IN RE: LICATESI LAW GROUP (2026)

DECISION & ORDER

In a proceeding pursuant to Judiciary Law § 475 to apportion attorney's fees, the appeal is from an order of the Supreme Court, Nassau County (Eileen C. Daly–Sapraicone, J.), dated January 10, 2025. The order, insofar as appealed from, after a hearing, awarded the petitioner 100% of the net contingency fee recoverable in a related action.

ORDERED that the order is affirmed insofar as appealed from, with costs.

The petitioner, Licatesi Law Group, LLP (hereinafter LLG), commenced this proceeding pursuant to Judiciary Law § 475 to apportion the attorney's fees for legal services it rendered on behalf of a client who sustained personal injuries in a motor vehicle accident. LLG alleged, inter alia, that pursuant to its retainer agreement with the client it was to be compensated on a contingency basis for 33 1/313% “of any judgment, settlement or otherwise” recovered on behalf of the client. LLG also alleged that after it obtained a full tender of the $100,000 policy limit from the adverse driver's insurance carrier, GEICO, it received a “stop work” letter from attorney Tony B. Nguyen of Bachu, Bedesi & Nguyen (hereinafter BBN). The letter advised that BBN would be substituting in as the client's new counsel in the underlying personal injury matter. Subsequently, GEICO disbursed the $100,000 policy-limit settlement funds to BBN, which collected and retained the entire attorney's fee. In an order dated January 10, 2025, the Supreme Court, after a hearing, among other things, awarded LLG 100% of the net contingency fee recoverable in the personal injury matter. BBN, Darmin Bachu, and Tony Nguyen (hereinafter collectively the appellants) appeal.

“The issue of apportionment of an attorney's fee is controlled by the circumstances and equities of each particular case, and the trial court is in the best position to assess such factors” (Rodriguez v Ryder Truck Rental, Inc., 171 AD3d 963, 964; see Mazza v Marcello, 20 AD3d 554). “In making this determination, the court should consider the amount of time spent by the attorneys on the case, the nature of the work performed, and the relative contributions of counsel toward achieving the outcome” (Stephen v City of New York, 216 AD3d 1029, 1030 [internal quotation marks omitted]).

Here, the testimony and documentary evidence submitted by LLG at the hearing established that the settlement of the personal injury matter for the GEICO policy limit of $100,000 was achieved solely through its own efforts (see Robinson & Yablon, P.C. v Sacco & Fillas, LLP, 192 AD3d 1154, 1156). The appellants provided no time records or other evidence from which their time and labor could be ascertained (see Hinds v Kilgallen, 83 AD3d 781, 783). Accordingly, the Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in awarding LLG 100% of the net contingency fee (see Del Rosso v Staten Is. Univ. Hosp., 246 AD3d 875, 877; Robinson & Yablon, P.C. v Sacco & Fillas, LLP, 192 AD3d at 1156).

The appellants' remaining contentions are without merit.

DILLON, J.P., WOOTEN, LOVE and GOLDBERG VELAZQUEZ, JJ., concur.