PEOPLE v. TAYLOR (2026)

DECISION & ORDER

Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Queens County (Stephen A. Knopf, J.), rendered June 6, 2022, convicting him of attempted robbery in the first degree, attempted robbery in the second degree, and criminal possession of a weapon in the fourth degree, upon a jury verdict, and imposing sentence.

ORDERED that the judgment is affirmed.

The Supreme Court properly denied defense counsel's application for a competency examination pursuant to CPL 730.30.  “During the course of a criminal action, whenever a court has a ‘reasonable ground for believing that a defendant is ․ incapable of understanding the charge, indictment or proceedings or of making his defense, it is the duty of the court to direct him to be examined in these respects’ ” (People v. Tortorici, 92 N.Y.2d 757, 765, quoting People v. Smyth, 3 N.Y.2d 184, 187).  “ ‘Although [a] defendant is presumed competent, [a]t any time after a defendant is arraigned upon an accusatory instrument other than a felony complaint and before the imposition of sentence, ․ the court wherein the criminal action is pending must issue an order of examination when it is of the opinion that the defendant may be an incapacitated person’ ” (People v. Aponte, 248 AD3d 938, 939 [internal quotation marks omitted], quoting People v. Sloane, 238 AD3d 899, 901;  see CPL 730.30[1] ).  “ ‘An incapacitated person is a defendant who as a result of mental disease or defect lacks capacity to understand the proceedings against him [or her] or to assist in his [or her] own defense’ ” (People v. Aponte, 248 AD3d at 939 [internal quotation marks omitted], quoting People v. Phillips, 16 NY3d 510, 516;  see CPL 730.10[1] ).  “The determination of whether to order a competency hearing lies within the sound discretion of the trial court” (People v. Sloane, 238 AD3d at 902 [internal quotation marks omitted];  see People v. Aponte, 248 AD3d at 939;  People v. Warren J.T., 208 AD3d 689, 691).  “[T]he court is under no obligation to order an examination unless there is reason to believe that the defendant is an incapacitated person” (People v. Warren J.T., 208 AD3d at 691;  see People v. Morgan, 87 N.Y.2d 878, 880).

Here, the Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in denying defense counsel's application for an examination of the defendant pursuant to CPL 730.30.  The court based its determination on its observations of and interactions with the defendant throughout the proceedings, and we decline to disturb the court's exercise of discretion in light of the record before us (see People v. Phillips, 16 NY3d at 516;  People v. Sloane, 238 AD3d at 902;  People v. Warren J.T., 208 AD3d at 691).

Furthermore, the Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in denying the defendant's application for an adjournment.  “ ‘The decision whether to grant an adjournment is ordinarily committed to the sound discretion of the trial court’ ” (People v. Silverstein, 236 AD3d 827, 829, quoting People v. Spears, 64 N.Y.2d 698, 699).  “ ‘But in particular situations, when the protection of fundamental rights has been involved in requests for adjournments, that discretionary power has been more narrowly construed’ ” (id., quoting People v. Spears, 64 N.Y.2d at 699–700).  Thus, depending on the nature of the request, the court's conduct in denying the adjournment may be an improvident exercise of discretion (see People v. Vasquez, 36 NY3d 1066, 1067).  “While it has been held improper to inquire into the worthiness of a defendant's religious beliefs to determine whether the First Amendment affords them protection, the court may inquire, as a threshold issue, into the sincerity of the defendant's religious beliefs” (People v. Johnson, 143 A.D.2d 847, 847;  see People v. Webb, 163 AD3d 880, 880–881).

Here, the Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in denying the defendant's day-before request for an adjournment, which occurred in the midst of jury selection.  The record also indicates that the defendant failed to bring up his need for an adjournment based on his religious beliefs at any prior point in the proceedings and that he had a history of obstructionist behavior that warranted the court's skepticism (see People v. Webb, 163 AD3d at 881;  People v. Johnson, 143 A.D.2d at 847).

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, we find that it was legally sufficient to establish the defendant's guilt of attempted robbery in the first degree and attempted robbery in the second degree (see People v. Li, 34 NY3d 357, 363;  People v. Lamont, 25 NY3d 315, 318;  People v. Silverstein, 236 AD3d at 828–829).  Moreover, in fulfilling our responsibility to conduct an independent review of the weight of the evidence (see CPL 470.15[5];  People v. Danielson, 9 NY3d 342, 348), we nevertheless accord great deference to the jury's opportunity to view the witnesses, hear the testimony, and observe demeanor (see People v. Baque, 43 NY3d 26, 30;  People v. Mateo, 2 NY3d 383, 410;  People v. Bleakley, 69 N.Y.2d 490, 495).  Upon reviewing the record here, we are satisfied that the verdicts of guilt for the crimes of attempted robbery in the first degree and attempted robbery in the second degree were not against the weight of the evidence (see People v. Baque, 43 NY3d at 29–30;  People v. Romero, 7 NY3d 633, 643–644;  People v. Clavell, 176 AD3d 844, 849).

The sentence imposed was not excessive (see People v. Suitte, 90 A.D.2d 80, 83, 85–86).

BARROS, J.P., FORD, TAYLOR and QUIRK, JJ., concur.