Dimita Mapp, Plaintiff, v. Dr. Konstantin Vasyukevich, Defendant. (2026)

The following papers were used on this motion: notice of motion, affirmation in support, memorandum of law, exhibits; affirmation in opposition, exhibits.

Upon the foregoing papers, having heard oral argument  ¹ , and due deliberation having been had, the within motion by Plaintiff seeking recusal of the undersigned is determined as follows.

In this action, Plaintiff appears pro se and is suing Defendant Dr. Konstantin Vasyukevich for medical malpractice  ² and alleging altered medical records in connection with a May 22, 2024 surgical procedure described as a "Deep Plane Face and Neck Lift." In prior motion practice initiated by Plaintiff, the Court ordered that three separate actions — two in the Supreme Court and one in the Civil Court — be consolidated into one, bearing the instant index number. Plaintiff was ordered to serve and file an amended complaint. She filed it on July 21, 2026, along with affirmations of service on Defendant's attorneys.

Plaintiff now moves for recusal of the Court. She writes: "The Court's failure to act on an unopposed request, combined with its refusal to review Plaintiff's fully submitted evidence prior to the stay, contributes to the appearance of partiality underlying this motion and is the reason Plaintiff sought intervention in Supreme Court." Apparently, Plaintiff evinces dismay at determinations made due to procedural requirements being enforced in the course of her litigation conducted on a pro se basis.

Plaintiff's motion is denied on four separate grounds.

First, as the Court stated during oral argument, it is not related to either Plaintiff or Defendant. Neither has the Court been an attorney or a party in any matter which is the subject of this action. Therefore, recusal is not warranted by virtue of Judiciary Law § 14, on which Plaintiff relies in part, said statutory provision providing as follows:

A judge shall not sit as such in, or take any part in the decision of, an action, claim, matter, motion or proceeding to which he is a party, or in which he has been attorney or counsel, or in which he is interested, or if he is related by consanguinity or affinity to any party to the controversy within the sixth degree. The degree shall be ascertained by ascending from the judge to the common ancestor, descending to the party, counting a degree for each person in both lines, including the judge and party, and excluding the common ancestor. But no judge of a court of record shall be disqualified in any action, claim, matter, motion or proceeding in which an insurance company is a party or is interested by reason of his being a policy holder therein. No judge shall be deemed disqualified from passing upon any litigation before him because of his ownership of shares of stock or other securities of a corporate litigant, provided that the parties, by their attorneys, in writing, or in open court upon the record, waive any claim as to disqualification of the judge.

Further, recusal is not called for pursuant to 22 NYCRR § 100.3 (E) (1), which provides as follows:

(E) Disqualification.

(1) A judge shall disqualify himself or herself in a proceeding in which the judge's impartiality might reasonably be questioned, including but not limited to instances where:

(a) (i) the judge has a personal bias or prejudice concerning a party; or (ii) the judge has personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts concerning the proceeding;

(b) the judge knows that: (i) the judge served as a lawyer in the matter in controversy; or (ii) a lawyer with whom the judge previously practiced law served during such association as a lawyer concerning the matter; or (iii) the judge has been a material witness concerning it;

(c) the judge knows that he or she, individually or as a fiduciary, or the judge's spouse or minor child residing in the judge's household has an economic interest in the subject matter in controversy or in a party to the proceeding or has any other interest that could be substantially affected by the proceeding;

(d) the judge knows that the judge or the judge's spouse, or a person known by the judge to be within the sixth degree of relationship to either of them, or the spouse of such a person:

(i) is a party to the proceeding;

(ii) is an officer, director or trustee of a party;

(iii) has an interest that could be substantially affected by the proceeding;

(e) The judge knows that the judge or the judge's spouse, or a person known by the judge to be within the fourth degree of relationship to either of them, or the spouse of such a person, is acting as a lawyer in the proceeding or is likely to be a material witness in the proceeding. Where the judge knows the relationship to be within the second degree, (i) the judge must disqualify him/herself without the possibility of remittal if such person personally appears in the courtroom during the proceeding or is likely to do so, but (ii) may permit remittal of disqualification provided such person remains permanently absent from the courtroom.

