ex parte on petitioner's first application, before any of the events of September 20 through 22, 2026 occurred. Whether it was supported must be judged by the showing made on that date, and the later events cannot retroactively supply a basis for it. That showing consisted principally of the prospect that respondent would take the child to California, together with the forehead mark and the statements attributed to respondent, which are discussed next. Standing alone, a parent's wish to return with the child to the state where the child has always lived is not an emergency. In Maurice C.C., the First Department rejected an exaggerated concern that a mother might abscond as a basis for a New York restraint (235 AD3d 576 [1st Dept 2025]). The same reasoning applies here. California was the child's lifelong home, respondent's stated destination was known, and respondent canceled the tickets on September 18, 2026. A dispute between parents about where their child should live is a custody dispute, and it belongs in the court that has jurisdiction to decide it. Nor does a child's adjustment, or difficulty adjusting, to a new school establish an emergency (see Matter of Francois B. v Fatoumata L., 170 AD3d 617 [1st Dept 2019]). Petitioner's reliance on Matter of Nehra v Uhlar (43 NY2d 242 [1977]), Matter of Jarvis v Lashley (169 AD3d 1043 [2d Dept 2019]), and Matter of Crivelli v Tolento (100 AD3d 884 [2d Dept 2012]) does not alter this conclusion. Those cases concern removal in defiance of existing custody orders or custody determinations made on developed records. They do not hold that the possibility of a return to a child's home state, before any custody order exists, is an emergency. The court therefore does not rest the restraint on travel continued below on the September 18 showing. That restraint rests instead on the events that followed, on the pendency of the interstate process, and on the need to preserve the child's circumstances for the brief period until the hearing and the California court's action, and it applies to both parents.

The second feature is the series of allegations concerning respondent's mental health, her alleged statements about self-harm and arson, her alleged use of nonprescribed medication, the mark on the child's forehead, and the child's dental condition. Each is disputed under oath. Respondent denies causing any mark and has produced date-stamped photographs. Petitioner, for his part, states that he has not accused respondent of anything beyond what he observed. Respondent has corrected her earlier statement about suicidal thoughts, and has explained the 2024 email as describing a brief episode in 2018. She denies misusing medication, and petitioner's contrary assertion rests on what he "understand[s]." The dental condition has not been placed in any medical context. The authorities on which petitioner relies do not permit the court to treat these allegations as established, because each was decided on an evidentiary record. In Matter of Devin M. (119 AD3d 435 [1st Dept 2014]), the First Department affirmed a neglect finding based on the mother's mental illness, holding that the lack of a definitive diagnosis did not preclude that finding, and also reviewed a separate award of custody to the father and the dismissal of the mother's family offense petition. In Matter of Joseph L. (168 AD3d 1055 [2d Dept 2019]), the Second Department held that evidence of mental illness may support a neglect determination when the proof further demonstrates that the parent's condition creates an imminent risk of harm to the child. In Matter of Adam T. (186 AD3d 1179 [1st Dept 2020]), the First Department affirmed a neglect finding based on a father's untreated mental illness and misuse of drugs and alcohol, made after fact-finding. Matter of Dior S. (160 AD3d 495 [1st Dept 2018]) also applied the statutory prima facie neglect provision concerning substance misuse (Family Ct Act § 1046 [a] [iii]). The present papers do not establish the factual predicate for that provision. Family Ct Act § 1046 [a] [ii], on which petitioner relies concerning the forehead mark, is likewise an evidentiary rule that presupposes proof of an injury of the kind it describes, which is the very fact in dispute. On conflicting affirmations, the court makes no finding that respondent suffers from any condition, misuses any substance, or caused any injury to the child.

The third feature is what occurred in the presence of the child between September 20 and 22, 2026. Here, unlike the other matters, the competing accounts share a substantial common core. It is undisputed that on September 20, 2026, within hours of learning of this proceeding, the child was present for an escalating conflict between her parents that involved adults following and recording her mother through the apartment, her mother recording in return, the packing of the child's belongings, a call to the police, and the child being carried down the stairwell to officers in the lobby while her mother called for help. It is undisputed that the child then spent the better part of two days in a hotel room, did not attend school during that time, and did not see her father, who, by his account, received only intermittent information about her, a characterization respondent disputes. The parties dispute who was responsible for each step, and the court does not decide that question. There is also sworn evidence, which will be tested at the hearing, that she told the child that only she and her family love the child and that the child need not listen to the adults in her father's household; that she left a voicemail in which the child repeated that petitioner's parents had been "spying" on them and then called the exchange "hilarious"; and that after the child was returned to petitioner, she wrote to him that the child had likened him to demons. Respondent's own account of the parting differs, and her reply does not address the voicemail or the message. Respondent, for her part, has offered sworn evidence that petitioner and his family subjected her and the child to constant surveillance and recorded them inside the apartment, that she was not permitted to be alone with her daughter after September 12, 2026, and that she acted out of fear. Petitioner does not deny that he arranged for the child never to be alone with her mother.

