JOHN DOE v. JANE ROE (2026)

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

Calendar Date:  September 15, 2026

Appeal from an order of the Supreme Court (Elizabeth Aherne, J.), entered March 24, 2025 in Tompkins County, which granted defendant's motion to dismiss the complaint.

In 2023, plaintiff, then an undergraduate student at Princeton University in New Jersey, commenced this defamation action against defendant, then an undergraduate student at Cornell University in New York. Service was made upon defendant in Washington, DC, where she was engaged in a college internship program.  According to plaintiff, defendant, while enrolled and present at Cornell, defamed him during a virtual disciplinary investigation conducted by Princeton regarding acts that had occurred on the Princeton campus.  Defendant moved pre-answer to dismiss the complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction, among other grounds, and plaintiff opposed.  Supreme Court granted the motion, concluding that defendant retained the State of Washington domicile of her parents while attending Cornell, and that this state's long-arm statute did not apply.  Plaintiff appeals.

Supreme Court correctly concluded that it did not have general jurisdiction over defendant.  CPLR 301 provides that a court may exercise general jurisdiction over persons, property or status as had been historically exercised before its enactment (see Banco Ambrosiano v. Artoc Bank & Trust, 62 N.Y.2d 65, 71 [1984] ).  Those bases include physical presence within the state at the time of service, domicile or consent (see Lesavoy v. Brady, 242 AD3d 856, 858 [2d Dept 2025];  Pichardo v. Zayas, 122 AD3d 699, 702 [2d Dept 2014], lv denied 26 NY3d 905 [2015];  Matter of Nilsa B.B. v. Clyde Blackwell H., 84 A.D.2d 295, 303 [2d Dept 1981] ).  Relevant here is domicile, which “requires bodily presence in a place with an intent to make it a fixed and permanent home” (Longwood Cent. School Dist. v Springs Union Free School Dist., 1 NY3d 385, 388 [2004];  see Matter of Newcomb, 192 N.Y. 238, 250 [1908];  Matter of Campaniello v New York State Div. of Tax Appeals Trib., 161 AD3d 1320, 1322 [3d Dept 2018], lv denied 32 NY3d 913 [2019] ).  In other words, a domicile “is the place where one always intends to return to from wherever one may be temporarily located” (Lesavoy v. Brady, 242 AD3d at 858 [internal quotation marks and citations omitted];  see Black v. Black, 108 AD3d 842, 843 [3d Dept 2013] ).  Thus, “[a]n existing domicile is assumed to continue until a new one is acquired” (Longwood Cent. School Dist. v Springs Union Free School Dist., 1 NY3d at 388;  see Matter of Noichl, 206 AD3d 1099, 1101 [3d Dept 2022] ).

Although defendant resided in New York while attending Cornell, the undisputed proof established that her parents remained domiciled in the State of Washington, that defendant returned there during academic breaks, maintained the bulk of her personal property there, remained financially dependent upon her parents and, at the time this action was commenced, did not intend to permanently reside in New York, instead anticipating relocating to Washington, DC following graduation.  In opposition, plaintiff has identified no evidence demonstrating that defendant intended New York to become her permanent home.  Under these circumstances, Supreme Court correctly concluded that defendant retained her State of Washington domicile while attending college in New York (see Porcello v Brackett, 85 A.D.2d 917, 918 [4th Dept 1981], affd 57 N.Y.2d 962 [1982];  see also Hakkila v Consolidated Edison Co. of N.Y., Inc., 745 F Supp 988, 990–991 [SD N.Y.1990];  compare King v. Car Rentals, Inc., 29 AD3d 205, 210–211 [2d Dept 2006] ).¹

Plaintiff alternatively argues that defendant's activities in New York independently subjected her to general jurisdiction, relying upon authorities recognizing jurisdiction over nondomiciled individuals who maintained extensive and continuing business activities within this state (see ABKCO Indus. v. Lennon, 52 A.D.2d 435, 439–440 [1st Dept 1976];  FCNB Spiegel v. Dimmick, 163 Misc.2d 152, 155–156 [Civ Ct, N.Y. County 1994];  compare Lesavoy v. Brady, 242 AD3d at 858;  Pichardo v. Zayas, 122 AD3d at 702–703).  Defendant's attendance at a New York university, without more, did not constitute the type of continuous commercial or professional presence/activity contemplated by those authorities, and we decline plaintiff's invitation to extend CPLR 301 to encompass the ordinary residential and academic activities of an undergraduate college student (see Laufer v. Ostrow, 55 N.Y.2d 305, 313 [1982];  Porcello v. Brackett, 85 A.D.2d at 917–918).

