CITADEL MEDICAL MANAGEMENT INC v. STATCARE URGENT WALK IN MEDICAL PLLC (2026)

DECISION & ORDER

In an action, inter alia, to recover damages for breach of contract, the defendant appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Reginald A. Boddie, J.), dated December 12, 2024.  The order granted the plaintiff's motion pursuant to CPLR 5015(a) to vacate a prior order of the same court dated May 1, 2024, directing dismissal of the complaint, in effect, pursuant to 22 NYCRR 202.27, upon the plaintiff's failure to appear at a scheduled court conference.

ORDERED that the order dated December 12, 2024, is reversed, on the law and in the exercise of discretion, with costs, and the plaintiff's motion pursuant to CPLR 5015(a) to vacate the order dated May 1, 2024, is denied.

The plaintiff commenced this action to recover damages for breach of contract, breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and unjust enrichment.  Issue was joined, a preliminary conference was held, and a compliance conference was scheduled for April 17, 2024.  On April 15, 2024, the plaintiff's counsel wrote to the court, requesting that the conference be adjourned until May 1, 2024, “due to an unexpected personal matter.”  The requested adjournment was granted.  Nevertheless, the plaintiff's counsel did not appear at the conference.  By order dated May 1, 2024, the Supreme Court directed dismissal of the complaint, in effect, pursuant to 22 NYCRR 202.27, upon the plaintiff's failure to appear at the conference (hereinafter the dismissal order).

In November 2024, the plaintiff moved pursuant to CPLR 5015(a) to vacate the dismissal order.  In an affirmation in support of the motion, the plaintiff's counsel affirmed that he had been unable to attend the conference on May 1, 2024, “due to an unexpected medical condition.”  In the same affirmation, the plaintiff's counsel asserted that the May 1, 2024 conference “was inadvertently entered as May 11, 2024 on counsel's calendar system.”  The defendant opposed the motion.  In an order dated December 12, 2024, the Supreme Court granted the plaintiff's motion.  The defendant appeals.

Pursuant to 22 NYCRR 202.27, a court is authorized to dismiss a complaint if the defendant appears, but the plaintiff does not, at “any conference” (id. § 202.27[b];  see Bank of N.Y. Mellon v. Ortiz, 238 AD3d 696, 697).  “In order to vacate a default in appearing at a scheduled court conference, a party must demonstrate both a reasonable excuse for the default and a potentially meritorious defense or cause of action” (Douglas Elliman of LI, LLC v. Baksh, 245 AD3d 681, 682 [internal quotation marks omitted];  see CPLR 5015[a];  Deutsche Bank Natl. Trust Co. v Singh, 242 AD3d 704, 705).  “Whether an excuse is reasonable is a determination within the sound discretion of the court” (Douglas Elliman of LI, LLC v. Baksh, 245 AD3d at 682).  “Law office failure may qualify as a reasonable excuse for a party's default provided the claim of such failure is supported by a detailed and credible explanation of the default” (Deutsche Bank Natl. Trust Co. v Singh, 242 AD3d at 706 [internal quotation marks omitted] ).  “[C]onclusory and unsubstantiated allegations of law office failure are not sufficient” and “[m]ere neglect is not a reasonable excuse” (DLJ Mtge. Capital, Inc. v. Brewster, 237 AD3d 902, 903 [internal quotation marks omitted] ).

Here, the plaintiff failed to provide a detailed and credible explanation of the default.  To the extent that the failure of the plaintiff's counsel to appear at the compliance conference was alleged to have been caused by a medical problem, he failed to submit any medical evidence documenting the illness or problem (see Clark v. Romeo, 239 AD3d 822, 823;  Nationstar Mtge., LLC v. Hassanzadeh, 228 AD3d 948, 950;  HSBC Bank USA, N.A. v. Scivoletti, 212 AD3d 600, 603).  Insofar as the default was alleged to have been the result of a miscalendaring of the adjourned conference date, which was the date that the plaintiff's counsel himself had requested, the plaintiff's excuse was not supported by a detailed and credible explanation of the error (see Matter of Sawwan v. Farhoud, 246 AD3d 927, 928;  Raphael v. City of Peekskill, 237 AD3d 1232, 1233;  Crudele v. Price, 218 AD3d 534, 535–536).

Since the plaintiff failed to establish a reasonable excuse for the default, it is unnecessary to determine whether the plaintiff demonstrated the existence of a potentially meritorious cause of action (see Deutsche Bank Natl. Trust Co. v Singh, 242 AD3d at 706;  Clark v. Romeo, 239 AD3d at 823;  DLJ Mtge. Capital, Inc. v. Brewster, 237 AD3d at 904).

In light of our determination, we need not reach the defendant's remaining contentions.

IANNACCI, J.P., CHRISTOPHER, VOUTSINAS and HOM, JJ., concur.