Mahadaye Rajpaulsingh, etc., respondent, v. LLC (2026)

Argued—March 27, 2026

DECISION & ORDER

Q/

In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, etc., the defendant Stewart Senter, Inc., appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Queens County (Darrell L. Gavrin, J.), entered January 26, 2022.  The order, insofar as appealed from, denied that branch of that defendant's motion which was for summary judgment dismissing the causes of action alleging common-law negligence and a violation of Labor Law § 200 insofar as asserted against it and granted the cross-motion of Tickarsingh Rajpaulsingh and the plaintiff for summary judgment on the issue of liability on the causes of action alleging violations of Labor Law §§ 240(1) and 241(6) insofar as asserted against the defendant Stewart Senter, Inc.

ORDERED that the order is modified, on the law, by deleting the provision thereof granting the cross-motion of Tickarsingh Rajpaulsingh and the plaintiff for summary judgment on the issue of liability on the causes of action alleging violations of Labor Law §§ 240(1) and 241(6) insofar as asserted against the defendant Stewart Senter, Inc., and substituting therefor a provision denying that cross-motion;  as so modified, the order is affirmed insofar as appealed from, without costs or disbursements.

On January 12, 2016, Tickarsingh Rajpaulsingh (hereinafter the decedent), who was employed as a welder by Roman Iron Works, Inc. (hereinafter Roman), was performing construction work in connection with a residential development project at certain premises in Old Westbury.  The defendant Stewart Senter, Inc. (hereinafter the defendant), was the construction manager for the project.  The decedent was directed by his supervisor, who was also an employee of Roman, to build a makeshift “scaffold” using wooden planks in order to carry a column between cement structures.  The decedent was carrying the column across the makeshift scaffold when it collapsed, causing the decedent to fall and the column he was carrying to strike him.

In March 2016, the decedent, and his wife suing derivatively, commenced this action against the defendant, among others, asserting, inter alia, causes of action alleging common-law negligence and violations of Labor Law §§ 200, 240(1), and 241(6).  Following the completion of discovery, the defendant moved, among other things, for summary judgment dismissing the causes of action alleging common-law negligence and a violation of Labor Law § 200 insofar as asserted against it.  The decedent and his wife opposed the motion and cross-moved for summary judgment on the issue of liability on the causes of action alleging violations of Labor Law §§ 240(1) and 241(6) insofar as asserted against the defendant.  In an order entered January 26, 2022, the Supreme Court, inter alia, denied that branch of the motion and granted the cross-motion.  The defendant appeals.

The decedent died during the pendency of the appeal.  His wife (hereinafter the plaintiff) was substituted for him, in her capacity as administrator of his estate.

“Labor Law § 200(1) is a codification of the common-law duty of an owner or general contractor to provide workers with a safe place to work” (Ortega v. Puccia, 57 AD3d 54, 60;  see Mitchell v. City of New York, 244 AD3d 716, 717).  “Cases involving Labor Law § 200 fall into two broad categories:  namely, those where workers are injured as a result of dangerous or defective premises conditions at a work site, and those involving the manner in which the work is performed” (Ortega v. Puccia, 57 AD3d at 61;  see Abelleira v. City of New York, 120 AD3d 1163, 1164).  “When the methods or materials of the work are at issue, recovery against the owner or general contractor cannot be had ․ unless it is shown that the party to be charged had the authority to supervise or control the performance of the work” (Kauffman v. Turner Constr.  Co., 195 AD3d 1003, 1006 [internal quotation marks omitted];  see Walsh v. Kenny, 219 AD3d 1555, 1557).  “A defendant has the authority to supervise or control the work for purposes of Labor Law § 200 when that defendant bears the responsibility for the manner in which the work is performed” (Ortega v. Puccia, 57 AD3d at 62).  “[T]he right to generally supervise the work, stop the contractor's work if a safety violation is noted, or to ensure compliance with safety regulations and contract specifications is insufficient to impose liability under Labor Law § 200 or for common-law negligence” (Austin v. Consolidated Edison, Inc., 79 AD3d 682, 684 [internal quotation marks omitted];  see Torres v. Perry St. Dev. Corp., 104 AD3d 672, 676).

