PEOPLE v. CRAWLEY (2026)

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

Calendar Date:  September 15, 2026

Appeal from a judgment of the County Court of Sullivan County (E. Danielle Jose–Decker, J.), rendered April 29, 2022, upon a verdict convicting defendant of the crimes of aggravated driving while intoxicated with a child passenger, endangering the welfare of a child and reckless endangerment in the second degree and the traffic infractions of speeding, failure to keep right, failure to signal and consumption of alcoholic beverages in a motor vehicle.

Defendant was charged in a multicount indictment with various crimes and traffic infractions in connection with allegations that he operated a motor vehicle while intoxicated by alcohol with a six-year-old child in the car.  Following a pretrial suppression hearing, County Court found, as relevant here, that there was probable cause to arrest defendant for reckless driving and driving while intoxicated (hereinafter DWI), that the search of the vehicle was permissible, and that the physical evidence seized from the vehicle and the testimony regarding the presence of a backseat child passenger were admissible at trial.  A jury trial subsequently ensued, following which defendant was convicted of the crimes of aggravated DWI, endangering the welfare of a child, and reckless endangerment in the second degree, as well as the traffic infractions of speeding, failure to keep right, failure to signal and consumption/possession of alcoholic beverages in a motor vehicle.  County Court imposed a split sentence of four weekends of incarceration and five years of probation on the aggravated DWI conviction, along with concurrent three-year terms of probation on the endangering the welfare of a child and reckless endangerment convictions.¹  County Court waived the imposition of fines and surcharges on the conviction for failure to signal, but otherwise imposed fines and surcharges on the remaining traffic infractions.  Defendant appeals.

We disagree with defendant's contention that the verdict is against the weight of the evidence.²  As charged here, a person is guilty of aggravated DWI when he or she “operate[s] a motor vehicle in violation of [Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1192(3) ] while a child who is [15] years of age or less is a passenger in such motor vehicle” (Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1192[2–a][b];  see People v. Diaz, 248 AD3d 1501, 1502 [3d Dept 2026] ).  A person operates a motor vehicle in violation of Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1192(3) when he or she does so “while in an intoxicated condition” (Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1192[3] ), meaning “incapable of employing the physical and mental abilities which he [or she] is expected to possess in order to operate a vehicle as a reasonable and prudent driver” due to the voluntary consumption of alcohol (People v. Cruz, 48 N.Y.2d 419, 428 [1979], appeal dismissed 446 U.S. 901 [1980] ).  Moreover, as relevant here, a person is guilty of endangering the welfare of a child when he or she “knowingly acts in a manner likely to be injurious to the physical ․ welfare of a child less than [17] years old” (Penal Law § 260.10[1] ), and of reckless endangerment in the second degree when he or she “recklessly engages in conduct which creates a substantial risk of serious physical injury to another person” (Penal Law § 120.20).  Regarding the traffic infractions of which defendant was convicted, the Vehicle and Traffic Law prohibits driving in excess of the speed limit (see Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1180[d] ), turning or changing lanes without signaling (see Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1163[d] ), failing to keep to the righthand side of a road when required to do so, subject to certain exceptions (see Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1120[a] ), and drinking alcoholic beverages or possessing open containers of alcohol in a vehicle driven on a public roadway (see Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1227[1] ).

At trial, the People elicited testimony from Kenneth Conklin, a police officer with the Village of Monticello Police Department (hereinafter the officer), regarding the circumstances of defendant's arrest.  The officer testified that, around 1:45 a.m. on July 7, 2019, he was sitting in his marked patrol vehicle in the Village of Monticello, Sullivan County, when he observed a Honda Pilot traveling at a high rate of speed in a 30 mile-per-hour zone.  The officer followed the Honda for around a quarter of a mile and observed it veer outside of its travel lane on two occasions.  Using a pacing method in which he had been trained to determine the vehicle's speed, the officer testified that the Honda was traveling roughly 45 miles per hour.  He subsequently activated his lights and sirens to effectuate a traffic stop, but the Honda did not pull over.

The officer continued to pursue the Honda and observed it veer outside of its travel lane another time.  He also witnessed it fail to yield to a second police officer who was in the process of conducting an unrelated traffic stop on the side of the road, testifying that the Honda came within “[a] few feet” of the second officer without slowing down and again veered outside of its travel lane while doing so.  The officer then witnessed the Honda make a left turn into the parking lot of a housing complex without signaling and come to a stop.  The officer positioned his patrol vehicle behind the Honda.  After additional police officers arrived on the scene, they observed a female in the front passenger's seat.  They ordered the driver to step out of the Honda, and defendant exited from the driver's seat.

