IN RE: JENNIFER NIN (2026)

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

et al., Respondent.

Calendar Date:  September 17, 2026

Appeal from a judgment of the Supreme Court (Justin Corcoran, J.), entered December 12, 2023 in Albany County, which dismissed petitioners' application, in a proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78, to review a determination of respondent Division of Criminal Justice Services placing petitioners' names on a list of decertified peace officers.

Respondent Division of Criminal Justice Services and the individual respondents (hereinafter collectively referred to as DCJS) maintain the Central State Registry of Police Officers and Peace Officers (hereinafter the central registry), which serves as a permanent system for identifying police and peace officers employed throughout the state (see Executive Law § 845[1], [3];  9 NYCRR 6056.1, 6056.3).  For each officer listed, the registry contains identifying and employment-related information including the officer's name, date of birth, rank or title, employer and completion of statutorily required training (see Executive Law § 845[1] ).  To ensure that the registry remains current, employers of police and peace officers are required to report new appointments and changes in an officer's employment status to DCJS (see Executive Law § 845[2];  9 NYCRR 6056.4).  When an officer ceases to serve, the employer must notify DCJS of the separation and report whether it resulted from a leave of absence, resignation, removal, removal for cause or removal during a probationary period (see Executive Law § 845[2][b] ).  DCJS, in turn, must enter the reported information into the central registry and, where an officer is removed for cause, take the corresponding action with respect to the officer's training certificate (see 9 NYCRR 6056.3[a] ).

Petitioners were employed by respondent Town of Islip as peace officers after successfully completing the requisite basic training and were issued basic training certificates by DCJS. The Town terminated petitioners' employment after their respective pistol permit licenses were suspended, as possession of a valid pistol license was a prerequisite to their continued employment as peace officers under the Civil Service Law. In 2019, the Town reported to DCJS that petitioners had been removed for cause under the then-applicable regulations, which encompassed removals based on incompetence or misconduct pursuant to any applicable law.  Based upon those reports, petitioners' basic training certificates were automatically invalidated and DCJS therefore placed their names on the list of decertified peace officers.  Petitioners subsequently requested that DCJS remove their names from the decertified list and reinstate their peace officer status.  DCJS denied the request.

In November 2022, petitioners commenced this CPLR article 78 proceeding seeking, among other things, an order compelling DCJS to remove their names from the decertification list, restore their basic training certificates and reinstate their peace officer status on the central registry.  DCJS moved to dismiss the petition on various grounds including the failure to join the Town as a necessary party.  Supreme Court denied the motion and permitted petitioners to serve an amended petition adding the Town as a party to the proceeding.  Thereafter, petitioners filed an amended petition adding the Town as a respondent but sought no specific relief against the Town. The Town answered the amended petition but took no position with respect to the relief sought against DCJS. Subsequently, Supreme Court dismissed the amended petition, finding that the underlying determination was not arbitrary, capricious or affected by an error of law.  Petitioners appealed, but petitioner Jennifer Nin's appeal was subsequently dismissed by operation of law, leaving only petitioner Anthony Passalacqua's appeal for our consideration.

We agree with respondents that the appeal has been rendered moot.  An appeal becomes moot when, due to the passage of time or change in circumstances, the court's determination will no longer directly affect the rights of the parties or have an immediate practical consequence for them (see Matter of Percinthe v Department of Corr. & Community Supervision, 227 AD3d 1347, 1347–1348 [3d Dept 2024], lv denied 42 NY3d 908 [2024];  Matter of Prisoners' Legal Servs. of N.Y. v New York State Dept. of Corr. & Community Supervision, 209 AD3d 1208, 1210–1211 [3d Dept 2022], affd 42 NY3d 936 [2024] ).  Judicial authority extends only to the resolution of live controversies, not to matters where the requested relief is no longer available and the parties' rights cannot be affected by the court's determination (see HSBC Bank USA, N.A. v. Sage, 237 AD3d 1327, 1328 [3d Dept 2025];  Matter of Cambridge Cent. Sch. Dist. v New York State Educ. Dept., 222 AD3d 1068, 1069 [3d Dept 2023];  Matter of City of Ithaca v New York State Dept. of Envtl.  Conservation, 188 AD3d 1322, 1323 [3d Dept 2020], lv denied 37 NY3d 906 [2021] ).

Here, even accepting Passalacqua's contention that his separation from service was not a removal for cause, no relief that this Court could grant would presently restore his basic training certification or entitle him to reinstatement on the central registry due to the passage of more than four years.  According to the statute, even where a peace officer's service is interrupted for a reason other than removal for cause, the officer's basic training certification remains valid for no more than four years following the interruption in service (see CPL 2.30[6] ).  Thus, inasmuch as Passalacqua was removed from service in January 2019, his basic training certification expired by operation of law in January 2023, and he would now be required to complete basic training again before becoming certified as a peace officer.  Accordingly, annulling the challenged determination would have no immediate practical effect upon Passalacqua's present eligibility for certification, rendering the appeal moot (see Matter of Hearst Corp. v. Clyne, 50 N.Y.2d 707, 713–714 [1980];  Matter of Percinthe v Department of Corr. & Community Supervision, 227 AD3d at 1347–1348).  The fact that DCJS retains a record of Passalacqua's prior decertification does not alter our findings in this regard.  Once the Town reported that his separation constituted a removal for cause, DCJS was required to decertify him and record that information.  As DCJS had no authority under the then-applicable regulations to revisit or alter the Town's classification, it cannot provide the relief Passalacqua seeks with respect to that designation.

Nor do we find the exception to the mootness doctrine applicable.  That exception requires a showing that the issue presented is likely to recur, is substantial or novel and will typically evade judicial review (see Matter of Albany–Schoharie–Schenectady–Saratoga Bd. of Coop. Educ. Servs. v Rosa, 234 AD3d 1034, 1036 [3d Dept 2024];  Matter of Association of Motor Veh. Trial Attorneys, Inc. v New York State Dept. of Motor Vehs., 223 AD3d 948, 950 [3d Dept 2024] ).  The statutory and regulatory framework governing DCJS's authority to review an employer's report of a removal for cause was materially amended in 2021, after Passalacqua's separation from service, and DCJS now has authority to address potential inaccuracies in an employer's reporting (see Executive Law § 845[3][b], as added by L 2021, ch 59, part BBB, § 10;  9 NYCRR 6056.7).  Consequently, the circumstances underlying Passalacqua's challenge to DCJS's actions under the former statutory and regulatory scheme are not likely to recur, and challenges arising under the current framework are not inherently likely to evade judicial review.  Accordingly, the appeal must be dismissed as moot.

Clark, J.P., Ceresia, McShan and Powers, JJ., concur

ORDERED that the appeal is dismissed, as moot, without costs.

Ryba, J.