Viewing these facts together, the court concludes that when it acted on September 21, 2026, the child was exposed to an acute and escalating conflict, conducted in her presence and centered on her, that presented an immediate threat to her emotional well-being and warranted state intervention under Domestic Relations Law § 76-c [1]. The court reaches that conclusion without assigning fault for the conflict as a whole, to which the papers indicate both parents contributed. The question that remains is whether an emergency continues to exist now, and if so, which protective measures it requires. That question is not answered by asking whether respondent has disproved a continuing emergency. It is answered by asking whether the record affirmatively shows one, and, for each restriction, whether the danger it addresses is shown and whether something less restrictive would suffice. The court turns to those questions next.

E. The Interim Orders and the Need for a Prompt Hearing

That the court had authority to act does not mean that every restriction it imposed on an ex parte record may continue indefinitely without a hearing. The Court of Appeals has made clear that "custody determinations should generally be made only after a full and plenary hearing and inquiry," and that the value of a plenary hearing is particularly pronounced in custody cases because of subjective factors, such as the credibility and sincerity of the witnesses and the character and temperament of the parents, that are often critical to the court's determination (see S.L. v J.R., 27 NY3d 558 [2016]). The First Department has held that even a temporary modification of custody or parental access ordinarily requires a hearing, which may be abbreviated as the specific allegations warrant, and has described the suspension of contact between a parent and child as a "drastic remedy" (see Matter of Kenneth J. v Lesley B., 165 AD3d 439 [1st Dept 2018], citing Matter of Shoshanah B. v Lela G., 140 AD3d 603 [1st Dept 2016]). Supervision of a parent's access has been sustained where a developed record, including testimony and a forensic report, showed that unsupervised contact would be detrimental to the child (see Matter of Tecza v Alija, 138 AD3d 872 [2d Dept 2016]). Petitioner acknowledges that Tecza followed a developed hearing.

Both sides, in the end, recognize that a hearing is required. Petitioner argues that the disputed allegations must be tested by sworn testimony and cross-examination, and asks that supervision continue "pending a full hearing." Respondent asks, in the alternative to vacatur, for a prompt hearing on the material jurisdictional facts and the present emergency, and for express limits on any emergency relief retained. Petitioner's own reliance on Matter of Sanders v Jaco (148 AD3d 812 [2d Dept 2017]), Pandis v Lapas (176 AD3d 837 [2d Dept 2019]), and Matter of Opalka v Skinner (81 AD3d 1005 [3d Dept 2011]) confirms the point. Whatever those decisions hold about the consequences of a parent's interference with the child's relationship with the other parent, each was decided on a record developed through testimony.

The present record affirmatively supports continued protection for the short period until the hearing, and that support rests on specific conduct affecting the child rather than on the existence of litigation between her parents. Seeking relief in another court is not evidence of danger, and competing accusations establish a dispute, not an emergency. What matters is what the child herself has been exposed to. The sworn accounts of Ms. C.L.G. and petitioner describe statements made to the child, or in her hearing, during and immediately after the episode that prompted the September 21 order: that only respondent and her family love the child, that the child need not listen to the adults in her father's household, and that her grandparents had been "spying." Petitioner also describes a message, sent to him after the transfer, in which respondent likened him to the demons in a television show and wrote that she had told the child, "I will come save her." Respondent's own affirmation confirms that the child asked at the parting whether "they" were demons. These accounts are contested in part, and they will be tested at the hearing. On the present record, however, they show a risk that the child will continue to be drawn into the center of her parents' conflict in a manner that threatens her emotional well-being. Vacating the interim orders now would withdraw protection that the present record affirmatively supports, before the hearing at which that support can be examined. Continuing them indefinitely without a hearing, on the other hand, would leave substantial restrictions on a parent who, by the account of several witnesses, has been closely involved in the child's daily care throughout her life, on the strength of an untested record and in a forum that lacks ordinary custody jurisdiction.

The court resolves that tension as the statute and the decisional law direct. The interim orders will continue, as modified below, only as temporary emergency orders under Domestic Relations Law § 76-c, only for the limited period fixed below, and only pending a prompt evidentiary hearing, which the court fixes for a specific date no later than ten days after the date of this decision and order. The period allowed for the parties to obtain relief from the California court, discussed below, is a separate matter, and it does not define how long these restrictions may continue untested. The hearing is confined to the questions that emergency jurisdiction permits this court to decide: whether, and to what extent, an emergency requiring the protection of the child or a parent presently exists, and what protective measures, if any, are necessary until the California court acts. It is not a plenary custody trial, and the continuation of these orders is not an adjudication that New York has jurisdiction to make an initial or final custody determination. Pending the hearing, the court has examined each restriction separately.

