HAYNES v. LEMUS (2026)

DECISION & ORDER

In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the plaintiff appeals from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Carolyn E. Wade, J.), entered October 17, 2024.  The judgment, upon a jury verdict finding that the plaintiff did not sustain a serious injury within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102(d) as a result of the subject accident, and upon the denial of the plaintiff's oral application pursuant to CPLR 4404(a) to set aside the jury verdict as contrary to the weight of the evidence and for a new trial, is in favor of the defendant and against the plaintiff, in effect, dismissing the complaint.

ORDERED that the judgment is affirmed, with costs.

The plaintiff commenced this action to recover damages for personal injuries she allegedly sustained in a motor vehicle accident.  After a jury trial on the issue of damages, the jury found that the plaintiff did not sustain a serious injury under the permanent consequential limitation and significant limitation of use categories of Insurance Law § 5102(d) as a result of the subject accident.  Thereafter, the plaintiff made an application pursuant to CPLR 4404(a) to set aside the verdict as contrary to the weight of the evidence.  The Supreme Court denied the plaintiff's oral application, and a judgment was entered on October 17, 2024, in favor of the defendant and against the plaintiff, in effect, dismissing the complaint.  The plaintiff appeals.

A jury verdict should not be set aside as contrary to the weight of the evidence unless the jury could not have reached the verdict by any fair interpretation of the evidence (see Shehata v Koruthu, 201 AD3d 761, 764;  Sarnelli v City of New York, 181 AD3d 623, 625).  If the verdict can be reconciled with a reasonable view of the evidence, the successful party is entitled to the presumption that the jury adopted that view (see Shehata v Koruthu, 201 AD3d at 764).  When conflicting expert testimony is presented, the jury is entitled to accept one expert's opinion and reject that of another expert (see id.).

Here, the jury's finding that the plaintiff did not sustain a serious injury under the permanent consequential limitation of use and significant limitation of use categories of Insurance Law § 5102(d) as a result of the accident was supported by a fair interpretation of the evidence (see Shehata v Koruthu, 201 AD3d at 764;  Bohan v DeLucia, 178 AD3d 999, 1000;  Pucci v Trabulsy, 161 AD3d 1117, 1119).

The plaintiff's remaining contentions are either without merit or improperly raised for the first time on appeal.

IANNACCI, J.P., WOOTEN, LOVE and GOLDBERG VELAZQUEZ, JJ., concur.