AL HAMID v. Ying Tan, et al., respondents-appellants, et al., defendants. (2026)

DECISION & ORDER

In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the plaintiff appeals, and the defendants Ying Tan and Starway International Group, LLC, cross-appeal, from an order of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Peter P. Sweeney, J.), dated December 16, 2024. The order, insofar as appealed from, denied the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment on the issue of liability against the defendants Ying Tan and Starway International, LLC, and dismissing the defendants' affirmative defenses alleging comparative fault and the failure to wear a seatbelt, and granted that branch of the cross-motion of the defendants New York City Transit Authority, Keshon Hopson, Metropolitan Transit Authority, and Access–A–Ride for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against them. The order, insofar as cross-appealed from, granted the cross-motion of the defendants New York City Transit Authority, Keshon Hopson, Metropolitan Transit Authority, and Access–A–Ride for summary judgment dismissing the complaint and all cross-claims insofar as asserted against them.

ORDERED that the cross-appeal from so much of the order as granted that branch of the cross-motion of the defendants New York City Transit Authority, Keshon Hopson, Metropolitan Transit Authority, and Access–A–Ride which was for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against them is dismissed, without costs or disbursements, as the cross-appellants are not aggrieved by that portion of the order (see CPLR 5511; Sooklall v Morisseav–Lafague, 185 AD3d 1079, 1080; Mixon v TBV, Inc., 76 AD3d 144); and it is further,

ORDERED that the order is modified, on the law, by deleting the provision thereof denying those branches of the plaintiff's motion which were for summary judgment on the issue of liability against the defendants Ying Tan and Starway International, LLC, and dismissing the defendants' affirmative defenses alleging comparative fault, and substituting therefor a provision granting those branches of the motion; as so modified, the order is affirmed insofar as appealed from and insofar as reviewed on the cross-appeal, without costs or disbursements.

This action arises from a five-vehicle chain collision that occurred on the Verrazano Bridge. The rear vehicle, an Isuzu box truck (hereinafter the Starway vehicle) owned by the defendant Starway International Group, LLC (hereinafter Starway), and operated by defendant Ying Tan (hereinafter together the Starway defendants), came into contact with a stopped vehicle, which was allegedly propelled into a third vehicle (hereinafter the third vehicle). The third vehicle then impacted a second vehicle in the chain, an Access–A–Ride vehicle that was operated by the defendant Keshon Hopson. The plaintiff was a passenger in the Access–A–Ride vehicle, seated in a regular, individual seat equipped with a seatbelt.

The plaintiff commenced this action against Hopson, the defendant New York City Transit Authority, the defendant Metropolitan Transit Authority, and the defendant Access–A–Ride (hereinafter collectively the Transit defendants) and the Starway defendants, among others, to recover damages for personal injuries she allegedly sustained due to the collision. The complaint alleged, inter alia, that the Starway defendants were negligent in causing the chain collision and that the Transit defendants were negligent in failing to properly secure the plaintiff in the Access–A–Ride vehicle.

Thereafter, the plaintiff moved for summary judgment on the issue of liability against the Starway defendants and dismissing the defendants' affirmative defenses alleging comparative fault and the failure to wear a seatbelt. The Transit defendants cross-moved for summary judgment dismissing the complaint and all cross-claims insofar as asserted against them. In an order dated December 16, 2024, the Supreme Court denied the plaintiff's motion and granted the Transit defendants' cross-motion. The plaintiff appeals, and the Starway defendants cross-appeal.

“A rear-end collision with a stopped or stopping vehicle establishes a prima facie case of negligence on the part of the operator of the rear vehicle, thereby requiring that operator to rebut the inference of negligence by providing a nonnegligent explanation for the collision” (Fischetti v Simonovsky, 227 AD3d 670, 671). “A nonnegligent explanation may include a mechanical failure ․ or any other reasonable cause” (Donnellan v LaMarche, 221 AD3d 783, 784 [internal quotation marks omitted]). “[W]here the operator of the moving vehicle alleges that the accident was the result of brake failure and presents evidence that the brake problem was unanticipated, and that reasonable care had been exercised to keep the brakes in good working order, he or she has demonstrated a nonnegligent explanation for the happening of the accident” (Schuster v Amboy Bus Co., 267 AD2d 448, 449; see Ballatore v HUB Truck Rental Corp., 83 AD3d 978, 980).

Here, the plaintiff demonstrated her prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law on the issue of liability against the Starway defendants by demonstrating that the Starway vehicle struck a stopped vehicle, which struck the third vehicle, causing the third vehicle to strike the Access–A–Ride vehicle (see Madrigal v Paragon Motors of Woodside, Inc., 236 AD3d 885, 887; McRae v City of New York, 208 AD3d 775, 776). In opposition, the Starway defendants failed to raise a triable issue of fact as to the existence of a nonnegligent explanation for the accident. Tan's conclusory assertion of brake failure was contradicted by the Starway defendants' own evidence that indicated that the brakes on the Starway vehicle were tested after the accident and were working properly (see Madrigal v Paragon Motors of Woodside, Inc., 236 AD3d at 888; Ballatore v Hub Truck Rental Corp., 83 AD3d at 980; Polanco v City of New York, 244 AD2d 322, 322). Accordingly, the Supreme Court should have granted that branch of the plaintiff's motion which was for summary judgment on the issue of liability insofar as asserted against the Starway defendants.

Further, the plaintiff established, prima facie, that she was entitled to summary judgment dismissing the defendants' affirmative defenses alleging comparative fault, as she was an innocent passenger who did not engage in any culpable conduct that contributed to the happening of the accident (see Streeter v North Shore Univ. Hosp., 243 AD3d 830, 831; Grecco v Altice USA, Inc., 230 AD3d 655, 656–657). In opposition, the defendants failed to raise a triable issue of fact. Accordingly, the Supreme Court should have granted that branch of the plaintiff's motion which was for summary judgment dismissing the defendants' affirmative defenses alleging comparative fault.

However, the Supreme Court properly denied that branch of the plaintiff's motion which was for summary judgment dismissing the defendants' affirmative defenses alleging the failure to wear a seatbelt. The plaintiff's submissions failed to eliminate triable issues of fact relevant to that defense (see generally Posner v Hendler, 302 AD2d 509, 509; Czumaj v Borzelleri, 222 AD2d 1053, 1053; DiMauro v Metropolitan Suburban Bus Auth., 105 AD2d 236, 243–244). Accordingly, the court properly denied that branch of the plaintiff's motion without regard to the sufficiency of the defendants' opposition papers (see Winegrad v New York Univ. Med. Ctr., 64 NY2d 851, 853).

Finally, the contentions of the plaintiff and of the Starway defendants that the Supreme Court should not have granted the Transit defendants' motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint and all cross-claims insofar as asserted against them are without merit (see generally Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1229–c[8]; Asantewaa v City of New York, 90 AD3d 537; Calandrillo v Alessi, 242 AD2d 551, 552).

CONNOLLY, J.P., CHRISTOPHER, VENTURA and GOLIA, JJ., concur.