GOMEZ v. MD (2026)

DECISION & ORDER

In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the plaintiff appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Katherine A. Levine, J.), dated January 22, 2025.  The order, insofar as appealed from, granted those branches of the separate motions of the defendant MD Muhibbullah and the defendants Lyft, Inc., Lyft Healthcare, Inc., and Lyft Center, Inc., which were for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against each of them.

ORDERED that the order is reversed insofar as appealed from, on the law, with one bill of costs payable by the respondents appearing separately and filing separate briefs, and those branches of the separate motions of the defendant MD Muhibbullah and the defendants Lyft, Inc., Lyft Healthcare, Inc., and Lyft Center, Inc., which were for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against each of them are denied.

In November 2021, the plaintiff was a passenger in a vehicle owned and operated by the defendant MD Muhibbullah, during a trip facilitated through the defendant Lyft, Inc., when Muhibbullah's vehicle was struck in the rear by a vehicle operated by the defendant Ihab H. Khatib.  A third vehicle, owned by the defendant Timothy Joshua Dueno and operated by the defendant Alyssa N. Perez, was traveling in the lane to the right of Muhibbullah's vehicle at the time of the accident.

The plaintiff commenced this action against Muhibbullah, Khatib, Dueno, Perez, and Lyft, Inc., and the defendants Lyft Healthcare, Inc., and Lyft Center, Inc. (hereinafter collectively with Lyft, Inc., the Lyft defendants), to recover damages for personal injuries she allegedly sustained as a result of the accident.  Muhibbullah moved, inter alia, for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against him.  The Lyft defendants moved, among other things, for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against them.  In an order dated January 22, 2025, the Supreme Court, among other things, granted those branches of Muhibbullah's motion and the Lyft defendants' motion which were for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against each of them.  The plaintiff appeals.

A defendant moving for summary judgment in a negligence action has the burden of establishing, prima facie, that he or she was not at fault in the happening of the subject accident (see Kamtchi v. Sarmiento, 242 AD3d 968, 969;  Choudhary v. DiSilvio, 225 AD3d 837, 838).  Since there can be more than one proximate cause of an accident, a defendant seeking summary judgment must establish freedom from fault as a matter of law (see Choudhary v. DiSilvio, 225 AD3d at 838;  Vargas v. Town of Huntington, 206 AD3d 1034, 1035).

Here, Muhibbullah and the Lyft defendants established their prima face entitlement to judgment as a matter of law dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against each of them by submitting, inter alia, Muhibbullah's affidavit, which demonstrated that Khatib's vehicle struck Muhibbullah's vehicle in the rear while Muhibbullah's vehicle was gradually slowing down.  This evidence established, prima facie, Muhibbullah's freedom from negligence in the collision between his vehicle and Khatib's vehicle (see Martinez v. Colonna, 232 AD3d 876, 878;  Guralenko v. New York City Tr. Auth., 220 AD3d 847, 848).

In opposition, however, the plaintiff raised a triable issue of fact by proffering evidence that Muhibbullah's vehicle also made contact with the vehicle operated by Perez in the lane to the right of Muhibbullah's vehicle.  Since there were conflicting accounts as to the number of impacts, and since Muhibbullah and the Lyft defendants failed to establish Muhibbullah's freedom from negligence with respect to the alleged impact with Perez's vehicle, it cannot be said as a matter of law that Muhibbullah and the Lyft defendants did not contribute to the accident or the plaintiff's injuries (see Vargas v. Town of Huntington, 206 AD3d at 1036;  Acampora v. Davis, 203 A.D.2d 399, 400).

Accordingly, the Supreme Court should have denied those branches of Muhibbullah's motion and the Lyft defendants' motion which were for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against each of them.

The plaintiff's remaining contention is academic in light of our determination.

LASALLE, P.J., CHAMBERS, TAYLOR and HOM, JJ., concur.