Here, the defendant failed to establish its prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law dismissing the causes of action alleging common-law negligence and a violation of Labor Law § 200 insofar as asserted against it.  The defendant failed to eliminate triable issues of fact as to whether it had the authority to supervise or control the manner in which the decedent performed his work (see Seferovic v Atlantic Real Estate Holdings, LLC, 127 AD3d 1058, 1060;  Torres v. Perry St. Dev. Corp., 104 AD3d at 676;  Ortega v. Puccia, 57 AD3d at 62).  The affidavit and transcript of the deposition testimony of the defendant's director of construction did not address the defendant's authority to supervise the project's subcontractors, including the decedent's employer.  Further, the defendant did not submit any other evidence, such as a construction contract setting forth the defendant's duties with respect to the work site (see Giannas v. 100 3rd Ave. Corp., 166 AD3d 853, 856), to establish that it lacked the authority to supervise or control the manner in which the decedent performed his work.  Accordingly, the Supreme Court properly denied that branch of the defendant's motion which was for summary judgment dismissing the causes of action alleging common-law negligence and a violation of Labor Law § 200 insofar as asserted against it regardless of the sufficiency of the opposition papers of the decedent and the plaintiff (see Winegrad v. New York Univ. Med. Ctr., 64 N.Y.2d 851, 853).

The nondelegable duties imposed by Labor Law §§ 240(1) and 241(6) apply only to contractors and owners, and their agents (see Martinez v. Shore Oaks, LLC, 235 AD3d 959, 960;  Bonkoski v. Condos Bros. Constr.  Corp., 216 AD3d 612, 614).  “Although a construction manager of a work site is generally not responsible for injuries under Labor Law §§ 200, 240(1), or 241(6), when it functions as an agent of the property owner or general contractor in circumstances where it has the ability to control the activity which brought about the plaintiff's injury, responsibility will attach” (Jin Gak Kim v Kirchoff–Consigli Constr.  Mgt., LLC, 197 AD3d 1289, 1290–1291;  see Walls v. Turner Constr.  Co., 4 NY3d 861, 863–864;  Lamar v. Hill Intl., Inc., 153 AD3d 685, 686).  “The label given a defendant, whether ‘construction manager’ or ‘general contractor,’ is not determinative” (Myles v. Claxton, 115 AD3d 654, 655;  see Simon v. Granite Bldg. 2, LLC, 170 AD3d 1227, 1232).  “Instead, the core inquiry is whether the defendant had the ‘authority to supervise or control the activity bringing about the injury so as to enable it to avoid or correct the unsafe condition’ ” (Myles v. Claxton, 115 AD3d at 655, quoting Rodriguez v. JMB Architecture, LLC, 82 AD3d 949, 951;  see Barrios v. City of New York, 75 AD3d 517, 518–519).

Here, the plaintiff failed to eliminate triable issues of fact as to whether the defendant was an agent of the owner or general contractor with regard to the decedent's work (see Abdou v. Rampaul, 147 AD3d 885, 887;  Gonzalez v. TJM Constr.  Corp., 87 AD3d 610, 611).  The decedent testified at his deposition that he only received work instructions from Roman's employees, and the defendant's director of construction averred that he only performed a “ ‘drive-by’ ” inspection of the property approximately once per week.  Accordingly, the Supreme Court should have denied the cross-motion of the decedent and the plaintiff for summary judgment on the issue of liability on the causes of action alleging violations of Labor Law §§ 240(1) and 241(6) insofar as asserted against the defendant.

DILLON, J.P., WOOTEN, VENTURA and OTTLEY, JJ., concur.

ENTER:

Darrell M. Joseph

Clerk of the Court