(f) The judge, while a judge or while a candidate for judicial office, has made a pledge or promise of conduct in office that is inconsistent with the impartial performance of the adjudicative duties of the office or has made a public statement not in the judge's adjudicative capacity that commits the judge with respect to:

(i) an issue in the proceeding; or

(ii) the parties or controversy in the proceeding.

(g) Notwithstanding the provisions of subparagraphs (c) and (d) of this section, if a judge would be disqualified because of the appearance or discovery, after the matter was assigned to the judge, that the judge individually or as a fiduciary, the judge's spouse, or a minor child residing in his or her household has an economic interest in a party to the proceeding, disqualification is not required if the judge, spouse or minor child, as the case may be, divests himself or herself of the interest that provides the grounds for the disqualification.

This Court does not have a personal bias or prejudice concerning the parties and lacks personal knowledge of the facts concerning Plaintiff's surgery. This Court was not a lawyer in the matter in controversy, was not associated with a lawyer representing anyone in it, and was not a witness to anything which transpired. Neither this Court nor any family member possesses any economic interest in the matter. Neither the Court nor any family member is a party, associated with a party, or has an interest in the proceeding. No family member of the Court has been involved in the matter in any way. The Court has not made any public statement inconsistent with the impartial performance of the adjudicative duties of the office relative to this case or the parties. Therefore, recusal is not warranted under 22 NYCRR § 100.3 (E) (1).

In Patrick UU. v Frances VV. (200 AD3d 1156 [3d Dept 2012]), the court held that allegations of bias against a judge because he previously ruled against a party "do[es] not establish a statutory basis for recusal under Judiciary Law § 14, and the record does not demonstrate that the trial judge has 'a direct, personal, substantial[ ] or pecuniary interest in the outcome of the custody litigation.' " It has also been held, "Absent a legal disqualification under Judiciary Law § 14, a trial judge is the sole arbiter of recusal and his or her decision in that regard will not be lightly overturned (see People v Moreno, 70 NY2d 403, 405-406 [1987]; Matter of Stampfler v Snow, 290 AD2d 595, 596 [2002])" (Khan v Dolly, 39 AD3d 649 [2d Dept 2007]).

Even if a judge has determined issues in a pre-trial hearing, the judge may conduct the trial (see People v Brown, 24 NY2d 168 [1969]; People v Latella, 112 AD2d 324 [2d Dept 1985]; People v Smith [2d Dept 2018]). A judge, through "learning, experience and judicial discipline, is uniquely capable of distinguishing the issues and of making an objective determination based upon appropriate legal criteria. . . ." (Moreno, 70 NY2d at 406). A party's "dissatisfaction with the court's rulings . . . do not present appropriate grounds for recusal" (McAuliffe v McAuliffe, 209 AD3d 1119, 1121 [3d Dept 2022]). Plaintiff's dissatisfaction with prior decisions of the Court in this action is not a valid ground for recusal.

Accordingly, there is no basis in law or fact for this Court to recuse itself in connection with Plaintiff's lawsuit against the doctor whom she accuses of malpractice and improprieties.

The second ground for denial of Plaintiff's motion is her failure to comply with CPLR 2106 (a) with respect to the submission of an affirmation in legal proceedings, said provision stating:

(a) The statement of any person wherever made, subscribed and affirmed by that person to be true under the penalties of perjury, other than in a deposition, or an oath of office, or an oath required to be taken before a specified person other than a notary, may be used in an action in New York in lieu of and with the same force and effect as an affidavit, a certificate, a response to a notice to admit, an answer to interrogatories, a verification of a pleading, a bill of particulars and any other sworn statement. Such affirmation shall be in substantially the following form:

I affirm this ___ day of ______, ____, under the penalties of perjury under the laws of New York, which may include a fine or imprisonment, that the foregoing is true, except as to matters alleged on information and belief and as to those matters I believe it to be true, and I understand that this document may be filed in an action or proceeding in a court of law.