Temporary custody with petitioner. Since September 22, 2026, the child has lived with petitioner at the New York apartment, attended school, and resumed her activities. During the episode that prompted the September 21 order, respondent, according to the sworn accounts of petitioner, Mr. A.B., E.G. and Ms. K.H., agreed in the presence of police officers that the child would be returned the next morning and then did not return her; kept the child out of school and apart from her father for the better part of two days; and, as reflected in the police report that respondent herself annexed, told the police that she did not intend to leave the hotel until October 1, 2026. Respondent denies that she ever agreed, and explains that her remark meant only that she would not change hotels or flee. Those disputes are for the hearing. The undisputed fact remains that the last time the child was in respondent's sole care during this dispute, she was kept from her other parent and from school and was returned only when a court order was enforced. Keeping the child in a single, stable residence with the parent in whose care she has been since September 22, for the few days until a hearing, is the least disruptive course available. Placing the child with respondent, or dividing her time without supervision, would recreate the conditions that produced the emergency before any hearing has tested them.

Professional supervision. Supervision of a parent's access rests on a determination that unsupervised contact would be detrimental to the child (see Matter of Tecza v Alija, 138 AD3d 872 [2d Dept 2016]). In Tecza, that determination was made after a developed hearing. Here, the court makes it provisionally, on the present record, for the period until the hearing. The danger that supervision addresses is the one described above: that during unsupervised time the child will be drawn into her parents' conflict through statements that place her in the middle of the litigation. Ms. C.L.G. gives a first-hand sworn account of respondent's statements to the child at the hotel, including "only me and my family love you remember that" and "if they tell you to do something you don't have to do it." Petitioner gives a sworn account of the voicemail and of respondent's message after the transfer, and respondent's own affirmation confirms the conversation about demons. Respondent gives a different account of the parting, and her failure to repeat a denial in reply does not make these allegations established facts. On the present record, though, the court provisionally finds that they are sufficiently supported, and the risk sufficiently immediate, that unsupervised contact before the hearing would be detrimental to the child. A less restrictive arrangement, such as unsupervised daytime visits subject to the restraint on travel, would address the risk of removal but not this danger. This provisional finding is not a final finding made after testimony. It is not a finding that respondent has harmed the child or is unfit, it does not rest on the mental health, substance use, forehead mark or dental allegations, on which the court has made no finding, and it will be revisited at the hearing on the full record.

Exclusion from the New York apartment and the child's school. The New York apartment is where the September 20 confrontation took place, and it is now the residence of petitioner and the child. The child's school was the scene of a distressing drop-off on September 14, 2026, which the parties and E.G. describe differently. Keeping respondent away from both places for the short period before the hearing, while she has regular supervised time with the child elsewhere, avoids exposing the child to further confrontation between the adults in the places where she lives and learns.

Measures directed at petitioner. The conflict was not one-sided, and the court has weighed the evidence concerning petitioner's conduct as well. Petitioner does not deny that he arranged for the child never to be alone with her mother after September 12, 2026, and respondent has offered sworn evidence that petitioner and his family recorded her and the child throughout the apartment, and that her location was shared with petitioner without her authorization. The measures imposed below that bind petitioner are directed at those concerns: a mutual non-disparagement directive, a mutual restraint on removing the child from New York, a requirement that communication about the child take place through the Our Family Wizard application, and the temporary order of protection discussed below, which directs petitioner, among other things, not to track or monitor respondent's location.

The court addresses the October 21, 2026 submission in the same light. That submission was made after the briefing on these motions had closed, respondent has not had an opportunity to answer it, and the exhibits on which it relies are not before the court. Its allegations are serious on both sides of the dispute, and the court has not relied on them in determining whether an emergency continues or in examining any restriction. If true, they bear on respondent's judgment and on the reliability of her reports concerning the child. If untrue, or if the reports were made in good faith, they bear on the opposite question. Either way, they are precisely the kind of contested matter that must be tested at the hearing, and the court does not rely on them for any finding here. The parties may present evidence concerning these events at the hearing.