The officer testified that when defendant exited the vehicle, he had trouble maintaining his balance and placed his hand on the vehicle to stabilize himself.  He also noticed “a strong odor of alcoholic beverage” on defendant's breath, bloodshot and watery eyes, and “very slurred” speech, testifying that he believed defendant was “highly intoxicated.”  Upon making such observations, defendant was handcuffed, informed that he was under arrest for reckless driving and placed in the officer's patrol vehicle.

Thereafter, the officer returned to the vehicle and saw a young girl in the back seat, estimating that she was around six or seven years old.³  He also observed an open bottle of Jack Daniel's whiskey in the center console of the vehicle that was “between a half and three quarters empty,” as well as two plastic cups in either cupholder containing “what [he] assumed [was] the same liquor.”  The officer testified that, after defendant was transported to the police station, standardized field sobriety tests (hereafter SFSTs) were conducted and defendant was asked to submit to a chemical test but ultimately refused to do so.  Following the SFSTs, defendant was formally placed under arrest for aggravated DWI.

The People also elicited testimony from a police sergeant who followed behind the officer's vehicle as he was attempting to pull the Honda over.  The sergeant corroborated several aspects of the officer's testimony, explaining that he also witnessed the Honda fail to yield to the second officer who was partially standing in the roadway conducting the unrelated traffic stop of a different vehicle, that the Honda “f[lew] by” the second officer and that he “nearly got hit.”  The second officer also confirmed as much at trial, testifying that the Honda defendant was driving came toward him “at a high rate of speed” and that he would have been hit had he not moved out of the way.  The sergeant also testified consistently as to defendant's physical condition upon exiting the Honda, recalling that defendant had trouble standing, held onto the vehicle for balance, had glassy eyes and slurred speech, and his breath smelled of alcohol.  The sergeant similarly testified that he believed defendant was intoxicated at the time.⁴

Defendant's weight-of-the-evidence challenge focuses primarily on the proof regarding the speeding and aggravated DWI convictions.  When viewing the evidence in a neutral light, a different verdict would not have been unreasonable given the lack of radar data to confirm the speed at which defendant was driving or a breath test to measure his blood alcohol content.  Nevertheless, when “deferring to the [jury's] credibility assessments, and weighing the relative probative force of conflicting testimony and the relative strength of conflicting inferences that may be drawn therefrom,” we are satisfied that the People proved such charges beyond a reasonable doubt (People v. Harrell, 251 AD3d 1167, 1173 [3d Dept 2026] [internal quotation marks, brackets and citations omitted], lv denied _ NY3d _ [Sept. 23, 2026];  see People v. Bleakley, 69 N.Y.2d 490, 495 [1987] ).  As for the speeding conviction, the officer testified that the vehicle being driven by defendant maintained a speed of approximately 45 miles per hour in a 30 mile-per-hour zone (see Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1180[d] ).  Although the officer did not use a radar device to determine such speed, he used a pacing method on which he had been trained to do so, which involved following the vehicle at a constant distance for around a quarter of a mile and reading the speedometer in his police vehicle to determine its rate of travel.  The officer's assessment that defendant was driving over the speed limit was generally corroborated by the sergeant and the second officer, who both testified that they observed the vehicle traveling at a high rate of speed.  In these circumstances, we conclude that the People sustained their burden of proof on the speeding charge (see generally People v. Olsen, 22 N.Y.2d 230, 231 [1968];  People v. Watkins, 180 AD3d 1222, 1230 [3d Dept 2020], lv denied 35 NY3d 1030 [2020];  People v. Goldberg, 61 Misc.3d 129[A], 2018 N.Y. Slip Op 51389[U], *2 [App Term, 2d Dept, 9th & 10th Jud Dists 2018] ).  The aggravated DWI conviction is also supported by the weight of the evidence, particularly given the erratic manner in which defendant was driving, the half-empty Jack Daniel's bottle located in the center console of the vehicle in close proximity to the driver's seat, defendant's demeanor upon exiting the vehicle, and the presence of a six-year-old child passenger in the back seat (see People v. Diaz, 248 AD3d at 1503;  People v. Cassell, 248 AD3d 1433, 1437 [3d Dept 2026] ).⁵  We are also satisfied that the verdict on the remaining counts is in accord with the weight of the evidence.