(Signature)

The First Department has upheld this standard for an admissible affirmation, rejecting an affirmation in Matter of Grandsard v Hutchinson (227 AD3d 491 [1st Dept], affg for reasons stated by Sup Ct, 2024 WL 1957086 [Sup Ct, NY County 2024]) which was made merely "under the penalty of perjury." In Grandsard, the Supreme Court cited Paez v Board of Elections (2023 NY Slip Op 31438[U] [Sup Ct, NY County 2023]), holding that an affirmation lacking the language that CPLR 2106 now required failed to demonstrate an appreciation for the gravity of the factual account related and was ultimately not a verification at all. Similarly, the Supreme Court in R.F. v L.K. (82 Misc 3d 1221[A], 2024 NY Slip Op 50358[U] [Sup Ct, Westchester County 2024]) held that because the defendant's affirmation did not include the required language, it was "not in admissible form and cannot be relied upon as proof of facts set forth therein."

Conformity with CPLR 2106 in effect at the time of filing of an affirmation is mandatory in order for a court to consider asserted facts, as opposed to legal argument (see Bellavia v Hoppenstein, 252 AD3d 1299 [2d Dept 2026]). Plaintiff's affirmation relates facts concerning her surgery and her court cases filed in connection with it. Under Bellavia, Plaintiff's asserted facts are not to be considered. Her affirmation merely states: "Dimita Mapp / Plaintiff Pro Se, I affirm the foregoing is true under penalty of perjury pursuant to CPLR 2106, deposes and says[.]" And, as the Appellate Division stated in Bellavia, "However, the oath contained in Bellavia's affirmation, which did not refer to the "laws of New York" or the potential penalties for perjury, was not in substantially the same form as required by former CPLR 2106" (252 AD3d at 1302). Therefore, Plaintiff's affirmation is a nullity, resulting in no prima facie case in support of the relief requested.

The third ground for denial of Plaintiff's motion involves the fact that her affirmation is not signed. On page 19, at the end, there appears the name "Dimita Mapp / Plaintiff Pro Se" in an italic font. This is not an electronic signature, particularly since the affirmation was submitted in hardcopy — not through the NYSCEF electronic filing platform (see Citibank, N.A. v Narvaez, 73 Misc 3d 709 [Civ Ct, Richmond County 2021]).

The final ground for denying Plaintiff's motion for recusal lies in her use of hallucinations, which are "citations to nonexistent cases, fabricated quotations from actual cases, or misstatements of law that are not representative of what a case actually decided" (Matter of Julien v Arthur, — AD3d —, 2026 NY Slip Op 03308, *2 [2d Dept 2026]). While the Court lacked the time to review each and every legal citation in Plaintiff's papers, the following hallucinations were discovered:

• Affirmation page 11: "Nimkoff Rosenfeld & Schechter, LLP v. RKO Properties, Ltd., 169 AD3d 678 (2d Dep't 2019)" (repeated in Memorandum of Law page 28)

• Memorandum of Law page 22: Matter of Eastbrooke Owners v. Eastbrooke Assocs., 108 AD3d 642 (2d Dep't 2013)"

• Memorandum of Law page 22: Matter of Murphy v. Murphy, 233 AD2d 881 (4th Dep't 1996)"³

At oral argument, the Court asked Plaintiff about each of these hallucinations, while presenting the printed Official Reports of New York State court opinions. None of these cited decisions appeared at the places indicated in the Official Reports. The Court offered Plaintiff an opportunity to explain these citations to non-existent cases. Plaintiff became defensive when asked about the use of AI (artificial intelligence) to create the hallucinations. Plaintiff refused to acknowledge that the hallucinations derived from the preparation of her papers through AI.

"[V]arious courts have determined that reliance by an attorney or party on GenAI to draft legal memoranda containing GenAI hallucinations constitutes frivolous conduct warranting the imposition of sanctions" (Matter of Julien v Arthur, 2026 NY Slip Op 03308, *2).