Pending the hearing, the record supports preserving the child's relationship with her mother to the fullest extent consistent with her safety. The papers do not set out the schedule of supervised parenting time now in effect, beyond petitioner's statement that he offered respondent six hours on a Sunday and that respondent asked for three, and his reference to nightly recorded video calls. So that the arrangement is clear and enforceable, the court fixes a minimum that does not depend on either party's agreement. Respondent shall have supervised parenting time on at least three days each week, for at least three hours on each day, one of which shall be a Saturday or Sunday on which respondent may elect up to six hours, and a video call with the child each evening for up to twenty minutes. Supervision shall be provided by D.D. or by another professional supervisor agreed upon in writing by counsel. If counsel cannot agree on times, locations, or a replacement supervisor within two days, either party may apply to the court by letter filed on NYSCEF, and the court will resolve the dispute promptly, and in the meantime the minimum schedule shall proceed at times and places designated by the supervisor. Because it is undisputed that respondent has no independent income and that petitioner has been the family's sole financial provider, petitioner shall arrange and pay for the professional supervision, without prejudice to reallocation. In addition, because the record reflects disparaging statements alleged on both sides, the non-disparagement directive will apply to both parents, and both parents shall communicate about the child through the Our Family Wizard application, which respondent herself has requested. For the same reason, and because each parent has accused the other of intending to take the child beyond the reach of the other, the restraint on removing the child from New York during the limited period of the interim orders will bind both parents.

F. Communication with the California Court and the Duration of the Interim Orders

The statute imposes two duties on a court that exercises temporary emergency jurisdiction while another state's proceeding is pending. The first is to communicate. Domestic Relations Law § 76-c [4] provides that a court of this state "which has been asked to make a child custody determination under this section, upon being informed that a child custody proceeding has been commenced in, or a child custody determination has been made by, a court of a state having jurisdiction under sections seventy-six through seventy-six-b of this title, shall immediately communicate with the other court." The second is to fix the duration of any emergency order. Under Domestic Relations Law § 76-c [3], as the parties describe it, an order issued in the exercise of temporary emergency jurisdiction must specify a period that the court considers adequate to allow the person seeking an order to obtain it from the state having jurisdiction, and the order remains in effect until an order is obtained from that state or the specified period expires, unless the court finds that the child would be at imminent risk of harm upon expiration, in which case the order remains in effect until the other state has taken steps to assure the protection of the child.

The First Department has enforced both duties. In Matter of Natalie P. v Steven L.R. (2026 NY Slip Op 02458 [1st Dept 2026]), the court vacated a Family Court order, observing that the Family Court "could properly have found that it had temporary emergency jurisdiction to issue a time-limited order as necessary to protect the child," but erred because it never communicated with the court of the other state and did not specify a duration for its order. In Matter of Shelby C.V. v Joshua W.K. (246 AD3d 606 [1st Dept 2026]), the court held that New York was required to communicate with the Ohio court once it became aware of the Ohio proceeding, and that the court must make a record of the communication and inform the parties. Petitioner seeks to distinguish these decisions on the ground that in each a prior custody order existed in the other state. That distinction does not help him. By its terms, Domestic Relations Law § 76-c [4] is triggered not only by a prior determination but by the commencement of a child custody proceeding in a state having jurisdiction, and petitioner himself asks the court to communicate with the California court. In Matter of Nathaniel H. (213 AD3d 525 [1st Dept 2023]), the First Department likewise identified the need for a recorded interstate communication.

The court has been informed that a custody proceeding concerning the child is pending in the Superior Court of California, County of Los Angeles, Case No. [redacted]. Nothing in the papers reflects that the required communication has yet taken place. The statute requires that it take place immediately, and the court will not make its initiation depend on any further submission by the parties. The court will therefore initiate the communication immediately upon the signing of this decision and order. If the communication cannot be completed at once, the court will document each attempt on the record, will continue its attempts until contact is made, and will report the status to the parties no later than the hearing date. The court will make a record of the communication, will promptly make that record available to the parties, and will afford them an opportunity to present facts and legal arguments before any determination of jurisdiction is made on the basis of the communication (see Domestic Relations Law § 75-i; Matter of Shelby C.V., 246 AD3d 606 1st Dept 2026]). The subjects of the communication shall include the jurisdiction of each court, the emergency, the protection of the parties and the child, and the period for which this court's temporary orders shall remain in effect.

As to duration, the court fixes a period of sixty days from the entry of this decision and order as the period adequate to allow the parties to seek and obtain an order from the California court. The interim orders shall remain in effect until the earlier of the issuance of an order by the California court addressing the child's custody or parental access, or the expiration of that sixty-day period. If, after the hearing, the court finds that the child would be at imminent risk of harm upon the expiration of its orders, they shall remain in effect until the California court has taken steps to assure the protection of the child. The period may also be adjusted by further order of this court in light of the communication with the California court. This period governs only the time allowed for the parties to obtain relief in California. It does not govern the hearing, which is fixed separately and much sooner, and the restrictions continued here are subject to modification at the conclusion of that hearing.

