ALLEN v. BRADLEY (2026)

DECISION & ORDER

In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the plaintiff appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Anne J. Swern, J.), dated November 21, 2024.  The order, insofar as appealed from, granted the motion of the defendants Christy Bradley and Venture Leasing, LLC, for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against them.

ORDERED that the order is affirmed insofar as appealed from, with costs.

The plaintiff commenced this action to recover damages for personal injuries she allegedly sustained while she was a passenger in a vehicle operated by the defendant Christy Bradley and owned by the defendant Venture Leasing, LLC (hereinafter together the defendants), which was involved in a collision with a vehicle operated by the defendant Peter Doe. The defendants moved for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against them, arguing that Doe, by reversing his vehicle into the vehicle operated by Bradley, was the sole proximate cause of the accident.  The plaintiff opposed the motion.  In an order dated November 21, 2024, the Supreme Court, inter alia, granted the defendants' motion.  The plaintiff appeals.

A defendant moving for summary judgment in a negligence action arising out of an automobile accident has the burden of establishing, prima facie, that he or she was not at fault in the happening of the accident or that the alleged negligence of another person was the sole proximate cause thereof (see Morante v. Blaney, 234 AD3d 679, 680;  Woods v. Burgos, 220 AD3d 688).  If the defendant makes a prima facie showing of entitlement to judgment as a matter of law, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to raise a triable issue of fact (see Morante v. Blaney, 234 AD3d at 680).

A violation of a standard of care imposed by the Vehicle and Traffic Law constitutes negligence per se (see id.;  Lylan Pham v. Lee, 219 AD3d 601, 602).  Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1211(a) provides that the driver of a vehicle shall not back the same unless such movement can be made with safety and without interfering with other traffic (see Usoiani v. Dumbo Moving & Stor., Inc., 241 AD3d 979, 981).

Here, the defendants established, prima facie, that they were free from fault in the happening of the accident and that Doe's conduct, which constituted negligence per se, was the sole proximate cause thereof (see id.).  In support of their motion, the defendants submitted, among other things, a transcript of Bradley's deposition testimony, which established that Doe reversed into Bradley's vehicle (see Singh v. Bisnath, 187 AD3d 814, 815;  Logan v. Apex Express, Inc., 165 AD3d 910, 911).  In opposition, the plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact.  Accordingly, the Supreme Court properly granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against them.

IANNACCI, J.P., WOOTEN, LOVE and GOLDBERG VELAZQUEZ, JJ., concur.