The Appellate Division, Second Department, in sanctioning a pro se litigant for the inclusion of hallucinations, in Matter of Julien v Arthur, stated:

Consequently, various courts have determined that reliance by an attorney or party on GenAI to draft legal memoranda containing GenAI hallucinations constitutes frivolous conduct warranting the imposition of sanctions (see e.g. Fletcher v Experian Info. Solutions, Inc., 168 F4th 231 [5th Cir]; Amarsingh v Frontier Airlines, Inc., 2026 WL 352016, *6-7, 2026 US App LEXIS 3928, *17-20 [10th Cir, No. 24-1391]; Lexos Media IP, LLC v Overstock.com, Inc., 2026 WL 265581, 2026 US Dist LEXIS 20994 [D Kan, No. 22-2324-JAR]; Dubinin v Papazian, 2025 WL 3248187, *3, 2025 US Dist LEXIS 229362, *9-10 [SD Fla, No. 25-CV-23877-RAR]; Mata v Avianca, Inc., 678 F Supp 3d at 466-467). Further, courts have stressed that even pro se litigants, who are typically afforded greater leniency than parties represented by an attorney, may be subject to sanctions for presenting fabricated case citations or misrepresentations resulting from reliance on GenAI (see Button v McCawley, 2026 WL 292150, *4, 2026 US Dist LEXIS 23074, *10 [SD Fla, No. 0:24-cv-60911-LEIBOWITZ/AUGUSTIN-BIRCH] ["(c)ourts in this district have not hesitated to sanction parties, even pro se litigants, for fake or hallucinated citations" (emphasis omitted)]; Kulkarni v Merit Sys. Protection Bd., 2025 WL 3627611, *3, 2025 US App LEXIS 32662, *6 [Fed Cir, No. 2025-1597, 2025-1598] ["(w)hile pro se litigants are understandably held to a less stringent standard than parties represented by counsel, a baseline, common-sense standard nonetheless requires that all parties refrain from citing non-existent case law and quoting non-existent language"]; Braica v Frankowski, 2025 WL 3644231, *5, 2025 US Dist LEXIS 263098, *13-14 [noting that the plaintiff's statement that he failed to verify the accuracy of his submissions containing GenAI hallucinations because he is a pro se party lacking legal training "undermine(s) the capabilities of pro se litigants" (emphasis omitted)]; Moore v City of Del City, 2025 WL 3471341, *3, 2025 US App LEXIS 31411, *8 [10th Cir, No. 25-6002] [warning future litigants, pro se and those represented by counsel alike, of the possibility of sanctions, monetary and otherwise, resulting from "the unscrutinized use of GenAI"]; Anonymous v New York City Dept. of Educ., 2024 WL 3460049, *7, 2024 US Dist LEXIS 127114, *20 [SD NY, No. 1:24-cv-04232 (JLR)] ["(w)ithout question, it is improper and unacceptable for litigants—including pro se litigants—to submit non-existent judicial opinions with fake quotes and citations" (emphasis and internal quotation marks omitted)]). (Matter of Julien v Arthur, 2026 NY Slip Op 03308, *2.)

The Second Department also wrote:

"Pursuant to 22 NYCRR 130-1.1(a), a court may impose financial sanctions upon any party or attorney in a civil action or proceeding who engages in frivolous conduct" (Aretakis v CPEX Real Estate, LLC, 246 AD3d 691, 693). "Conduct is frivolous if: (1) it is completely without merit in law and cannot be supported by a reasonable argument for an extension, modification or reversal of existing law; (2) it is undertaken primarily to delay or prolong the resolution of the litigation, or to harass or maliciously injure another; or (3) it asserts material factual statements that are false" (id. [internal quotation marks omitted]; see 22 NYCRR 130-1.1[c]).