Having determined that New York lacks jurisdiction under Domestic Relations Law § 76 [1], the court has considered whether the petition should be dismissed now, as respondent requests. Dismissal at this moment would end the very emergency authority that the court has found warranted, before the hearing, before the communication with the California court, and before that court has had an opportunity to act. That would leave the child's protection unresolved, a result the First Department cautioned against in Matter of Nathaniel H. (213 AD3d 525 [1st Dept 2023]). The branch of the cross-motion seeking dismissal is therefore granted to the extent of the court's determination that it lacks jurisdiction to make an initial custody determination, and the request for outright dismissal of the proceeding is held in abeyance pending the hearing, the communication with the California court, and the expiration or termination of the interim orders.

G. The Request for an Order of Protection

Respondent seeks a temporary full stay-away order of protection in favor of herself and the child. She relies on Domestic Relations Law § 240 [3], which authorizes a court in a covered custody proceeding to issue an order of protection and, under Domestic Relations Law § 240 [3] [e], a temporary order of protection on motion for good cause shown, and on Gerner v Stalvey (174 AD3d 601 [2d Dept 2019]), which recognizes that the Supreme Court may entertain custody proceedings between unmarried parents framed under Domestic Relations Law §§ 70 and 240. Two further features of the statute bear on this request. A temporary order of protection may not be denied solely on the ground that the events alleged are not relatively contemporaneous with the request (Domestic Relations Law § 240 [3] [e]). And a request for emergency relief of this kind is to be heard promptly, on the day it is made or the next day the court is in session (Domestic Relations Law § 240 [3] [g]). Petitioner, citing Family Ct Act § 828 [1] [a], argues that good cause has not been shown. Respondent makes the request expressly without conceding New York's custody jurisdiction, and correctly notes that Domestic Relations Law § 76-c [1] extends emergency protection to a parent as well as to a child. The request has been fully submitted, and the court determines the application for temporary relief now rather than deferring it to the hearing.

Insofar as the request seeks to exclude petitioner from the child's life by a stay-away order in favor of the child, it is denied. Two different dangers must be separated. The first is direct harm to the child. Respondent does not allege that petitioner has ever struck or threatened the child, and on September 18, 2026, two days before these events began, she told the couples counselor that she had "never, for a moment," thought that petitioner would hurt the child "in any capacity, emotional or physical." The second is the danger to a child of exposure to violence against her mother, which respondent rightly emphasizes, relying on Matter of Nathaniel H. (213 AD3d 525 [1st Dept 2023]) for the significance of domestic violence against a mother, including in the child's presence. Respondent alleges that the child witnessed the August 2025 table incident and was afterward deeply distressed, and petitioner admits that he dumped the contents of the table in frustration, though he denies that any child was nearby. That danger is real, but a stay-away order excluding the father from the child's life is not the measure that addresses it. The parties no longer live together, respondent's time with the child takes place apart from petitioner, communication between the parents is now confined to the Our Family Wizard application, and the narrower order of protection issued below forbids the conduct respondent alleges. Those measures address the asserted danger to the child from violence against her mother without severing her relationship with her father before the hearing.

Insofar as the request seeks protection for respondent herself, the court finds good cause for a temporary order of protection, though of narrower scope than respondent requests. Respondent has given a specific sworn account of an incident on or about July 1, 2026, in which, she states, petitioner held her in a chokehold that impeded her breathing and then grabbed her wrist hard enough to leave marks. She states that she recorded the immediate aftermath, in which petitioner acknowledged putting his hands on her while saying he was trying to hug her, and that she reported the incident at once by text to the parties' couples counselors and to her mother. She also gives a sworn account of a broader pattern of physical intimidation and of the monitoring of her location, and petitioner acknowledges the August 2025 incident in part. Petitioner's categorical denial creates a dispute for the hearing, but it does not defeat good cause for interim protection, and the fact that the July incident preceded this proceeding by several weeks is not a ground for denial (Domestic Relations Law § 240 [3] [e]). Nor does the California court's September 29, 2026 ruling bear on the question. That ruling addressed only whether relief should issue without notice, and it made no determination of the underlying allegations. The issuance of a temporary order of protection is not a finding that any of the alleged acts occurred.

