IN RE: 99 WASHINGTON LD HOLDINGS (2026)

DECISION & ORDER

In a proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78 to review a determination of the Zoning Board of Appeals of the Village of Suffern dated September 19, 2024, which, after a hearing, inter alia, denied the petitioner's application for an interpretation that the outdoor storage of vehicles is permitted as an accessory use in the relevant zoning district, the petitioner appeals from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Rockland County (Larry J. Schwartz, J.), dated April 1, 2025.  The judgment denied the petition as time-barred and dismissed the proceeding.

ORDERED that the judgment is affirmed, with costs.

99 Washington LD Holdings, LLC (hereinafter Holdings), received a certificate of use from the Village of Suffern for a professional office at a certain location.  Subsequently, the Village alleged that Holdings violated the Village ordinances by using the property's rear lot for storage of vans.  Holdings made an application to the Zoning Board of Appeals of the Village of Suffern (hereinafter the ZBA) for an interpretation of the zoning ordinances, inter alia, to the effect that storage of vans is a permitted accessory use.  Following a hearing, the ZBA voted, among other things, to uphold the determination finding that the storage of vehicles is not a permitted accessory use to a professional office under the circumstances.  Holdings commenced this proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78 to review the ZBA's determination.  In a judgment dated April 1, 2025, the Supreme Court denied the petition as time-barred and dismissed the proceeding.  Holdings appeals.

“Unless a shorter time is provided in the law authorizing the proceeding, a four-month statute of limitations is generally applicable to proceedings pursuant to CPLR article 78” (Matter of Baker v. Stanford, 183 AD3d 889, 890;  see CPLR 217[1] ).  Village Law § 7–712–c(1) provides, in part, “Any person ․ aggrieved by any decision of the board of appeals ․ may apply to the supreme court for review by a proceeding under article seventy-eight of the civil practice law and rules.  Such proceeding shall be instituted within thirty days after the filing of a decision of the board in the office of the village clerk.”  “A party seeking to assert the statute of limitations as a defense in such a proceeding has the burden of establishing that the challenged decision was filed with the village clerk more than 30 days before the proceeding was commenced” (Matter of Camarda v. Ubert, 238 AD3d 1030, 1032).

Here, the statute of limitations began to run when the minutes containing the ZBA's determination were filed with the Village Clerk (see Matter of Kennedy v Zoning Bd. of Appeals of Vil. of Croton–on–Hudson, 78 N.Y.2d 1083, 1084–1085;  Matter of Fox v Planning Bd. of the Inc. Vil. of Plandome, 220 AD3d 772, 772–773).  As a result, this proceeding, commenced more than 30 days later, was untimely.

In light of our determination, we need not reach Holdings's remaining contentions.

Accordingly, the Supreme Court properly denied the petition as time-barred and dismissed the proceeding.

DILLON, J.P., DUFFY, LANDICINO and GOLDBERG VELAZQUEZ, JJ., concur.