MELENDEZ v. CITY OF NEW YORK (2026)

DECISION & ORDER

In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the plaintiff appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Queens County (Kevin J. Kerrigan, J.), dated December 16, 2024.  The order granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

ORDERED that the order is affirmed, with costs.

On June 10, 2010, the plaintiff allegedly was injured while walking on a crosswalk across Cornelia Street at the northwest corner of its intersection with Myrtle Avenue in Ridgewood, Queens, when his foot caught in a hole, causing him to lose his balance and twist his leg.  In June 2011, the plaintiff commenced this action to recover damages for personal injuries against the defendant City of New York, alleging that the City was negligent in maintaining the crosswalk where the accident allegedly occurred.  Thereafter, the City moved for summary judgment dismissing the complaint on the ground that it did not receive prior written notice of the alleged defect as required by Administrative Code of the City of New York § 7–201(c)(2).  By order dated December 16, 2024, the Supreme Court granted the City's motion.  The plaintiff appeals.

Pursuant to Administrative Code § 7–201(c)(2), “no civil action may be maintained against the City for personal injuries sustained as a consequence of an alleged dangerous condition in the roadway unless written notice of the defective condition was actually given to the appropriate person authorized to receive such notice, or there is a written acknowledgment from the City of the defective condition, and the City failed to repair it within 15 days of such notice” (Elsaid v City of New York, 226 AD3d 749, 750 [internal quotation marks omitted];  see Caballero v City of New York, 198 AD3d 713, 713–714).  Thus, prior written notice of a defect is a condition precedent that the plaintiff is required to plead and prove to maintain an action against the City (see Katz v City of New York, 87 NY2d 241, 243;  Nieves v City of New York, 216 AD3d at 801).

Big Apple Pothole and Sidewalk Protection Corporation (hereinafter Big Apple) “is a corporation established by the New York State Trial Lawyers Association for the purpose of giving notices in compliance with [Administrative Code § 7–201(c)(2) ]” (D'Onofrio v City of New York, 11 NY3d 581, 584;  see Nieves v City of New York, 216 AD3d at 801).  “It does so through maps on which coded symbols are entered to represent defects” (D'Onofrio v City of New York, 11 NY3d at 584;  see Nieves v City of New York, 216 AD3d at 801).  “A Big Apple map submitted to the Department of Transportation may serve as prior written notice of a defective condition” (Ghumann v City of New York, 203 AD3d 704, 705).  “The awareness of one defect in the area is insufficient to constitute notice of a different particular defect which caused the accident” (Nieves v City of New York, 216 AD3d at 801 [alterations and internal quotation marks omitted];  see Fisch v City of New York, 194 AD3d 786, 788).

Here, the City established its prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law dismissing the complaint by demonstrating through its submissions, including the affidavit of a New York City Department of Transportation employee who conducted a search of certain databases and paper records for a period of two years prior to and including the date of the accident, including Big Apple maps, that the City had not received prior written notice of the alleged crosswalk defect that the plaintiff claimed to have caused him to fall (see Flores–Da Silva v Long Is. Univ., 243 AD3d 642, 643;  Nieves v City of New York, 216 AD3d at 801).  In opposition, the plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact.  Contrary to the plaintiff's contention, a purported “dotted line” symbol on the Big Apple maps did not provide the City with prior written notice of the alleged defect, as it did not correspond to any symbol denoting a defect as listed in the “Key to Map Symbols” for the maps, and any designated symbols depicted on the maps did not pertain to the specific condition that allegedly caused the accident (see Nieves v City of New York, 216 AD3d at 801;  De Zapata v City of New York, 172 AD3d 1306, 1308).

Accordingly, the Supreme Court properly granted the City's motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

IANNACCI, J.P., WOOTEN, LOVE and GOLDBERG VELAZQUEZ, JJ., concur.