IN RE: Erion HASKO (2026)

DECISION & ORDER

In a proceeding pursuant to Family Court Act article 6, the father appeals from an order of the Family Court, Queens County (Lauren Norton Lerner, J.), dated October 27, 2025.  The order, without a hearing, dismissed the father's petition to modify the custody provisions of a judgment of divorce dated January 25, 2017, which incorporated but did not merge a stipulation of settlement dated August 11, 2016, so as to award him sole legal and residential custody of the parties' child.

ORDERED that the order is reversed, on the law, without costs or disbursements, the father's petition is reinstated, and the matter is remitted to the Family Court, Queens County, for further proceedings in accordance herewith.

The parties are the parents of one child, born in 2013.  The parties were divorced by a judgment of divorce dated January 25, 2017, which incorporated but did not merge a stipulation of settlement of the parties dated August 11, 2016 (hereinafter the 2016 stipulation).  Pursuant to the 2016 stipulation, the parties would share joint legal custody of their child, and the mother would have primary residential custody.  The 2016 stipulation required, inter alia, consultation regarding educational and medical decisions and afforded the mother final decision-making authority concerning medical matters after the prescribed consultation.

In 2024, the father filed the instant petition to modify the custody provisions of the 2016 stipulation so as to award him sole legal and residential custody of the child based on an alleged change in circumstances.  In an order dated October 27, 2025, the Family Court, without a hearing, dismissed the father's petition.  The father appeals.

“Modification of a court-approved stipulation setting forth the terms of custody or parental access is permissible only upon a showing that there has been a sufficient change in circumstances such that modification is necessary to ensure the best interests and welfare of the child” (Matter of Farco v. Farco, 246 AD3d 799, 800 [internal quotation marks omitted];  see Matter of Sanna v. Delong, 238 AD3d 880, 881).  “The paramount concern when making such a determination is the best interests of the child under the totality of the circumstances” (Matter of Shepherd v. Mirukaj, 235 AD3d 769, 770;  see Matter of Farco v. Farco, 246 AD3d at 801).  “Custody determinations should generally be made only after a full and plenary hearing” (Matter of Liang v. O'Brien, 216 AD3d 1101, 1101).  “Before subjecting children and their parents to additional litigation, courts require that, before a full hearing is ordered, the parent seeking a change of custody must make an evidentiary showing of a change in circumstances demonstrating a need to conduct a full hearing into whether a change of custody is appropriate in order to insure the child's best interests” (Matter of Farco v. Farco, 246 AD3d at 801 [internal quotation marks omitted];  see Matter of Liang v. O'Brien, 216 AD3d at 1101).

Here, the Family Court improperly dismissed, without a hearing, the father's petition.  The father's allegations, which were supported by the requisite threshold evidentiary showing, demonstrated factual issues so as to require a hearing on the issue of whether the 2016 stipulation continued to serve the child's best interests (see Matter of Farco v. Farco, 246 AD3d at 801).  Among other things, the father alleged that the mother “ke[pt him] in the dark with regard to any information about [the child's] medical, psychological, and educational needs,” that the child had widening educational gaps, and that the child had been recommended for consideration of a more specialized educational setting.  When these allegations are considered together with the child's changed needs associated with an autism diagnosis, as well as indications that parental arguments over educational placement caused the child emotional distress, they demonstrated factual issues that required a hearing (see id.;  Matter of Liang v. O'Brien, 216 AD3d at 1101–1102).

The mother's remaining contention is without merit.

Accordingly, the Family Court should not have dismissed, without a hearing, the father's petition, and we reverse the order, reinstate the petition, and remit the matter to the Family Court, Queens County, for a hearing and a new determination thereafter of the petition.

IANNACCI, J.P., GENOVESI, LOVE and GOLDBERG VELAZQUEZ, JJ., concur.