At the same time, the record does not support the full stay-away order that respondent seeks. The parties live apart, respondent has continued to contact petitioner directly and frequently since asking for protection, and the parents must continue to communicate about their child. The court therefore issues a temporary order of protection in favor of respondent directing petitioner to refrain from assaulting, attempting to assault, harassing, menacing, stalking, threatening, or obstructing the breathing of respondent, and from tracking or monitoring her location or her electronic accounts, and to communicate with her only through the Our Family Wizard application concerning the child, through counsel, or as the court otherwise directs, except in an emergency affecting the child's health or safety, the same exception that applies to the parties' communications generally. The separate temporary order of protection shall set out these terms and its expiration in full. The order shall remain in effect until the conclusion of the hearing, at which the court will consider whether further or different protection is warranted, and in no event longer than the interim orders. The branch of the cross-motion seeking a full stay-away order in favor of respondent is referred to the hearing.

H. Counsel Fees

Domestic Relations Law § 237 [b] authorizes a court hearing an application concerning child custody to direct one parent to pay the counsel fees of the other, as justice requires, having regard to the circumstances of the case and of the parties. That authority extends to custody disputes between unmarried parents, including an initial application in the Supreme Court, and it permits interim awards (see Matter of Balber v Zealand, 169 AD3d 500 [1st Dept 2019]). In Balber, the First Department sustained interim awards despite claims that the requesting parent had multiplied the proceedings, and explained that a parent's access to funds sufficient to pay counsel does not itself bar an award. The court must consider the parties' relative financial circumstances, including historical and prospective earning capacity (see Matter of Brookelyn M. v Christopher M., 161 AD3d 662 [1st Dept 2018]). A fee award may be denied where the disparity in the parties' finances is insufficient (see Matter of Steven S. v Yelena M., 129 AD3d 408 [1st Dept 2015]), or where the requesting party fails to demonstrate an inability to pay (see Jacobson v Jacobson, 240 AD3d 676 [2d Dept 2025]), and the amount and allocation of fees among related proceedings may require further determination (see Matter of Yu Wei v Mathews, 165 AD3d 957 [2d Dept 2018]).

The court's limited jurisdiction does not foreclose an interim award. Respondent has been required to litigate two emergency applications and to secure counsel on a day's notice in a proceeding that, by the court's own determination, was commenced in a state that is not the child's home state, and she has been required to defend the interim orders that the court is continuing. The fees she has incurred in this court are fees incurred in a proceeding concerning child custody.

On the financial question, the record, though incomplete, is not evenly balanced. It is undisputed that respondent has not worked since the child was born, that petitioner has been the family's sole financial provider, and that the household's expenses, including respondent's own, have been paid on petitioner's credit card. Petitioner's own papers show that he has the means to pay more than $27,000 of respondent's charges in twelve days, to retain counsel, and to maintain office space in New York, and he does not claim that his resources are comparable to respondent's. His principal arguments, that respondent has retained counsel on two coasts and paid retainers, and that she has filed in several courts, go to the amount of an award and its ultimate allocation, not to respondent's entitlement to an interim award (see Matter of Balber, 169 AD3d 499 [1st Dept 2019]). At the same time, neither party has provided a sworn statement of net worth, the source of the $20,000 respondent has paid in retainers is not explained, and the papers do not show whether any of the billed time relates to the Family Court proceeding, in which respondent's counsel also appeared and which is not chargeable to this application.

Balancing these considerations, the court awards respondent interim counsel fees of $20,000, payable by petitioner directly to respondent's counsel. The accounting behind that figure is as follows. Respondent has already paid $20,000 in retainers, which approximately covers the $20,240 billed through the filing of the cross-motion. The court does not direct reimbursement of those retainers at this time; that request is reserved for the final allocation of counsel fees. Counsel's billing through the reply totals $34,430, which leaves $14,430 billed in excess of the retainers. The interim award is intended to pay that unpaid balance, to the extent it reflects services rendered in this proceeding, and to provide prospective funding of the remaining $5,570 toward the expedited hearing and the proceedings that follow the communication with the California court. Because respondent's counsel also appeared for her in the Family Court on September 22, 2026, and the papers do not identify what time, if any, was billed for that appearance or for any work concerning the California proceeding, counsel shall, within ten days, file an affirmation identifying any such time, and no part of the award shall be applied to it (see Matter of Yu Wei, 165 AD3d 957 [2d Dept 2018]). Any portion of the award thereby released shall be applied to services rendered in this proceeding after the reply. The award is made without prejudice to a further application, supported by sworn statements of net worth and updated billing records, and without prejudice to the reallocation of all counsel fees, including the retainers already paid, at the conclusion of the proceedings in this court. The balance of the request is denied without prejudice.

