EGUZOUWA v. CURB MOBILITY LLC (2026)

DECISION & ORDER

In an action, inter alia, to recover damages for employment discrimination on the basis of disability in violation of the New York State Human Rights Law and the New York City Human Rights Law, the defendants appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Queens County (Joseph J. Esposito, J.), dated January 2, 2025.  The order denied the defendants' motion pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7) to dismiss the amended complaint.

ORDERED that the order is affirmed, with costs.

In 2019, the plaintiff, who is deaf, was hired by the defendant Curb Mobility, LLC, as a production technician.  The defendant Kacem El Mallouli was the plaintiff's direct supervisor, and the defendant Carlos Tamayo also worked in a supervisory capacity.  In June 2022, the plaintiff's employment was terminated.

The plaintiff commenced this action against the defendants in September 2022, alleging violations of the New York State Human Rights Law (Executive Law § 290 et seq.) and the New York City Human Rights Law (Administrative Code of City of NY § 8–101 et seq.), gross negligence, hostile and abusive work environment, and wrongful and retaliatory discharge.  The defendants moved pursuant to CPLR 3211(a) to dismiss the complaint on the ground, among others, that it failed to state a cause of action (see id. § 3211[a][7] ). In an order dated August 22, 2023, the Supreme Court denied the defendants' motion and granted the plaintiff's cross-motion for leave to file an amended complaint.  Thereafter, the plaintiff filed an amended complaint.  The defendants moved pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7) to dismiss the amended complaint for failure to state a cause of action.  In an order dated January 2, 2025, the court denied the defendants' motion.  The defendants appeal.

CPLR 3211(e) provides, in relevant part, that at any time before service of a responsive pleading is required, a party may move to dismiss a pleading “on one or more of the grounds set forth” in CPLR 3211(a), and that “no more than one such motion shall be permitted” (id. § 3211[e];  see Bremner v. Bush, 244 AD3d 1044, 1047;  Bailey v Peerstate Equity Fund, L.P., 126 AD3d 738, 738–739).  “The rule bars both repetitive motions to dismiss a pleading pursuant [to] CPLR 3211(a), as well as subsequent motions to dismiss [the] pleading pursuant to CPLR 3211(a) that are based on alternative grounds” (Bailey v Peerstate Equity Fund, L.P., 126 AD3d at 739;  see McLearn v. Cowen & Co., 60 N.Y.2d 686, 689).

Here, the defendants violated the single motion rule of CPLR 3211(e) when they moved pursuant to CPLR 3211(a) to dismiss the complaint, and then made a subsequent motion pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7) to dismiss the amended complaint with the same arguments.  Therefore, the Supreme Court properly denied the defendants' motion pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7) to dismiss the amended complaint (see Bremner v. Bush, 244 AD3d at 1047).

In light of our determination, we need not address the defendants' remaining contentions.

LASALLE, P.J., CHAMBERS, TAYLOR and HOM, JJ., concur.