THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK v. NATHANIEL BRADFORD (2026)

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

Calendar Date:  September 8, 2026

Appeal from a judgment of the County Court of Saratoga County (James Murphy III, J.), rendered April 11, 2023, upon a verdict convicting defendant of the crimes of predatory sexual assault, predatory sexual assault against a child (two counts), endangering the welfare of a child (two counts), rape in the second degree (three counts), and criminal sexual act in the second degree.

In May 2021, victim A (born in 2007) confided to a classmate that she was afraid that she was pregnant and that she had been sexually abused by defendant (born in 1985), showing the classmate screenshots that included a text message in which defendant asked victim A if she wanted to “f* * * then shower” and offered her the use of his vape pen.  The classmate told her mother, who contacted authorities.  The ensuing investigation resulted in defendant being charged in an 11–count indictment with offenses relating to his sexual abuse of victim A and victim B (born in 2006), victim A's sister, during specified periods when he resided with them between 2014 and 2021.  The matter proceeded to trial, where defendant was found guilty of all nine counts submitted to the jury.  The jury found defendant guilty of predatory sexual assault relating to both victims.  The jury further found him guilty of predatory sexual assault against a child, three counts of rape in the second degree, criminal sexual act in the second degree and endangering the welfare of a child with regard to victim A, as well as predatory sexual assault against a child and endangering the welfare of a child with regard to victim B. County Court imposed sentences, some running consecutively and some concurrently, that amounted to 78 years to life in prison, to be followed by 10 years of postrelease supervision.  The court issued 100–year orders of protection in favor of both victims, their mother, their sister and their half brother.  Defendant appeals.

We affirm.  Defendant first argues that the proof at trial was not legally sufficient to establish the time frames in which the charged abuse occurred.  Although we are satisfied that defendant preserved this argument by making a trial motion to dismiss that appeared to advance distinct challenges to the proof of when the alleged acts occurred and the proof underlying the counts for predatory sexual assault and predatory sexual assault against a child, the argument lacks merit (cf.  People v. Scott, 250 AD3d 1345, 1347 [3d Dept 2026], lv denied _ NY3d _ [Sept. 14, 2026] ).  Without belaboring the point, the victims gave detailed testimony at trial as to how defendant had sexually abused them on numerous occasions and in various ways during the several years that he resided with them, and the veracity of that testimony was supported by, among other things, lascivious electronic messages from defendant that were recovered during the investigation into his conduct.  Although the victims were unable to recall the precise dates when those incidents occurred, they described details such as where they were residing, their living arrangements and how certain areas in the residence were being used when the abuse occurred.  The People relied upon that information to narrow the time range of the incidents to match those alleged in the indictment as amended, most notably by eliciting testimony from the victims' mother establishing when they moved from one residence to another, when and how their living arrangements changed over time, and when other significant events described in the victims' testimony occurred.  We have no difficulty concluding that the foregoing proof, when viewed in the light most favorable to the People, provides a valid line of reasoning and permissible inferences from which the jury could reach its verdict (see People v. Kancharla, 23 NY3d 294, 302 [2014];  People v. Harris, 246 AD3d 1300, 1303–1304 [3d Dept 2026], lv denied 45 NY3d 971 [2026];  People v. Cuadrado, 227 AD3d 1174, 1176–1177 [3d Dept 2024], lv denied 42 NY3d 969 [2024];  People v. May, 188 AD3d 1309, 1309–1310 [3d Dept 2020], lv denied 36 NY3d 974 [2020] ).¹

Defendant next argues that County Court erred in limiting his attempts to impugn the victims' credibility, focusing upon his unsuccessful efforts to cross-examine the victims' mother regarding their familiarity with pornography and their middle school principal regarding victim A's history of discipline for lying.  In assessing those claims, it is well established that “ ‘[a]n accused's right to cross-examine witnesses ․ is not absolute,’ “ and County Court is vested with “discretion to determine the scope of the cross-examination of a witness” and limit it where the questions are irrelevant or of marginal relevance, concern collateral matters or pose a risk of misleading the jury (People v. Corby, 6 NY3d 231, 234 [2005], quoting People v. Williams, 81 N.Y.2d 303, 313 [1993];  see People v. Erfurt, 234 AD3d 1120, 1124 [3d Dept 2025], lv denied 43 NY3d 1008 [2025] ).