Here, by filing an appellate brief citing to a nonexistent case as the sole support for his claim of judicial bias, the father engaged in conduct that was "completely without merit in law and cannot be supported by a reasonable argument for an extension, modification or reversal of existing law" (22 NYCRR 130-1.1[c][1]; see Deutsche Bank Natl. Trust Co. v LeTennier, _____ AD3d at _____, 2026 NY Slip Op 00040, *5), and that involved the assertion of "material factual statements that are false" (22 NYCRR 130-1.1[c][3]). Thus, the father's reliance on GenAI, without taking the time to verify that the limited number of cases in his appellate brief stood for the propositions cited, let alone were actually in existence, constituted frivolous conduct. (Matter of Julien v Arthur, 2026 NY Slip Op 03308, *2.)

In a case, where the Supreme Court, Kings County identified hallucinations in a pro se party's papers, it stated:

It is clear and undisputed that Makinen used Artificial Intelligence to create the documents relied upon in his motions. Moreover, it is undisputed that these papers contained AI hallucinations and made material misrepresentations to the Court. The Court finds his argument that he is pro se and simply putting his best foot forward to be disingenuous. At oral argument, the Court noted that there are hundreds of pro se litigants that appear in this Court without relying on AI generated documents and memorandums. The Court pointed out that Makinen had the option to simply state his arguments in an affidavit instead of submitting memorandums of law with fictitious quotes and citations. This conduct not only wasted this Court's time and resources but also caused plaintiff and her attorney to incur unnecessary time and expense. (Keefe v Bmakin Film Ltd, 2026 NY Slip Op 31794[U], *5 [Sup Ct, Kings County 2026].)

While no financial sanction was imposed, the Court decided that it "will not consider Makinen's motion papers based on fictitious authority" (id.).

In a similar situation, where a pro se party submitted legal papers containing AI-generated hallucinations, the Supreme Court, Albany County, wrote:

After plaintiff made her reply submission, defendants filed a reply affirmation of counsel, in which they point out that the case citations set forth in plaintiff's filings do not exist, and argues that plaintiff's use of such false citations renders her entire summary judgment motion frivolous (Attorney Affirmation in Reply to Plaintiff's Opposition to Defendants' Cross-Motion for SJ, dated April 8, 2026 [Def Reply Aff] ¶¶ 6-8). They also note that the Court may sanction plaintiff sua sponte under Part 130 of the Rules of the Chief Administrative Judge for using false case citations (id. ¶¶ 11-16).

In response, plaintiff sought permission to submit a sur-reply so that she could be heard on defendants' application for sanctions. I granted the motion, and in her sur-reply plaintiff acknowledged that the cases she purports to cite do not exist, but she asserts that she included them without knowing that they were inaccurate (Sur-Reply, dated April 13, 2026 ["Sur-Reply"] ¶¶ 1-3). Plaintiff further contends that her use of non-existent case citations was not completely without merit or otherwise frivolous under 22 NYCRR 130-1.1, and defendants were not prejudiced thereby (id. ¶¶ 2-4). Thus, she argues that sanctions are not warranted.

Having considered the parties' submissions, I find that imposition of a sanction on plaintiff is appropriate here. Initially, the purportedly authoritative cases cited by plaintiff are, indeed, fabrications, and appear to be "hallucinations" created by an artificial intelligence tool. Although the case names appear to mimic those of actual parties to real rulings issued by the Appellate Division, Third Department, the cases bearing these names concern entirely different matters, and the citations themselves are fake.

The filing of legal paper[s] with fabricated legal authorities is sanctionable as frivolous conduct (see Deutsche Bank National Trust Co. v Le Tennier, — AD3d —, 250 NYS3d 260, 266 [3d Dept January 8, 2026] [the "submission of fabricated legal authorities is completely without merit in law and therefore constitutes frivolous conduct"]; see also Cassata, supra ["Citing nonexistent case law or misrepresenting holdings of a case is making a false statement to a court"]). That is because, in signing and submitting a legal paper to a court, a " 'party certifies that, to the best of that person's knowledge, information and belief, formed after an inquiry reasonable under the circumstances . . . the presentation of the paper or the contentions therein are not frivolous' " (Deutsche Bank National Trust Co., 250 NYS3d at 267, quoting 22 NYCRR 130-1.1a[b][1]).

