PEOPLE v. PORTILLO (2026)

DECISION & ORDER

Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the of the County Court, Suffolk County (Karen M. Wilutis, J.), rendered December 19, 2023, convicting him of rape in the first degree, course of sexual conduct against a child in the first degree, and sexual abuse in the first degree, upon a jury verdict, and imposing sentence.

ORDERED that the judgment is affirmed.

The defendant's contention that the evidence was not legally sufficient to prove that he was guilty of first degree rape is unpreserved for appellate review (see CPL 470.05[2];  People v Hawkins, 11 NY3d 484, 492;  People v Germain, 203 AD3d 746, 746).  In any event, viewing the facts in the light most favorable to the prosecution (see People v Contes, 60 NY2d 620, 621), we find that the evidence was legally sufficient to establish the defendant's guilt of the crime of rape in the first degree beyond a reasonable doubt (see People v Germain, 203 AD3d at 746).

Moreover, in fulfilling our responsibility to conduct an independent review of the weight of the evidence (see CPL 470.15[5];  People v Danielson, 9 NY3d 342, 348), we nevertheless accord great deference to the jury's opportunity to view the witnesses, hear the testimony, and observe demeanor (see People v Baque, 43 NY3d 26, 30;  People v Mateo, 2 NY3d 383, 410).  Upon reviewing the record here, we are satisfied that the verdict of guilt on the conviction of rape in the first degree was not against the weight of the evidence (see People v Baque, 43 NY3d at 29–30;  People v Romero, 7 NY3d 633, 643–644).

The defendant's contention that the testimony of certain prosecution witnesses constituted improper bolstering is unpreserved for appellate review, since either no specific objections were made to the challenged testimony or the defense did not object to that testimony (see CPL 470.05[2];  People v Miller, 186 AD3d 1717, 1718;  People v Speaks, 124 AD3d 689, 692, affd 28 NY3d 990).  In any event, the challenged testimony did not constitute improper bolstering because it was offered to assist in completing the narrative (see People v Honghirun, 29 NY3d 284, 289;  People v Robertson, 240 AD3d 617, 618–619).

The defendant's contention that the County Court improperly limited cross-examination of the complainant and the complainant's mother regarding their alleged motive to fabricate is without merit.  While extrinsic proof tending to establish a motive to fabricate is never collateral and may not be excluded on that ground, when the evidence is too remote or speculative of a motive to fabricate, the trial court may, in its discretion, exclude such proof (see People v Grose, 172 AD3d 1092, 1093;  People v Spencer, 87 AD3d 751, 752).  Here, the court properly limited the defendant's cross-examination of the complainant and the complainant's mother because the evidence of their motive to fabricate was too speculative (see People v Grose, 172 AD3d at 1093;  People v Spencer, 87 AD3d at 752).  To the extent that the defendant contends that limiting his cross-examination deprived him of his constitutional rights to present a defense, to a fair trial, to due process, and to confront witnesses, those contentions are unpreserved for appellate review, as the defendant did not assert a constitutional challenge at trial (see People v Morales, 247 AD3d 932, 933;  People v Brown, 220 AD3d 802, 803).  In any event, the defendant's contentions are without merit (see People v Parris, 244 AD3d 1005, 1006).

The defendant is not entitled to a de novo sentencing proceeding and the sentence imposed was not excessive (see People v Suitte, 90 AD2d 80).

The defendant's remaining contention is academic.

DUFFY, J.P., WOOTEN, GOLIA and HOM, JJ., concur.