With that in mind, defendant argues that County Court erred in determining that his cross-examination of the victims' mother regarding their prior observation of pornography was barred by the Rape Shield Law (see CPL 60.42) because that statute only “prohibits evidence of a victim's sexual conduct in a case” (People v. Pendell, 164 AD3d 1063, 1070 [3d Dept 2018], affd 33 NY3d 972 [2019];  see People v. Contreras, 47 AD3d 411, 412 [1st Dept 2008], affd 12 NY3d 268 [2009];  People v. Jovanovic, 263 A.D.2d 182, 192–195 [1st Dept 1999], appeal dismissed 95 N.Y.2d 846 [2000] ).  Assuming, without deciding, that defendant is correct, the jury heard other testimony that he had exposed the victims to pornography, and he offered little support for his contention that their independent familiarity with it was relevant to their credibility (see People v. Hoffman, 244 AD3d 1588, 1596 [3d Dept 2025], lv granted 45 NY3d 940 [2026] ).  As such, and given “that the proof against defendant was overwhelming, we find that any error was harmless” (People v. Echavarria, 53 AD3d 859, 863 [3d Dept 2008], lv denied 11 NY3d 832 [2008];  see People v. Segarra, 46 AD3d 363, 364 [1st Dept 2007], lv denied 10 NY3d 816 [2008] ).  As for victim A's purported history of discipline for lying, the record reflects that the middle school principal did not know whether victim A had been disciplined for lying and that counsel for defendant had no basis for believing otherwise.  Defendant therefore failed to show that the questioning would lead to relevant information, and County Court properly sustained the objection to it unless he laid a “basis/foundation to make another inquiry,” which he did not (compare People v. Fernandez, 74 AD3d 1379, 1380–1381 [3d Dept 2010], affd 17 NY3d 70 [2011] ).  Accordingly, we cannot say that County Court committed any evidentiary errors warranting reversal.

Defendant's challenges to supposed errors in the jury charge are no more persuasive.  Although County Court mistakenly referred to count 7 of the indictment as count 6, and count 8 of the indictment as count 5, at one point when explaining the elements of the charged crimes to the jury, any challenge to those isolated mistakes is unpreserved given defendant's failure to object to the charge as given (see People v. Russ, 250 AD3d 1131, 1136 [3d Dept 2026];  People v. Jones, 215 AD3d 1123, 1133 [3d Dept 2023], lv denied 40 NY3d 935 [2023] ).²  His further complaint regarding County Court's statement that it was not permitted to give the jury a written copy of the instructions to use during deliberations – which, we note, County Court is generally not permitted to do absent consent from the parties that was neither sought nor given – is also unpreserved (see People v. Muhammad, 34 NY3d 1152, 1153–1154 [2020];  see also CPL 310.30;  People v. Johnson, 81 N.Y.2d 980, 981–982 [1993];  People v. Townsend, 94 AD3d 1330, 1331–1332 [3d Dept 2012], lv denied 19 NY3d 1105 [2012] ).  We do not agree with defendant that either issue presents the type of fundamental, mode of proceedings error that would excuse the lack of preservation (see People v. Williams, 21 NY3d 932, 934–935 [2013];  People v. Dandridge, 26 AD3d 779, 780 [4th Dept 2006], lv denied 9 NY3d 1032 [2008] ), and we decline his invitation to take corrective action in the interest of justice absent any reason to believe that he was prejudiced by the jury charge as given (see CPL 470.15[6][a];  People v. Banks, 227 AD3d 1225, 1228 [3d Dept 2024], lv denied 42 NY3d 937 [2024] ).

In view of the heinous acts committed by defendant, which involved his exploitation of a position of trust to sexually abuse the victims over a prolonged period of time, and his failure to accept responsibility for his crimes, we do not find the sentences imposed to be unduly harsh or severe (see People v. Cuadrado, 227 AD3d at 1184;  People v. Burdo, 210 AD3d 1306, 1311 [3d Dept 2022], lv denied 39 NY3d 1077 [2023];  People v. Robinson, 156 AD3d 1123, 1131–1132 [3d Dept 2017], lv denied 30 NY3d 1119 [2018] ).  Finally, defendant does not dispute that the crimes here were committed “between members of the same family or household” and that County Court was therefore authorized to issue orders of protection in favor of the sister and half brother of the victims who lived with them (People v. La Motte, 285 A.D.2d 814, 816–817 [3d Dept 2001];  see CPL 530.11[1];  530.12[5];  People v. Goodband, 291 A.D.2d 584, 585 [3d Dept 2002] ).  Notwithstanding his argument to the contrary, we discern no abuse of discretion in either the issuance or the duration of those orders given the depravity of his conduct (see People v. Blauvelt, 211 AD3d 1175, 1176 [3d Dept 2022];  People v. Ash, 162 AD3d 1318, 1323 [3d Dept 2018], lv denied 32 NY3d 1002 [2018] ).  To the extent that they have not been addressed by the foregoing, defendant's remaining contentions have been examined and are meritless.

Pritzker, J.P., Ceresia, Powers and Ryba, JJ., concur.

ORDERED that the judgment is affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   To the limited extent that defendant's brief can be read as advancing the separate argument that the verdict is against the weight of the evidence, after considering the evidence in a neutral light and deferring to the jury's assessments of credibility, we are satisfied that it is not (see People v. Harris, 246 AD3d at 1303–1304;  People v. Cuadrado, 227 AD3d at 1177–1178).

2.   County Court may have mistakenly denominated the counts because counts 6 and 10 of the indictment were not submitted to the jury, and it elected to use the original numbers for the remaining nine counts and instructed the jury not to speculate regarding why the count numbers were not in sequence.  County Court otherwise submitted all nine counts to the jury with an explanation of their elements as required and provided an agreed-upon written verdict sheet that used the correct count numbers, leaving no question that the instruction as a whole “fairly instructed the jury on the correct principles of law to be applied to the case” (People v. Ladd, 89 N.Y.2d 893, 896 [1996];  see CPL 300.10, 300.40;  People v. Fields, 87 N.Y.2d 821, 823 [1995] ).

Corcoran, J.