Ms. Gully notes in her sur-reply that she is self-represented, and asserts that "any such errors were inadvertent, unintentional, and not made in bad faith" (Sur-Reply ¶ 3). But proceeding pro se does not excuse a party from the need to ensure that the legal authorities she cites are genuine (see Augustin v Formula 3 Brooklyn Inc., 88 Misc 3d 1236[A], *4 [Sup Ct Kings County 2025] ["It is of the utmost importance in preserving the integrity and functioning of the legal system that attorneys as well as pro se litigants not improperly use AI and comply by affirming the accuracy of the information provided to the Court"]; Dowlah v Professional Staff Congress, 227 AD3d 609 [1st Dept 2024] [stating in regard to plaintiff's use of hallucinated AI citations, "[w]e caution plaintiff that his pro se status does not excuse his failure to check the legal citations that he offers to a court"]).

Indeed, while plaintiff says the citations were incorrect "unbeknownst to her" (see Sur-Reply ¶ 3), this is essentially an acknowledgment that she did not read or otherwise check the legal authorities she cited to the Court. While a pro se litigant may not have access to the same legal research tools as a represented party, I take judicial notice of the fact that a simple Google search for the cases named would have revealed that cases bearing the same names addressed entirely different issues. In any event, it is not proper for any party to rely upon and cite to the Court case citations for decisions they have not reviewed.

Many harms flow when a party presents a court with false or fraudulent material in a judicial proceeding, such as fake case citations. As one court has noted:

"The opposing party wastes time and money in exposing the deception. The Court's time is taken from other important endeavors, [and when an attorney is involved] the client may be deprived of arguments based on authentic judicial precedents. There is potential harm to the reputation of judges and courts whose names are falsely invoked as authors of the bogus opinions and to the reputation of the party attributed with fictional conduct. It promotes cynicism about the legal profession and the American judicial system."

(Grymes Development Co. v Fodera, 88 Misc 3d 767, 771 [Sup Ct Richmond County 2025] [denying summary judgment motion with prejudice for the use of false case citations]; see also Deutsche Bank Trust Co., supra ["Courts throughout the country which have been confronted with AI-generated authorities have concluded that filing papers containing hallucinated cases and fabricated legal authorities may be sanctionable, as there are many harms associated with the submission of fake cases that extend beyond merely wasting the time and money of the opposing party, but also in taking up the court's resources to evaluate and resolve the deception"] [citations omitted]).

A court has "inherent power to address actions which are meant to undermine the truth-seeking function of the judicial system and place in question the integrity of the courts and our system of justice" (Williams v Scafidi, 205 AD3d 1175, 1177 [3d Dept 2022] [internal quotation and citation omitted]). Here, the most appropriate consequence is to strike the papers in which plaintiff cited fraudulent caselaw. Indeed, the only cases on which plaintiff relies in both her affirmative motion and in her opposition papers are those imagined by AI. For that reason, I will deny her affirmative motion for summary judgment, and strike the submissions that contain the false citations.

I have considered whether additional or more significant sanctions are warranted, such as the imposition of a monetary fine. Given the weight of the sanction imposed, plaintiff's pro se status, and the caselaw on this issue, I find that the remedy imposed is sufficient. Plaintiff is cautioned, however, that she will be expected at trial to present legally competent evidence, and to the extent she cites legal authorities to the Court, they must be ones she has reviewed, and not those produced by artificial intelligence. (Gully v Varghese, 89 Misc 3d 1208[A], 2026 NY Slip Op 50864[U], *3-4 (Sup Ct, Albany County 2026] [footnotes omitted].)