IV. Conclusion and Decretal Paragraphs

This court did not have jurisdiction to make an initial custody determination for this child when the proceeding was commenced, and it does not have that jurisdiction now. It did have, and continues to have, the authority to protect the child in an emergency. That authority is real but limited. It must be exercised for a defined period, in communication with the California court, and on a record tested at a hearing rather than on competing affirmations. The disposition below is designed to keep the child protected while those steps are taken, and to place the question of custody before the court that has jurisdiction to decide it.

Accordingly, it is hereby

ORDERED that Motion Sequence Nos. 001, Cross-Motion Sequence No. 001, and Motion Sequence No. 002 are consolidated for disposition; and it is further

ORDERED that the branch of respondent's cross-motion (Cross-Motion Sequence No. 001) seeking dismissal of the verified petition for lack of jurisdiction is GRANTED to the extent that the court determines that New York was not the home state of the child, G.R.G., born in 2022, on the date of the commencement of this proceeding, that this court does not have jurisdiction under Domestic Relations Law § 76 [1] to make an initial child custody determination concerning the child, and that this court's jurisdiction is limited to temporary emergency jurisdiction under Domestic Relations Law § 76-c, and the request for outright dismissal of the proceeding is held in abeyance pending the hearing, the communication with the California court, and the expiration or termination of the interim orders continued herein; and it is further

ORDERED that petitioner's request that this court exercise exclusive, continuing jurisdiction over the custody of the child is DENIED; and it is further

ORDERED that the branch of Motion Sequence No. 001 seeking an award of sole legal and physical custody of the child is DENIED to the extent that it seeks an initial or final custody determination, and is otherwise GRANTED solely to the extent set forth herein; and it is further

ORDERED that the branch of Motion Sequence No. 001 seeking to restrain respondent from removing the child from the State of New York is GRANTED to the extent that, as a temporary emergency order under Domestic Relations Law § 76-c and for the period fixed herein, neither party shall remove the child from the State of New York without the written consent of the other party or further order of a court of competent jurisdiction; and it is further

ORDERED that Motion Sequence No. 002 is GRANTED to the extent that, as temporary emergency orders under Domestic Relations Law § 76-c and for the period fixed herein, (1) petitioner shall continue to have temporary sole legal and physical custody of the child; (2) the child shall continue to reside and spend her overnights at the New York apartment at [address redacted], New York, New York; (3) respondent shall stay away from the New York apartment and from the child's school, and shall have no contact with the child other than the supervised parenting time and video calls provided for herein; and (4) respondent's parenting time with the child shall be professionally supervised; and Motion Sequence No. 002 is otherwise DENIED to the extent that it seeks any initial or final custody determination; and it is further

ORDERED that, pending the hearing and for the period fixed herein, respondent shall have professionally supervised parenting time with the child on at least three days each week, for at least three hours on each such day, one of which days shall be a Saturday or Sunday on which respondent may elect to have up to six hours, at times and places arranged through counsel, together with a video call with the child each evening for up to twenty minutes at a time arranged through counsel; that supervision shall be provided by D.D. or by another professional supervisor agreed upon in writing by counsel; that if counsel cannot agree on times, locations, or a replacement supervisor within two days, either party may apply to the court by letter filed on NYSCEF for prompt resolution, and in the meantime the minimum schedule shall proceed at times and places designated by the supervisor; that petitioner shall arrange and pay for the professional supervision, without prejudice to reallocation; and that this schedule may be enlarged upon the written consent of both parties, provided that all in-person parenting time shall remain professionally supervised until further order of the court; and it is further

ORDERED that the branch of Motion Sequence No. 002 seeking a non-disparagement directive is GRANTED to the extent that neither party shall disparage the other party or the other party's family to the child or in the child's presence, and neither party shall permit any third party to do so, and neither party shall discuss this litigation or any other court proceeding concerning the child with the child or in the child's presence; and it is further

ORDERED that, for the period fixed herein, the parties shall communicate with each other concerning the child only through the Our Family Wizard application, except in an emergency affecting the child's health or safety; and it is further

ORDERED that the branch of respondent's cross-motion seeking vacatur of the September 18, 2026 and September 21, 2026 interim orders is DENIED to the extent that it seeks their immediate vacatur, and is GRANTED to the extent that those orders are continued, as modified herein, solely as temporary emergency orders under Domestic Relations Law § 76-c, for the period fixed herein, and pending the hearing directed herein; and it is further

ORDERED that the interim orders continued herein shall remain in effect until the earlier of (1) the issuance by the Superior Court of California, County of Los Angeles, of an order addressing the custody of or parental access to the child, or (2) the expiration of sixty days from the date of entry of this decision and order, which period the court finds adequate to allow the parties to seek and obtain an order from the California court, unless, upon a finding made after the hearing that the child would be at imminent risk of harm upon the expiration of these orders, the court directs that they remain in effect until the California court has taken steps to assure the protection of the child, and subject to adjustment by further order of this court in light of its communication with the California court; and it is further

