PEOPLE v. NEWTON (2026)

DECISION & ORDER

Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Raymond L. Rodriguez, J.), rendered March 1, 2024, convicting him of criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree and criminal contempt in the second degree, upon a jury verdict, and imposing sentence.  The appeal brings up for review the denial, after a hearing, of the defendant's application to suppress physical evidence.

ORDERED that the judgment is affirmed, and the matter is remitted to the Supreme Court, Kings County, for further proceedings pursuant to CPL 460.50(5).

The defendant was indicted for, inter alia, criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree, based on the discovery of a gun in his car during a traffic stop.  The defendant made an application to suppress the physical evidence obtained during the traffic stop.  After a suppression hearing, the Supreme Court denied the defendant's application.  Following a jury trial, the defendant was convicted of criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree and criminal contempt in the second degree.

“Where a defendant moves to suppress evidence, the People bear the burden of going forward to establish the legality of police conduct in the first instance” (People v Harris, 244 AD3d 755, 756;  see People v Bermudez–Cedillos, 228 AD3d 681, 681).  “An automobile stop is lawful only when, among other limited possibilities, it is ‘based on a reasonable suspicion that the driver or occupants of the vehicle have committed, are committing, or are about to commit a crime’ ” (People v Harris, 244 AD3d at 756, quoting People v Hinshaw, 35 NY3d 427, 430).

“If the People establish the legality of the police conduct by credible evidence, the defendant bears the burden of establishing that the arrest was not based on probable cause or that the police conduct was otherwise illegal” (People v Hawkins, 251 AD3d 856, 857 [alteration and internal quotation marks omitted];  see People v Harris, 244 AD3d at 756).  “A hearing court's determination as to witness credibility is accorded great weight on appeal, as it saw and heard the witnesses, and its determination will not be disturbed unless clearly unsupported by the evidence” (People v Hawkins, 251 AD3d at 857 [internal quotation marks omitted];  see People v Julien, 201 AD3d 948, 950).

Here, the Supreme Court properly denied the defendant's application to suppress physical evidence.  The evidence adduced at the suppression hearing established that the police officers conducted a database inquiry regarding the license plate of the defendant's illegally parked vehicle, and that query indicated a possibility that the license plates were stolen.  Based on that information, the police had reasonable suspicion to conduct further investigation (see People v De Bour, 40 NY2d 210, 220;  People v David, 248 AD3d 813, 815).  During the stop, another officer observed a gun in plain view attached to the center console of the defendant's vehicle.  The observation of the gun in plain view gave the police probable cause to arrest the defendant (see People v Messano, 41 NY3d 228, 233;  People v Brown, 96 NY2d 80, 89).  Since the initial stop and subsequent arrest of the defendant were lawful, the court correctly denied the defendant's application to suppress the gun.

The Supreme Court also providently exercised its discretion in denying the defendant's motion to reopen the suppression hearing (see CPL 710.40[4] ).  The defendant failed to meet his burden of proffering new facts which could not have been discovered with reasonable diligence before the determination of the suppression application and which were pertinent to the suppression issue (see People v Etienne, 233 AD3d 705, 707).

The Supreme Court did not err by instructing the jury that the lawfulness of the police stop of defendant was not a question for the jury to decide (see People v J.L., 36 NY3d 112, 119;  People v Scott, 145 AD3d 555, 555–556).  In any event, any error in this instruction was harmless as there was overwhelming evidence of the defendant's guilt and no significant probability that the alleged error contributed to his convictions (see People v Crimmins, 36 NY2d 230, 240).

DILLON, J.P., WARHIT, LANDICINO and OTTLEY, JJ., concur.