Nasael Webb, et al., appellants, v. Primez Trucking, Inc., et al., respondents. (2026)

Argued—April 24, 2026

DECISION & ORDER

A/

In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the plaintiffs appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Caroline Piela Cohen, J.), dated November 7, 2024.  The order, insofar as appealed from, denied that branch of the plaintiffs' motion which was for summary judgment on the issue of liability.

ORDERED that the order is reversed insofar as appealed from, on the law, with costs, and that branch of the plaintiffs' motion which was for summary judgment on the issue of liability is granted.

The plaintiffs commenced this action against the defendants to recover damages for personal injuries that they allegedly sustained when their vehicle was struck in the rear by a vehicle operated by the defendant Edward H. Griggs (hereinafter the defendant driver) and owned by the defendant Primez Trucking, Inc. Following the completion of discovery, the plaintiffs moved, inter alia, for summary judgment on the issue of liability.  The defendants opposed the motion.  In an order dated November 7, 2024, the Supreme Court, among other things, denied that branch of the plaintiffs' motion.  The plaintiffs appeal.

A driver of a vehicle approaching another vehicle from the rear is required to maintain a reasonably safe distance and rate of speed under the prevailing conditions to avoid colliding with the other vehicle (see Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1129[a];  Merino v. Ferrante, 241 AD3d 1449, 1451).  Moreover, drivers have a duty to see what should be seen and to exercise reasonable care under the circumstances to avoid an accident (see Balducci v. Velasquez, 92 AD3d 626, 628;  Filippazzo v. Santiago, 277 A.D.2d 419, 420).  As such, a rear-end collision establishes a prima facie case of negligence on the part of the operator of the rear vehicle, thereby requiring that operator to rebut the inference of negligence by providing a nonnegligent explanation for the collision (see Balgobin v. McKenzie, 213 AD3d 893, 893–894;  Carter v. Castle Elec. Contr.  Co., 26 A.D.2d 83, 85).  A nonnegligent explanation may include a mechanical failure, a sudden, unexplained stop of the vehicle ahead, an unavoidable skidding on wet pavement, or any other reasonable cause (see Donnellan v. LaMarche, 221 AD3d 783, 784).

Here, the plaintiffs established, prima facie, that the defendant driver was negligent in striking the plaintiffs' vehicle in the rear, regardless of whether the plaintiffs' vehicle was moving or slowing down at the time of the collision (see Merino v. Ferrante, 241 AD3d at 1451;  Yonghong Xia v. Zhao Xian Zeng, 219 AD3d 914, 915).  In opposition, the defendants failed to raise a triable issue of fact as to whether there was a nonnegligent explanation for the happening of the accident or whether the emergency doctrine applied to this case (see Radosta v. Caronia, 244 AD3d 890, 892).  The defendant driver's admission that he did not see the plaintiffs' vehicle until the collision, demonstrates that he, by his own actions, created the emergency by failing to see what should have been seen and by failing to exercise reasonable care under the circumstances to avoid the accident (see Burke v. Kreger Truck Renting Co., 272 A.D.2d 494, 494–495;  Pappas v. Opitz, 262 A.D.2d 471, 471;  Abramowicz v. Roberto, 220 A.D.2d 374, 375).

Accordingly, the Supreme Court should have granted that branch of the plaintiffs' motion which was for summary judgment on the issue of liability.

In light of our determination, we need not reach the defendants' remaining contention.

DILLON, J.P., WOOTEN, LOVE and GOLDBERG VELAZQUEZ, JJ., concur.

ENTER:

Darrell M. Joseph

Clerk of the Court