The People, etc., respondent, v. Shaquan Taylor, appellant. (2026)

Argued—October 2, 2026

DECISION & ORDER

O/

Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Vincent M. Del Giudice, J.), rendered November 7, 2018, convicting him of murder in the second degree, assault in the second degree, and aggravated criminal contempt, upon a jury verdict, and imposing sentence.

ORDERED that the judgment is modified, on the law and as a matter of discretion in the interest of justice, by vacating the imposition of a mandatory surcharge and fees;  as so modified, the judgment is affirmed.

The defendant was charged by indictment, inter alia, with murder in the second degree (depraved indifference murder of a child) in connection with the death of his 16–month old daughter (hereinafter the child).  At trial, the People's evidence demonstrated that while the child was in the defendant's exclusive care, the child sustained multiple injuries, including a skull fracture, a brain bleed, and damage to the optic nerve, neck, and spinal chord, all consistent with repeated shaking.  The People's experts, one in child abuse and the other from the Office of the Chief Medical Examiner, concluded that the child's injuries were sustained from being beaten and shaken to death and not from a fall as the defendant had told the police.  The evidence further included surveillance video in which the defendant could be seen grabbing the physically limp and incapacitated child from her mother.  Upon the foregoing evidence, the defendant was convicted of, among other crimes, murder in the second degree.

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution (see People v. Contes, 60 N.Y.2d 620, 621), we find that it was legally sufficient to establish the defendant's guilt of murder in the second degree beyond a reasonable doubt.  Moreover, in fulfilling our responsibility to conduct an independent review of the weight of the evidence (see CPL 470.15[5];  People v. Danielson, 9 NY3d 342), we nevertheless accord great deference to the jury's opportunity to view the witnesses, hear the testimony, and observe demeanor (see People v. Mateo, 2 NY3d 383;  People v. Bleakley, 69 N.Y.2d 490).  Upon reviewing the record here, we are satisfied that the verdict of guilt as to that crime was not against the weight of the evidence (see People v. Romero, 7 NY3d 633).

The Supreme Court properly denied the defendant's Batson challenge (see Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79) with respect to prospective juror nos. 2, 8, 10, and 15 on the first panel of prospective jurors and prospective juror nos. 8 and 15 on the second panel of prospective jurors.  In each instance, the defendant failed to satisfy his burden of demonstrating under the third prong of the Batson test that the facially race-neutral explanation given by the prosecutor was a pretext for racial discrimination (see People v. Wright, 203 AD3d 965).

The defendant's contention that the Supreme Court improperly denied his motion for a mistrial based on substantial juror misconduct is partially unpreserved for appellate review (see CPL 470.05[2];  People v. Wahhab, 84 AD3d 982, 984).  In any event, the contention is without merit.  A defendant's motion for a mistrial should be granted “when there occurs during the trial an error or legal defect in the proceedings, or conduct inside or outside the courtroom, which is prejudicial to the defendant and deprives him [or her] of a fair trial” (CPL 280.10[1] ).  “ ‘[T]he decision to declare a mistrial rests within the sound discretion of the trial court which is in the best position to determine if this drastic remedy is truly necessary to protect the defendant's right to a fair trial’ ” (People v. Knorr, 284 A.D.2d 411, 412, quoting People v. Williams, 264 A.D.2d 745, 746).  “The trial court's assessment as to whether juror misconduct warrants a mistrial is afforded great weight on appeal because of the court's unique position to observe the jurors” (People v. Reader, 142 AD3d 1109, 1109;  see People v. Dombroff, 44 AD3d 785).  Here, upon receiving information that jurors engaged in discussions of the case prior to deliberations, the court conducted an inquiry of each juror and determined that the discussions did not rise to the level of deliberations and that each juror was still able to render an impartial verdict.  Under the circumstances, the court providently exercised its discretion in denying the defendant's motion for a mistrial.

The defendant's contention that he was deprived of a fair trial by certain comments made by the prosecutor in summation is only partially preserved for appellate review because he failed to object to most of the challenged statements (see CPL 470.05[2];  People v. Morris, 2 AD3d 652;  People v. McHarris, 297 A.D.2d 824).  In any event, the prosecutor's comments in summation, for the most part, constituted fair comment on the evidence and the inferences to be drawn therefrom (see People v. Fuhrtz, 115 AD3d 760;  People v. Birot, 99 AD3d 933;  People v. Guevara–Carrero, 92 AD3d 693;  People v. McHarris, 297 A.D.2d at 825) or were fair response to defense counsel's remarks during summation (see People v. Adamo, 309 A.D.2d 808;  People v. Clark, 222 A.D.2d 446;  People v. Vaughn, 209 A.D.2d 459), and any improper statements “were not so flagrant or pervasive as to deny the defendant a fair trial” (People v. Almonte, 23 AD3d 392, 394;  see People v. Svanberg, 293 A.D.2d 555).  Furthermore, defense counsel's failure to object to those comments did not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel (see People v. Hankerson, 149 AD3d 778, 779;  People v. Bajana, 82 AD3d 1111, 1112).

The defendant's contention that he was deprived of a fair trial by certain evidence that was purportedly given to the deliberating jury cannot be reviewed on this direct appeal.  “[T]he lack of an adequate record bars review on direct appeal not only where vital evidence is plainly absent, ․ but wherever the record falls short of establishing conclusively the merit of the defendant's claim” (People v. McLean, 15 NY3d 117, 121).

The sentence imposed was not excessive (see People v. Suitte, 90 A.D.2d 80).

Pursuant to the exercise of our interest of justice jurisdiction, and as consented to by the People, we modify the judgment by vacating the mandatory surcharge and fees imposed on the defendant at sentencing (see CPL 420.35[2–a][c];  People v. Dillon H., 229 AD3d 722, 723, People v. Jaaber, 223 AD3d 685, 685).

CONNOLLY, J.P., DOWLING, GOLIA and MCCORMACK, JJ., concur.

ENTER:

Darrell M. Joseph

Clerk of the Court