IRISH v. TROPICAL EMERALD LLC (2026)

DECISION & ORDER

In an action, inter alia, to recover damages for discrimination on the basis of disability in violation of the New York State Human Rights Law and the New York City Human Rights Law, the plaintiff appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Steven Z. Mostofsky, J.), dated March 20, 2025. The order, insofar as appealed from, granted those branches of the defendants' motion which were pursuant to CPLR 3211(a) to dismiss the causes of action alleging violations of the New York State Human Rights Law and the New York City Human Rights Law.

ORDERED that the order is reversed insofar as appealed from, on the law, with costs, and those branches of the defendants' motion which were pursuant to CPLR 3211(a) to dismiss the causes of action alleging violations of the New York State Human Rights Law and the New York City Human Rights Law are denied.

In June 2024, the plaintiff, who utilizes a wheelchair for mobility, commenced this action against the defendants, Tropical Emerald, LLC (hereinafter Tropical), and Rainbow USA, Inc. (hereinafter Rainbow), alleging, inter alia, discrimination on the basis of disability in violation of the New York State Human Rights Law (N.Y.SHRL) (Executive Law § 296) and the New York City Human Rights Law (N.Y.CHRL) (Administrative Code of City of N.Y. § 8–107). The complaint alleged, in sum, that the plaintiff was unable to navigate between merchandise display racks inside of a clothing store owned by Tropical and operated by Rainbow because there was insufficient space between the racks for a person using a wheelchair and that the store's employees refused to adjust the display racks to make space for the plaintiff. The defendants moved, among other things, pursuant to CPLR 3211(a) to dismiss the causes of action alleging violations of the NYSHRL and the NYCHRL on the ground that the plaintiff was collaterally estopped from asserting those causes of action. In support of their motion, the defendants submitted evidence that, in 2019, the plaintiff commenced an action against them in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York (hereinafter the federal court) in which the plaintiff alleged disability discrimination in violation of Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) (42 USC § 12101 et seq.) and of the NYSHRL and the NYCHRL and that, in March 2024, the federal court, inter alia, granted that branch of the defendants' motion which was for summary judgment dismissing the cause of action alleging violations of the ADA, declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the causes of action alleging violations of the NYSHRL and the NYCHRL, and dismissed the causes of action alleging violations of the NYSHRL and the NYCHRL without prejudice. The plaintiff opposed the defendants' motion. In an order dated March 20, 2025, the Supreme Court, among other things, granted those branches of the defendants' motion. The plaintiff appeals.

The doctrine of collateral estoppel prohibits a party from relitigating in a subsequent action or proceeding an issue clearly raised in a prior action or proceeding and decided against that party, regardless of whether the causes of action are the same (see Russell v. New York Univ., 42 NY3d 377, 384; Reyes v. Seaqua Delicatessen, Inc., 234 AD3d 88, 92). “ ‘[C]ollateral estoppel only applies when: (1) the issues in both proceedings are identical, (2) the issue in the prior proceeding was actually litigated and decided, (3) there was a full and fair opportunity to litigate in the prior proceeding, and (4) the issue previously litigated was necessary to support a valid and final judgment on the merits’ ” (Reyes v. Seaqua Delicatessen, Inc., 234 AD3d at 92 [internal quotation marks omitted], quoting Domingo v. Avis Budget Group, Inc., 219 AD3d 964, 965). Where a federal court declines to exercise jurisdiction over a plaintiff's state law claims, collateral estoppel may still bar those claims provided that the federal court decided issues identical to those raised by the plaintiff's state law claims (see Rosa v Triborough Bridge & Tunnel Auth., 218 AD3d 810; Milione v. City Univ. of N.Y., 153 AD3d 807, 808–809).

Here, contrary to the defendants' contention, the plaintiff is not collaterally estopped from asserting causes of action alleging violations of the NYSHRL and the NYCHRL based on the determinations made in the prior federal action. The federal court determined, inter alia, that the defendants did not discriminate against the plaintiff within the meaning of the ADA by failing to remove existing barriers to accessibility because such removal was not “readily achievable” (see 42 USC §§ 12182[b][2][A][iv]; 12181[9]). The causes of action alleging violations of the NYSHRL and the NYCHRL, however, involve a different legal threshold and different factual issues than those involved in determining whether the defendants discriminated against the plaintiff within the meaning of the ADA. Under the NYCHRL, which “must be construed liberally for the accomplishment of the uniquely broad and remedial purposes thereof,” regardless of whether similarly-worded federal laws have been so construed (Domingo v. Avis Budget Group, Inc., 219 AD3d at 965 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Administrative Code of City of N.Y. § 8–130[a]), a covered entity must establish that the accommodation sought would cause “undue hardship” in the conduct of the entity's business (see Administrative Code of City of N.Y. § 8–102; Matter of Mutual Apts., Inc. v New York City Commn. on Human Rights, 203 AD3d 1154, 1156–1157). Thus, a cause of action asserted pursuant to the NYCHRL must be analyzed independently from similar or identical causes of action asserted pursuant to the ADA (see Domingo v. Avis Budget Group, Inc., 219 AD3d at 966).

Furthermore, although the standards for establishing unlawful discrimination in a place of public accommodation under the NYSHRL previously were the same as those governing cases alleging violations of the ADA (see Executive Law § 296[2]; Wright v White Plains Hosp. Med. Ctr., 237 AD3d 1143, 1144; Graves v. Finch Pruyn & Co., Inc., 457 F3d 181, 184 n 3 [2d Cir]), in 2019, the New York State Legislature amended the NYSHRL to require that it “be construed liberally for the accomplishment of the remedial purposes thereof, regardless of whether federal civil rights laws, including those laws with provisions worded comparably to the provisions of [the NYSHRL], have been so construed” (Executive Law § 300; L 2019, ch 160, § 6; see Wright v White Plains Hosp. Med. Ctr., 237 AD3d at 1144). The amendment, which became effective August 12, 2019 (see L 2019, ch 160, § 16), applies to this action (see Executive Law § 300; L 2019, ch 160, § 16[d]; Wright v White Plains Hosp. Med. Ctr., 237 AD3d at 1144–1145; Elco v. Aguiar, 226 AD3d 649, 651).

Accordingly, the Supreme Court should have denied those branches of the defendants' motion which were pursuant to CPLR 3211(a) to dismiss the causes of action alleging violations of the NYSHRL and the NYCHRL.

The plaintiff's remaining contention need not be reached in light of our determination.

GENOVESI, J.P., DOWLING, WAN and QUIRK, JJ., concur.