Defendant additionally argues that the endangering the welfare of a child charge should have been dismissed as multiplicitous of the aggravated DWI charge.  Such argument is unpreserved (see People v. Harris, 246 AD3d 1293, 1299 [3d Dept 2026], lv denied 45 NY3d 971 [2026];  People v. Marcantonio, 238 AD3d 1262, 1265 [3d Dept 2025] ) and, in any event, lacks merit insofar as the two charges consist of distinct and independent elements (compare Penal Law § 260.10[1], with Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1192[2–a][b];  cf.  People v. Cassell, 248 AD3d at 1433–1436;  People v. Marcantonio, 238 AD3d at 1265).

Next, defendant challenges portions of County Court's pretrial suppression ruling, particularly its findings that there was probable cause to arrest him for reckless driving and that a search of the vehicle was authorized.  Turning to the propriety of defendant's arrest, a warrantless arrest is authorized if supported by probable cause (see People v. Palacios, _ NY3d _, 2026 N.Y. Slip Op 02360, *1 [Apr. 16, 2026];  People v. Daniels, 247 AD3d 1257, 1260 [3d Dept 2026], lv denied 45 NY3d 1015 [2026] ).  “Probable cause does not require proof sufficient to warrant a conviction beyond a reasonable doubt but merely information sufficient to support a reasonable belief that an offense has been or is being committed” (People v. Warren, 160 AD3d 1132, 1133 [3d Dept 2018] [internal quotation marks and citations omitted], lv denied 31 NY3d 1154 [2018];  see People v. Maldonado, 86 N.Y.2d 631, 635 [1995] ).

The testimony at the suppression hearing pertaining to the circumstances of defendant's arrest and the subsequent search of the vehicle was in all material respects the same as the trial testimony elicited in that regard.  The police officers who testified at the hearing explained that, although defendant was exhibiting signs of intoxication when he exited the vehicle in the parking lot of the apartment complex, he was under arrest for reckless driving at the time and was not placed under arrest for intoxicated driving until undergoing SFSTs at the police station.  Although defendant argues that County Court's probable cause finding pertaining to the arrest for reckless driving was erroneous, we conclude otherwise.

In that regard, a person engages in reckless driving when, as relevant here, he or she drives “in a manner which unreasonably interferes with the free and proper use of the public highway, ․ or unreasonably endangers users of the public highway” (Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1212[a];  accord People v. Earley, 121 AD3d 1192, 1193 [3d Dept 2014], lv denied 25 NY3d 1200 [2015] ).  “Determining whether conduct rises to the level of unreasonable interference or endangerment such that it constitutes the requisite recklessness involves the presence of additional aggravating acts or circumstances beyond a single violation of a rule of the road” (People v. Goldblatt, 98 AD3d 817, 819 [3d Dept 2012] [citations omitted], lv denied 20 NY3d 932 [2012];  accord People v. Earley, 121 AD3d at 1193).  The “voluntary use of alcohol ․ may be considered as a factor in the reckless driving analysis,” but it “is the manner of operation that is the important inquiry” (People v. Goldblatt, 98 AD3d at 819).

Defendant's assertion that his arrest for reckless driving was premised solely upon proof that he had consumed alcohol is not supported by the hearing testimony.  Instead, such testimony established that, prior to arresting defendant, police officers had observed him drive at a high rate of speed, veer outside of his travel lane multiple times, fail to yield to a roadside traffic stop and nearly hit the officer who was conducting the stop, and fail to signal a left turn.  After defendant pulled into the parking lot of a housing complex and exited the vehicle, police officers observed demeanor indicative of intoxication.  When considering the totality of the circumstances, the police officers' observations prior to and following the stop of defendant's vehicle provided probable cause to believe that he had committed the misdemeanor offense of reckless driving and authorized an arrest on that ground (see People v. Warren, 160 AD3d 1132, 1134 [3d Dept 2018], lv denied 31 NY3d 1154 [2018];  People v. Cooper, 38 AD3d 678, 679–680 [2d Dept 2007] ).⁶  To the extent defendant challenges County Court's determination that there also was probable cause to make a DWI arrest, we conclude that such finding was likewise proper (see People v. Warren, 160 AD3d at 1134).

