ANDERSON v. PFANNER (2026)

DECISION & ORDER

In an action for a judgment declaring the rights of the parties with respect to certain alleged partnership property, the defendant Andreas Pfanner appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Leon Ruchelsman, J.), dated October 29, 2024.  The order, insofar as appealed from, granted that branch of the plaintiff's motion which was for a preliminary injunction enjoining that defendant from moving or disposing of certain property and denied that defendant's cross-motion pursuant to CPLR 3211(a) to dismiss the complaint insofar as asserted against him.

ORDERED that the order is modified, on the law and in the exercise of discretion, by deleting the provision thereof granting that branch of the plaintiff's motion which was for a preliminary injunction enjoining the defendant Andreas Pfanner from moving or disposing of certain property, and substituting therefor a provision denying that branch of the motion;  as so modified, the order is affirmed insofar as appealed from, without costs or disbursements.

The plaintiff, Eric Anderson, and the defendant Andreas Pfanner (hereinafter the defendant) allegedly formed a partnership to acquire and redevelop certain real property in New York and California.  In November 2023, the defendant allegedly notified the plaintiff of his intent to retire from the partnership.  In July 2024, the plaintiff commenced this action for a judgment declaring the rights of the parties with respect to certain alleged partnership property, including three California limited liability companies (hereinafter the California LLCs).

The plaintiff moved, inter alia, for a preliminary injunction enjoining the defendant from moving or disposing of certain personal property that was stored in certain parking lots.  The defendant cross-moved pursuant to CPLR 3211(a) to dismiss the complaint insofar as asserted against him.  In an order dated October 29, 2024, the Supreme Court, among other things, granted that branch of the plaintiff's motion and denied the defendant's cross-motion.  The defendant appeals.

Pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(8), a party may move to dismiss one or more causes of action asserted against him or her on the ground that the court lacks personal jurisdiction.  The ultimate burden of proving a basis for personal jurisdiction rests with the party asserting jurisdiction (see Lesavoy v. Brady, 242 AD3d 856, 858).  However, to defeat a motion pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(8), a plaintiff need only make a prima facie showing that personal jurisdiction exists (see id.).

A state court may assert general all-purpose jurisdiction over a particular defendant when that defendant is “essentially at home” in the State (WCVAWCK–Doe v Boys & Girls Club of Greenwich, Inc., 216 AD3d 1, 5 [internal quotation marks omitted] ).  General jurisdiction extends to any claim against the defendant, and those claims need not relate to the forum State or the defendant's activity there (see id.).  CPLR 301 provides that “[a] court may exercise such jurisdiction over persons, property, or status as might have been exercised heretofore.”  The bases for jurisdiction recognized by our common law before the date of the enactment of the CPLR were physical presence within the State, domicile, or consent (see Chen v. Guo Liang Lu, 144 AD3d 735, 737).

Here, deeming the facts alleged in the complaint and in the evidence submitted in opposition to the cross-motion as true, and construing them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff (see Lesavoy v. Brady, 242 AD3d at 858), the plaintiff made a prima facie showing that the defendant was domiciled in New York and was personally served at his main office in Brooklyn.  Thus, the plaintiff was not required to make a prima facie showing of jurisdiction under the long-arm statute (see CPLR 302[a][1];  Aybar v U.S. Tires & Wheels of Queens, LLC, 211 AD3d 40, 48).  Moreover, since the California LLCs have not contested personal jurisdiction, the defendant's contention that the court lacks personal jurisdiction over the California LLCs is not properly before this Court (see CPLR 3211[a];  Williams v. Beemiller, Inc., 33 NY3d 523, 527–528).

Accordingly, the Supreme Court properly declined to dismiss the complaint insofar as asserted against the defendant for lack of personal jurisdiction.

Pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(2), a party may move to dismiss one or more causes of action asserted against him or her on the ground that the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction.  A court's lack of subject matter jurisdiction is not waivable but may be raised at any stage of the action, and the court may, on its own motion, at any time, when attention is called to the facts, refuse to proceed further and dismiss the action (see Matter of Fry v. Village of Tarrytown, 89 N.Y.2d 714, 718).  The Supreme Court has general jurisdiction in law and equity (see N.Y. Const, art VI, § 7[a] ) and is competent to entertain all causes of action unless its jurisdiction has been specifically proscribed (see Matter of Doran Constr.  Corp. v New York State Ins. Fund, 241 AD3d 101, 105).

Here, the plaintiff seeks a judgment declaring the parties' rights as to certain alleged partnership property (see CPLR 3001).  Although a claim for dissolution of a foreign limited liability company is one over which the New York courts lack subject matter jurisdiction (see Sutton v. Houllou, 191 AD3d 1031, 1034), the record is inadequate to find that the declaratory relief sought by the plaintiff, in effect, requires the dissolution of the California LLCs. Accordingly, the Supreme Court properly declined to dismiss the complaint insofar as asserted against the defendant for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

CPLR 3211(a)(4) provides that a party may move to dismiss one or more causes of action asserted against him or her on the ground that there is another action pending between the same parties for the same cause of action in a court of any state or the United States.  However, the court need not dismiss upon this ground but may make such order as justice requires (see id.).  A court has broad discretion in determining whether an action should be dismissed based upon another pending action where there is a substantial identity of the parties, the two actions are sufficiently similar, and the relief sought is substantially the same (see Melis v. Blake Stone, LLC, 227 AD3d 882, 884–885).  Here, the defendant failed to show that the plaintiff's causes of action are sufficiently similar to the causes of action in two California actions that were commenced by two of the three California LLCs allegedly owned by the partnership.  Accordingly, the Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in declining to stay the action (see American Intl. Group, Inc. v Greenberg, 60 AD3d 483, 483–484) or direct dismissal of the complaint insofar as asserted against the defendant pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(4) (see Busiello v. Whelan, 240 AD3d 736, 737).

However, the Supreme Court should have denied that branch of the plaintiff's motion which was for a preliminary injunction enjoining the defendant from moving or disposing of certain property.  To obtain a preliminary injunction, the moving party must establish, by clear and convincing evidence, (1) a likelihood of success on the merits, (2) irreparable injury absent a preliminary injunction, and (3) that the equities balance in his or her favor (see CPLR 6301;  Ashirova v. Cevallos, 186 AD3d 791, 792).  Here, the plaintiff failed to establish these three elements (see Benaim v. S2 Corona, LLC, 214 AD3d 760, 761;  Braunstein v. Hodges, 157 AD3d 850, 851).

The defendant's remaining contention need not be reached in light of our determination.

CONNOLLY, J.P., CHRISTOPHER, WARHIT and GOLIA, JJ., concur.