ORDERED that the continuation of the interim orders is not an adjudication that New York has jurisdiction to make an initial or final custody determination concerning the child, or that it has exclusive, continuing jurisdiction, and is not a determination on the merits of custody; and it is further

ORDERED that the branch of respondent's cross-motion seeking a judicial communication between this court and the Superior Court of California, County of Los Angeles, is GRANTED; that this court shall initiate communication with that court concerning Case No. [redacted], pursuant to Domestic Relations Law § 76-c [4], immediately upon the signing of this decision and order, without awaiting any further submission by the parties; that if the communication cannot be completed at once, the court shall document each attempt on the record, continue its attempts until contact is made, and report the status to the parties no later than the hearing date; and that the court shall make a record of the communication, shall promptly make that record available to the parties, and shall afford them an opportunity to present facts and legal arguments before any determination of jurisdiction is made on the basis of the communication; and it is further

ORDERED that, to assist the court, and without delaying the communication directed above, within five days of the entry of this decision and order, respondent's counsel shall file with this court, and serve upon petitioner's counsel, copies of all pleadings, declarations, notices and orders filed or issued in Case No. [redacted] to date, together with the identity of the judicial officer and department to which that case is assigned, and both parties shall promptly file any further order issued in that case; and it is further

ORDERED that an expedited evidentiary hearing shall be held, limited to (1) whether, and to what extent, an emergency requiring the protection of the child or of a parent presently exists within the meaning of Domestic Relations Law § 76-c [1]; (2) what temporary protective measures, if any, including supervision of either parent's parenting time, are necessary pending action by the California court; (3) whether the child would be at imminent risk of harm upon the expiration of the interim orders; and (4) the branch of respondent's cross-motion seeking a temporary order of protection in her favor; and it is further

ORDERED that the hearing shall commence on November 5, 2026, at 9:30 a.m., in Part 44, at the courthouse located at 60 Centre Street, New York, New York, which date shall be no later than ten days after the date of this decision and order, and shall continue from day to day as the court's calendar permits; that the sixty-day period fixed herein for obtaining relief from the California court shall not be construed to extend the time within which the hearing shall be held; and that the parties may present evidence at the hearing concerning the matters set forth in petitioner's supplemental affirmation dated October 21, 2026, upon which the court has made no finding; and it is further

ORDERED that the branch of respondent's cross-motion seeking an order of protection is GRANTED to the extent that a temporary order of protection shall issue in favor of respondent against petitioner, directing petitioner to refrain from assaulting, attempting to assault, harassing, menacing, stalking, threatening, or obstructing the breathing of respondent, and from tracking or monitoring her location or her electronic accounts, and to communicate with respondent only through the Our Family Wizard application concerning the child, through counsel, or as the court otherwise directs, except in an emergency affecting the child's health or safety, which temporary order of protection shall set forth these terms and its expiration in full and shall remain in effect until the conclusion of the hearing or further order of the court, and in no event longer than the interim orders continued herein; is DENIED insofar as it seeks an order of protection in favor of the child directing petitioner to stay away from the child; and is otherwise referred to the hearing insofar as it seeks a full stay-away order of protection in favor of respondent; and it is further

ORDERED that the branch of respondent's cross-motion seeking counsel fees is GRANTED to the extent that petitioner shall pay interim counsel fees of $20,000 directly to respondent's counsel, Murgolo & Rutigliano, Attorneys at Law, LLP, within thirty days of the entry of this decision and order, which award shall be applied first to the unpaid balance of fees for services rendered in this proceeding through the reply, and thereafter to services rendered in this proceeding after the reply; that within ten days of the entry of this decision and order, respondent's counsel shall file an affirmation identifying any billed time attributable to the Family Court proceeding or to the California proceeding, and no part of the award shall be applied to such time; that the request for reimbursement of the $20,000 in retainers already paid by respondent is reserved for the final allocation of counsel fees; that the award is without prejudice to a further application supported by sworn statements of net worth and updated billing records, and to the reallocation of all counsel fees at the conclusion of the proceedings in this court; and that the balance of that branch is DENIED without prejudice; and it is further

ORDERED that all relief not expressly granted, held in abeyance, reserved for later determination, or referred to the hearing herein is DENIED; and it is further

ORDERED that petitioner shall serve a copy of this decision and order, with notice of entry, upon respondent's counsel within ten days of its entry.

This constitutes the decision and order of the court.

Dated: October 29, 2026

New York, New York

E N T E R:

HON. RONALD CASTORINA, JR.

JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT

Ronald Castorina, Jr., J.