Plaintiff likewise failed to establish a basis for the exercise of specific jurisdiction pursuant to this state's long-arm statute, CPLR 302.  As Supreme Court correctly recognized, plaintiff's sole cause of action sounds in defamation, and CPLR 302(a)(2) and (3) expressly exclude such claims (see SPCA of Upstate N.Y., Inc. v American Working Collie Assn., 18 NY3d 400, 403 [2012];  see generally Williams v. Beemiller, Inc., 33 NY3d 523, 528 [2019] ).  Although plaintiff does not directly argue as much on appeal, we note that he also has not demonstrated jurisdiction pursuant to CPLR 302(a)(1), which contains no similar exclusion (see SPCA of Upstate N.Y., Inc. v American Working Collie Assn., 18 NY3d at 404;  Montgomery v. Minarcin, 263 A.D.2d 665, 667 [3d Dept 1999];  Legros v. Irving, 38 A.D.2d 53, 56 [1st Dept 1971], lv dismissed 30 N.Y.2d 653 [1972] ).  That provision requires both purposeful business activity within the state and a substantial relationship between that activity and the claim asserted (see Johnson v. Ward, 4 NY3d 516, 519 [2005];  see also Licci v. Lebanese Can. Bank, SAL, 20 NY3d 327, 339–340 [2012];  McGowan v. Smith, 52 N.Y.2d 268, 272–273 [1981] ).  Here, the allegedly defamatory statements in this case arose from defendant's participation in a university disciplinary investigation, not from any business transaction conducted in New York (see Talbot v. Johnson Newspaper Corp., 71 N.Y.2d 827, 829 [1988];  see generally SPCA of Upstate N.Y., Inc. v American Working Collie Assn., 18 NY3d at 404–405).  Supreme Court therefore properly found that no statutory basis existed for the exercise of specific jurisdiction.

Finally, we perceive no abuse of discretion in Supreme Court's denial of plaintiff's request for jurisdictional discovery.  Although a plaintiff opposing a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction need only make a “sufficient start” at demonstrating jurisdiction to warrant further discovery (Peterson v. Spartan Indus., 33 N.Y.2d 463, 467 [1974];  see Archer–Vail v. LHV Precast Inc., 168 AD3d 1257, 1261 [3d Dept 2019];  see also CPLR 3211[d] ), discovery is not required where the proposed inquiry would not alter the jurisdictional analysis.  Plaintiff sought discovery regarding the duration of defendant's residence on or near the Cornell campus, the frequency and duration of her undisputed trips home to the State of Washington, the length of her internship in Washington, DC, voter registration and identification cards.  Even accepting plaintiff's assumptions as to the proposed discovery, none of the identified facts would have been sufficient to demonstrate defendant's intent to establish New York as her permanent domicile or otherwise transform her status as an undergraduate college student into the continuous commercial presence necessary to support general jurisdiction (see Porcello v. Brackett, 85 A.D.2d at 918;  see also Laufer v. Hauge, 140 A.D.2d 671, 673 [2d Dept 1988], lv dismissed 72 N.Y.2d 1041 [1988];  Matter of Gadway, 123 A.D.2d 83, 86 [3d Dept 1987] ).

Plaintiff's remaining arguments, to the extent properly before us, have been considered and determined to be without merit.  Accordingly, Supreme Court properly granted defendant's motion to dismiss the complaint.

Clark, Aarons, Reynolds Fitzgerald and Ryba, JJ., concur.

ORDERED that the order is affirmed, with costs.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Plaintiff has indeed sued defendant in Washington State for defamation, asserting that she is domiciled there (see Doe v. Roe, Docket No. 25204786–32 [WA Super Ct, Spokane County, 2025] ).

Garry, P.J.