ATLANTIC ADULT DAY CARE CENTER INC v. TEMPLE BETH EL OF MANHATTAN BEACH (2026)

DECISION & ORDER

In an action, inter alia, for injunctive and declaratory relief, the defendant appeals from (1) an order of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Carolyn E. Wade, J.), dated October 23, 2024, and (2) an order of the same court dated February 26, 2025. The order dated October 23, 2024, insofar as appealed from, denied those branches of the defendant's motion which were for summary judgment dismissing the complaint and on its first counterclaim. The order dated February 26, 2025, denied the defendant's motion for leave to file a second amended answer.

ORDERED that the order dated October 23, 2024, is modified, on the law, by deleting the provision thereof denying those branches of the defendant's motion which were for summary judgment dismissing the first, third, fourth, and fifth causes of action and on its first counterclaim, and substituting therefor a provision granting those branches of the motion; as so modified, the order dated October 23, 2024, is affirmed insofar as appealed from; and it is further,

ORDERED that the appeal from the order dated February 26, 2025, is dismissed as academic in light of our determination on the appeal from the order dated October 23, 2024; and it is further,

ORDERED that one bill of costs is awarded to the defendant.

In September 2023, the plaintiffs commenced this action against the defendant, asserting causes of action for injunctive relief, alleging breach of contract, for specific enforcement of a lease agreement, alleging breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and for declaratory relief, arising from a lease agreement entered into by the parties in January 2014. The defendant filed an amended answer in which it asserted, inter alia, a counterclaim for ejectment. The defendant moved, among other things, for summary judgment dismissing the complaint and on its first counterclaim, seeking ejectment. In an order dated October 23, 2024, the Supreme Court, inter alia, denied those branches of the motion. Thereafter, the defendant moved for leave to file a second amended answer. In an order dated February 26, 2025, the court denied the motion. The defendant appeals from both orders.

“To demonstrate entitlement to judgment on a cause of action for ejectment, [the party seeking ejectment] must establish (1) it is the owner of an estate in tangible real property, (2) with a present or immediate right to possession thereof, and (3) the [party to be ejected] is in present possession of the estate” (Esposito v Larig, 241 AD3d 782, 786 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see City of New York v Anton, 169 AD3d 999, 1001). A lessee in possession who does not deny the tenancy or the validity of the lease cannot question the lessor's title in the latter's action to recover the premises, so that, in such an action, the lessor is not required to prove title (see Jones v Reilly, 174 NY 97, 104–105; Randall Co. v Willetts, 204 App Div 841, affd 237 NY 510).

Here, it is undisputed that the plaintiffs were in possession of the leased premises and did not deny the tenancy or the validity of the lease. In support of its motion, the defendant submitted evidence establishing that it terminated the lease by written notice of termination dated August 23, 2023, requiring the plaintiffs to surrender possession on September 30, 2023, based upon the plaintiffs' breach of the lease agreement by failing to timely pay rent. Contrary to the plaintiffs' contentions, both the notice of termination and paragraph 43(D) of the lease agreement, which was one of the referenced grounds for termination, were unambiguous (see Donohue v Cuomo, 38 NY3d 1, 12–13; Ellington v EMI Music, Inc., 24 NY2d 239, 244). In opposition, the plaintiffs failed to raise a triable issue of fact. Accordingly, the Supreme Court should have granted that branch of the defendant's motion which was for summary judgment on its first counterclaim.

The Supreme Court should have granted those branches of the defendant's motion which were for summary judgment dismissing the first cause of action, seeking injunctive relief pursuant to CPLR 6301 (see Prestige Deli & Grill Corp. v PLG Bedford Holdings, LLC, 213 AD3d 962, 962–963; Korova Milk Bar of White Plains, Inc. v PRE Props., LLC, 70 AD3d 646, 648), and the third cause of action, seeking specific enforcement of the lease agreement (see Van Wagner Adv. Corp. v S & M Enters., 67 NY2d 186, 192; Straisa Realty Corp. v Woodbury Assoc., 154 AD2d 453, 454), as the defendant established that it validly served a notice of termination upon the plaintiff.

The Supreme Court also should have granted those branches of the defendant's motion which were for summary judgment dismissing the fourth cause of action, alleging breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, as that cause of action was duplicative of the breach of contract cause of action (see Goldberg v KOSL Bldg. Group, LLC, 236 AD3d 995, 997; Hymowitz v Nguyen, 209 AD3d 997, 1002), and the fifth cause of action, seeking declaratory relief, as that cause of action was “unnecessary and inappropriate when the plaintiff[s] [have] an adequate, alternative remedy in another form of action, such as breach of contract” (189 Schermerhorn Owners Co., LLC v Board of Mgrs. of the Be@Schermerhorn Condominium, 186 AD3d 1467, 1468 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Klein v State Farm Ins. Co., 198 AD3d 741, 743).

As the defendant established its entitlement to summary judgment on its first counterclaim, the appeal from the order dated February 26, 2025, denying the defendant's motion for leave to file a second amended answer asserting additional counterclaims for ejectment based upon the expiration of the lease and for a judgment declaring that the plaintiff's attempt to renew the lease was a nullity must be dismissed as academic, as the rights of the parties will not be affected by the resolution of that appeal (see Matter of Hearst Corp. v Clyne, 50 NY2d 707).

The parties' remaining contentions either are without merit or need not be reached in light of our determination.

DUFFY, J.P., DOWLING, TAYLOR and LOVE, JJ., concur.