IN RE: T. C. (2026)

DECISION & ORDER

In a proceeding pursuant to General Municipal Law § 50-e(5) for leave to serve a late notice of claim, the petitioners appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Patria Frias-Colón, J.), dated December 20, 2024. The order denied the petition and, in effect, dismissed the proceeding.

ORDERED that the order is affirmed, with costs.

In September 2024, the petitioners commenced this proceeding against the respondent, New York City Department of Education, pursuant to General Municipal Law § 50-e(5) for leave to serve a late notice of claim. The petitioners alleged that on April 18, 2024, the infant petitioner broke her ankle while she was descending a stairwell to visit her guidance counselor as she was attempting to navigate around a crowd of students. The petition alleged that there was a “stampede” and to avoid the stampede, the infant petitioner fell over a railing. The infant petitioner's attorney stated the infant petitioner fell down stairs.

In support of the petition, the petitioners submitted an “occurrence report” prepared by the infant petitioner's school dated April 18, 2024, the same date as the accident, which stated that the infant petitioner was part of a crowd of students in a hallway, jumped to look over the crowd, and injured her ankle. A school employee had accompanied the infant petitioner to a hospital, and a report prepared by the New York City Fire Department stated that upon arrival to the hospital, the infant petitioner claimed that “there was a brawl going on,” she jumped the last step to get down a flight of stairs quicker, and felt a sudden pain in her right ankle. The respondent also prepared a “comprehensive injury report,” which stated that the incident occurred going to and from class in a hallway or corridor. On April 22, 2024, the infant petitioner's medical provider provided the school with a “medical accommodation request form,” stating the infant petitioner fractured her right ankle, requiring surgical intervention.

In an order dated December 20, 2024, the Supreme Court denied the petition and, in effect, dismissed the proceeding. The petitioners appeal.

In determining whether to grant leave to serve a late notice of claim under General Municipal Law § 50-e(5), “the court, in its discretion, must consider all relevant facts and circumstances, including, but not limited to, whether (1) the claimant demonstrated a reasonable excuse for the failure to serve a timely notice of claim, (2) the public corporation acquired actual knowledge of the essential facts constituting the claim within 90 days after the claim arose or a reasonable time thereafter, and (3) the delay would substantially prejudice the public corporation in its defense” (Matter of Akangi v New York City Health & Hosps. Corp., 233 AD3d 777, 778 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Santos v. Westchester Med. Ctr., 216 AD3d 1121, 1122). The law is that “ ‘the presence or absence of any one factor is not determinative, [although] whether the municipality acquired actual knowledge of the essential facts constituting the claim within 90 days of its accrual or within a reasonable time thereafter is of great importance’ ” (Matter of Aime v New York City Health & Hosps. Corp., 230 AD3d 759, 760, quoting Jara v. Elmhurst Hosp. Ctr., 213 AD3d 653, 654).

Here, there was no reasonable excuse proffered for the failure to serve a timely notice of claim. However, the petitioners asserted that the respondent had timely notice of the essential facts constituting the claim.

“In order to have actual knowledge of the essential facts constituting the claim, the public corporation must have knowledge of the facts that underlie the legal theory or theories on which liability is predicated in the notice of claim; the public corporation need not have specific notice of the theory or theories themselves” (J.B. v. City of New York, 231 AD3d 696, 698 [internal quotation marks omitted]). Knowledge of the accident itself does not satisfy the enumerated factors where those facts do not also provide the public corporation with knowledge of the essential facts constituting the claim (see Matter of Egalite v. New York City Tr. Auth., 238 AD3d 744, 746; I.N. v. City of Yonkers, 203 AD3d 721, 723).

The petitioners cite lack of supervision as a cause of the accident. “[F]or a report to provide actual knowledge of the essential facts, one must be able to readily infer from that report that a potentially actionable wrong had been committed by the public corporation” (Matter of Taylor v. County of Suffolk, 90 AD3d 769, 770). With lack of supervision, “it is well established that schools cannot reasonably be expected to continuously supervise and control all movements and activities of students” (Matter of R.M. v Board of Educ. of the Long Beach City Sch. Dist., 212 AD3d 812, 814 [internal quotations marks omitted]), especially movements that “occurred in so short a period of time that any negligent supervision on its part was not a proximate cause of the infant plaintiff's injuries” (Meyer v. Magalios, 170 AD3d 1163, 1165 [internal quotation marks omitted]).

In the material that purportedly notified the respondent of the essential facts constituting the claim shortly after the accident, reference was made to a brawl and a crowd in the hallway. However, there was no indication that the infant petitioner was shoved, pushed, or tripped by the crowd. From the reports submitted in support of the petition, it appeared that the crowd merely furnished the occasion for the accident (see Brinkley v. STD Trucking Corp., 240 AD3d 566).

In view of the foregoing, the denial of leave to serve a late notice of claim was a provident exercise of discretion (see Matter of Brown v. New York City Tr. Auth., 247 AD3d 887).

BARROS, J.P., WARHIT, TAYLOR and QUIRK, JJ., concur.