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IN RE: PROTECT THE ADIRONDACKS! INC., Appellant, v. NEW YORK STATE DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL CONSERVATION et al., Respondents.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Calendar Date: September 8, 2026
Appeal from a judgment of the Supreme Court (Anthony McGinty, J.), entered April 9, 2025 in Albany County, which, in a proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78, granted respondents' motion to dismiss the petition.
Petitioner, a not-for-profit environmental advocacy organization, commenced this CPLR article 78 proceeding against respondents Department of Environmental Conservation (hereinafter DEC) and Adirondack Park Agency (hereinafter APA) seeking an order compelling DEC to conduct a study of the Saranac Lakes Complex to determine the maximum level of recreational watercrafts it can accommodate. Petitioner also sought injunctive relief prohibiting respondents from approving projects within the Saranac Lakes Complex pending completion of such study.
As background, in 2019, DEC adopted the Saranac Lakes Wild Forest Unit Management Plan (hereinafter UMP) in consultation with the APA. The UMP governs the management of approximately 75,000 acres of forest preserve lands within the Adirondack Park which includes the Saranac Lakes Complex, an interconnected network of lakes, ponds and waterways that supports extensive motorized and nonmotorized recreational use. In October 2023, petitioner advised DEC that it was legally obligated by both the UMP and the Adirondack Park State Land Master Plan (hereinafter the Master Plan) to undertake and complete a carrying capacity study of the waterbodies within the Saranac Lakes Complex to determine the maximum level of recreational use the waterbodies may accommodate without impairing their environmental, scenic or recreational character. DEC declined to immediately undertake the study, explaining that it was engaged in a similar study elsewhere and wished to evaluate the results of that effort before expanding environmental studies to additional lands and waters. Alleging that DEC has a nondiscretionary duty to conduct a carrying capacity study of the waterbodies within the Saranac Lakes Complex, petitioner commenced this proceeding in the nature of mandamus to compel together with injunctive relief. Respondents moved to dismiss the petition, arguing, among other things, that neither the Master Plan nor the UMP imposed a nondiscretionary duty requiring DEC to conduct the requested study and that the petition failed to state a cause of action against the APA. Supreme Court granted the motion, and petitioner appeals. We affirm.
Mandamus to compel is an extraordinary remedy available only where the respondent has a nondiscretionary duty to perform the requested act and the petitioner has demonstrated a clear legal right to compel its performance (see People v. Norlite, LLC, 246 AD3d 1346, 1349 [3d Dept 2025], appeal dismissed 46 NY3d 938 [2026]; Matter of Clements v. New York Secretary of State, 227 AD3d 84, 86–87 [3d Dept 2024], appeal dismissed 43 NY3d 955 [2025]; Matter of Hussain v. Lynch, 215 AD3d 121, 125–126 [3d Dept 2023] ). Although mandamus is available to compel a purely ministerial act required by law, it may not be employed to compel governmental action that involves the exercise of judgment or discretion (see People v. Norlite, LLC, 246 AD3d at 1349; Woodside Manor Nursing Home, Inc. v Zucker, 223 AD3d 94, 99 [3d Dept 2024], appeal dismissed 41 NY3d 991 [2024], lv denied 42 NY3d 907 [2024]; Matter of Hussain v. Lynch, 215 AD3d at 126). A ministerial act is one that requires direct adherence to a governing rule or standard allowing no exercise of judgment or discretion, whereas a discretionary act permits the exercise of reasoned judgment in determining the appropriate course of action (see Alliance to End Chickens as Kaporos v New York City Police Dept., 32 NY3d 1091, 1093 [2018]; New York Civ. Liberties Union v State of New York, 4 NY3d 175, 184 [2005]; Woodside Manor Nursing Home, Inc. v Zucker, 223 AD3d at 99). Accordingly, petitioner's entitlement to mandamus relief turns on whether the Master Plan and the UMP impose upon DEC a mandatory, nondiscretionary duty to conduct the carrying capacity study or whether the decision to undertake such study is discretionary.
