The People, etc., respondent, v. Jose Pichardo, appellant. (2026)

Argued—September 24, 2026

DECISION & ORDER

K/

Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Queens County (Michael Aloise, J.), rendered October 26, 2021, convicting him of murder in the second degree and burglary in the first degree (two counts), upon a jury verdict, and imposing sentence.  The appeal brings up for review the denial, after a hearing (Kenneth C. Holder, J.), of that branch of the defendant's omnibus motion which was to suppress his statements to law enforcement officials.

ORDERED that the judgment is affirmed.

Contrary to the defendant's contention, the Supreme Court properly denied that branch of his omnibus motion which was to suppress his statements to law enforcement officials.  “At a hearing to suppress statements made to law enforcement officials, the People have the burden of demonstrating, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendant's statements were voluntary and, if applicable, that the defendant knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived his or her Miranda rights prior to making the statements” (People v. Loucks, 125 AD3d 890, 890 [citations omitted];  see Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444).  “Whether a defendant knowingly and intelligently waived his or her rights to remain silent and to an attorney is determined upon an inquiry into the totality of the circumstances surrounding the interrogation” (People v. Santos, 112 AD3d 757, 758 [internal quotation marks omitted] ).  Here, the People established beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant's statements were voluntarily made after the defendant knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently waived his constitutional rights, and were not the product of coercion (see People v. Pelaez, 218 AD3d 497, 498;  People v. Sanders, 119 AD3d 713).  Accordingly, the court properly denied suppression of those statements.

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution (see People v. Contes, 60 N.Y.2d 620, 621), we find that it was legally sufficient to establish the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.  Moreover, in fulfilling our responsibility to conduct an independent review of the weight of the evidence (see CPL 470.15[5];  People v. Danielson, 9 NY3d 342, 348), we nevertheless accord great deference to the jury's opportunity to view the witnesses, hear the testimony, and observe demeanor (see People v. Mateo, 2 NY3d 383, 410;  People v. Bleakley, 69 N.Y.2d 490, 495).  Upon reviewing the record here, we are satisfied that the verdict of guilt was not against the weight of the evidence (see People v. Romero, 7 NY3d 633, 644).

Any error in the Supreme Court's denial of the defendant's request for a missing witness charge was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, as there was overwhelming evidence of his guilt and no significant probability that the jury would have acquitted him had it not been for the complained of error (see People v. Vasquez, 76 N.Y.2d 722, 725;  People v. Crimmins, 36 N.Y.2d 230, 241–242).  Further, any such error did not deprive the defendant of his right to a fair trial (see People v. Crimmins, 36 N.Y.2d at 238).

The sentence imposed was not excessive (see People v. Suitte, 90 A.D.2d 80).

The defendant's remaining contention need not be reached in light of our determination.

DUFFY, J.P., WOOTEN, GOLIA and HOM, JJ., concur.

ENTER:

Darrell M. Joseph

Clerk of the Court