PEOPLE v. ABBOSOV (2026)

DECISION & ORDER

Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Abena Darkeh, J.), rendered December 18, 2024, convicting him of strangulation in the second degree and assault in the third degree, upon a jury verdict, and imposing sentence.

ORDERED that the judgment is affirmed.

The defendant was convicted of strangulation in the second degree and assault in the third degree in connection with his assault upon the complainant, who was his former girlfriend.  The complainant's testimony was translated by an interpreter from Russian to English.  The defendant's contention that the Supreme Court should have granted his motion for a mistrial because of the interpreter's allegedly inaccurate translation of the complainant's testimony is without merit.  The court conducted a searching inquiry into the accuracy of the interpreter's translation of the complainant's testimony.  There was no showing of a serious error made by the interpreter.  Therefore, the court providently exercised its discretion in denying the defendant's motion for a mistrial (see People v Carlton, 218 AD3d 790, 791;  People v Chowdhury, 180 AD3d 455, 456).

Further, the Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in limiting the scope of cross-examination of the complainant with regard to prior civil lawsuits against third parties to recover damages for personal injuries and whether she intended at some future time to sue the defendant to recover damages for personal injuries.  The proposed line of questioning was irrelevant or only marginally relevant, concerned collateral issues, and/or posed a danger of misleading the jury (see People v Carey, 251 AD3d 966;  People v Anderson, 235 AD3d 993, 993).  While proof aimed at establishing a motive to fabricate is never collateral and may not be precluded on that ground, the trial court may, in the exercise of its discretion, properly limit such cross-examination where it is too remote and speculative to establish a motive to fabricate (see People v Jones, 184 AD3d 751, 753;  People v Hicks, 88 AD3d 817, 818).  Here, the excluded line of questioning was too remote and speculative (see People v Herrera–Machuca, 181 AD3d 901, 902;  People v Garcia, 47 AD3d 830, 831).

A defendant has a right to be present at any material stage of the trial (see People v Williams, 85 NY2d 945, 947;  People v Jacob, 249 AD3d 1081, 1082).  An important factor in determining whether a defendant has a right to be present is the extent to which the particular proceeding involved factual matters about which the defendant might have peculiar knowledge that would be useful in advancing the defendant's position or countering the People's position (see People v Rodriguez, 85 NY2d 586, 590;  People v Dunaway, 207 AD3d 742, 745).  However, a defendant's presence is not required where the proceeding at issue involves only questions of law or procedure (see People v Velasco, 77 NY2d 469, 472;  People v Jacob, 249 AD3d at 1082).  Here, the challenged colloquy with defense counsel and the prosecutor, which allegedly occurred in the defendant's absence, involved only questions of law or procedure.  Accordingly, the defendant has not shown that the Supreme Court violated his right to be present at all material stages of trial (see People v Rodriguez, 76 NY2d 918, 921;  People v Dunaway, 207 AD3d at 745).

The defendant was provided with meaningful representation by counsel (see People v Benevento, 91 NY2d 708;  People v Baldi, 54 NY2d 137).

The sentence imposed was not excessive (see People v Suitte, 90 AD2d 80).

BARROS, J.P., FORD, TAYLOR and QUIRK, JJ., concur.