Likewise, in the instant case, the Court does not impose a financial sanction on Plaintiff due to her pro se status, but does impose the sanction of treating the affirmation and memorandum of law as nullities, thereby warranting denial of Plaintiff's motion. Plaintiff is placed on notice that if she submits any further legal papers to the Court containing hallucinatory citations, the Court will consider imposing financial sanctions.

It has been evident to the Court that while proceeding on a pro se basis in this case, Plaintiff has made various procedural errors, culminating in the serious infraction of submitting false case law through AI-generated hallucinations. No doubt this is due to a lack of knowledge of how to prosecute a civil lawsuit in the court system.⁴ Combined with a possible lack of knowledge of substantive law and litigating against a Defendant represented by legal counsel, Plaintiff is at a disadvantage. She is again reminded that it is preferable to be represented by an attorney in pursuing a claim of medical malpractice. She is also reminded that if she proceeds in a pro se fashion, she will be required to articulate a basis in law for granting any relief she seeks.

The Court recognizes that pro se litigants might not be familiar with legal procedures (e.g., Brown v Lavine, 45 AD2d 753 [2d Dept 1974]), and that certain latitude may be afforded (e.g. Haverlin v Gottlieb, 49 Misc 3d 131 [A], 2015 NY Slip Op 51750[U] [App Term, 9th & 10th Dists. 2015] [motion providently construed as one to renew]; Bank Trust Natl. Assn. v Dubrowski, 2024 WL 3312482 [Sup Ct, NY County 2024] [court will examine claim under uncited provision as well as cited one]; Matter of J.E.P. v People, 9 Misc 3d 1104[A], 2005 NY Slip Op 51397[U] [Fam Ct, Nassau County 2005] [incorrect caption and minor technical deficiencies in papers excused]). Even so, "A self-represented litigant acquires no greater rights than any other litigant (see Duffen v. State, 245 AD2d 653, 665 N.Y.S.2d 978; Brooks v. Inn at Saratoga Assn., 188 AD2d 921, 591 N.Y.S.2d 625)" (Greenfield v Gluck, 2003 WL 1961333 [App Term 2d & 11th Dists 2003] [untimely summary judgment motion]). Where a motion fails to meet the standards of CPLR 2214 (a), even when made by a pro se litigant, it must be denied (see Abizadeh v Abizadeh, 159 AD3d 856 [2d Dept 2018]; Renaud v Renaud, 79 Misc 3d 1237[A], 2023 NY Slip Op 50824[U] [Sup Ct, Kings County 2023]). A pro se party's lack of understanding of the legal process does not, by itself, constitute a reasonable excuse (see OneWest Bank, N.A. v Jacobs, 234 AD3d 983, 985 [2d Dept 2025] [late filing of answer]).

Accordingly, Plaintiff's motion seeking recusal of the Court is DENIED.

E N T E R

HON. AARON D. MASLOW

Justice of the Supreme Court of the State of New York

FOOTNOTES

1.   Transcripts may be procured from the court reporter (see Matter of Lewandowski v Office of Ct. Admin., 173 Misc 2d 335 [Sup Ct, Albany County 1997]).

2.   Among the allegations in Plaintiff's complaint are the following: 11. Defendant exceeded any implied scope of authorization and performed interventions Plaintiff did not consent to, resulting in significant physical injuries, including a deep avulsion incision extending from the left posterior hairline to the mid-neck, severe thermal burns behind both ears, the left cheek, and the right side of the neck, and the retention of a sharp, needle-like foreign object embedded in the soft tissue behind Plaintiff's left ear.

3.   Normally the Court italicizes case names, in accordance with conventional citation formatting. Here, however, these case names and the accompanying citations are not real. Therefore, italicization is not warranted.

4.   This Court perceives a lack of understanding on the part of Plaintiff that the regular process of litigation involves the filing and service of a summons and complaint, filing and service of an answer, engaging in the discovery process whereby each party discloses its evidence to the other, attending discovery conferences, motion practice, filing and service of a note of issue, and a trial being held. It is quite possible that this process may take two years.

Aaron D. Maslow, J.