Beginning with the Master Plan, we conclude that its provisions do not impose a ministerial duty upon DEC to undertake the requested study. The Master Plan establishes broad policies and management objectives governing the stewardship of forest preserve lands within the Adirondack Park and, consistent with those objectives, it provides in relevant part that “[a] comprehensive study of Adirondack lakes and ponds should be conducted by [DEC] to determine each water body's capacity to withstand use, particularly motorized uses, and to maintain biological, natural and aesthetic qualities” (emphasis added). When considered in the context of the Master Plan as a whole, this language stating that DEC “should” conduct a comprehensive carrying capacity study is an aspirational planning objective rather than a mandatory one. The Master Plan neither requires DEC to undertake the study by any specified date nor prescribes the scope, methodology or timetable for its completion. Nor does it provide objective standards by which a court could determine whether DEC has discharged such an obligation. Had the drafters intended to impose a ministerial duty enforceable through mandamus, they would have used mandatory language requiring DEC to undertake the study within a prescribed period or upon the occurrence of specified conditions.
This conclusion is reinforced by the statutory framework in which the Master Plan
operates. Executive Law § 816(1) directs DEC to prepare unit management plans that conform to the Master Plan's “general guidelines and criteria” and provides that such plans, together with the Master Plan, “shall guide” the management of state lands in the Adirondack Park. By its terms, the statute contemplates that the Master Plan establishes broad management policies and objectives, leaving their implementation to DEC through its exercise of professional judgment. This interpretation is consistent with the Master Plan itself, which identifies the carrying capacity study as one of numerous management objectives. It also recognizes that “[f]irst emphasis should be given” to certain categories of lakes and ponds, that “planning is an on-going process,” that land-use controls “may require re-analysis” and that revisions will occur “as needs dictate.” Collectively, this language contemplates that implementation of the Master Plan necessarily requires DEC to balance competing management priorities in the exercise of its expertise, rather than the mere performance of ministerial acts. To hold otherwise would effectively authorize courts to supervise the timing and prioritization of innumerable planning objectives entrusted to the agency's expertise, a result fundamentally at odds with the limited purpose of mandamus to compel. Accordingly, petitioner has failed to establish a clear right to mandamus based upon the Master Plan.
Petitioner's reliance on the UMP as the basis for mandamus relief is likewise
unavailing. The UMP identifies the completion of a comprehensive study of lakes and ponds to determine their recreational carrying capacity as a management objective and contemplates an ongoing monitoring of environmental and social impacts associated with their use. Petitioner contends these provisions impose a nondiscretionary duty upon DEC to undertake and complete a carrying-capacity study of the Saranac Lakes Complex. We disagree. Although the UMP establishes the study and related monitoring as management objectives, it neither requires their completion by a specified date nor prescribes the manner in which they must be undertaken. Rather, the UMP leaves DEC to determine, in the exercise of its professional judgment, when to undertake the study. Such a determination is discretionary in nature and therefore not subject to compulsion by mandamus.
Petitioner's reliance upon our decision in Matter of Jorling v. Adirondack Park Agency (214 AD3d 98 [3d Dept 2023] ) is misplaced. Notably, Jorling involved an application for a shoreline variance under applicable wetland regulations. It did not involve a request for mandamus relief or address whether the Master Plan or the UMP imposed a ministerial duty enforceable by judicial order. Accordingly, our ruling in Jorling cannot be read as resolving the question presented here, namely whether petitioner has established a clear legal right to compel DEC to undertake the study.
Next, we reject petitioner's contention that recent legislative appropriations funding a carrying-capacity study demonstrate that DEC is now obligated to undertake the study. Although an appropriation may provide the resources necessary for an agency to act, it does not transform a discretionary management objective into a judicially enforceable ministerial duty absent statutory language to that effect. Inasmuch as neither the Master Plan nor the UMP imposes upon DEC a nondiscretionary duty to complete a carrying capacity study of the waterbodies within the Saranac Lakes Complex, petitioner failed to establish its clear right to mandamus relief. Supreme Court therefore properly dismissed the petition against DEC.
Finally, we address petitioner's claims against the APA. As set forth above, the sole relief sought in the petition is an order compelling DEC to undertake a carrying capacity study. The petition does not allege that the APA is required to perform such a study, and does not identify any statute, regulation or provision of the Master Plan purporting to impose such duty upon the APA. Neither does the petition seek any relief compelling the APA to act. As petitioner failed to allege a clear legal duty enforceable by mandamus, Supreme Court properly dismissed the petition against the APA. In light of this determination, we need not address respondents' alternative contention that the proceeding is time-barred or petitioner's arguments concerning injunctive relief.
Pritzker, J.P., Ceresia, Powers and Corcoran, JJ., concur.
ORDERED that the judgment is affirmed, without costs.
Ryba, J.
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Docket No: CV–25–0656
Decided: November 05, 2026
Court: Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Third Department, New York.
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