EAGAN v. GINGO (2026)

DECISION & ORDER

In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the plaintiff appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Nassau County (Eileen C. Daly–Sapraicone, J.), dated March 25, 2024.  The order denied the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment on the issue of liability and dismissing the defendants' affirmative defense alleging comparative negligence, and granted the defendants' cross-motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint on the ground that the plaintiff did not sustain a serious injury within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102(d) as a result of the subject accident.

ORDERED that the order is reversed, on the law, with costs, the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment on the issue of liability and dismissing the defendants' affirmative defense alleging comparative negligence is granted, and the defendants' cross-motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint on the ground that the plaintiff did not sustain a serious injury within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102(d) as a result of the subject accident is denied.

The plaintiff commenced this action to recover damages for personal injuries she allegedly sustained when her vehicle was struck in the rear by a vehicle owned by the defendants North Shore University Hospital and Northwell Health, Inc., and operated by the defendant Robert John Gingo.  The plaintiff moved for summary judgment on the issue of liability and dismissing the defendants' affirmative defense alleging comparative negligence.  The defendants opposed the motion and cross-moved for summary judgment dismissing the complaint on the ground that the plaintiff did not sustain a serious injury within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102(d) as a result of the accident.  In an order dated March 25, 2024, the Supreme Court denied the plaintiff's motion and granted the defendants' cross-motion.  The plaintiff appeals.

The defendants failed to meet their prima facie burden of showing that the plaintiff did not sustain a serious injury within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102(d) as a result of the accident (see Toure v Avis Rent A Car Sys., 98 NY2d 345;  Gaddy v Eyler, 79 NY2d 955, 956–957), as they failed to submit competent medical evidence establishing that the plaintiff did not sustain a serious injury to the cervical and lumbar regions of her spine under the permanent consequential limitation of use or significant limitation of use categories of Insurance Law § 5102(d) (see Zennia v Ramsey, 208 AD3d 735, 735;  Melika v Caraballo, 187 AD3d 1173, 1173;  Staubitz v Yaser, 41 AD3d 698, 699).  The defendants' experts found significant limitations in the range of motion of the cervical and lumbar regions of the plaintiff's spine and failed to adequately explain and substantiate their opinions that the limitations were voluntary (see Z.H.B. v Sica, 221 AD3d 575, 576;  Matveieva v Metropolitan Transp.  Auth., 212 AD3d 726;  Mondesir v Ahmed, 175 AD3d 1291).  Moreover, the defendants' submissions failed to address the plaintiff's claims, set forth in the bill of particulars, that as a result of the defendants' negligence, the accident exacerbated preexisting injuries to the cervical and lumbar regions of her spine (see Weber v Kalisky, 218 AD3d 629, 630;  D'Augustino v Bryan Auto Parts, Inc., 152 AD3d 648, 650;  Sanclemente v MTA Bus Co., 116 AD3d 688, 689).  Accordingly, the Supreme Court should have denied the defendants' cross-motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint regardless of the sufficiency of the plaintiff's opposition papers (see Winegrad v New York Univ. Med. Ctr., 64 NY2d 851, 853).

The driver of a vehicle approaching another vehicle from the rear is required to maintain a reasonably safe distance and rate of speed under the prevailing conditions to avoid colliding with the other vehicle (see Martin v Copado–Esquivel, 226 AD3d 668, 669;  An v Abbate, 213 AD3d 891, 892).  Thus, a rear-end collision with a stopped or stopping vehicle establishes a prima facie case of negligence on the part of the operator of the rear vehicle, thereby requiring that operator to rebut the inference of negligence by providing a nonnegligent explanation for the collision (see Martin v Copado–Esquivel, 226 AD3d at 669;  An v Abbate, 213 AD3d at 892).  A sudden stop of the lead vehicle may constitute a nonnegligent explanation for a rear-end collision, but vehicle stops that are foreseeable under the prevailing traffic conditions, even if sudden, must be anticipated by the driver who follows (see Toledo v Pascal, 242 AD3d 1039;  Perez v Persad, 183 AD3d 771, 772;  Xin Fang Xia v Saft, 177 AD3d 825, 826).  Although a plaintiff is not required to show freedom from comparative fault to establish her or his prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law on the issue of liability, the issue of a plaintiff's comparative negligence may be decided in the context of a summary judgment motion where the plaintiff moves for summary judgment dismissing a defendant's affirmative defense alleging comparative negligence and culpable conduct on the part of the plaintiff (see Liying Qian v Eggens, 245 AD3d 809, 810;  Maurice v Donovan, 235 AD3d 633, 634).

Here, the plaintiff established her prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law on the issue of liability by submitting, inter alia, the transcript of her deposition testimony, which established that her vehicle was stopped at a red light when it was struck in the rear by the defendants' vehicle (see Maurice v Donovan, 235 AD3d at 634;  Martin v Copado–Esquivel, 226 AD3d at 670).  The plaintiff also established her prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law dismissing the defendants' affirmative defense alleging comparative negligence by demonstrating that she was not at fault in the happening of the accident (see Maurice v Donovan, 235 AD3d at 634;  Martin v Copado–Esquivel, 226 AD3d at 670).  In opposition to the plaintiff's motion, the defendants relied on the deposition testimony of Gingo that the plaintiff suddenly stopped, causing him to strike the rear of her vehicle despite his efforts to stop his vehicle, and an affidavit from Benjamin Kurian, a passenger in the defendants' vehicle, who averred that both vehicles were traveling at approximately one mile per hour in heavy traffic when the plaintiff suddenly stopped her vehicle, causing a collision.  This explanation, without more, failed to raise a triable issue of fact as to Gingo's negligence or whether the plaintiff was comparatively at fault in the happening of the accident (see Perez v Persad, 183 AD3d at 772;  Buchanan v Keller, 169 AD3d 989, 992).  Accordingly, the Supreme Court should have granted the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment on the issue of liability and dismissing the defendants' affirmative defense alleging comparative negligence.

The parties' remaining contentions need not be addressed in light of our determination.

BRATHWAITE NELSON, J.P., WOOTEN, LOVE and MCCORMACK, JJ., concur.