As for the propriety of the vehicle search, defendant does not dispute that, upon observing the commission of traffic infractions, the officer had probable cause to stop the vehicle he was driving (see Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 810 [1996];  People v. Robinson, 97 N.Y.2d 341, 349 [2001] ).  The subsequent search of the vehicle was authorized under the automobile exception to the warrant requirement, as defendant's erratic driving and his physical demeanor upon exiting the vehicle provided the officer with probable cause to believe that alcohol would be found inside and there was “a nexus ․ between the probable cause and ․ defendant's arrest” (People v. Hines, 172 AD3d 1649, 1650 [3d Dept 2019], lv denied 34 NY3d 951 [2019];  see People v. Galak, 81 N.Y.2d 463, 467–468 [1993];  People v. Mena–Coss, 210 A.D.2d 745, 747 [3d Dept 1994], lv denied 86 N.Y.2d 798 [1995] ).  The evidence regarding the Jack Daniel's bottle, the two plastic cups and the backseat child passenger was also admissible under the plain view doctrine since the officer made such observations from a lawful vantage point and the incriminating nature of such evidence was immediately apparent (see People v. Brown, 96 N.Y.2d 80, 89 [2011];  People v. Brown, 248 AD3d 1415, 1417 [3d Dept 2026] ).  Accordingly, County Court's suppression ruling was proper.

Defendant additionally argues that the officer should not have been permitted to testify about the SFSTs or refusal warnings administered to him at the police station, as they were administered by a different police officer who did not testify at trial.  In that regard, during his trial testimony, the officer explained the circumstances that occurred after defendant was transported back to the police station, revealing that SFSTs were administered to him by a different police officer and that such officer also read defendant refusal warnings from a preprinted document that advised him of the consequences of failing to submit to a chemical test.  The officer was not present when the SFSTs were conducted, but he was present when the refusal warnings were read to defendant and revealed that defendant ultimately refused to submit to a chemical test.  The officer who performed the SFSTs and read the refusal warnings to defendant did not testify at trial;  however, the People entered a copy of the preprinted refusal warnings into evidence and had the officer read them while on the stand.

Contrary to defendant's contention, the officer's testimony about the SFSTs “complete[d] the narrative of events leading [up] to ․ defendant's arrest” for intoxicated driving and did not constitute inadmissible hearsay (People v. Montello, 197 AD3d 575, 576 [2d Dept 2021] [internal quotation marks and citation omitted], lv denied 37 NY3d 1061 [2021] ).  Moreover, defendant was not prejudiced by the testimony insofar as he merely testified that SFSTs were conducted and did not reveal the results of the testing.  As for defendant's argument that allowing the testimony about the refusal warnings violated his right to confrontation, he concedes that such argument is unpreserved for appellate review (see People v. Cokely, 249 AD3d 1329, 1338 n 4 [3d Dept 2026] ).  In any event, under the circumstances presented, such argument is unavailing (see generally People v. Pealer, 20 NY3d 447, 453–455 [2013], cert denied 571 U.S. 846 [2013] ).

We are also unpersuaded by defendant's sentencing challenges.  We do not view the sentence imposed to be unduly harsh or severe and decline to modify the sentence as a matter of discretion in the interest of justice (see CPL 470.15[6][b] ).  Moreover, contrary to defendant's contention, the sentence and commitment form accurately reflects his sentence and contains no error requiring amendment.  Any remaining contentions, to the extent not expressly addressed, have been considered and found unavailing.

Garry, P.J., Aarons, Reynolds Fitzgerald and Ryba, JJ., concur.

ORDERED that the judgment is affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   County Court also revoked defendant's license to drive for a period of one year, directed that an ignition interlock device be installed on his vehicle and ordered him to participate in an impaired driver program.

2.   In the section of his brief challenging the verdict on weight of the evidence grounds, defendant also makes an argument that the endangering the welfare of a child charge should have been dismissed as multiplicitous of the aggravated DWI charge.  We will address such argument separately.

3.   Defendant stipulated at trial that the child was less than 15 years old.

4.   In addition to eliciting the aforementioned testimony, the People also admitted into evidence, among other things, the Jack Daniel's bottle retrieved from the vehicle and photographs of the relevant stretch of roadway.  The plastic cups were not admitted into evidence and were not listed in either the case report or the incident report generated in connection with defendant's arrest.

5.   In his brief, defendant emphasizes the lack of photographs or other physical evidence corroborating the officer's testimony about finding two plastic cups filled with liquid near the Jack Daniel's bottle.  However, defense counsel fully explored this issue on cross-examination, and the officer's testimony in this regard implicated a credibility determination for the jury to resolve (see People v. Lekovic, 200 AD3d 1501, 1504 [3d Dept 2021], lv denied 38 NY3d 1008 [2022] ).

6.   In his brief on appeal, defendant emphasizes that he was not “charged or indicted or convicted of reckless driving” under Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1212.  However, the fact that defendant was not criminally charged with violating Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1212 does not mean that police lacked probable cause to believe he had committed such offense (see generally People v. Guthrie, 25 NY3d 130, 139–140 [2015] ).

Clark, J.